Race and Nation. On *ius sanguinis* and the origins of a racist national perspective

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Until the beginning of the 19th century, *ius soli* was the default common standard to acquire citizenship in Europe. Its roots, which were ultimately developed by the Middle Ages glossators and commentators, were interconnected with the notion of sovereignty and had a working simplicity that avoided the generation of stateless people among the varying territories of the early European modern states. Anyhow, with the enforcement of the Code Napoléon this finally came to change with the introduction of ius sanguini as its main criterion to recognize nationality. Its imposition was against the whole of the Western legal tradition, the main scholarship that influenced the code and even the wishes of Napoleón himself. What made the commission adopt such an unusual standard? We will try to prove that the emergence of the first essays on what will be known as scientific racism – a dark science, which will tend to explain national character in terms of genetic heritage- was a the very base of such development.

Concepts as Forward-looking: Rethinking the Question of Referential Stability

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The question of referential stability of scientific concepts throughout theory change is often taken as central to issues of rationality in theory choice. I suggest, through an analysis of the concept SYNAPSE at several points in time, that the traditional framing of the question is unsatisfactory, as it leaves out an important part of the story. In its traditional formulation, the question still holds on to the mistaken assumption that concepts are static constructs. Thus, a concept whose reference has changed over time is treated as a temporal series of static 'referential snapshots'. It is then the task of the historian and philosopher of science to determine the degree of overlap between these snapshots, and (at least on some accounts) the ways in which these snapshots are interconnected to enable continuity. The apparatus that connects the snapshots is taken, in a sense, as external to the concepts themselves (that is, it is not taken as part of what individuates concepts).

I offer an alternative view of concepts as forward-looking. On my account, concepts are set up to accommodate a range of newly discovered phenomena. I draw on the psychology of categorization and similarity judgments to elucidate the mechanisms that facilitate this aspect of concepts. I argue that these mechanisms are rooted in the taxonomy, or conceptual hierarchy, within which one's concepts are formed. The conceptual hierarchy, and especially the concept's contrast-class (i.e., the class of items that the category is distinguished from, within the broader genus in the taxonomy) both facilitate and constrain the application of an existing concept to newly observed phenomena. Last, I return to the concept SYNAPSE, and show that my approach provides a more nuanced understanding of the continuity of the concept over time, than that provided by the traditional approach to referential stability.

Survivor – the Emergence and Shifts of a Transnational Concept after 1945

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The liberation of the concentration camps in Europe 1944/1945 made it necessary to come to terms with the situation, finding new concepts and meanings for those Jews who had survived what was going to be called the Holocaust or the Shoah. Displaced persons, Sheyres hapleyte, Shee'rith Hapletah, Iberlebende and Verfolgte des Naziregimes were among the first concepts used. But after a period of about 15 years, the English concept "survivor" became the hegemonic term in public as well as in scholarly discourse. Parallel to the conceptual history of other terms survivor became "americanized" in the last three to four decades.

Drawing from conceptual history as inspired by Reinhart Koselleck and others this paper aims at discussing the history and current state of the term survivor, critically reflecting, what can be understood as "Americanization". A preliminary definition of Americanization is here the territorial shift onto the United States, combined with the observation of American institutions being hegemonic in the discourse upon the Holocaust.

The paper will address the emergence of a key concept of contemporary history – the survivor – and its subsequent conceptual shifts and changes. Meanwhile the focus will be on the English term, attention will be paid to Yiddish, Hebrew and German terms as well. The discussion will be framed with the conceptual shifts of the term for the historical events and be linked to the evolving memorial culture after the Shoah as the theoretical approach to the emergence and shifts discussed.

Conceptual change and international law

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Scholars of the history and theory of international law have recently turned their attention to the problems of historiography raised by the burgeoning interest in international legal history. Despite this new attention to problems of method, few scholars have sought to draw on 'mainstream' historiography to deepen their understandings of the complexities of historical method.

