Russia’s Nuclear Deals with the EU Continue Despite the War In Ukraine

by Viktoryia Kolchyna

In September, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation visited the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) for the first time since the beginning of the war. Ukraine had long sought this visit, but their calls to deploy the IAEA mission to Zaporizhzhia fell on deaf ears. Now that fighting around the largest atomic energy plant in Europe is putting European import of cheap electricity from Ukraine at risk and the world under immediate threat of a nuclear disaster, the IAEA has decided to maintain a continued presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant”. How is this delayed emergency response connected to fears that Russia may ban export of uranium to European nuclear power stations in retaliation for sanctions?

Five of the 13 nuclear EU member states have Russian-designed nuclear reactors, VVER-440s or VVER-1000s, and depend solely on “Rosatom” for nuclear fuel and supply chain provisions.

“Rosatom”, the Russian nuclear power giant that now provisionally controls Zaporizhzhia NPP, is involved in the global nuclear power supply chain. According to a Columbia University study on Global Energy Policy, 40 % of the world’s total uranium conversion infrastructure in 2020 and 46 % of the uranium enrichment capacity in 2018 was owned by Russia. It currently operates reactors in 11 countries. Five of the 13 nuclear EU member states have Russian-designed nuclear reactors, VVER-440s or VVER-1000s, and depend solely on “Rosatom” for nuclear fuel and supply chain provisions. It is a particular concern for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia that use nuclear power extensively and have no authorized nuclear fuel to replace Russian-enriched uranium in the near future.  The American fuel alternative, produced by Westinghouse, is more expensive and requires a new waste management system. Only the Czech Republic has switched from Russian nuclear fuel to Westinghouse (USA) and Framatome (France) alternatives.

Not surprisingly, despite a flight ban on Russian aircraft in EU airspace, a Russian cargo plane Ilyushin IL76TD was allowed to land in Slovakia in March with a special permit to supply the two Slovakian nuclear power plants Jaslovské Bohunice and Mochovce with fuel.  Similarly, in April, Hungary received the first shipment of nuclear fuel for its Paks NPP from Russia by air.  In August Hungary also hired “Rosatom” to build two new reactors at their Paks nuclear power plant, which will increase Hungarian dependency on Russian imports for the next 10 years. The plans for the two new blocks at Paks serve Hungary’s strategic interests”, said Péter Szijjártó, a Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The Russian orientation in Hungarian politics has historically provided the Kremlin with access to EU and NATO member states’ policymakers.

The Russian orientation in Hungarian politics has historically provided the Kremlin with access to EU and NATO member states’ policymakers. It is inevitable that Hungary will be able to influence the EU and NATO political agenda and decision-making processes. In the long run, it may lead to a lasting, strategic division inside the V4 region, particularly with Poland as Orban’s links with Russia increase Hungarian strategic unpredictability. For instance, the new Paks NPP deal with Moscow can simply one day turn from an economic opportunity into a liability, as Hungary is becoming more dependent on Russian energy.

The controversy surrounding nuclear deals with the Kremlin involves other EU members. In September, Germany also permitted a shipment of Russian uranium destined for French nuclear plants to be processed at a site in Germany. Électricité de France S.A. (EDF), which receives more than 70 percent of its electricity from nuclear power plants, has so far refused to end its cooperation with “Rosatom”. “France ensures strict compliance by economic players with all the European sanctions adopted against Russia. Civil nuclear power is not affected by these sanctions,” explained the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the German company “Siemens” stated at “Tageszeitung” that it will also continue already-commissioned nuclear projects with “Rosatom”.

From the above information, we can conclude that in the short term, Russia will remain a strong player in the global nuclear market. Substitution of its export will cause realignment in the supply chain. In the future, it will require cooperation and investments in the production capabilities of other uranium-rich states such as Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, or Namibia, which are moving to the vanguard of a new uranium-centric geopolitical scene. These measures would lead to rising competition over uranium and more expensive fuel for operating reactors.  Still, despite the ongoing sanctions burden, the Kremlin shows no signs of stopping the crediting or building of “Rosatom” NPPs globally.

Moscow can play its card to use a nuclear fuel supply ban as leverage in the ongoing conflict over Ukraine.

Although the full extent of Russian- EU nuclear collaboration has not yet come to light, it is clear that the Russian nuclear industry’s exemption from sanctions has opened a window to pro-Kremlin lobbies within the EU. What this means is that if they have little effect, Moscow can play its card to use a nuclear fuel supply ban as leverage in the ongoing conflict over Ukraine. In this case, electricity prices would jump rapidly and some nuclear plants may be forced to suspend operations altogether. Therefore the stakes are high. Exempting “Rosatom” from sanctions may have long-lasting consequences for deepening crises within the EU.  Such policies are likely to provoke the rise of populism within the Union and empower authoritarian and right-wing leaders that will be backed by Russia’s supply of nuclear power.

