Ville Erkkilä

The Conceptual Change of Conscience

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106

Mohr Siebeck
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und Christoph Schönberger

106
Ville Erkkilä

The Conceptual Change of Conscience

Franz Wieacker and German Legal Historiography
1933–1968

Mohr Siebeck
Ville Erkkilä, born 1978; post-doctoral researcher at the Center for European Studies, University of Helsinki.
Abstract

This is a history of the ideas of German legal historian Franz Wieacker. The broader aim of this study is to analyze the intellectual context in which Wieacker’s texts were situated, thus the German legal scientific discourse from 1933 to 1968. In this study Franz Wieacker’s texts are analyzed in the light of his correspondence and the broader social historical change of the twentieth century Germany. The study concentrates on the intertwining of his scientific works with the contemporary society, as well as on the development of his personal perception of continuity and meaning in history.

The theoretical framework of this study derives from conceptual history and hermeneutics of historiography. As objects of analyze I have picked two concepts which Franz Wieacker often utilized in illuminating European legal history: Rechtsbewusstsein (legal consciousness) and Rechtsgewissen (legal conscience). These concepts were the key terms in his attempt to analyze the themes of justice and the rule of law in European history. In concrete terms, the change in the meanings of Wieacker’s concepts Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein is being tracked in reference to paradigmatic changes in continental legal science and social historical development of Germany.

The analysis conducted in this dissertation proves Franz Wieacker’s continuous and firm belief in the necessity of the distinct social position of legal scholars in society. The prestigious status of the ‘juridical estate’ was a premise for social justice. Furthermore, Wieacker’s view on society was shaped by his unconditional trust on the values concerning learnedness and higher education. This preconception was due to his upbringing and attachment to the values of Weimar Republic Bildungsbürgertum, ‘learned bourgeoisie’.

As a result, in the later scientific production of Franz Wieacker, the themes of ‘communality’ as the context of legal scholarship and ‘elastic creativity’ as the aim of legal science were significantly important. Wieacker explained the diverse social breaches and recent crises of Germany through a vast narrative of European legal culture, which he constructed with the means of concepts. Despite the radical changes brought about the National Socialist seizure of power of 1933 and the end of the Second World War in 1945, the core of his scholarly identity remained the same from Weimar to the Federal Republic of Germany.
Acknowledgements

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The project ‘Re-inventing the Foundations of European Legal Culture 1934–1964’ was my academic home from the autumn of 2013 to summer 2017. Thank you Tommaso Beggio, Heta Björklund, Jacob Giltaj, Magdalena Kmak and Kaius Tuori for your company, support, and constructive criticism. The project provided me the perfect academic setting for writing my book, but at least as significant are the memories of our common work, conference trips, and your friendship.

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to the theoretical world of historiography. Juha Siltala and Marja Jalava showed me that researching historiography was about people, flesh and blood, and convinced me that the study of historical scholarship was both interesting and important. Peter Fritzsche reminded me of what is truly meaningful in academic work. In the guidance of Martin Burke, Jani Marjanen and Johan Strang, I was able to balance between theory and practice.

The rich and innovative language of Franz Wieacker’s letters is written down with a virtually incomprehensible handwriting. Furthermore, the texts and message of the transcribed letters, in addition to some quotes from his scientific texts, had to be translated in English. A task which would have been insurmountable for me, if it had not been Jörg Schöpper, Heike Wessling, Markus Köhler, Salla Huikuri and Saara Uvanto who contributed to the transcriptions and translations of Wieacker’s texts. Their help was decisive, but the flaws are naturally my own. Heta Björklund’s editing skills and Mark Shackleton’s proofreading were a priceless aid. Thank you Hadle Andersen, Tuomas Tepora, Tomi Rantamäki and Ville Yliaska for the conversations which might have seemed casual, but, with respect to research process, were vital. With Anette Alén-Savikko I was able to maintain a down-to-earth view on academic life, and a hope that, in the end, everything will go just fine. Jaakko Taipale. Our common journey from the warehouses of Ruokakesko, from the tough streets of Hakunila to the calm atmosphere of the University of Helsinki could be a subject of another study. Thank you my friend.

This has been a time consuming project. Often an extra hour for researching and writing was an hour away from what one understands to be the most important thing, but keeps on forgetting. I cannot thank enough my parents Arto and Paula for all their support. One of the good sides of this project was the fact that I came to realize how much your presence means to me. Salla, Thank you for everything. I could have not done it without you, but I would also be lost without you. My kids Jonatan, Ronja, Elia and Amos continue to give me more than I could have ever imagined. Maybe someday I will be able to help them as much as they have helped me. This book is, however, dedicated to my sisters, Elina, Jenni and Johanna who taught me, and still remind me, what is the value of simple and sincere attitude.

In Helsinki 14.12.2018
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I. Introduction

This book is about the German legal historian Franz Wieacker and the body of scientific writings he produced during the years from 1933 to 1968. I study


changes in Wieacker’s ideas, and the way these are reflected in his legal historical texts. Wieacker’s legal historical works constituted an influential and essential contribution to contemporary knowledge of European jurisprudence in the past. Therefore, a larger task for this study, in which I utilize Wieacker’s case, is to analyze the pre- and post-Second World War turmoil of German legal history – the scientific context in which Wieacker’s texts were situated – and the manner in which common experiences shape historiography.