This paper considers how conceptual history might be used as one frame for doing just that. It first considers what specific problems of historiography are raised by international law, before examining how the questions, methods, themes and assumptions of conceptual history developed by Reinhart Koselleck and his interlocutors might guide us towards a more methodologically-aware international legal history.

While a focus on the emergence of 'basic concepts' of international law, read through the political projects attached to legal arguments, is a powerful frame, Koselleck's emphasis on broader political and social arguments runs against international law's specialised, technical vocabulary confined to a small group of voices speaking primarily to and about the state. Koselleck's central theses about conceptual change should be adapted to fit international legal argument more closely: When do international legal concepts take on a progressive/regressive temporal aspect within wider philosophical or historical narratives? When might they gain wider audiences beyond the elite strata of jurists and statesmen? When were they employed for political projects of particular states or groups? And when can they become more easily manipulable for political actors?

In structuring historical investigations around answering these questions, juristic texts should form the principal archive to be contextualised within the political projects of their authors and the institutions and events which spurred and shaped their views of concepts in international law. The paper concludes with reflections on the strengths and limitations of a conceptual history framing in writing histories of international law.

Rechtsgewissen – the conceptual change of conscience

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In this talk I will analyze the conceptual change of the term *Rechtsgewissen* (legal conscience) from 1930s to 1950s in German legal science. Originally *Rechtsgewissen* had a twofold meaning. First, it was a personal ability to weigh between right and wrong and, with respect to legal professionals, a source for just laws and righteous judgments. It was a skill to interpret law, acquired through distinguished training and learnedness. Second, it referred to the legally oriented cultural spirit of the nation, which mediated between the positive norms of legislature and more broad understanding of social justice.

Since the concept was used by National-Socialists and the bases of the German legal science as a whole were being questioned in 1950s, the concept appeared as highly problematic and suspicious. Either it seemed to refer to the fascist idea of a *Volksgemeischaft*, or the individual moral ability it stood for had been nonexistent amidst the political changes of Germany.

Franz Wieacker, a German legal historian and Romanist, was largely responsible for redefining the concept in his classic book *Das Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit* (1952) in a way that it could be again utilized to explain legal development and phenomena. Wieacker emphasized the educational aspects within the legal conscience, especially its near relation to Roman law, as well as distinguished it from a more inclusive term *Rechtsbewusstsein* (legal awareness). In keeping the term *Rechtsgewissen* as a signifier of the entity of (legal) conscience, Wieacker was able to bring aspects from the pre-war German legal science to the contemporary discussion, even retain the traditional narrative of the tragic transformation process of the German modernity, but also give a coherent explanation to the disturbing social and legal events of the 1930s and 40s. In this case the conceptual change concerned the target dimension of the concept, the instinct understanding of right and wrong. In Wieacker's text legal conscience was no longer a widespread ability, but in possession of a learned class and intangible for common people.

Moments of Resilience: Race in International Law

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This paper will explore three 20th Century moments that promised, or were considered to record change in the salience of race category in international law: Versailles (the Covenant) post-Holocaust (genocide convention), decolonization/anti-apartheid struggle. Each moment, I argue, in fact records the resilience of the category. Nonetheless, each such moment reveals a different dynamic through which race was reinstated, reasserted or rephrased. Exploring these dynamics offers subtle insights into how change is affected, resisted, coopted, and recorded.

Historicizing Scientific Concepts: Conceptual History meets History & Philosophy of Science

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Starting in the mid-20th century, conceptual history developed a set of theoretical and methodological tools mainly for approaching political concepts. The semantic content of concepts themselves, their change through time and their appropriation by various contexts have been thoroughly studied by historians of political concepts.

At the same time, conceptual change is one of the most crucial issues historians and philosophers of science face when they attempt to make sense of scientific change. The historicist turn and the subsequent developments in historiography of science particularly focused on the study of semantic shifts and the variety of factors participating in the construction of scientific meaning. This paper will focus on the intersection of the two developments and explore how historians and philosophers of science could take advantage of the tools and methods of history of concepts in order to promote their research.