 

Viktoryia Kolchyna is a Master’s student of student in International Relations and Regional Security at University of Tartu and a Marcin Król Fellow 2022/2023 at Visegrad Insight.

 

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the energy security part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

 

 

 

The Energy Crisis and Retrospective Voting: obstacles to a more energy-efficient Europe

by Daria Venikova

Worrying newspaper articles are popping up all over Europe with the rise of record-breaking energy bills: Europe is in a state of energy crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have been named among the main catalysts for this crisis, however warnings about the possibility of crisis were in place years in advance.

There are many reasons why European countries continued to have low energy resilience and were slow at implementing energy efficiency laws.

There are many reasons why European countries continued to have low energy resilience and were slow at implementing energy efficiency laws.  The different energy profiles among EU countries prevent the Union from making unified decisions.  An active lobby of powerful energy companies and even memory politics, making some countries more inclined to trade with Russia, are also contributing factors. But today, we will talk about the link between the nature of democratic decision-making and implementing effective long-term energy resilience decisions.

First off, all political leaders try to stay in power for as long as possible and in democracies, leaders do so by winning the majority of votes. It is that simple: make your voters happy and be re-elected in four to six years. However, this makes it hard for them to implement unpopular measures that will not be beneficial in the short term. This is exactly what often prevents democratic leaders from implementing measures to develop the energy resiliency of their country.

But what happens if the government needs to implement measures that will negatively affect people’s well-being in the short term, but will be good in the long run?

This phenomenon is called retrospective voting. It happens when voters base their decisions on economic prosperity and livelihood. If these indicators improve, voters are more likely to vote for the incumbent. In this way, people hold governments accountable for their living conditions, which is one of the basic principles of democracy. But what happens if the government needs to implement measures that will negatively affect people’s well-being in the short term, but will be good in the long run? There are other factors to consider, such as the fact that people are not always rational when it comes to voting, as well as the presence of partisanship in voter behavior (when people historically vote for the same party). However, research suggests that retrospective voting does in fact exist (Healy 2013).

At the same time, opting for more green energy sources or a more diversified energy profile would mean in the short term more expensive energy for consumers, increased prices, and struggling businesses. An experiment carried out in Canada concluded that voters’ preferences can influence democratic accountability, thus creating barriers to addressing climate change (Stokes 2016). As a result of voters mobilizing, the government of Ontario froze the policy to install more windmills in 2012 (which was a more climate-friendly alternative energy resource), because climate policy would have imposed large costs for the public.

All over Europe, it is understood as a necessary step to help Ukraine by refusing to buy Russian energy resources.

In conclusion, we can suggest that a better framing of unpopular energy decisions can help ease the effect of retrospective voting. As an example, the war was not only the catalyst for crisis, but also a massive shock leading to change. It made leaders rapidly change their energy policies, which will cause severe economic burdens on people, yet it was faced with minimal resistance from the public. All over Europe, it is understood as a necessary step to help Ukraine by refusing to buy Russian energy resources. Of course, this is an exceptional case, but it begs the question: would the transition to green energy be smoother if it was more often framed as something necessary, rather than just a concern of only a small group of people?

 

Daria Venikova is a student of a double degree MA program in International Relations and Eastern European Studies at the University of Tartu (Estonia) and Freie Universität Berlin (Germany). Her areas of interest include Russian foreign policy, regime transitions and memory politics. Her Master’s thesis covers the topic of authoritarian regimes resisting democratic diffusion with a case study of Russian law on foreign agents.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the energy security part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

 

References:

Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013). Retrospective voting reconsidered. Annual Review of Political Science, 16, 285-306.

Stokes, L. C. (2016). Electoral backlash against climate policy: A natural experiment on retrospective voting and local resistance to public policy. American Journal of Political Science, 60(4), 958-974.

Jastramskis, M., Kuokštis, V., & Baltrukevičius, M. (2021). Retrospective voting in Central and Eastern Europe: Hyper-accountability, corruption or socio-economic inequality?. Party Politics, 27(4), 667-679.

