

Interpretations of the Psychological Analogy from Aquinas to Biel

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Introduction

Still, someone might say: what does such a studious, or even painstaking, inquiry into the distinctions between the powers of the soul avail the theologians? It seems worth to be left to the philosophers. Such a person should know that the issue is not unimportant to theologians for the sake of the proper assignment of the image of the blessed Trinity in the rational soul. Some authors maintain that the image consists of the three powers, which are memory, intellect and will, and others in another manner; according to the more recent it consists of the essence of the soul and of the acts of the two noblest powers, namely intellect and will, which can be more clearly seen in the discussions on the third distinction of Master [Peter Lombard's] first book [of the *Sentences*.]¹

This was the answer that Jodocus Trutfetter (d. 1519), a nominalist theologian and philosopher in the early 16th century Erfurt offered to those of his readers who would question whether a detailed study of philosophical psychology was important for the exercise of theology. It has been maintained that in William Ockham's theology, the psychological analogy of the Trinity lost much of its fundamental importance.² However, Trutfetter was deeply influenced by a theological and philosophical tradition which made use of Ockham's theological writings. Whenever it came to the questions discussed in the *Sentences* commentaries, Trutfetter's authorities included such writers as Gregory of Rimini, Pierre d'Ailly and Gabriel Biel, whose commentaries discuss the questions treated in Ockham's theological commentaries. The use of these authorities was part of a philosophical and theological movement, which beginning in the 15th century, identified itself as *via moderna* or nominalism.³

¹ JODOCUS TRUTFETTER, *Summa in totam physicen* X4^f: "Sed diceret quis: Quid theologis cum tam studiosa, immo curiosa, disquisitione distinctionis potentiarum animae; videtur namque relinquenda philosophis. Is sciat eam non parum conferre theologis ad convenientem assignationem imaginis beatissime Trinitatis in anima rationali, quam quidam consistere astruunt in his tribus potentiis, memoria scilicet, intellectu et voluntate, alii iterum aliter, recentiores vero in essentia animae et duobus actibus nobilissimarum potentiarum, scilicet intellectus et voluntatis, ut patet plenius circa distinctionem tertiam Magistri libri primi".

² WIENEKE 1994, 142; FRIEDMAN 2003, 118. The main interest of FRIEDMAN (2003, 107–8; see also 1999, 13–4) seems to be how the medieval authors used psychological terminology in their discussions on inner-trinitarian matters. One could say that the psychological analogy was discussed from the viewpoint of what we could call "divine psychology". In this study, I shall adopt another point of view: how the theologians understood the divine Trinity as being reflected in human psychology. This starting point does, however, lead to questions concerning the divine psychology, particularly among the latest authors discussed.

³ In a certain way, it would be tempting to call this textual tradition starting from Ockham's commentaries of *Sentences* (to which one could also include Marsilius of Inghen's commentary) "Ockhamist", since the *venerabilis inceptor* had a key role in it and was also extensively quoted by the later writers. However, that would perhaps suggest too strongly that the later authors were lacking originality, which certainly is not the case. As we shall see, since these authors' comments on earlier views were connected intertextually, a certain degree of coherence remains regarding the problems they discussed and their solutions.

My starting point is Trutfetter's assumption that certain psychological issues determine the manner in which the psychological analogy of the Trinity is discussed. My main objective is, however, to investigate how Trutfetter's theological authorities generally understood the doctrine of the image of the Trinity in the human mind, and how their interpretation was related to such earlier authorities as Aquinas and Scotus, who had become by Trutfetter's time, normal theologians of the rivalling school of *via antiqua*.⁴

Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham on the Psychological Analogy

In his description of the different interpretations of the psychological analogy, Trutfetter mentions two main lines, which seems to be influenced by Ockham's account of the matter. There is first an interpretation, which posits the image in the three powers of memory, intellect and will, and then there is another more recent view, which posits the image in the essence of the soul and the acts of intellection and willing. The latter is by and large the view which Ockham presented as his own and which was followed by many later authors. On the second view, Ockham notes that his view contradicts this "common view", which posits the image, at least principally, as being in the powers of the soul and not in their acts.⁵

For Ockham, the pursuit of the correct attribution of the psychological analogy was still an important task, as it was for the most of late medieval commentators of the *Sentences*. Despite his doubts about the possibility of natural theology, Ockham never questioned the Augustinian psychological reading of the basic Christian doctrine that considered the image of God as being a revealed truth of faith. Nevertheless, a model which posits the analogy as occurring simply in the faculties of the rational soul would have caused problems for his view on the distinction between them. According to Ockham, these powers have one and the same reference, which is the essence of the soul. The different names of the powers refer to the essence as being the principle of various kinds of acts. Such a distinction does not seem to correspond very closely to the distinction between the trinitarian persons, which Ockham himself defined as a real distinction. Furthermore, the explicit reason why Ockham rejected the model, which he called the "common view", was the dissonance between the psychological and trinitarian distinction. However, as we shall see, Ockham's contrast of this

This makes it also partially understandable that writers from the late 15th century onwards would treat these authors as being authorities of a school called *via moderna*.

⁴ On schools of thought at the end of Middle Ages, see HOENEN 2003; on Trutfetter's involvement in the *Wegestreit*, see TEWES 1995.

⁵ WILLIAM OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1, d. 3, q. 10; OTh II, 554, 6–9; 18: "Quantum ad primum est opinio communis quod partes imaginis sunt ipsae potentiae animae, ita quod imago consistit in intelligentia, memoria et voluntate, – vel saltem illa est evidentior assignatio imaginis –, et non est in actibus secundis, saltem principaliter... Sed ista opinio non videtur esse vera".

issue to the earlier theologians was less dramatic concerning this issue than it would seem at first glance.⁶

Thomas Aquinas was one of the theologians who was still able to describe the distinction between the powers of the soul in a manner that rather plausibly conforms to the corresponding distinction between the divine persons. This is because Aquinas understood the powers of the soul as being qualities emanating from the essence of the soul and even as being distinct by a real distinction from the essence as well as from each other.⁷ A closer examination of his view makes it clear as to what was at stake in the disagreement between the "old" and the "more recent" views in the descriptions provided by Ockham and Trutfetter. Aquinas's early view of the image of the Trinity, as stated in his early *Sentences*' commentary, is indeed rather close to the category which Trutfetter describes as positing the image in three powers, which are the memory, intellect and will.⁸

While being capable of explaining how the distinction between the divine persons is reflected in the soul, Aquinas's solution faces still other kinds of problems regarding the image as presented by Augustine and Lombard. It seems that even Aquinas thought that the powers are not suitable candidates for resembling the relationships between the trinitarian persons.