In order to scrutinize a change in the ideas of an individual scholar, I focus my study on concepts which are related to the themes of justice and the rule of law. I take these concepts more as mobile and transparent explications of ideas than practical models of jurisprudence. Thus, my starting point is the history of ideas – and following Jürgen Kocka’s elaboration – I believe that scholarly thinking always appears in relation to actions and social circumstances. In order to study the thinking or ideas of a given scholar, one needs to concentrate on the wider systemic triangle, where the ideas are influenced by the social situation and behavior. Conversely, the ideas of a given scholar cannot be distinguished from his actions, and the actions and thoughts together have an effect on the reality he lives in. In a way, I study Franz Wieacker’s texts like he himself studied legal

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4 According to Aviezer Tucker, the history of historiography should concentrate both on published texts (the superstucture) and on the research process (the infrastructure). Aviezer
I. Introduction

history: I emphasize the “material” conditions of the author, and analyze how these premises shape the meaning of his text.5

In Central Europe, the era from 1933 to 1968 was a turbulent, politically loaded, and even disturbing time. War, violence and scarcity, and on the other hand a sense of unity and meaningful national destiny generated strong emotional experiences also among the academics of the time. National Socialism demolished the previous practices of administration and law, challenging the contemporary ideas on subjective rights, communality and justice. After the Second World War, German society was physically in ruins, but also faced with an inevitable rethinking of the ideologies and values which defined the national community. Demarcation between individuality and social pressure, common values and personal space were topics which defined public discussion and identity in one way or another, not only in Germany, but throughout Europe.6 Thus, common explanations of the world of human affairs became more fragile and possibly incompatible with the experiences individuals faced in their everyday lives. In the face of this ontological crisis, legal historiography, from its part, also had to provide answers to the questions of continuity and meaning not only in the realm of abstract history, but with respect to the essence of contemporary society. Franz Wieacker wrote some of his most influential works during this ideological turmoil and social disarray. Thus, an analysis of his academic works, which were written amidst changing norms and tumbling common assumptions, has to take this ambiguity not only into account but as a starting point.

An academic historical text is produced in a dialogue about the past between the author and his cultural meanings, where neither the culturally constructed meanings nor the identity of a scholar are rigid, permanent or emotion-free elements (let alone the entity of “the past”). 7 Consequently, I argue that historiogra-


7 To say this in a slightly different way, historiography can be studied as an aesthetic entity. The aesthetics of historiography is a vast field which is being studied by numerous scholars. Here my theoretical approach is close to Hayden White’s theories, at least in the way that I am
I. Introduction

In addition to researching past sources and weighing them against a philosophy or methodology, as a representation also deals with the socially experienced emotions which its writer confronts in his surroundings as a member of a community. Franz Wieacker wrote not only about “the past” of the phenomena of the rule of law and justice, but concurrently conceptualized and commented on contemporary social and political events he witnessed at first hand, and which somehow affected the ideas of German rule of law and justice. In this book I concentrate on this intertwining of the personal view, cultural change and scientific tradition in Wieacker’s production.

I argue that the ‘intertwinement’ inside the historical text reveals itself in the metaphors and concepts used by the historian, and focusing on them enables me to grasp this complicated level in historiography. Despite the claims of historical scholarship, historians are not exceptionally able to discern between their subject matter, outer public influence, and personal orientation in their works. Rather, and this is often the case, historical writing resembles more a semi-conscious process, where the author’s ideas of significance are weighed against what one believes to be the socially acknowledged meaning. By semi-conscious I mean that usually for historians the process appears as if it is guided by the automatic, axiomatic and unquestionable principles of a methodology or paradigmatic truth, even though this process has rarely been explicated or even given much cognitive effort. Such principles seem to be attributed with affective meaning, and they are “true” because other options are perceived as untenable. As a finished aesthetic entity, a history, a narrative of and for a community, is “correct” because there cannot be other options.

I take as my starting point a conceptual historical approach in which concepts and metaphors are perceived as flexible and contested symbols in communal meaning production.8 These terms and sayings manage to include the various and interested in the actual writing process of history (cf. Hayden White, ‘The Practical Past,’ in Historein 10 (2010), 10–19). I have also been influenced by Frank Ankersmit’s analysis of the relation between the feeling and expression of the temporal (see Frank Ankersmit, Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation. Ithaca, Cornell UP 2012, and ‘Historical Experience Beyond the Linguistic Turn,’ in Nancy Partner & Sarah Foot (ed.), The SAGE Handbook of Historical Theory. Los Angeles, SAGE 2013, 424–438). Nevertheless, in many cases I have found it useful to borrow from and refer to theorists of aesthetics such as Arthur C. Danto and Hans-Georg Gadamer, who, with different emphasis, illuminate the interplay of the subjective and object in cultural reproduction.

even contradictory opinions on the phenomenon they signify. In other words, concepts and metaphors are the mediums which deliver the experience of the writer to the receiving end. They help, on the one hand, historians to present personal and credible arguments on a contested subject to a wider audience and, on the other hand, the wider audience to understand historians’ claims at a personal level. To focus on the linguistic mediums, and perceive historical writing as a dialogue, enables the researcher to take into account the concurrent impacts of personal view, public influence and scientific tradition in the legal historiographical texts under scrutiny.

Such a stance is helpful especially when studying the continuities and discontinuities embedded in a given historiographical culture. Franz Wieacker, among many other legal scientists, wrote of matters which were anchored in concrete reality, such as ‘property’ and ‘education.’ Amidst the social and political turbulence of early twentieth-century Europe, the actual circumstances defining these entities changed rapidly, and so did the common meanings which were associated with them, as well as Wieacker’s view on those phenomena. However, this study is not about tracking developments in legal definitions, since that was not the manner in which Franz Wieacker himself understood legal historical change. For him, legal historical analysis should not focus on legal language concerning “things,” but on the mentality, perceptions and valuations related to those “things,” and their change in time. To Wieacker, “things” were always mere (though important) particles of a wider cultural understanding regarding the rule of law and justice, and, in the end, a temporal change in those entities should be the primary interest of a legal historian.

Wieacker explicated the abstractions of justice and people’s understanding of the rule of law with the concepts of Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein, ‘legal conscience’ and ‘legal consciousness.’ Embedded in these two concepts were the common meanings which the contemporary time gave to “things,” but

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9 I, however, go even further than traditional Begriffsgeschichte in holding that concepts and metaphors are perfect and elemental cognitive tools in connecting the domains of the writer and his or her audience in the field of history. cf. George Lakoff & Mark Johnsen, Metaphors We Live By. London: Chicago UP 2003; Gilles Fauconnier & Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities. New York, Basic Books 2002.