 

Biopolitics in the Chinese COVID-19 Response

by Abigail Weston

The application of biopolitics is incredibly broad, with the basic definition of biopolitics being governmental structures restricting the population’s bodily presence and/or functions. Biopolitics can be used by western liberal governments for multiple purposes but the most repressive form of biopolitics comes from authoritarian regimes such as the People’s Republic of China. The COVID-19 pandemic gave states ample opportunity to use biopolitics as a way of cracking down on protest and public dissent.

The social credit system has been used to influence population behavior by incentivizing conformity with government policy.

While the Chinese government has long been accustomed to interfering in the Chinese population’s lives, the measures taken during the COVID-19 pandemic, which are ongoing, have been an accurate representation of repressive biopolitics. The first event that the Chinese government enacted was the COVID-19 social credit pass installed on phones. The social credit system has been used to influence population behavior by incentivizing conformity with government policy. Through this system, the Chinese government has been able to not only keep a close eye on dissidents, but also actively intrude on their lives by using their individual social credit scores to bar them from fully participating in normal life activities.

A similar application was used during the COVID-19 pandemic, whereby a web-based COVID-19 pass was issued to Chinese citizens. This app not only indicated if a person was vaccinated, but also acted as a contact tracer indicating if a person had come in contact with the COVID-19 virus through social interactions. The application would display a red or green icon showing that a person had or had not come in contact with an infected person. If the icon was red, then a person was not allowed to leave a defined area, whether that be a town or an individual home depending on the province and the timeframe within the pandemic. The green icon allowed travel without as many limitations.

Biopolitics, in this case, are shown through the restriction of movement in relation to a person’s political opinions rather than a person’s health status.

The Chinese government also used this application to prevent protesters, who were planning to protest COVID-19 lockdowns, from leaving towns or homes, effectively quelling potential protests. While many governments in both the west and the east employed the use of lockdowns in an attempt to stop the spread of COVID-19, Chinese authorities used the crisis as a way to silence dissidents on a mass scale through the justification of public health. Biopolitics, in this case, are shown through the restriction of movement in relation to a person’s political opinions rather than a person’s health status.

Though the use of biopolitics within China is not an unknown phenomenon, the COVID-19 pandemic allowed for an increase in the severity and degree of biopolitics. Restricting the movement of citizens due to political stance is a very good representation of the use of biopolitics by the state against those with dissenting opinions. In essence, the health crisis allowed for a perfect storm in which the Chinese government could not only justify an extreme use of biopolitical power, but would also not come under scrutiny from the international community for such courses of action.

Abigail Weston is a master’s degree student at Vilnius University with the Institute of International Relations and Political Science in the Eastern European and Russian Studies course. Abigail’s specific area of expertise is in Russian security culture; her master’s thesis is a cultural analysis of the Russian Federal Security Service focusing on the cultural elements that impact this organizations’ behavior. Abigail has additional professional interests in the developments of Eastern European region culture as it relates to the cultural memory of the Soviet Union.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the biopolitics part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

 

 

The Pandemic’s Threat to Democracy

by Aino Puhto

Democratic nations seem to be more resilient to crises than authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, in the past few years, global developments have been gnawing at the foundations of democratic nations and their principles. The quality of democracy in the world has been declining for over a decade, and the COVID-19 pandemic was a hard test of its resilience. During this time, weak democracies were more prone to erosion than others. Issues democracies have faced were, among others, a decline in media freedom, emergency measures that sidelined parliaments, and inequality, since the consequences of political decisions were often felt by vulnerable groups.

Did the pandemic measures taken to limit the spread of the virus open new avenues for governments to control the public?

Did the pandemic measures taken to limit the spread of the virus open new avenues for governments to control the public? Nearly all people in the world were introduced to new regulations in everyday life such as restrictions on mobility, mask mandates, mandatory vaccines, and restrictions for the non-vaccinated. The physical restrictions controlling people’s bodies and their autonomy were the most severe seen in a while, or at least that was the impression people were left with; mandatory vaccines are nothing new but the recent vaccine programs created major resistance. Closed borders, harsh policing of people’s day-to-day functions, quarantines, and lockdowns enforced by police were also common during the height of the pandemic.

While making decisions about restrictions, governments had to determine the value of the life of the vulnerable. They had to find a balance between restricting people’s lives and risking them. According to Michel Foucault, biopolitical power is the regulation of bodies and their functions in society and it is the main form of power used by modern governments. Modern power is no longer exercised by the sovereign’s right to use violence and kill, but to preserve life and ways of life deemed worthy. The use of this kind of power can be seen during the pandemic in the mandates that regulated everyday life. Although biopower values life and does not rule by the fear of violence, governments were not always labouring under altruistic motives; the pandemic restrictions were often utilised to benefit governments. Democratic violations such as harassment of activists and journalists, excessive use of force while implementing regulations, and forced lockdowns for marginalised groups were detected. Acts of violent repression of unwanted civil movements, often justified by pandemic restrictions, were also reported. Examples range from Hungary passing mandates limiting citizens’ rights to India harshly repressing protests. The pandemic has therefore caused some governments to become bolder with regard to direct control of their people.