Consequently, not even Aquinas would have argued that the analogy between the soul and the Trinity could be solved entirely by referring to these powers in their generic state, but rather that the image is realized in various degrees with respect to the different objects of the powers. Particularly the *order* of divine productions – the Son being from the Father alone and the Spirit proceeding from both the Father and the Son – corresponds only to the soul's powers concerning such high objects as the soul itself and God. Regarding these, it is apparent that intellection proceeds from the present object itself and that the love in turn proceeds from the intellection.⁹

⁶ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1, d. 3, q. 10; OTh II, 554, 18–555, 10. On Ockham's psychology, see MAURER 1999, 465–466.

⁷ On Thomas's psychology, see MUNDHENK 1980, 87–8; THOMAS AQUINAS, *Sent.* 1, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 co. (ed. Busa, p. 14): "Similiter dico, quod ab anima, cum sit substantia, nulla operatio egreditur, nisi mediante potentia: nec etiam a potentia perfecta operatio, nisi mediante habitu. Hae autem potentiae fluunt ab essentia ipsius animae...et ideo dico, quod sunt accidentia... sicut propria accidentia, quae consequuntur speciem, originata ex principiis ipsius: simul tamen sunt de integritate ipsius animae, in quantum est totum potentiale, habens quamdam perfectionem potentiae, quae conficitur ex diversis viribus".

⁸ On how Aquinas posits the image in the powers, see MERRIELL 1990, 51–79.

⁹ THOMAS, *Sent.* 1, d. 3, q. 4, a. 4, co. (ed. Busa, p. 14): "Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, hac distin., quaest. 3, art. 1, imago dicit expressam repraesentationem. Expressa autem repraesentatio est in ipsis potentiis propter quinque. Quorum duo se tenent ex parte ipsius animae, scilicet consubstantialitas et distinctio potentiarum, et ideo se habent indifferenter respectu quorumlibet objectorum; alia vero tria, scilicet aequalitas, et ordo, et actualis imitatio respiciunt objecta, unde se habent diversimode respectu diversorum objectorum... Si autem considerentur istae potentiae respectu hujus objecti quod est anima, sic salvatur ordo, cum ipsa anima naturaliter sit sibi praesens; unde ex notitia procedit intelligere, et non e converso. Servatur etiam aequalitas potentiae ad potentiam simpliciter: quia quantum se intelligit, tantum se vult et diligit: non sicut in aliis, quod velit se tantum intelligere, sed simpliciter. Servatur etiam ibi aequalitas potentiae ad objectum. Servatur etiam ibi actualis imitatio ipsius Trinitatis, in quantum scilicet ipsa anima est imago

In addition to the order of processions, another feature of the divine Trinity is expressed most clearly in the case of the soul itself as the object, namely the equality between the divine persons, which corresponds to the soul and its potencies being the same as their object. This is not the case when God is the object owing to the inequality between the human soul and God. This does not prevent Thomas from stating that the image of the Trinity is most clearly manifested in the soul, when God is regarded as its object, because in this case, the soul is driven to the archetype itself.¹⁰

Therefore it is apparent that for a comprehensive account of the analogy between the human soul and the Trinity, Aquinas, even as early as in his *Sentences* commentary, needed to regard not only the powers themselves, but also the different actualizations of the powers in the case of the various objects. This goes back to some extent to the ambiguities of Augustine's sayings, recorded by Peter Lombard in the distinction 3 under discussion, as the Church father speaks on occasion of the capabilities and sometimes of the actual operations of the soul as the image.¹¹ Aquinas opted for concentrating on the features of the image which were common to all human beings, resulting on a predominantly static view of the image. Nevertheless, Aquinas did not abandon the more dynamic features, which presupposed the actualizations of the powers regarding diverse objects.¹²

Later in *De veritate* and in *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas develops his view more towards the dynamic view based on Augustine's description of the image in the book 15 of *De trinitate*. Here the image is seen in terms of the actual knowledge and love of God in the soul and no longer in terms of the

expresse ducens in Deum. Si autem considerentur respectu hujus objecti quod est Deus, tunc servatur ibi actualis imitatio. Maxime autem servatur ordo, quia ex memoria procedit intelligentia, eo quod ipse est per essentiam in anima, et tenetur ab ipsa non per acquisitionem. Servatur etiam ibi aequalitas potentiae ad potentiam simpliciter, sed non potentiae ad objectum: quia Deus est altior quam sit anima. Unde dico, quod imago quodammodo attenditur respectu quorumlibet objectorum; verius autem respectu sui ipsius, et verissime respectu hujus objecti quod est Deus; nisi tantum quod deest aequalitas potentiae ad objectum, quae etiam non multum facit ad imaginem". Aquinas does not try to solve the problem of order by referring to an order of emanation between the potencies, although he thinks that there is a natural order by which the potencies emanate from each other. Cf. *Sent.* 1, d. 3, q. 4, a. 3 co. (ed. Busa, p. 14). Merriell finds the dynamic aspect of the otherwise rather static notion of the image in Aquinas's use of the idea of actual imitation as the key to explain the analogy of order. See MERRIELL 1990, 69–79.

¹⁰ Cf. previous footnote.

¹¹ PETER LOMBARD, *Sententiae* I, d. 3, 2, 1–2 (10) citing AUGUSTINE, *De trinitate*, 14, 8, 11: "Nunc vero ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem, ubi in mente humana, quae novit Deum vel *potest nosse* [italics P.K.], Trinitatis imaginem reperiamus... Licet humana mens non sit eius naturae cuius Deus est, imago tamen illius 'quo nihil melius est' ibi quaerenda et invenienda est, quo natura nostra nihil habet melius, id est in mente. In ipsa enim mente, etiam antequam sit particeps Dei, eius imago reperitur; etsi enim, amissa Dei participatione, deformis sit, imago tamen Dei permanet. Eo enim ipso imago Dei est mens, quo capax eius est eiusque particeps esse potest...Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se; hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem: nondum quidem Deum, sed imaginem Dei".

¹² MERRIELL 1990, 91–2.

powers of the soul.¹³ These new insights change the view of Aquinas to some extent. In *Summa*, he states that since the divine persons are distinguished by their respective order of origination, the image is also found in the soul principally in the acts of the powers, insofar as they represent a certain order of generation. This image is attributed only secondarily to the powers and above all in the corresponding habits of the soul since the acts are present in them latently. The solution makes it easier to find a correspondence to the relationships between the divine persons, although the idea of essential unity remains rather vague.¹⁴

In *Summa* Thomas also develops the Augustinian idea further so that the image is most appropriately found in the acts of knowing and loving God.¹⁵ Regarding these acts, a distinction is made between the different levels in the image. As a consequence, the image as the capability to know and love God is given to all humans as a part of the constitution of their minds. This image is actualized by grace in the acts and by the habits of knowing and loving God, which is perfected in the final state of the perfect knowledge and love of God among the blessed, an image accompanied with the similitude.¹⁶

Without going into how the ideas put forth by Aquinas were developed by his followers, it is instructive for later developments to look at how Scotus

¹³ For a summary of the development, see MERRIELL 1990, 148–50. Regarding this, it is evident that Gabriel Biel's later attributing the opinion which posits the image primarily in the potencies and not in the acts to Aquinas, applies only to the *Sentences* commentary. See GABRIEL BIEL, *Collectorium* I d. 3, q. 10, C.