11 A more detailed definition of the concepts of Rechtbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen will be given in the methods chapter.
moreover, they also included the accumulated knowledge of preceding scientific tradition, and the personal valuations of the scholar utilizing them. *Rechtsbewusstsein* and *Rechtsgewissen* were frequently and widely used terms in German legal science from the 1930s to the 1960s, and they played a significant part in Wieacker’s legal historical texts, but moreover, these concepts were tools with which Wieacker – and indeed many other legal scientists too – perceived his society and its change in time.

Concentrating on these two concepts and by following the lines of my theoretical framework, an intellectual historical study of a culture of writing about the past through the character of Franz Wieacker can be made. It also provides a stance in which the experience and historical view of Franz Wieacker are not unconditionally attached to the general historical development of Germany nor tied to the narrative of German legal scholarship. However, acknowledging the dialogical nature of historiography and the communal bind which concepts carry with them, necessarily places Wieacker within a certain group of scholars. His personal view of contemporary society was not a closed creed, but an evolving stance, which he and his circle of friends reflected. So, while studying the ideas in Wieacker’s texts, I argue that I can comment on the assumptions, explanations and ideologies of a group (a community) of people, rather than on the mere axioms of one particular scholar. The research interest of this study, therefore, is concerned with the continuities and discontinuities in this culture of writing about the past.¹²

This study analyses the ideas of a scholar, and concurrently his relation to politics, the ideal of social good and the morality of science. Thus, and in addition, it also contributes to an understanding of Franz Wieacker’s intellectual context. I study how a community of scholars once saw the definition of the abstractions of social justice and rule of law in the European framework as their own projects. Their definitions were transformed by the common experiences they faced, and the virtues appreciated by this material community characterized the

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form of the justice and rule of law they represented. In distinction to previous studies I am able to tie Franz Wieacker’s understanding of the relation between scientific knowledge and society to the worldview of this legal scientific community. Wieacker’s personal understanding of morality and justice in society and the corresponding beliefs of his closest colleagues were built upon similar premises. The intertwine ment of this shared belief, social change, and cumulative learnedness in scientific tradition shaped Wieacker’s academic texts from the 1930s to the 1970s. The continuities and discontinuities in the ideas embedded in that body of scientific writings affect even today our common understanding of European legal heritage and the ideas of justice and the rule of law in continental legal history.

1. Historical background for the research and research questions

Franz Wieacker was a Romanist and legal historian, and sometimes it is hard to say which came first. He did not write solely on matters concerning Roman law and its heritage in the modern German (and European) legal system, for his texts contributed to discussions about legal hermeneutics, property and work law, as well as methodological questions, both before and after the Second World War. In all these subfields of legal discipline, his writings either clarified or re-interpreted the existing body of knowledge. In his scientific texts, through those decades, the target was always the existing law, and he actively tried to have an effect on contemporary jurisprudence, judicature and even legislation. If there is a concise theme inside Wieacker’s scientific works, it must be the question of justice, namely the problem of a just interpretation. “To search for the timeless idea of justice” from the history of European legal tradition is the research task that Wieacker explicitly formulated for himself in the first pages of his classic book *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit* (1952). Wieacker’s ideas on the history and practice of that justice are groundbreaking and are still influential today. He was one of the most influential legal historians of twentieth-century Germany, and

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analyzing his texts means scrutinizing a theory which many other scholars have taken as a starting point or comparative model in their respective works.\(^{15}\)

In the 1930s Wieacker established his status among the leading young legal scholars in Germany. He started his academic career as a scholar of Roman law, but soon moved on to more contemporary themes, and was renowned especially for his work on property law. Wieacker’s works had an effect not only in giving a sophisticated and appropriate elaboration of the phenomenon of ownership in law, but through his writings he indirectly supported the National Socialist intentions to bend jurisprudence so that it echoed the fascist political ideology.\(^{16}\) After the war, Wieacker’s influence was again dual. His texts which concerned legal interpretation, and especially his thorough *History of Private Law in Europe* (*Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit*), shaped the way in which continental legal scholars perceived the study of law. However, Wieacker’s input on the larger paradigmatic shift when continental legal history started to emphasize continuities and kinship between the Roman legal tradition and European, namely United European, law, was also decisive.

The time frame of my study (1933–1968) takes us from the beginning of the Third Reich to the early Berlin Wall years and the student riots of the late 1960s. This frame leaves out some significant work Franz Wieacker produced and rules out a detailed study of the development of his scientific stance as a whole. I argue for this framing on the basis of the coincidence of several important events in the personal and public spheres of the scholar under scrutiny, in both the starting and end point of my time frame. In 1933 not only did Nazis seize power in Germany, but Franz Wieacker also took the first steps in his academic career.\(^{17}\) In the 1960s the Berlin Wall was erected, Konrad Adenauer left his position, student riots escalated in 1968, and West Germany had to face its Nazi past in an unprecedented manner.\(^{18}\) In 1967 the second revised edition of Franz Wieacker’s magnum opus *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit* was published. In this volume Wieacker concluded the results of his scholarly work of the last decades, and in a much more direct manner than in the first edition of 1952 he extended his analysis to the fields of historical meaning and interpretation. For Wieacker the late 1960s was


\(^{16}\) See Wolf 2007, 77 and Wieacker’s influence on the 1937 reform of matrimonial law.

\(^{17}\) Wieacker completed his doctoral dissertation in 1932 with the book *Lex commissoria. Erfüllungszwang und Widerruf im römischen Kaufrecht*. (Berlin, J. Springer 1932), and started to gain a good reputation among legal scholars towards the end of the decade. Liebs 2010, 34–35.

an era of rethinking, not only in the scientific sense, but also with regard to his personal history. This becomes evident in the publication of the revised version of his 1935 article *Wandlungen in Eigentumsverfassungen*. 1968 marked the ending of an era both to Wieacker personally and in more general terms to the Federal Republic of Germany. Since it would be impossible to cover Wieacker’s whole career in this study, I consider the boundaries I have placed to be justified.