My talk consists of two parts. The first part concerns a brief presentation of the works bridging history of science with history of concepts, and the different ways these fields can be integrated. In the second part, I will argue that, by using the methods and theories of conceptual history, scholars in history of science can broaden their perspective and challenge the established narratives. The concept of *force* and its metamorphoses in 17th-century natural philosophy will be used as an example of how a "conceptualist" approach can significantly alter our understanding of science through the study of its past across disciplinary borders.

Crisis as a concept of movement

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Reinhart Koselleck shows that conceptual change is not possible without continuity: new concepts can be understood if the structure of language stay unchanged. However, the topic of conceptual change is not fixed by Koselleck only linguistically, but also politically. In the so-called threshold period (*Sattelzeit*) *Grundbegriffe* were taken as a catchword in the philosophy of history. What characterizes this passage is not just the fact that political concepts become subject to the principle of politicization, functioning as a keyword of political struggle, but more generally that they become subject to the principle of temporalization. Concepts are no longer used to describe states of fact or to establish political diagnoses (and to offer political prognoses), but are instead used to indicate future scenarios with all their latent uncertainties.

Agaist temporalization of concepts, historiography should be able to relate change and permanence. A possible future can´t be pronosticated without reference to iteratibility and permanence. «In other words, a justifiable critique of the voluntaristic selfassurance of utopian planners of the future can be effected only if history as a *magistra vitae* draws instruction not from histories (*Geschichten*); but rather from the "structure of movement" of our history» (*Future Past*, 114).

I would show this koselleckian topic with reference to the concept of *crisis*. As a «concept of movement», *crisis* is used to postulate historical progress. History is understood as a progressive process that ends in a great final crisis, bringing the religious Last Judgment to a secular level. We have not references to a permanence: the future is completely new. However, the term *crisis* can be useed also as «scientific cognitive category» (*Future Past*, 256). In this case the concept show elements of permanence in history, is used as a discoursive "a priori" that qualifies history as such, because formalize conditions of possibility of history.

Concepts of history and historians' responsibilities

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Debates over the historians' responsibilities divide scholars. Is it the past or the pre-sent which historians' should care about? (de Baets 2009; Bevernage 2012; Cracraft 2004; Harlan 2009; Jenkins 2004; Torpey 2003;) Although extensively discussed, these debates often focus on general concepts of history and historians' responsibili-ties. Little attention has been given to individuals' own concepts of history. Likewise, cognitive and educational research of concepts and conceptual change in history (see e.g. van Drie & van Boxtel, 2003; Levesque, 2008; Limón, 2002; Stoel, van Drie & van Boxtel, 2015; VanSledright & Limón, 2006) has previously concentrated on so called *first* (e.g. nation, nationalism, revolution) and *second order concepts* (e.g. cau-sality, chronology, evidence). However, it is clear that such concepts are very much dependent on the ways people understand the very concept of *history* itself, more precisely, history as epistemic aim, ideal, product, and methodology.

Bridging educational psychology and philosophy of history, we argue that historians, having to provide their work for individuals with differing concepts, face an armada of epistemic expectations for their work. Furthermore, some of these expectations are based in developing concepts. The latter is especially crucial for e.g. historians work-ing at the university. This raises a question of scholarly responsibility: In what ways and extent ought historians to take these, often unpronounced, individual expectations into account?

Through a philosophical analysis, supported by empirical examples from previous studies as well as new interviews with academic historians, we present a mapping of the connections between the historians' responsibilities and some of the common concepts of history individuals have. These connections are interpreted within an ed-ucational framework of conceptual change.

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Standards of Conceptual Change

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In a recent paper (*History and Theory* 2010), we argued that a historian of philosophy has to rely on what we called 'non-textual standards of interpretation'. We defined these standards as heuristic postulations of relevant features of the world as immune to historical variation, arguing that historical texts cannot be understood without supposing such a shared world. For example, in order to understand historical theories of projectile motion, we have to suppose that they deal with phenomena we are pre-theoretically familiar with (rocks falling down) even if these phenomena are never (indeed can never be) exhaustively described in the texts. Such postulations are often unproblematic, even trivial, but in some cases they raise the threat of anachronistic attribution of our own ideas and interests to historical contexts. Theories revolving around subjectivity and self-awareness are a particularly delicate example. Our interest in these phenomena emerges from particular historical preoccupations. Can we as intellectual historians detach the phenomena from the contemporary ways of conceiving them so that we are warranted to take them as standards for understanding a historical author? Or are we inescapably bound to our own framework, lacking access to any such common standard? Which alternative is more prone to anachronism?