¹⁴ THOMAS, *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 93 a. 7 co. : "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad rationem imaginis pertinet aliqualis repraesentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinae debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur, quod maxime accedit, prout possibile est, ad repraesentandum speciem divinarum personarum. Divinae autem personae distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris connectentis utrumque. Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae; unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio, secundario, et quasi ex consequenti, imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt".

¹⁵ Cf. PETER LOMBARD, *Sententiae* I dist. 3, 2, 1 cited in footnote 11 above.

¹⁶ THOMAS, *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 93 a. 4 co. : "Respondeo dicendum quod, cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum, et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus. Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte, et haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae. Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte, et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gloriae. Unde super illud Psalmi IV, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine, Glossa distinguit triplicem imaginem, scilicet creationis, recreationis et similitudinis. Prima ergo imago invenitur in omnibus hominibus; secunda in iustis tantum; tertia vero solum in beatis".

reformulated the doctrine. It turns out that the way Scotus analyses the doctrine closely resembles the way Aquinas interprets it, but Scotus also contributes significant, new insights. Already at the outset, Scotus states that the image consists not only of the powers of the soul, nor solely of the acts they produce, but of them both. The reasons are the same as found in Thomas's *Sentences*, in addition to the reason that arises in Scotus's psychology, that no real distinction exists between the powers as there is between the divine persons. In some sense, the analogy turns out to be more literal in Scotus's view than it was in the view proposed by Aquinas: there is a *formal* distinction between the principles of productions in God as there is in the human mind; similarly there is a *real* distinction between the produced entities.¹⁷ Despite this analogy, Scotus nevertheless does not want to argue that the above-mentioned distinctions were univocal in the divine and human realm.¹⁸

Furthermore, Scotus stresses that the image of the Trinity in the human mind cannot be considered as being a basis for a demonstrative proof for a trinity of persons in one God; the image serves merely as a way for a believer to explicate the already existing faith in the Trinity. While maintaining that there cannot be strictly demonstrative proofs for the trinitarian nature of the divine essence in general, Scotus notes that particularly the knowledge about the human soul does not entail the idea that the soul would reflect a being which exists in three persons, since the various operations of the soul actually take place in one person.¹⁹

Scotus describes the image of divine consubstantiality rather unproblematically by the Augustinian ternary memory/intelligence/will. These are formally distinct perfections by which the soul is the first act causing the intellection, then receiving it, and again receiving the volition concerning the intellection. These perfections reflect the consubstantiality of the divine persons, but not the real distinction and order of origination between them. These features are reflected by corresponding three "acts", which in this case refers to both the principles of operations (the Aristotelian "first acts") as well as the operations caused by these principles ("second acts"). The Father is resembled by the power of memory, which produces the acts of intellection and volition.²⁰

However, here Scotus expresses some doubts, since the first part of the ternary, "memory", being most obviously a cognitive potency, does not seem to reflect satisfactorily how the Father possesses the power for *both* generation *and* spiration. For this reason, Scotus in *Lectura* prefers another

¹⁷ JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 578–80, ed. Vaticana 341–3. Cf. *Lect.* 1, 3, 3, 4, 448, ed. Vaticana 403. In *Lectura* Scotus still mentions the Thomist view as another alternative of understanding the distinction between the powers. Like Thomas, Scotus also considers the acts of knowing and loving God the most appropriate form of the image in the human mind. See SCOTUS, *Ord.* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 590, ed. Vaticana 349.

¹⁸ See CROSS 2005, 154–5.

¹⁹ CROSS 2005, 128–30; on the image of Trinity, see SCOTUS, *Ord.* 1, 3, 3, 4, 597, ed. Vaticana III, 352, 13–353, 4 quoted by CROSS 2005, 130.

²⁰ SCOTUS, *Ord.* 1, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 578–80, ed. Vaticana III, 341, 18–343, 20; *Lect.* 1, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 434–8, ed. Vaticana XVI, 398, 10–399, 24.

Augustinian ternary, namely that of *mens/notitia/amor* as a more perfect image, which better resembles the idea that both the subsequent operations proceed from the same first actualisation. Later in *Ordinatio*, Scotus equally accepts the use of both ternaries if they are understood in a correct manner. Even there he notes that *mens/notitia/amor* reflects more perfectly the way of how the Father is the originator, despite Augustin's remark that the other ternary turns out to be more evident to us.²¹

Scotus is aware that the freedom of the will is endangered by the ordered relationship between the divine emanations. It would thus be untenable for him to describe the relationship between human intellection and volition in terms of a full analogy to the procession of the Spirit, where the Son has received an equal power of producing the Spirit from the Father, a power like the Father himself possesses. Like Henry of Ghent before him, Scotus is ready to admit that the act of will, both in God as in human beings, presupposes intellection. Even so, Scotus does not find it necessary to propose that human intellection produces volition, which would, according to Scotus, be possible only if the volition would arise *per modum naturae* and not freely. The natural order, where intellection precedes volition, remains for Scotus a sufficient reason to suggest an analogy between the mental operations and the order of processions in the Trinity.²²

Ockham conceived of the distinction between the faculties of intellect and will neither as a real nor as a formal one, but merely as a rational distinction based on the specific difference between the acts the soul produces. According to Ockham, the terms for powers stand for the essence of the soul, connoting the different types of acts it produces.²³ Similarly, Ockham rejected the notion by Scotus of a formal non-identity between the divine perfections in general and consequently, that of the principles of the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Spirit in particular.²⁴

However, the differences between Scotus and Ockham do not appear to be as crucial regarding the image, since even for Scotus, the analogy between the soul's powers and the principles of emanations in God does not quite appropriately express the real distinction between the persons, but rather the consubstantiality of the essence. According to both Scotus and Ockham, the distinction of persons and the order of emanation are reflected by means of

²¹ SCOTUS, *Lect.*, 1, 3, 3, 4, 443–7 ed. Vaticana XVI, 400, 24–402, 22; *Ord.* 1, 3, 3, 4, 583–6, ed. Vaticana III, 344, 13–347, 6.

²² SCOTUS, *Ord.* 1, 3, 3, 4, 589 ed. Vaticana III, 348, 5–15: "Similiter, si notitia genita esset aliquo modo alicuius productiva, hoc non esset nisi per modum naturae, et non libere. Est tamen hic aliquis ordo inter secundam partem imaginis, et tertiam, quia tertia praesupponit secundam naturaliter, licet non sit ab ea. Et istud exprimit Augustinus XV *De Trinitate* cap. 27...patet ergo quod illum ordinem originis ponit praecise propter naturalem ordinem volitionis ad intellectionem, non autem quod intellectio sit causa respectu volitionis." Cf. *Lect.*, 1, 3, 3, 4, 439–40 ed. Vaticana XVI, 399, 25–400, 11. See HENRY OF GHENT, *Summae quaestionum ordinarius* II, art. 60, q. 3 K–Z, fol. 163^v–6^f. On Henry, see also FRIEDMAN 1996, 177. On emanations *per modum naturae* vs. *per modum voluntatis*, see Friedman's article elsewhere in this volume.