In this study I take Franz Wieacker’s personal history and scholarly identity to be deeply intertwined with the more general social and scientific destinies of Germany, and argue that this connection is also evident in the ideas of his academic texts. My purpose, however, is not to offer social historically derived causal explanations of the ideas of a single individual. Both before and after the Second World War, the view that Franz Wieacker had on society cannot be straightforwardly equated with any particular ideology, but it is obvious that the shifts in the material conditions and changes in the political sphere of the society were reflected in his works. Moreover, even the intellectual atmosphere, or “public opinion” if one prefers, itself is a very complex and multileveled phenomenon.

For example, National Socialism was neither a monolithic nor a completely thought out plan of actions for the German people. Rather, from the beginning it constituted two competing discourses: the harsh anti-Semitism of the NSDAP, and disguised ethnic fundamentalism directed towards “ordinary” Germans. No one had absolute mastery over this ideology. In other words, “National Socialism” was defined (one could say constructed) in interactive situations in the context of old clubs, committees, classes, gatherings, informal chats between neighbors, friends and relatives, etc., namely wherever people shared their experiences of recent social events. Nevertheless, behind the communal meaning construction of the 1930s was the National Socialist party’s ruthless greed for power. The unusual nature and success of the fascist revolution was due to its capability to persuade the old networks of the Republic to redefine themselves as National Socialist. The Nazi demagogues utilized common emotions or intentions like political opportunism, fear, nationalistic euphoria or the mere wish to have an

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effect on one’s local environment. They created an atmosphere and social possibilities where individuals motivated by those feelings could take a lead in stabilized or totally new, freshly established, networks and groups. These new champions of the “movement” were provided with the vocabulary and concepts of National Socialism, which they then interpreted in their own context and preached in their communities. The task of this standardized vocabulary and language was to disguise the harsh takeover of communal networks and present it as a strong and unified, unprecedented uprising of the Volk.  

Academia and jurisprudence were by no means immune to this phenomenon. The emphasis on *Führerprinzip*, enthusiastic but irrelevant deployment of the fashionable rhetoric and outright racist remarks in academic texts, were common traits in the legal scientific works following the National Socialist *Machtergreifung* [seizure of power]. The National Socialist revolution, however, did not as such change legal historical methodology. Of course, if one wanted to obtain grants, be promoted or even keep one’s job, the research topics, questions and results had to follow a certain pattern. But this “paradigmatic change,” like every other change, left free space for scholars to express themselves as scientists.  

Despite the seemingly harsh demands of the National Socialist state on academic life, and especially on those studying Roman law, the party for the most part let the learned be, possibly because the Nazis were just not very interested in human sciences. The majority of German scholars did not feel that they were involved in a theatrical pseudo-scientific game; it was relatively easy to contribute to the introduction of the “legal renewal,” at least on the level of rhetoric, and ignore the already visible and alarming signs of injustice.

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23 Koonz’s account of Martin Heidegger as a new herald of the idée, gives an example how scientific language was jumbled with the new vocabulary as a nonsense, which power lied not in its verbal reasoning or deduction (which it didn’t have), but in the ruthless and overwhelming message of fundamental change. Koontz 2003, 46–56; Stolleis writes of “centralized regulation of language”. Michael Stolleis, *Law under the Swastika. Studies in Legal History in Nazi Germany*. Chicago, Chicago UP 1998, 12, 15, 45.


I. Historical background for the research and research questions

The relation between scholarly ideas and both the social and scientific beliefs of the time was by no means a simple, causal or unidirectional one. Before the Second World War, and despite the fact that many scholars found the public mentality following the fascists’ accession to be empowering, it was common among academic circles to look down at, silently disdain, or fear the vulgar Nazis. The academic stance towards National Socialist politics was fused with the experience of the generational revolution, which overshadowed the social perception of young scholars. Nevertheless, fascist rhetoric was commonly used in academic works, and scholars utilized the positive chance to see the emerging historical force as a guiding light to clarify unsolved episodes of the past.

Consequently, in 1945 most Germans had to face what Peter Fritzsche calls an “abyss” of emotions. Worry, victimization, scarcity, shame and cynicism existed alongside of the need to hold on to what one had possibly achieved during the previous years. For many, Germany’s defeat came close to being a traumatic experience as it destroyed and removed symbols and structures which had previously represented emotions and ideas which were important with respect to one’s own narrative and life as a member of a group. Now societal change affected everyday practices with respect to nutrition, work and safety. Besides, where

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27 “Their [lawyers’] motivations for later affirmation were complex and diverse. The systematic conservatism of lawyers in supporting the rulers on the basis of legality does not suffice to explain the motivations behind their sometimes enthusiastic advocacy. Hope for an end to the permanent crisis of the Weimar system was coupled with relief at the demise of an unpopular republic. Often, National Socialism was misunderstood to be a conservative movement. On top of everything else, the coming generation expected it to provide career opportunities and soon filled the positions of the numerous professionals driven out by the Law to Restore the Professional Civil Service [Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums],” Reinhard Mehring, ‘Introduction,’ in Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink (ed.), Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis. Berkeley, University of California Press 2000, 314.


29 Outline article about the subject, see Winfried Schulze, Gerd Helm & Thomas Ott, ‘Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus: Beobachtungen und Überlegungen zu einer Debatte,’ in Winfried Schulze & Otto Gerhard Oexle (eds.), with the assistance of Gerd Helm & Thomas Ott, Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Verlag 1999; also Stolleis 1998, 55–56, 61.