Pandemic measures may have opened a Pandora’s box of harsher decisions and emboldened governments to start exercising biopolitics more openly.

Biopolitical power may be the basis of modern power, but the negative effects of its use have become easier to spot in the last couple of years. Pandemic measures may have opened a Pandora’s box of harsher decisions and emboldened governments to start exercising biopolitics more openly. Any violence exercised in modern society needs legitimacy and an international crisis provides a framework for tighter control of the public. While democracies keep backsliding, the citizens are at risk of becoming more susceptible to measures restricting their movement and autonomy, normalised by the special conditions of the pandemic.

Aino Puhto is a Bachelor’s student of Area and Cultural Studies, concentrating on Eastern Europe, at the University of Helsinki.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the biopolitics part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

 

The Return of Necropolitics

by Lance Bradley

Professor Achille Mbembe, a political scientist famous for his research in necropolitics, defined the term in 2019 as a “unique form of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to the status of the living dead”. Unfortunately, this relatively modern research focuses on necropolitics is not only related to historical empires but is increasingly relevant to our modern world.

Following WWII, many countries were interested in reducing violence and aggressiveness in politics and society.

Following WWII, many countries were interested in reducing violence and aggressiveness in politics and society. This included getting rid of domestic politics that stripped citizens down to a form of “living death”, as it’s called in necropolitical research, in which they no longer have sovereignty over their own bodies. The USSR closed gulags, the European Community helped restore peace to Europe, civil rights activists fought to end racial violence, and anti-war and anti-fascist movements grew worldwide. Extreme violence still took place despite broad acceptance of these norms, but the shock and disgust around such events lead to action against violent actors and solidarity with victims. This is thanks to media, particularly television, which brought global news into the living rooms of families all over the world. But beyond media, many shared the conscious goal of establishing the antithesis to global fascism that led to the political, social, or literal death of millions – an end to necropolitics.

Democratic peace theory was born during this period, de-colonization raced through Africa, and most states made advancements in peace and democracy benchmarks. Practically, necropolitics was coming to an end. This world order created with norms, values, international law, regulations on war, emphasis on human rights, and acute interest in global policing and justice significantly formed this pacifist, caring generation that made the world more livable. This ideal so-called ‘liberal World Order’, figure-headed by Martin Luther King Jr., Lech Wałęsa, and Desmond Tutu, is slowly dying.

Since the turn of the century, it seems that global society reverted to realist political thought, war, nationalism, and egoism.

Since the turn of the century, it seems that global society reverted to realist political thought, war, nationalism, and egoism. Russia’s domestic and international terror, America’s police violence, China’s ethnic cleansing, Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the EU’s bloody border, etc. All over, democracy is decreasing, inequality increasing, and nationalism is becoming mainstream. Many new nationalist governments have either already begun violently silencing opposition and minorities, removing the rights of those “less valuable to their necroeconomy”.

How can the generation raised by anti-war hippies and democratic trailblazers be inclined to nationalism and indifferent toward violence?

Necropolitics is back, but why? How can the generation raised by anti-war hippies and democratic trailblazers be inclined to nationalism and indifferent toward violence? Media reports on atrocities used to outrage people, now the omnipresence of such reports desensitizes. The constant bombardment of news on conflict, hunger, inequality, despair, and the climate crisis hardened younger generations, creating a deaf ear listening to the multiple cries for help. Ironically, another reason is the success of the older generation in sheltering younger generations from the terrors of war. Particularly for people from Western Europe or the Americas, war is something from movies or novels, but there is a detachment to the suffering war causes. This ignorance of the horrors of war has, perhaps, increased support for nationalism, authoritarianism, and new bloody wars. Necropolitics is back, and necropolitical researchers have warned us of its consequences. History may be bound to repeat itself, but can this evil be stopped in its tracks?

Lance Bradley is a soon-to-graduate Master’s student of International Relations and Regional Studies at the University of Tartu. Lance’s research interests focus on foreign and security policy as well as European integration in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. He also has a special interest in Russian relations to de facto states in Eastern Europe. His Master’s thesis is a study of state-building in the Donbas from 2014-2021. Professionally, Lance is interested in humanitarian aid and development in Eastern Europe.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the biopolitics part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.