²³ HIRVONEN 2004, 47–8.

²⁴ See HOENEN 1993, 48–9.

the acts of intellection and willing. Therefore, the problem concerning the coherence of the analogy between the Trinity and the powers of the soul was already inherent in this view of Scotus.

Ockham bases his position on an argument used by both Aquinas and Scotus. Ockham argues that since there is no order between the powers of intellect and will which would correspond to the order of divine emanations, the image cannot consist of the powers of the soul. Like Aquinas and Scotus, Ockham finds the corresponding order in the order of mental acts, which the powers of intellect and will generate.²⁵

Basing on this argument, Ockham states that the image of God, which refers to the natural capability of participation in God which was stated at the beginning of Lombard's passage discussing the image, is still an imperfect form of the image. In short, this is something that is in the very substance of the soul. This notion of an imperfect image corresponds largely to what Aquinas understood as the image as a natural capacity to know and love God.²⁶ Then Ockham proceeds in formulating the notion of a perfect image of God. His basic argument relies on the assumption that the image of God in Lombardian definition is something, "through which soul is capable of reaching God and participating in Him", which was lost in the Fall. Therefore, so Ockham continues, the perfect image cannot be anything in the essence of the soul, and since he does not allow any mediating entities between the essence and the acts of the soul as Aquinas did, the image must lie in the acts or habits of the soul. Following such argumentation, Ockham ends up positing the image of the Trinity in both the essence of the soul and its two noblest acts, namely those of intellection and volition or in the habits corresponding to these acts. This notion of the perfect image clearly contradicts the earlier observations of Aquinas, who stated that the image restored by grace is an image of God only in an improper sense. In his later works, Aquinas seems to have shifted his view on this matter. The main difference between Ockham and Aquinas's later view lies in the fact that Ockham no longer considers the real distinction between the persons as being reflected in the potencies of the soul. Regarding this, Ockham seems to agree with Scotus.²⁷

²⁵ OCKHAM, *Ord.* I, d.3 q. 10, OTh II, 558, 16–559, 1: "Praeterea, omnes ponunt imaginem in tribus consistere habentibus ordinem originis inter se; sed potentiae non originantur nec ipsa substantia animae originatur; igitur oportet ponere aliqua accidentia animae originata pertinere ad imaginem. Ideo dico quod completa ratio imaginis consistit in ipsa substantia animae et duobus actibus, scilicet actu intelligendi et volendi, et etiam potest consistere in ipsa substantia anime et in duobus habitibus correspondentibus ipsis actibus."

²⁶ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 3, q. 10; OTh II, 557, 4–6; 8–14: "Circa secundum dico quod imago Dei imperfecta et quasi radicaliter et originaliter consistit in ipsa anima secundum suam substantiam...quia secundum Augustinum, XIV De Trinitate, cap. 8: 'Eo anima imago Dei est quo capax eius est particepsque esse potest', ita quod de quocumque verificatur hoc quod est capax Dei possetque eius esse particeps, de eo verificatur imago; igitur sicut haec est vera 'anima secundum suam substantiam est capax Dei et potest esse particeps eius' ita haec est vera 'anima secundum suam substantiam est imago Dei'."

²⁷ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 3, q. 10; OTh II, 557, 6–7; 558, 3–15: "Verumtamen perfectio imaginis complete consistit in ipsa substantia animae et duobus actibus productis...Secundum patet, quia illud quo anima capax Dei est pertinet ad imaginem perfectam, hoc est ad perfectionem imaginis; sed actus intelligendi et volendi sunt

However, Ockham's defense of the consubstantiality echoes that of Aquinas, since both have to argue that underlying the real distinction in the qualities needed to resemble the relational opposition of divine persons, is a consubstantiality in the source of these qualities, which is for both of the qualities the essence of the soul. Whereas Aquinas argued that different faculties were united in their source, Ockham observes that there is a real unity between the principles of the various acts in the essence of the soul. It is this very same soul, which is called memory, intelligence and will, although these concepts connote to distinct acts the soul produces. This is sufficient for Ockham to show that the consubstantiality of the divine essence is reflected in the human rational soul. Still, at least for early Aquinas, the unity of the powers in their sources was of secondary importance in comparison to the unity in the generic faculty of mind, which represented an ontologically stronger unity.²⁸

It is also noteworthy that even when Ockham denies the real or formal distinction between the potencies of the soul, he insists that the Augustinian ternaries of memory/intelligence/will and *mens/notitia/amor* apply to the essence of the soul. Ockham argues by means of several citations that Augustine does not presuppose any stronger distinction between the potencies of the soul than the conceptual distinction based on the different connotations when he discusses the ternaries of memory/intelligence/will and *mens/notitia/amor*.²⁹ Nevertheless, since Ockham denied the formal distinction between the potencies of the soul, he is left with yet another problem: why is it then that the image of the Son and the Holy Spirit lies in the double act of intellection and volition, since the rational soul produces a multitude of diverse acts?³⁰ Ockham's answer is that all the different species

huiusmodi; igitur etc. Hoc patet per Augustinum, in quodam sermone, dicentem quod si homo servasset in se bonum quod in illo creavit deus, id est imaginem suam, semper laudaret Deum non solum lingua sed etiam vita. Igitur secundum beatum Augustinum creata fuit in homine imago Dei quam non servavit. Hoc non potest intelligi de substantia animae, igitur intelligit de aliquo accidente creato in anima, quod homo perdidit per peccatum. Tale non potest dici nisi actus intelligendi vel volendi vel habitus, et si habitus accidentales pertineant ad imaginem, multo magis actus, igitur etc." On early Aquinas, see MERRIELL 1990, 80–1; on the changed insights, see *ibid.* 149; 224. In *De veritate*, Aquinas seems to have adopted much of Bonaventure's terminology, noting that the image is found "primarily and principally" in the acts of knowing and loving God and that this image expresses the similitude to God "by conformity". See MERRIELL 1990, 139–141. On Scotus, see above.

²⁸ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 3, q. 10; OTh II, 565, 15–23: "Ad primum in contrarium dico quod inter partes reales imaginis non debet esse consubstantialitas; in hoc enim deficit a trinitate personarum divinarum inter quas est consubstantialitas; sed ad intentionem Augustini sufficit quod illa quae expriment illas partes illo modo expriment quod possint de eadem substantia praedicari, ut possit dici quod eadem substantia est memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, quae tamen connotant aliqua distincta, quia aliter non possent relative dici ad invicem; et ita illa connotata non sunt substantia animae." O'Callaghan argues that in *Summa* there is no more such a generic power for intellectual and volitive powers as there was in the *Sentences*. See O'CALLAGHAN 2002, 34–52.

²⁹ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 3, q. 10; OTh II, 561, 20–565, 12.