31 Brown et. al found that the harsher the conditions with respect to everyday routines get, the more traumatic and dominating the memory of those times will become (Norman R. Brown, Tia G.B. Hansen, Peter J. Lee, Sarah A. Vanderveen & Fredrick G. Conrad, ‘Historically Defined Autobiographical Periods: Their Origins and Implications,’ in Dorthe Berntsen & David
there was a continuum in conservative lifestyle from Weimar to the Nazi regime, the end of the Second World War in Germany also meant, to a degree, an end to a certain nationalistic ideology. Many (especially those who had foreign contacts, like scholars) faced outside pressure to explain one’s, in retrospective possibly questionable, actions during the recent decade. The moral condemnation of the winners and the revealed horrors of the Nazi regime, also comprised a serious dilemma to the individual ethic. The almost inconceivable National Socialist crime against humanity did not fit into and was not acceptable in any historical explanation. As a participant (or even as a silent supporter) of a social phenomenon which had committed such crimes, how could one define oneself as a moral agent following certain rules or aspiring to certain righteous goals?

Again, explanations were constructed within networks. However, in many cases there was no revolution in communal or local networks, and the people who were in charge during the wartime were able to keep their positions. The allied countries were mostly interested in either exploiting the rich coal resources of Germany or worried about the relational power hierarchies within their own, slowly eroding coalition. For Germany, the ultimatum to immediately switch from a fascist nation to a country like its liberal western victors, was a mission impossible with respect to at least scientific tradition and common culture. The existing social structures, the few which still worked after the total defeat, largely concentrated on mere survival and did not prioritize distinguishing themselves from the legacy of the previous years. Universities were among those strongholds where the former supporters of the National Socialist regime maintained their posts. Only a few scholars eventually lost their place within the academia due to their co-operation with the Nazis. In academia the emotional re-categorization met with the negative challenge to rewrite history, since the fashionable concepts of the preceding decades, utilized to make sense of the past and present,

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had been steered towards following the fascist vision of the world.\textsuperscript{36} There was an unbridgeable gap between one’s experiences and the language that was used to make sense of social and legal phenomena. Yet, the immediate past had to be articulated and rationalized,\textit{ and} in a way which explained the unacceptable in one’s society as well as within the self. At first glance, the explanatory act was paradoxically conducted by means of the old concepts, metaphors and philosophical constructions which were used to back up a National Socialist regime.

In the field of legal science, there is hardly a decisive paradigmatic rift between the discourses of the Third Reich and those of post-War Germany. With respect to methodology, one cannot distinguish any clear change which would have occurred on account of some war-related turn in the intellectual atmosphere.\textsuperscript{37} However, it is obvious, and as I intend to show, that scholars did reflect their personal past and the new situation in their networks. At first glance this reflection seems to remain outside the textual level of their works. Visible in them is only the “communicative silence” deployed with regard to the Nazi years, the emphasis on natural law and away from Germanistic explanations.\textsuperscript{38} Widely acknowledged in recent elaborations, however, is the “rise” of Roman law as a source and a stable ground in reconstructing the European legal culture. According to Michael Stolleis, this was due to the more “untainted” status of Roman law, since Nazis originally, in their Party program, had announced their repulsion towards it.\textsuperscript{39} After 1945 scholars like Franz Wieacker and Helmut Coing explicitly argued on behalf of the shared European legal culture built upon the foundations of the law of the Late Roman Republic. This stream of thought became dominant, was later developed by, for example, Raoul C. Caenegem and Peter Stein, and has retained its status well up to our own days.\textsuperscript{40}

An important feature of the explanations about the essence of Nazi Germany and the academia within it, as well as the concept of European legal culture built

\textsuperscript{37} Rüthers 2012, 485–504.
on Roman law, is that not only were they reconstructed in retrospective, but also mostly by people who had to reevaluate the stance they themselves had taken during the Nazi regime. Today, few, if any, claim that German scholars managed to maintain their strictly objective handling of the subject matter both before and after the Second World War, free of outside interference, and thus produced textual presentations only about and solely on legal *science*. Rather, the opposite view, emphasizing the deep and effective relation between the scientific and the political spheres during the Third Reich, as well as the apologetic tone after the War, appears to be more like the paradigmatic truth.\(^{41}\) In the 1950s, while looking back to the 1930s, it was almost impossible for scholars to deploy the same methodological requirements they were supposed to use in their research in analyzing their own part in the intellectual life of the Third Reich. Such a demand for objectivity on behalf of later generations is in fact very unfair, since, as I intend to show, it would have required scholars from the 1950s to reject the very principles that keep personal and social identities together and enable historical writing, namely a trust in the congruity between the individual and communal narratives and a certainty in one’s ability to interpret temporal phenomena.

The change in the premises which defined the work of a historian from the 1930s to the 1970s has been explicated by Franz Wieacker himself, when in 1976 he rewrote his old article ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ from 1935. In the original article Wieacker wrote:

> The suprapersonal collective which the authority of the peasant is executed for is the blood bond collective of the peasant’s House (not the nuclear family). The House is the sphere of people’s order where the property of entailed estate is connected with it. This order is not based on abstract legal entities, but on the connection of concrete individuals by a blood-relationship.\(^{42}\)

The rhetoric and style of the texts belongs unmistakably to the National Socialist culture. Emphasizing the ‘blood-bind’ and the entity of the ‘people’ as principles defining the individual’s position towards the state, were clichés in the legal sci-

\(^{41}\) At the level of public and explicit evaluations, very few paid any attention to the co-operation between academia and the National Socialists (Mehring 2000, 315). However, in the private sphere, legal scientists acknowledged that the scholarly world had played its part in strengthening and justifying the violent exclusion and destruction of an entire people, not only inside academia but with respect to public opinion (see e.g. Meinel 2012, 240). On present elaborations on the responsibility theme, see Stolleis 2003, 1–18.

ence following the National Socialist Machtergreifung. Later Wieacker revisited the article from the perspective of democratic society. In 1976 he wrote:

Although it [the original article] contains no word that the young author did not believe […] and although its contents manifest that it cannot condone the oppression and breaches of law of the regime in its continued path given its intentions and effects, today the author must nevertheless reproach it for the illusion that the new regime at that time had as its goal a just […] new order for the make-up of society and property in a modern industrial nation. […] I believe that the phrasing avoids opportunistic expressions and any disparagement of the ideological adversaries and tendencies opposed to the rulers of that time, besides conscious and recognizable distancing from party-official complaining about those who think differently.\footnote{Obwohl sie kein Wort enthält, an das der junge Autor nicht glaubte […] und obwohl ihr Inhalt ergibt, dass sie nach Absicht und Wirkung die Unterdrückungen und Rechtsbrüche des Regimes in seinem weiteren Fortgang nicht ermutigen konnte, muss der Vf. ihr heute doch die Illusion vorhalten, das neue Regime habe es damals ernstlich und verantwortlich auf eine gerechte […] Neuordnung der Sozial- und Besitzverfassung einer modernen Industrienation abgesehen. […] Der Stil hält sich zwar wie ich denke, von opportunistischen Phrasen frei, und meidet – übrigens in bewusster und erkennbarer Distanzierung von der parteioffiziösen Beschimpfung der Andersdenken – jegliche Herabsetzung der weltanschaulichen Gegner und Genrichtungen der damaligen Machthaber.\footnote{Wieacker, ‘‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ revisited’ [1976/77], 475–477; In this work I often (obviously) use straight quotations from Wieacker’s writings, either from published works or letters. If the quotes are short, I have not set them apart from the existing text, but marked them with double quotation marks. The source of the reference is then usually placed at the end of the sentence. If a given quote is then further used in the text, it is marked with single quotation marks, enabling a flexible analysis of the key-terms and themes which characterized Wieacker’s texts.}}

There is no doubt that Wieacker in 1976 saw his old article as incorrect, and in the light of succeeding historical development, unethical. Nevertheless, even if one believes – as I do – that Wieacker sincerely tried to review his earlier worldview, comparison of those two articles does not comprehensively answer questions concerning historiography’s relation to the society and tradition in which it is being contextualized. Further, the dilemma of continuity continues. Wieacker’s revisiting verifies that there was a change in his legal historiography – and in the premises that affected his representations – but neither Wieacker nor a contemporary reader can point out a simple factor or factors to explain the change. Wieacker insisted that the original article was not mere ‘opportunism.’ He did not write ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ in order to improve his own position within the Third Reich or to make an impression on the political and scientific leaders. Rather, the article was the result of a belief in a certain social reality and development which had led to that situation.\footnote{Cf. Behrends 1995, XXIII.} How did the original ‘belief’ become constituted, and when and why did the ‘belief’ in the nature of social reality transform to what it was in 1976? Moreover, Wieacker proposes that some
structures in his thinking and valuations have remained the same, although he has ‘matured’ and currently lives in a totally different ideological environment. What were those principles and why did they stay with him? There were continuities and discontinuities in Wieacker’s historiographical culture, and although they most certainly relate to changes in the epistemological bases guiding the work of a legal historian, shifts in the political atmosphere in which he lived and in the material conditions of society, none of them alone provides an adequate explanation of the historiographical change.

In deconstructing the textual meaning which Franz Wieacker exhibited in his time and society, one needs to take into account two fundamental difficulties in the history of ideas. They are, namely, the problem of discerning individual agency and thinking from conceptual expressions, and a more general question of understanding scientific texts from another time and culture. First, it is very difficult to define the space for a subjective agency inside a historical situation and scientific discourse. In other words, how committed were German scholars in the 1930s to Nazism, and how ardently did they try to make sense of the(ir) past in the 1950s? The expressions which we nowadays categorize as fascist or belonging to some other ideological family, were once fashionable and widely used, even if individual authors who used them necessarily did not adhere to the ideology with which the concepts have later been associated. The primary sources of intellectual history, the scientific texts themselves, do not differentiate between the ideological, opportunistic, or social reasons behind the intentions and textual decisions, and the motivational force which connected the scholars to nationalism before and de-nazification after the Second World War remains ambiguous. If one is committed to a legal or intellectual historical study of the academic texts of past generations, and simultaneously acknowledges the influence of the “outer-scientific” forces in the object of one’s study, it is necessary to weigh the effects of an author’s personality, scientific discourse and the historical situation within those texts. It would be a naïve and not very solid argument to assert that the pre-war works of a given historian were thoroughly “wrong” if the author has shown some support for fascist ideas, but that orientation nevertheless comprises a dilemma when studying the later works of that very same writer.

A much deployed (self-)explanation in clarifying the changing of meanings in a historian’s texts, is to point to societal reasons, especially on social pressure or public influence. This view not only makes it impossible to discriminate any historical presentation, but it also simply transfers the original dilemma to a different place. If the differences between histories of a given historian are explained on the grounds of nationalism, one is entitled to ask why scholars were oversensitive to nationalism, but immune to other ideologies. After all, according to the self-proclaimed rationalism of social sciences, researchers should be able
I. Historical background for the research and research questions

to exclude the influence of current public opinion from their methodologically
attuned research machinery. Consequently, and with respect to Wieacker, this
problem expresses itself as a difficulty in grasping his sincerity while deploying
a certain rhetoric, and the extent to which he believed that those politically load-
ed terms did depict reality in a truthful way.

For example, during the 1930s and early 40s Wieacker utilized the concepts of
Weltreich [empire] and Konkrete Ordnung [concrete order], confident in their
ability to represent reality, but after 1945, like every other respected legal schol-
ar, he ceased to use them on account of their fascist connotations. He also de-
ployed a concept like Rechtsbewusstsein to argue in support of the jurisprudence
prevailing in the Third Reich, and in the post-Second World War society he used
the same concept to highlight the innate and perennial failure of the fascist legal
system.45

It is obvious that the meanings to which these concepts referred in Wieacker’s
texts changed during the time he utilized them. The relations between concepts,
contexts and discussions drastically altered from the 1930s to the 1970s, but to
plausibly explain why, when, and how is a very complex matter. It is evident,
nevertheless, that the referred meanings where not consistent; the exact connota-
tions of a given concept in Wieacker’s body of scientific writings varied in time,
and to investigate the causes and bases of this variation is a task which is far from
simple.