In this talk we examine the non-textual standards insofar as they constitute the necessary coordinates for recognising and assessing conceptual change in intellectual history. Addressing the most obvious counterargument, namely that we can never rid ourselves of our own conceptual framework, we argue that non-textual standards should be understood as heuristic tools, that the recognition of their necessity makes us more alert to potential anachronisms, and that this encourages us to constantly re-examine the presumed borderline between the standards and the historically contingent conceptualisations. Finally, we argue that awareness of the non-textual standards results in a sharper and better founded understanding of conceptual change.

On the historically changing significance of 'polity' to 'political science'

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There is a traditional conception of political science or philosophy in which a particular historical political community (e.g., the ancient *polis* or the modern state) can 'dictate the terms' of the respective scientific disciplines both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, this means that many key theoretical terms of the traditional 'politics disciplines' are derived from the concrete polity or other terms referring to that polity as a whole, for example, *polis*, *demos,* state, nation, constitution, or parliament. Empirically, the polity has often been a 'natural' or 'privileged' subject of 'political studies', whether they focus on individual political communities or their mutual relations, in other words, 'inter-national politics'. This paper describes four ideal-typical versions of 'political science' depending on the strength of these linkages between the 'polity' and 'political science' and discusses their occurrences in the history of political science. (1) *Master Science*: key concepts of 'political science' are derived from the actual polity and its practices; polity is the self-evident main subject of political science. (2) *Modern Social Science*: key concepts of 'political science' are increasingly generic social scientific concepts (e.g., class, system, structure, process); the polity, now increasingly understood as 'political system', remains the key empirical content of 'political studies'. (3) *Modern Political Theory*: key theoretical concepts are derived from the 'political' relations or form of life of some existing, historical, or idealised community; empirical focus can be on the 'political aspect' of any human relationships irrespective of their connection with the state or other formal political institutions. (4) *Global Governance*: key concepts are generic (e.g., network, partnership, efficiency); the state is just one possible empirical reference amidst networks, corporations, public-private partnerships, etc.

Translational Action at the End of a World

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What can one do, and what happens to our normative orders, when a culture collapses? Jonathan Lear, in his book *Radical Hope* , presents us with such a case: the fate of the Crow nation in the late 19th century. When they had to move to a reservation they found themselves in a situation where all their ethical and political concepts, which were grounded in the old nomadic way of life, were not applicable anymore. Their problem was not psychological: they understood their concepts theoretically, but with the corresponding social reality gone these concepts could not feature in their practical reasoning anymore. Courage, for example, was understood as courage in war and hunting. But with no more buffaloes to hunt and tribal warfare outlawed, it was not clear to them whether anything could still count as courageous. And since they had all internalized from early childhood on that only a life with such courage has value, it seemed to many of them that there was no point to living anymore. Yet Lear argues that they managed to *transform* their ethical and political concepts in an extraordinary way which allowed them to preserve "integrity across that discontinuity" and to avoid crushing despair, or a life in shame or denial.

Drawing on George Steiner's theory of translation and Lear's case study, I develop an account of *translational action* as response to such radical conceptual loss. It involves four steps: (1) trust that a transfer of meaning will be possible across the collapse; (2) transformation of concepts; (3) integration into a new context, so that the survivors of the collapse will be able to take ownership of the concepts in their speech and practical reasoning. Finally, it has to enable (4) sufficient and genuine continuity on the level of the experience of ethical life. The continuity will be such if those who have lived on both sides of the collapse can testify in good faith to the goodness, by and large, of the new ways from the perspective of the old and vice versa.