³⁰ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 3, q. 10; OTh II, 559, 22–560, 3: "Primum, quia si illa esset ratio quare creatura rationalis est imago Dei et non aliqua alia creatura, sequeretur quod imago consisteret non tantum in tribus sed etiam in pluribus, quia talia accidentia sunt in

of acts of the rational soul can be reduced to two basic genres of intellectual and volitional acts.³¹

Like Aquinas and Scotus, Ockham also thinks that the order of generation between the acts of intellection and volition resembles the order of processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Ockham describes the correspondence as follows: the Son originates from the Father alone, like the act of intellection, which comes from the essence of the soul; the Father and Son together produce the person of the Holy Spirit, and in a similar manner, the essence of the soul and the acts of intellection together produce an act of volition. Unlike Scotus, Ockham states that the act of volition has two partial causes, namely the essence of the soul and an intellection, whereas the act of intellection has only the essence of the soul as its cause. To call intellection a cause of volition was something which Scotus had expressly denied. However, as Ockham himself notes, "cause" is used in a rather broad sense, meaning a necessary precondition to another thing, which may be called "cause" in some sense.³²

Even if the notion of origins from one and two is sufficient for Ockham to distinguish the divine persons and their image in the soul, Ockham is not entirely content with this notion when he discusses the ultimate distinction between the Son's generation and the Spirit's spiration. On the contrary, he tries to find a formulation that would clarify *why* the generation takes place from one person and spiration from two persons. To solve this, he ends up formulating the notion of generation as a production from another that is similar to its producer.³³ This kind of act can be attributed both to the human

creatura multa, sicut misericordia, iustitia, dilectio, volitio, scientia, intellectus, ars, prudentia, et sic de multis aliis, igitur essent plures partes imaginis quam tres."

³¹ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 3, q. 10; OTh II, 561, 17–19: "Ad primum istorum dico quod quamvis sint tales multi actus et habitus, tamen omnia reducuntur ad duo genera, et ideo ponitur in duobus."

³² OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 3, q. 10; OTh II, 559, 1–20: "Et tunc loquendo de actibus naturalibus, iste est ordo: quod sicut Pater in divinis habet fecunditatem ad producendum Spiritum Sanctum et communicat Filio fecunditatem producendi Spiritum Sanctum, et Pater et Filius producunt Spiritum Sanctum, ita ipsa substantia animae est fecunda et productiva tam actus intelligendi quam volendi; et producit primo actum intelligendi qui est productivus actus volendi, et tunc illae duae causae, scilicet substantia animae et actus intelligendi possunt producere actum volendi, ita quod sicut Filius in divinis est tantum ab uno, et Spiritus Sanctus est a Patre producente et a Filio producto, ita actus intelligendi est a sola substantia animae, et actus volendi est a substantia animae et ab actu intelligendi producto, et sic imago potest aliquo modo repraesentare distinctas personas, et originem et ordinem earum. Quod autem actus volendi sit effective ab actu intelligendi, ostendo per illud commune verbum quod 'omne absolutum necessario praesuppositum alteri habet rationem causae in aliquo genere causae'; sed actus intelligendi necessario tamquam aliquid absolutum praesupponitur actui volendi; igitur habet rationem causae respectu illius." The analogy between the Father and the essence of the soul might be one of the theological reasons which restrained Ockham from denying the active role of the soul as an agent intellect, although he found the philosophical arguments for the view inconclusive. See HIRVONEN 2004, 97; OCKHAM, *Questiones variae*, q. 5, OTh VIII, 191, 730–6; *Rep.* 2 Sent. q. 20 OTh V, 442, 15–443, 20. On the disagreement between Scotus and Ockham on the causes of volition, see MAURER 1999, 513.

³³ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 13 q. un., OTh III, 418, 3–7: "Aliter accipitur generatio stricte pro productione viventis a vivente, quia vivens productum ratione suae productionis

mind producing the intellection and to the Father as the divine essence producing the person of the Son.³⁴ The acts of the will and the spiration of the Spirit, on the contrary, do not belong to this category. This is because the will is not a power to produce a similitude, but when it produces an act of loving, has the power to give (*habet vim donativam*), which is another virtue, and depends not on the similitude or dissimilitude of its object.³⁵ According to Ockham, the divine acts differ from the mental acts only in their capacity to produce their ultimate objects in a real existence (*esse subiectivo*), whereas mental acts produce their object in an intentional existence (*esse obiectivo*).³⁶

producitur ut totaliter simile et eiusdem rationis cum producente, saltem quantum ad omnia excepta ipsa sola productione, et istud proprie dicitur nasci.”

³⁴ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 13 q. un., OTh III, 418, 18–419, 2; 421, 1–12: ”Circa primum sciendum quod non obstante identitate intellectus et voluntatis, tamen actus intelligendi et volendi sunt distincti. Et ideo volo uti intellectu et voluntate prout connotant istos actus, propter quam connotationem aliquid potest attribui intellectui et negari de voluntate, secundum modum alibi exponendum. Est igitur sciendum quod intellectus noster primo intelligit intuitive aliquod singulare realiter existens, quo intellecto potest idem intellectus fingere aliquod consimile prius intellecto... [Essentia divina] intelligendo se ipsam vere est principium productivum Filii tamquam alicuius quod est simillimum ipsi Patri intellecto, non tamen praeintellecto sicut est in nobis. Et quia sicut productum est simillimum, oportet quod distinguatur realiter ab illo quod producit. Et non potest distingui in aliquo absoluto, quia tunc non esset simillimum, ideo oportet quod distinguatur ipsamet productione passiva. Et ita productio illa est productio viventis de vivente, quod ex hoc ipso quod producitur primo et immediate virtute intellectionis obiecti cogniti – et non est formaliter volitio nec intellectio – producitur ut simile obiecto cognito, scilicet ipsi producenti, et ita vere est generatio strice accipiendo generationem.”

³⁵ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 13 q. un., OTh III, 419, 16–420, 3; 421, 14–23: ”Sed aliter est de voluntate, quia voluntas diligendo aliquod obiectum non habet virtutem productivam alicuius similis nec etiam vim fictivam alicuius similis. Et ideo voluntas nostra numquam tale simile nec in esse obiectivo nec in esse subiectivo potest producere. Sed voluntas nostra, posita tali dilectione, habet vim donativam, qua potest aliquid donare ipsi obiecto. Et si sit aliquid praeexistens quod possit donare obiecto, si potest, producit aliquid donabile ipsi obiecto, quod quidem donabile, ratione qua est donabile a voluntate, non plus est simile obiecto quam dissimile, immo magis in nobis est dissimile quam simile. Et ita voluntas nostra non habet ex se virtutem donativam similis, quia ita possit dare dissimile sicut simile... Nam ipse Spiritus Sanctus producitur virtute volitionis, quae quamvis sit eadem formaliter cum divina essentia et intellectione, tamen vere potest esse principium donandi aliquid dilecto. Et divina volitio non tantum potest esse principium donandi aliquid dilecto, sed etiam potest esse principium producendi donum, quod quidem donum, ex hoc ipso quod donum, non est simile, sicut declaratum est, quamvis ex hoc quod producitur in eadem essentia sit simile. Et ideo stricte accipiendo generationem, productio Spiritus Sancti, qui est donum Patris et Filii, non est generatio, quia non ex hoc ipso quod est donum productum, est vivens simile viventi amato.”