Second, how is one supposed to provide a solid analysis of a legal historical
text from the 1930s or 1950s if the meaning of that representation changes ac-
cording to the stance the researcher has to the circumstances which define the
text under scrutiny? In another words, analyzing German legal science before
and after the Second World War inevitably leads to comparisons between the
values of the researcher and the objects of his study. In order to understand Franz
Wieacker’s ideas, one has to make an attempt to identify with his – and his clos-
est colleagues’ – worldviews, but how does one maintain a distance and avoid a
concluding verdict? From our perspective, the state of German legal science in
the late 1930s and some choices which Wieacker did in that context were simply
morally wrong, but merely announcing that does not add any scientific value to
one’s study, nor does it treat the people of the past in an ethical way.46 Although,

45 On ‘Konkrete Ordnung,’ see Franz Wieacker, ‘Zum Wandel der Eigentumsverfassung’
NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg. On Rechtsbe-
wusstsein during the Second World War, see Wieacker, ‘Das römische Recht und das deutsche
Rechtsbewusstsein’ 1944, and after 1945, see Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 323.
46 Here we are, of course, talking about a fundamental philosophical problem, the topic of a
multitude of scholarly works, which usually and cordially agree on the impossibility of ad-
I. Introduction

and especially, with respect to fascism we can make moral judgments on representations, it is impossible by means of a retrospective analysis to draw a line exactly where and to what extent Wieacker ‘erred’ and where he ‘succeeded’ in his ‘search for the timeless idea of justice.’ We can explicitly compare his works on our current idea of justice and seek plausible differences, but that would not be a historical study of ideas. It is not possible to perfectly repeat the historical situation which the scholars faced before and after the Second World War, and then causally derive the meaning of a given text from this reenactment. Rather, a researcher’s view, including my own, on the meaning of a text under scrutiny is in many respects predetermined by his own historical situation. This said, to investigate the above-mentioned themes in different historical situations remains fundamentally important in research in the history of ideas. Embedded within these dilemmas are the principles of the scientific pursuit of truth and justice/injustice, and to seek for a presentation of them, despite their ungraspable nature, should constitute a norm for self-understanding in the human sciences.

In this study I do not aim for an over-encompassing answer to the questions of truth or justice, but I do intend to show that an adequate analysis of a representation in history, such as a legal historical work of the 1930s or 1950s needs to take into account the affective side and level in the text one tries to study. One has to consider the intertwining of the personal and public spheres in historical representations, where the personal sphere cannot be perceived as clear-cut, invariable or even primarily rational.

The questions and preconceptions which guide my work are:

1. How did Franz Wieacker perceive the political and social changes of his society, and why did he believe some of them were just and some were unacceptable?

2. What were the continuities and discontinuities in the historiography of Wieacker, and with what kind of shared worldview or culture did he situate his historical vision?

3. By what means did Wieacker explicate his belief in the “truthfulness” of some historical development as well as the continuities/discontinuities in his historiographical culture at the level of text?

2. Previous studies

Legal science both before and after the Second World War as well as Wieacker’s personal stance within it, have been dealt with in various studies. None of these works, however, shares the research approach I have chosen in my analysis, or leans on similar source material. I have divided the existing research literature on Franz Wieacker which I have utilized in my study into two categories in order to highlight the added value of my elaboration with respect to the previous research.

The starting point for the studies on the history of legal science in Germany is usually found, in one way or the other, in the works of Michael Stolleis. Stolleis’s reviews on the jurisprudence of the twentieth century remain a major achievement, but do not concentrate very deeply on single cases, at least not in Franz Wieacker’s case. In addition, in them, as well as in Bernd Rüthers’s books, the emphasis is on the twisted legal system and its later reconstruction as a whole. The authors concentrate more on the discontinuities and continuities of the structures than with identities. Since the primary focus of this book is on one scholar, I also need to utilize more narrowly focused works.

With respect to the individual position of Wieacker within the historical context, Detlef Liebs, Okko Behrends and Joseph Georg Wolff have provided very detailed and sophisticated biographies of Franz Wieacker. They all studied under the guidance of Wieacker, and thus possess a first-hand experience of his personality and character. The biographies they have written present an invaluable aid in my attempt to scrutinize the ideas in Franz Wieacker’s texts. My study is, however, in a different situation with regard to their works, since I have been able to utilize a large portion of the correspondence between Wieacker and his close friends stretching from 1930s to 1970s. Over one hundred and fifty letters from Wieacker to, for example, Gerard Dulckeit, Ernst Forsthoft, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ernst Rudolf Huber, Karl Larenz, Erich Rothacker, Salvatore Riccobono, Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Smend, Werner Weber and Erik Wolf provide a rich body of primary sources which previous writers have not been able to use. The Franz Wieacker whom his former students knew was a middle-aged professor who had already done his work in explaining the shifting social surroundings and his own place as an individual within them. The correspondence, however, offers an insight into the evolving identity of a scholar, constructed within the transforming social surroundings. Thus, I do not have to rely on the memory of those surroundings or inductions from general historical representation. In a way, the

48 Rüthers 2012.
acquaintance of Wieacker’s students with their teacher starts where Wieacker’s correspondence ends. I believe the information provided by the letters gives me a firm ground for bringing the “personal sphere” into the research process when investigating Franz Wieacker’s academic texts.

Probably due to the scarcity of good contemporary primary sources, the explanations for the acts and motives of Franz Wieacker have more or less inclined to approach one or the other extremes; either they emphasize the consequence of overwhelming nationalism in society or they point to individual and opportunistic motivations. I aim for an analysis which does not lean too heavily either on individualistic and opportunistic motives or explanations which sideline the impact of subjective agency when referring to overwhelming collective ideologies. In analyzing the interpretative act and dialogue within historiography, exploring the personal voice of Franz Wieacker is a necessity. In his letters Wieacker reflects upon his position vis-à-vis contemporary political and social events, but also, and more often, in relation to philosophies and theoretical constructions concerning legal science. Thus, through these letters it is possible to deduce the actual affective relationship which Wieacker had to the social world and academic ideas in his time.