Some think that (forcefully) forgetting the old ways and waiting for culture to restart through the work of a great new poet, broadly understood as a "creative maker of meaningful space" (Lear), is the better way. I defend the translational paradigm against this *p oetic paradigm* as articulated by the later Heidegger and the early Stefan Zweig.

Continuity in Discontinuity: The Concept of Element in History

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How should the expression 'conceptual change' be understood? How much is there continuity and how much is there discontinuity in a conceptual change? I will tackle this question through constructing two alternative accounts of the conceptual history of ELEMENT. I base these interpretations on my previous suggestion ("Making Sense of Conceptual Change," *History & Theory* (2008) 47, 351-371) that the talk of conceptual change requires continuity of a core conceptual content, while the margin of the concept may change. Further, if the core of the concept is nevertheless transformed, it is the case of conceptual replacement rather than that of conceptual change. However, there is no self-evident answer to the question of continuity and discontinuity in a conceptual change. That is because the answer depends on how widely or how narrowly the core content is understood in any specific case of conceptual change. As a consequence, in one possible conceptual history of ELEMENT continuity plays a more prominent role than in another, which reflects on how the suggested conceptual core of ELEMENT, 'ultimate constituent of matter,' is interpreted. These histories illustrate how it is possible to produce several accounts of conceptual continuity and discontinuity by using the same historiographical data. I will also briefly consider the kinds of factors that determine conceptual discontinuity and continuity. In the conceptual history of ELEMENT both so called cultural factors and empirical phenomena play a role.

Hans Freyer and Conceptual History

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This paper introduces the thought of the German sociologist, historian, and radical conservative political theorist Hans Freyer (1887–1969) and maps his links to German conceptual history. I propose Freyer shaped the way concepts, conceptual change, and epochal ruptures were theorized and empirically studied within *Begriffsgeschichte.*

There are, I claim, five key points of convergence between Freyerian historical sociology and conceptual history. First, Freyer gave crucial impulses to Otto Brunner's and Werner Conze's history of structures, which largely affected Reinhart Koselleck, the methodological primus motor of *Begriffsgeschichte.* Second, in developing a historical method of social inquiry, Freyer asserted the need to study social concepts as reflecting their respective epochs, thus foreshadowing the emphasis on contextuality in conceptual history. Third, Freyer, theorized epochal thresholds in a manner largely parallel to Koselleck's famous saddle time thesis.

Fourth, – and more politically – Freyer criticized the attempts to give history a singular form by invoking philosophy of history as well as theorized the expansion of European conflicts into the mid-20th-century ideological crisis – both elements that underlay Koselleck's critical project of European historiography. Fifth, reinforcing Carl Schmitt's similar points, Freyer theorized the ideological dynamics of modernity and particularly the aspect of conflict inherent in political concepts – a key impetus of conceptual change, as underlined by *Begriffsgeschichte*.

Briefly addressing each aspect, the paper offers the first systematic overview of Freyer's partly indirect impact on conceptual history. The paper contributes to the discussion regarding the contingent commitments of *Begriffsgeschichte* and particularly its links to (radical) conservatism, without, obviously, implying direct ideological congruence. Scholar's have briefly noted Freyer's influence on Brunner and Conze and analyzed the fellow-radical conservative Schmitt's influence on Koselleck. However, the direct relationships between Freyer and Koselleck and their respective research agendas have so far been completely neglected.

The Necessary Illusion: Criminal responsibility and conceptual change

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When the Finnish Criminal Code was enacted in 1889, criminal responsibility was based on the idea of free will. In 1909, the professor of criminal justice and legal history Allan Serlachius stated that free will is an illusion, but a necessary one. If there was general belief in fatalism, punishment would lose its purpose and society would not function.

The Criminal Code introduced a new concept, diminished responsibility. It was intended for perpetrators whose mental capacity was diminished: their free will was curtailed and therefore they should be punished more mildly. In practice, the concept of diminished responsibility was to a great extent applied to perpetrators diagnosed with psychopathy, a new diagnosis that came to medical use in Finland at the beginning of the twentieth century.