³⁶ OCKHAM, *Ord.* 1 Sent. d. 13 q. un., OTh III, 418, 25–419, 15; 420, 8–10: ”Est igitur sciendum quod intellectus noster primo intelligit intuitive aliquod singulare realiter existens, quo intellecto potest idem intellectus fingere aliquod consimile prius intellecto. Sed illud sic fictum non poterit habere esse subiectivum, sed tantum esse obiectivum. Et ideo non produceretur in esse subiectivo sed tantum in esse obiectivo. Et ideo illud sic fictum erit tantum tale quale fuit prius intellectum in esse obiectivo et non in esse subiectivo. Et erit quasi imago simillima rei prius intellectae in esse obiectivo, in tantum quod si intellectus haberet vim productivam realem sicut habit vim fictivam, illud productum vere esset eiusdem rationis cum illo praeintellecto et imago simillima ei, sicut filius alicuius patris dicitur imago et similitudo ipsius. Et ita si intellectus intelligendo seipsum haberet vim productivam talis similis sicut habet vim fictivam talis similis, et vere posset producere tale de se ipso tamquam de aliquo essentiali illi simili, vere haberet ipsum generare, strictissime accepta generatione... Istud de esse ficto dicitur secundum opinionem quae ponit

Ockham's reflections are characteristic of his general approach to theological statements. Despite his scepticism on natural theology, Ockham is careful to stress the univocity of concepts, which name God and the creatures to ensure the intelligibility of the theological statements.³⁷ This seems to be the reason why he tries so hard to find the correct definitions of the powers of intellection and willing. These definitions would need to be applicable to both the Trinity as revealed in the statements of faith, and to the corresponding powers of the human soul, which is believed to be the image of the Trinity. However, Ockham also seems to be aware that it is precisely the question of the Son's generation, where the capabilities of human reason were traditionally seen to reach their limits, as implied by Lombard's discussion in the distinction 9 of the first book. Ockham consequently ends his account by doubting whether even this provides a sufficient explanation for the distinction between generation and spiration.³⁸ He discusses the topic once again in the context of interpreting the consequence: "If the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, he does not differ from the Son". Although Ockham considers this consequence to be formal and necessary, it does not follow that the spiration from the Son would be a property, which would establish a distinction between the persons of the Son and the Spirit.³⁹

Generally speaking, Ockham seems to posit a rather elaborate analogy between the rational soul and the Trinity. It must be noted, however, that this applies only to the primordial state of human beings before the Fall. Ockham never explicitly says that the acts of intellection and volition were something like the perfect acts of knowledge and love towards God. But this seems to be implied in his conviction that this image was lost in the Fall and in the idea that the perfect image is the actualization of the imperfect image, which consists of the soul's capacity to reach and to participate in God.⁴⁰

Further Developments of Ockham's Position

Among the authors who adopted Ockham's view of the image of the Trinity in the human soul are Pierre d'Ailly and Gabriel Biel. Their views do not differ mainly as to how the image is conceived, but rather they differ in their understanding of the basic distinction between the generation of the Son and spiration of the Spirit, which the image reflects. The discussion thus moves from the human side to the realm of divine psychology and further towards

ficta. Secundum alias opiniones esset proportionaliter dicendum de ipsa intellectione vel aliquo ficto per actum intellectus."

³⁷ On Ockham's conceptual understanding of theological language and the broad concept univocity, which does not imply the real identity or any perfect similitude between God and the creatures, see LEPPIN 1995, 146–52.

³⁸ OCKHAM, *Ord.* I Sent. d. 13 q. un., OTh III, 422, 1–3: "Haec sint dicta sine praeiudicio sententiae melioris, quia ad investigandum distinctionem inter generationem et spirationem, et quare spiratio non sit generatio, scio me totaliter insufficientem."

³⁹ OCKHAM, *Ord.* I, d.11.

⁴⁰ Cf. above fn. 26.

the possibility of articulating the distinction between the divine persons in terms of psychological language.

Other scholars, such as d'Ailly and Biel, follow the line of discussion on the distinction between generation and spiration that was initiated by Gregory of Rimini, who in turn builds on Ockham's argumentation. Firstly, Gregory rejects Ockham's attempts to articulate the distinction between generation and spiration through the definitions of univocal or at least partially univocal concepts. Gregory's strategy is here to show that the distinctions that Ockham makes have no explanatory value. Gregory makes it clear that the number of causes of divine emanations is irrelevant in distinguishing between the modes of emanation. The fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from two producers does not make the procession essentially different from the generation of the Son. Gregory takes the example of fire which is not generated more when it is ignited by one source than by two.⁴¹

Secondly, Gregory argues that the generation is no more evidently distinguished from the spiration by the difference between 'word' and 'gift'. To Gregory the reference to the relation of the similarity between the Father and the Son is not sufficient since the Spirit is equally similar to the Father as the Son on the basis of their equal divinity.⁴² For this reason, there is no justification to distinguish between the word and the volition in God in any manner other than to simply make the distinction between the persons of the Son and the Spirit.⁴³

This conforms to Gregory's general rejection of the usual manner of using compositional terms to define the constitution of divine persons. Basing his ideas on the concept of a very strong identity between the persons and their properties, he concludes that personal property does not constitute the person, but persons exist by the virtue of their own personal existence, since speaking about a person's constitution in terms of some personal property like filiation or paternity, would imply some distinction between the person and its property, which Gregory refuses to admit.⁴⁴

However, Gregory does admit that the Son is distinguished from the Father by a certain state of affairs (which is according to Gregory, corresponds to a *complexe significabile*), namely that the Son is from the Father, and the

⁴¹ GREGORY OF RIMINI, *In 1 Sent.*, dist 13 q 1, p. 198, : "Unitas enim et pluralitas producentium non variat rationem productionis, sicut patet quod productio unius ignis a duobus non minus dicitur generatio quam productio unius ab uno. Spiritus sanctus autem, quamvis sit a duobus, eodem tamen modo penitus est ab utroque, ut in praecedenti quaestione dictum est." On Gregory see also LEFF 1961, 85–90.

⁴² GREGORY OF RIMINI, *In 1 Sent.*, dist 13 q 1, 199, 12–20: "Quamvis autem haec sit subtilis via ad manifestandum differentiam praedictam, nihilominus tamen nec ipsa evidens est, quoniam aequae incognitum est nobis quod spiritus sanctus non sit verbum patris et filii, sicut quod eius productio non sit generatio. Et aequae immanifestum est quod ipse non sit verbum, sicut quod ipse non sit filius. Unde, cum spiritus sanctus sit aequae similis patri et filio sicut filius patri, et intellectio et volitio nullo modo distinguantur ex natura rei in eo, non apparet, cur spiritus sanctus non sit verbum, quod se intelligendo producunt pater et filius, ita bene sicut filius est verbum, quod se intelligendo pater producit."

⁴³ GREGORY OF RIMINI, *In 1 Sent.* dist 13 q 1, p. 199, 28–200, 5.

⁴⁴ GREGORY OF RIMINI, *In 1 Sent.* d. 11, q. 1, 179–83.

Father is distinguished from the Son by being from nobody.⁴⁵ This is not, Gregory maintains, to be understood as a property of those persons, but as a state of affairs from which it is possible to infer that there is in fact a distinction between the persons. Furthermore, the Spirit is distinguished similarly from the Son, not by virtue of his spiration from the Son, as seen above, but rather by his distinct manner of emanation from the Father.⁴⁶

Gregory's account leads to a position which makes it extremely difficult to explain some of the basic ideas of both the Franciscan and Dominican types of trinitarian theology. On the one hand, Gregory's position devalues the importance of the different number of origins for distinguishing the two modes of divine emanations. On the other hand, it does not explain the difference even by a strong use of the psychological analogy. Gregory points out that the differences between the mental acts of intellection and volition do not apply to the divine sphere, since the correspondences between these spheres are merely accidental. As such, Gregory's position presents a relatively minimalist doctrine of the Trinity, where almost everything can be reduced to the ideas of the unity of essence and the real distinction between the persons. At the same time, certain central ideas of western trinitarian theology, such as *Filioque* and the psychological analogy, seem to lose most of their fundamental relevance.

However, Gregory would not want to deny the validity of the consequence: "The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, therefore he is not distinct from the Son". He considers the consequence valid and proves his position by reasoning that if the first proposition were true, which is false according to the catholic doctrine this would result in the argument that the Holy Spirit does not exist, which would make the second proposition true.⁴⁷

For Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly, Gregory's position appeared to be unsatisfying and even scandalous. Furthermore, d'Ailly favoured more the idea that the Son and the Holy Spirit differ by their respective productions out of one and out of two persons. For him, this was still the only plausible way to explicate the distinction.⁴⁸ D'Ailly considered this to be the only way to explicate the difference between the generation and spiration in the discussions with the eastern theologians, who denied the *Filioque*.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ GREGORY OF RIMINI, *In 1 Sent.* d. 11, q. 1, 183.

⁴⁶ GREGORY OF RIMINI, *In 1 Sent.* d. 11, q. 1, 184–5.

⁴⁷ GREGORY OF RIMINI, *In 1 Sent.* d. 11, q. 1, 186.

⁴⁸ PIERRE D'AILLY, *Quaestiones 1 Sent.* q. 8 O: "Primo sequitur quod licet generatio et spiratio sint productiones distinctae ex natura rei et seipsis formaliter sint distinctae, tamen istarum productionum differentia non potest a nobis melius explicari quam per hoc quod generatio est ab uno tantum et spiratio a duobus...Secundo sequitur quod non potest a nobis explicari quare filius procedit quomodo natus et non spiritus sanctus. Spiritus sanctus procedit quomodo datus et non filius, nisi per hoc quod filius est ab uno solo et non spiritus sanctus, et spiritus sanctus est a duobus quorum unus dat alteri, scilicet pater filio, quod spiritus sanctus sit vel procedat ab eo, et non sic procedit filius...Tertio sequitur quod non potest a nobis explicari quare filius est verbum et non spiritus sanctus, et spiritus sanctus est donum et non filius nisi per modum immediate dictum."

⁴⁹ PIERRE D'AILLY, *Quaestiones, 1 Sent.* q. 8 O: "Quarto sequitur quod licet ex distinctione filii et spiritus sancti vel generationis et spirationis non possit fieri evidens argumentum ad probandum quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio, tamen ex hoc potest fieri forte et apparens

D'Ailly, like Gregory and Ockham, considered the consequence: "The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, therefore he is not distinct from the Son" not evidently valid, but nevertheless true. D'Ailly rejects the validity of Gregory's argumentation on the grounds that (1) the first sentence is factually impossible although this is not known without revelation and any sentence can be inferred from an impossible one; (2) there are no other grounds for it and therefore for a person who considers the first premiss to be true (such as someone from the Eastern Orthodox churches), the consequence appears as such ridiculous.⁵⁰

D'Ailly accepts Gregory's criticism concerning the possibility of differentiating between generation and spiration by distinguishing between the act of producing a similitude and an act of donating. Against the argument that the difference in the number of producents is not sufficient for the distinction of the productions, d'Ailly responds that this may be correct in the created realm, but not necessarily in the divine realm. For Gregory's example concerning fire, he notes that even Gregory's own strict definition of generation does not apply here (apparently because it does not speak about the generation of a living being out of a living being).⁵¹ D'Ailly's main target in Gregory's account, however, seems to be Gregory's unwillingness to formulate appropriate definitions, which would give an adequate expression for the difference between the divine generation and spiration. This cannot be excused even by a reference to the divine incomprehensibility.⁵²

argumentum ad hoc probandum contra graecos. Prima pars patet ex primo articulo quaestionis. Secunda patet ex dictis, quia non videtur aliter qualiter graeci possint explicare differentiam generationis et spirationis, nec alia explicare quae dicta sunt. Et forte ista fuit ratio quae movit ecclesiam romanam ad determinandum et tenendum contra graecos quod spiritus sanctus procedit ab utroque, quia non apparet mihi quod hoc posset aliter evidenter concludi ex textu sacrae scripturae, ut reputo patere intuenti etc."

⁵⁰ PIERRE D'AILLY, *Quaestiones* I Sent. q. 8 D: "Sed contra hoc pono aliquas propositiones. Prima est quod illa consequentia est bona. Patet, quia illud antecedens est impossibile et ad impossibile sequitur quodlibet. Secunda est quod illa consequentia non magis valet: 'spiritus sanctus non procedit a filio, ergo non distinguitur ab eo' quam ista valeat: 'spiritus sanctus non procedit a filio, ergo distinguitur ab eo.' Patet, quia utraque est necessaria propter rationem dictam. Tertia est quod licet ista consequentia valet, tamen rationes illius doctoris non probant ipsam esse bonam. Patet, quia petunt principium ut patet intuenti. Immo essent derisoriae apud unum graecum qui negaret spiritum sanctum procedere a filio. Ideo miror tales rationes fieri ab aliquo subtili viro."

⁵¹ PIERRE D'AILLY, *Quaestiones* I Sent. q. 8 N: "Et ideo ad instantiam magistri Gregorii quando dicit, quod unitas vel pluralitas producentium non videtur variare rationem productionis, dico quod licet hoc esset verum in creaturis, tamen non oportet sic esse in divinis. Nec exemplum quod ponit de productione ignis etc. bene est ad propositum quia etiam secundum eum illa propositio non est generatio stricte sumpta et ut hic accipitur etc."