This paper delves into conceptual change in criminal responsibility by taking a closer look at the debate on psychopathy and diminished responsibility throughout the twentieth century. Treading a fine line between judicial and medical viewpoints, the concept of diminished responsibility has taken a stand on individual's free will.

Even today, diminished responsibility is applied when mental illness, mental deficiency, mental disturbance or disturbance of consciousness significantly weakens the perpetrator's ability to understand the factual nature or unlawfulness of his or her act or the perpetrator's ability to control his or her behaviour. However, the concept of diminished responsibility has significantly changed, and the numbers of perpetrators to whom it is applied has dropped drastically. The reasons for these changes are manifold and tied to pragmatic, theoretical and ideological viewpoints in forensic psychiatry and criminal justice.

The paper argues that the necessity of the illusion of free will is regarded stronger than it has ever been since the enactment of the Criminal Code.

Conceptual change in history and in historiography

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When addressing the concept of change in history there are, at least, two distinct aspects of such changes distinguishable. On the one hand historians focus upon historical ruptures which the then contemporaries themselves view as significant to such a degree that they (despite not being historians) phrase new concepts in order to grasp and to describe their experiences and the changes involved. These contemporary concepts are then used, as well, by historians analysing and discussing these events. However, on the other hand, focussing upon conceptual change can, as well, refer to levels of conceptual change within historical scholarship when, at a later date, other historians study the specific developments and events in question. In other words, it is a different matter if historians analyse conceptual changes as perceived by contemporaries (being non-historians), or as perceived by preceding historians. I argue, therefore, that in order to aim at an appropriate understanding of conceptual change a thorough analysis of these two levels of conceptual change is required, as it is to be taken into account that previous understandings of conceptual change could anytime be reconceptualised anew. It is, therefore, necessary to differentiate these levels of conceptual change, depending upon the respective focus and perspective in question: be it the events and developments as viewed and understood by contemporaries and, following them, by a first generation of historians, or as reflected upon and re-written by later generations of historians, resulting in re-phrased understandings and narratives. In order to gain an appropriate understanding of these different levels of conceptual changes and their development I intend to analyse their structure by referring to the work of Arthur Danto and Niklas Luhmann, as both reflect upon and underline the significance of temporal dimensions.

A phylomemetic approach to conceptual change: the case of scientific research on evolutionary novelty between 1965 and 2015

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During the last three decades, the dominant paradigm in evolutionary biology established between the 1930s and the 1950s, the Modern Synthesis, has been the target of attempts at questioning or modifying it. The most recent attempt is the call for the creation of an "Extended Synthesis" (Laland et al., 2015; Pigliucci, Müller (eds.), 2010). This theoretical debate spreads to the domain of history, notably through the claim that recent historical work has been written from the point of view of the victors, that is, from the Modern Synthesis point of view (Amundson, 2005). The development of these criticisms coincides with the emergence and institutionalisation of Evo-devo, a series of research programs unified by the idea of integrating the study of biological development to the study of evolution, in contrast with the separation of these domains established by the Modern Synthesis.

The problem of the upcoming of novelties (or innovations) in evolutionary biology – that is, phenotypic traits that are not quantitatively but qualitatively distinct from the ancestral condition, such as petals in angiosperms or the shell in turtles – holds a central position in the arguments for an Extended Synthesis and more generally in Evo-devo. Two claims are recurrent in the literature: 1) the Modern Synthesis has neglected the problem of novelty ; 2) The Modern Synthesis framework does not have the theoretical resources necessary to explain novelty, whereas methods and concepts from Evo-devo can explain it (Müller et Newman, 2003; Raff, 2000; Wagner, Chiu, Laubichler, 2000).

In order to assess these claims, a detailed history of the research on the problem of novelty is required. We apply here the method of "phylomemy" reconstruction (Chavalarias et Cointet, 2013) to research on novelty of the last 50 years. This nearly exhaustive analysis of the

scientific corpus will allow us to corroborate or hypotheses formulated by previous historical research (e.g. Love, 2003, 2005) or by us: The hypothesis of a neglect of the problem of novelty before the 1980s ; the hypothesis of a transition from the concept of "key innovation" in the context of research on macroevolutionary patterns to the concept of novelty liked to the study of developmental mechanisms and their evolution ; the hypothesis of a domination of animal studies over plant, fundi and microbe studies. More generally, it will allow us to produce a map of the evolution of concepts linked to the study of novelty.

A Computational Cambridge School: Identifying Conceptual Change and Legal Languages with Vector Space Models

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When do legal concepts change? When do new legal concepts emerge? Historians have long read texts to determine when a concept shifts its meaning or when a new concept gains support. Recently some legal historians have turned to mathematical representations of texts to measure changes in the law. Computer science and computational linguistics have developed one possible method to identity conceptual change in the law: vector space models. In this paper I briefly outline the theoretical origins for the word-context approach of vector space models to measure semantic similarity. This approach stems from the late writings of Wittgenstein and shares many intellectual connections to the Cambridge school of political thought. Then I suggest how the word-context method of vector space models can be applied to digitized legal texts to identify periods of conceptual change and consistent use of particular legal and political languages. Although I draw on my own computer code in the language R to explain how to use vector space models for historical research, the paper focuses on the theoretical implications of using mathematical representations of texts. The word-context approach of vector space models provides numerical measures for the consistent use of the vocabulary around a word or concept, and then mathematically marks the moments when those vocabularies around a word change. This computational method combines Pocock's description of persistent political languages with Skinner's interest in rapid conceptual shifts.

Conceptual Change and the Nature of Scientific Concept

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Traditionally, philosophers of science (for example, Bird & Tobin, 2016) assume, without argument, a fundamentalist account of scientific concepts in the sense that most basic concepts of mature science designate the fundamental entities or processes. However, many conceptual changes in history pose a serious challenge to this assumption. The variation of the meaning of a concept undermines the designation.

The history of the concept "dominance" is such a case. Though the phenomenon of dominance had been observed by many (for example, Goss, 1824; Knight, 1799; Seton, 1824) by the first half of the nineteenth century, Gregor Mendel (1865) was the first to conceptualise the phenomenon in terms of "dominance", as well as "recessiveness". In 1900s, Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns, and William Bateson all adopted Mendel's terminology, but they used the term "dominant" differently. Mendel mainly attributed it to the morphological traits with a certain behaviour in the progeny. De Vries (1900a, 1900b, 1900c) also used it to the hereditary characteristics, while Correns (1900) and Bateson (1900) attributed it to the hereditary material.

Recently, C. Kenneth Waters (2014) proposes an alternative account of scientific concepts, in which scientific concepts are tools in scientific practice. By illustrating the history of concept "dominance", this paper aims to develop Water's instrumental account to argue that a scientific concept is a tool to define, refine, and solve the research problem in scientific practice.

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The relationship between inheritance and queer kinship related concepts, and normative orders such as law and legal culture

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My paper describes a specific case, which illuminates some legal and theoretical aspects of the challenges of conceptual changes in law. It looks at how inheritance family got defined in the Finnish law, and discusses the definition with the findings from a survey on inheritance practices and will-writing in sexually marginalized groups I made with 1007 respondents in six languages in 2015-2016.

Considering that the inheritance family gets a rather different definition in different European countries, and that the concept of "chosen" family has been widely accepted among queer people, the paper explores some of the problems that queer people face when they the are matching their actual support relations and queer conceptualisations of kinship and relations with the categories provided by the inheritance legislation (or legal culture, in terms of legal aid – the lawyers' insufficient knowledge of queer kin concepts and relations may be even damaging for queer inheritance arrangements as some of my case studies show).

I will discuss the fact that the chosen family or the actual queer care relations do not automatically turn into queer will-writing as the bio-kin is often the preferred beneficiary when it comes to one's inheritance – even if it has been the queer community, friends and lovers not the bio-relatives who have been supporting one's life during the crises one has faced.