⁵² PIERRE D'AILLY, *Quaestiones* I Sent. q. 8 N: "Unde melius est dicere sic quam dicere sicut ipse dicit, quod nulla descriptio divinae generationis cum ea convertibilis potest a nobis dari, quia est a nobis incomprehensibilis, quia absurdissimum mihi videtur quod credamus fide aliquam propositionem et tamen nesciamus dare diffinitionem quid nominis terminorum ipsius seu descriptionem convertibilem. Nec incomprehensibilitas ipsius rei hoc tollit, quia deus est a nobis incomprehensibilis, et forte quaelibet creatura, et tamen damus diffinitionem dei convertibilem. Ideo sua responsio cum reverentia videtur scandalosa."

Consequently, d'Ailly himself gives nominal definitions for both generation and spiration, which do not differ in the notion of similitude or donation, as in Ockham's account, but by the notion of a number of producers.⁵³ Generation and spiration are thus not the ultimate realities which account for the distinction between the persons of the Son and the Spirit, but they are further distinguished by the determinate states of affairs, insofar as the generation takes place from the Father only and the spiration from the Father and the Son. According to d'Ailly, therefore, the *Filioque* attains a fundamental position.

This also sheds some new light on the description of the psychological analogy, which d'Ailly borrows almost directly from Ockham.⁵⁴ The perfect image of the Trinity, which consists of the primordial acts of the knowing and loving of God (as d'Ailly explicitly names the acts), resembles in its order of intellection and volition the very basic difference between the divine emanations of generation and spiration although d'Ailly is not trying to go so far as to argue that this order would provide some basis for differentiating the mental acts of intellection and volition. Thus d'Ailly modifies the common Ockhamist tradition so that it concerns the function of the *Filioque* more in line with the traditional Dominican-type of trinitarian theology, but at the same time, even more than in Ockham's case, underlines the relevance of the psychological analogy.

The Reconstruction of Ockhamist Doctrine in Biel's Collectorium

Pierre d'Ailly's position was only partly received by Gabriel Biel, who used the aforementioned authors as his sources. Concerning the image of God, for the most part Biel recites Ockham's texts, including the passages where Ockham posits the perfect image in the order of intellection and volition.⁵⁵ However, this notion of the image does not occupy the same central position as it did in d'Ailly's thinking. When it comes to the question of the distinction between the generation and spiration, Biel explicitly rejects the basic point made by d'Ailly, namely that the distinction between generation and the spiration could *only* be explicated by the differences in the producers of those emanations. Biel does this by attacking Gregory's argumentation, shared by d'Ailly, which rejected the explanatory power of the notions of similitude and the act of donation in defining how the Son is the Word of God and the Spirit is the Gift of divine love.⁵⁶ By doing so, Biel rehabilitates Ockham's original attempt to express the difference in

⁵³ PIERRE D'AILLY, *Quaestiones* 1 Sent. q. 8 N: "Dicitur generatio productio non de nihilo alicuius viventis cognoscentis ab uno solo producente eiusdem naturae numero vel specie. Et sic sumitur in divinis, et est diffinitio quid nominis sive descriptio completa divine generationis, ut patet inducendo in partibus singulis. Unde proportionabiliter potest describi spiratio, quod est productio non de nihilo alicuius viventis cognoscentis non ab uno solo producente sed a pluribus eiusdem naturae numero vel specie."

⁵⁴ PIERRE D'AILLY, *Quaestiones* 1 Sent. q. 3 E-F.

⁵⁵ BIEL, *Coll.* 1 d. 3 q. 10 C-E.

⁵⁶ BIEL, *Coll.* 1 d. 13 q. un. A.

using these notions. By the course of his presentation, Biel points out strongly the fundamental incomprehensibility of God, but at the same time he is careful to state that the distinction between the generation and spiration is in our present state, comprehensible to us although in an imperfect way.⁵⁷

Biel's main objective seems to be the reconstruction of Ockham's position and he obviously takes Ockham's explicit doubts on his own solution as sign of a pious reverence towards the mystery of the Trinity. Since Biel does not attempt to refute Gregory's and d'Ailly's arguments against Ockham in detail, it remains rather unclear as to why he accused d'Ailly's argument to beg the question. One might think that for Biel, the careless way in which Gregory and d'Ailly referred to the perfect similarity of the Spirit with the other two persons, missed the point. Ockham's idea seemed to be that even the divine gift is not similar to its object by virtue of being a gift, although it may be similar by virtue of sharing the common essence. The divine Word, on the contrary, is similar to the one whose image it is, exactly with respect to its being the Word or image, the similarity being part of the concept of being generated.⁵⁸

In defending Ockham's manner of distinguishing between the generation and spiration against d'Ailly (and Gregory), Biel tends to present his position in a manner that underlines the importance of the explanation that was rejected by those authors. In Biel's thinking, however, this distinction attains a more fundamental status. He reintroduced the notion of the formal constitution of the divine persons, originally used by Ockham in the *Sentences* commentary, but rejected by Gregory and d'Ailly. Biel seems to be aware of the criticism of his successors, since he had to face the ambiguities in Ockham's different notions of the formal distinction between the person and its personal properties in *Ordinatio* and *Quodlibeta*, but Biel opts for a solution that is opposite to Gregory and d'Ailly. Therefore, Biel regards the filiation and (passive) spiration as being properties which constitute the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit.⁵⁹

Whatever differences there might be in the conclusions, Biel's exposition shows a similar reverence for the idea of psychological analogy as did d'Ailly's account. They both seem to suppose, unlike Gregory, that the fundamental difference between the trinitarian persons has a correspondence in the acts of intellection and volition. For Biel, this lies more or less in the distinction between the very nature of those acts, whereas for d'Ailly, the correspondence is found in the more accidental order of the acts. The notion of the unity, on the contrary, seems to be explained similarly by three authors, who all follow Ockham's use of the strong unity of the potencies of the soul as resembling the unity of the principle of emanations in the divinity.

Conclusion

⁵⁷ BIEL, *Coll.* 1 d. 13 q. un. B–C. See also FRIEDMAN 2003, 109–12.

⁵⁸ Cf. OCKHAM, *Ord.* I, d. 13 q. un. p. 418; 423.

⁵⁹ See ERNST 1972, 156.

The observation by Trutfetter that the knowledge of the human soul is necessary for a correct description of the image of the Trinity, seems to be more easily applied to the notion of unity than to the description of the distinction between the divine persons. Ever since Aquinas, the unity of the divine essence was an easier theme to approach, whereas the distinction of the persons seems to have presented more problems for defining the image of the Trinity. Ockham's view about the essential unity of the powers of the rational soul made it even easier to express the unity, but at the same time the distinction between the persons continued to be a problem, as it also was for Scotus. In this framework, however, the psychological analogy was continuously regarded as being meaningful and even something worth studying in detail among the writers inspired by Ockham.

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