Inheritance law is the crucial legal field where personal relationships clash with legal categorizations and conceptualizations of kinship. Therefore, my paper asks whether there should be some changes on the conceptual level of legal kinship to overcome some of the problems that the inheritance legislation (including inheritance tax categories) as a normative order has set for the shaping or influencing the understandings of the economic relevance of the bio-kinship in queer groups.

In analyzing my own survey and interview data on the topic, I will discuss this through theoretical ideas that Marilyn Strathern have developed on kinship and legal concepts and categories. Also, I will touch the topic of whether the concept of motherhood should be re-formulated in Finnish legislation in such a way that co-mothers would be better protected in their families, also in terms of inheritance.

Imperial Concepts: Legal heritage and imposition in the European settler states

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The process of colonization and European expansion was also a legal one, marked by the export and imposition of European law. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of legal concepts in the colonizing process, how they shaped the perception of the settlers on the indigenous culture. When European explorers and settlers came into contact with indigenous cultures, they would reach into their own historical experience to find parallels to the phenomena they observed. Legal concepts from the ancient Roman law tradition would be utilized to conceptualize and make understandable the ways of indigenous peoples, leading to numerous long-standing misconceptions that plaque the understanding of indigenous law to this day. The paper will demonstrate this through examples of property law, marriage and violence, arguing that the use of Western concepts imposed a false teleology to the understanding of indigenous culture.

'Living experience' (Erlebnis) - from a philosophical to commercial concept

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The German concept *Erlebnis* is hard to translate in English. The nearest equivalent is *experience*, but this is a far too general translation. *Erlebnis* is derived from *das Leben*, life, and it ment originally – in the end of the 19th century, when the concept was first formulated in German philosophy – an existentially important experience. We should therefore translate it 'life-experience' or 'existentially important experience'. Geographically the concept is spread in its original meaning in German languages (German, Swedish) and through the cultural impact of Germany or Sweden (Swedish *upplevelse*) to Finnish (*elämys*). In Roman languages like France or Italy there is no special term, it is translated as experience (*experience, esperienza*). Also in Classical Greece – which is especially relevant, because *Erlebnis* is originally a philosophical concept – there is no equivalent, only experience (*empeiria*).

The history of this concept is short, but especially interesting. Originally a philosophical concept in the German *Lebensphilosophie* in the end of 19th century, it has become one of the key concepts of our modern society, economy and popular culture. One even speaks of a 'experience-society' (*Erlebnisgesellschaft*) and 'experience-industry' – we want and seek new and strong, if possible unique experiences and adventures and it is big business to sell them. We want to experience our life meaningful and important and this need creates demand to the commercialization of existentially important experiences.

The clarification of the history of *Erlebnis* can make us better critically aware of this commercial talk. We should ask, what actually is existentially important right now – is it any more adventures, simulations of fights or sports in games, or other commercial applications. Could we instead learn to find existentially important experiences in non-commercial activities of making philosophy, art, walking in nature or in 'simple' everyday activities in family ('housing': baking and cooking together, playing traditional games etc.) and value them even higher?

Conceptualisations of mental health

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My research is on the role of the definitions of 'mental health' and associated terms that have been used in legislation in the United Kingdom during the post war era. In this paper, I will briefly outline my research, which is looking at the ways in which language used to refer to people suffering from mental health disorders has changed during this period. The research is asking why language has changed from using broad terms such as 'lunatic' and 'insane' to using more specific language that differentiates between those with disabilities and those with mental illnesses that have prevented them from, for instance, making legally binding decisions. One of the central historiographic and philosophical questions that has arisen as a result of this research is 'does changing language reflect changing conceptual understanding of what we now call mental illness?'. This paper will argue that this is no simple question, with language reflecting conceptual changes in a complex and mulivalenced manner which resists the simple story that language has developed alongside conceptual change. The paper will outline examples of instances when anachronistic conceptualisations of mental health disorders have been enshrined in legal definitions which have the auspice of modern terminology in order to illuminate this point. The paper will in this way address questions of methodology that are of wider interest to historians of conceptual change.