In addition, and with respect to the research interest of this study, which I briefly sketched in the Introduction, the letters reveal the fundamental significance which Wieacker gave to his in-group. From his correspondence it is easy to both track down this loose group of friends and colleagues, and consequently observe how the contemporary social and scientific events were being processed within this circle. One can contextualize Wieacker’s scholarly works within a shared matrix of social meanings and preconceptions. If Wieacker is studied as a representative of the culture of a group of scholars and the focus is on his interaction with others in a network which was facing similar emotional, social and political ruptures, research has something new to offer to legal history. Hence, the correspondence enables me to analyze Wieacker’s texts in a way that has not

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51 Cf. Stolleis 1998, 40–41: “Although it is true that scholars make their decisions as indi-
2. Previous studies

Previously been possible. His correspondence can be systematically studied as a result of an ongoing dialogue between an author and his social surroundings, where the obvious yet indefinite influences of personal worldview, scientific tradition and public opinion in historical writing are given the attention and importance they deserve.

In his dissertation Viktor Winkler presents a thorough and successful analysis of the academic influences that shaped Wieacker’s perception of, and claims about, history. Winkler also, for the first time, utilizes primary sources as letters and contemporary reports when interpreting the scientific meaning of Wieacker’s production. Winkler is able to bypass the petpeeve of the previous studies on Wieacker, namely the tendency to reduce Wieacker’s person and context as a grace note to his classics. In admitting the effect of the biographical factors in Wieacker’s legal history, Winkler draws a compelling and realistic picture on the ideas behind the text. Hence, Winkler’s book gives a fresh view on Wieacker’s writings and relates his texts to other contemporary legal histories and philosophies. Nevertheless, Winkler does not utilize Wieacker’s correspondence on a large scale but concentrates on few letters from 1930s and 40s and does not tie “case Wieacker” to any comprehensive theory of historical writing. I claim that Winkler’s argument can be taken further in order to comprehensively answer why Franz Wieacker chose to assimilate and use the theories he allegedly did. I argue that in order to reach an adequate understanding of the intentions of a writer, one needs to study the systemic interaction of not only ideas but also social emotions and practices in which that given writer participated.

The second category consists of the works of Joachim Rückert and Martin Avenarius. Joachim Rückert has elaborated how Wieacker used history in order to explain phenomenon in his recent past. Martin Avenarius has successfully analyzed the peculiar methodology of Franz Wieacker and placed it within the field of twentieth-century legal history and science. In this sense, Wieacker truly was an exceptional scholar since he impressively applied methods and sources from intellectual history and Geistesgeschichte to legal study. My attempt is not to study Wieacker in this respect. Rather, I focus on the way he constructed and utilized the mentalities he saw as forces in historical development. In other

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52 Winkler 2014.
54 Cf. Franz Wieacker, ‘Privatrechtsgesetzgebung und politische Grundordnung im römischen Freistaat,’ Die Antike 16 (1940), 176: “[D]ie Geschichte ist nicht die Lehrmeisterin der Politik und die Rechtsgeschichte insbesondere keine illustrierte Unterweisung für Rechtspolitik […] Die Offenbarung der Rechtsgeschichte spricht vielmehr nur Urgestalten des menschli-
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words, I am not studying the legal scientist Franz Wieacker as an intellectual historian, but instead Franz Wieacker, a historian of ideas, as a legal scholar.

Wieacker held that the study of ideas and patterns of thought of past people gave as valuable information about legal history as did the scrutiny of the institutions and legal statutes of the past. Ways of thinking influenced and explained human behavior. This tendency was also characteristic of his work in general, and was a feature which separated him from the majority of the field.55 In illuminating and describing these influential mentalities he borrowed concepts from legal historians and philosophers of nineteenth-century German idealism. With the help of these concepts and abstractions he both explained past events and action, but also connected them to recent social phenomena. These concepts comprised a point of comparison from where the movement in history could be explained. To Wieacker, the words depicting different modes of legal thinking were not just analytical tools in the categorizing attempt of a scholar. They were displayed and used as affirmative depictions, organic subfields of the legal system, and moral and educational entities affecting the everyday reality of the people. This method was a truthful way to analyze the inconsistencies of legal systems and the social reality (Wirklichkeit).56

It is the connection of Wieacker’s works to the political and social spheres of society, including both continuities and discontinuities that I intend to study. While doing so, a comparison of scientific representations needs to be deepened to involve the practices which the historian under study has participated in and his personal experience of the social change needs to be charted. A change in the ideas of an individual scholar or a scholarly culture does not restrict itself to a mere re-transformation of representations. Thus, in order to study conceptual change, one has to track the change in the identity or identities of the scholars under scrutiny. This is even more so when one is researching the intellectual history of early twentieth-century Germany, when the scientific community, along with society as a whole, faced unprecedented material turbulence.

Thomas Duve has explained changes in European legal historiography after the Second World War, using Wieacker as an example. The changes, he argues, derive mainly from the central European (German) desire to detach itself from previous Nazi theories, the narrow borders of the discipline of legal history al-

ready at the beginning of nineteenth century, the influence of two new-found theorists (Max Weber and Arnold Toynbee), and a certain degree of political opportunism. These reasons are very likely true, but only present a partial picture. In Duve’s account it seems as if researchers made a mutual rational decision to change scientific paradigm to emphasize common European roots. Duve’s article also leaves unanswered why precisely Weber and Toynbee were employed and how political opportunism revealed itself in historiography. Scholars are not and were not blotting paper, soaking up wandering ideas. Assimilating and accepting an idea always requires rethinking.

If the breach between National Socialist and Eurocentric legal history is seen entirely as an academic change with respect to research questions and theoretical bases, the affective and personal level of historiography is easily diminished. Many scholars felt genuinely inspired amidst the general euphoria during the Nazi seizure of power. This emotion of belonging, expressed in different ways, substantially affected scholarly texts in the 1930s. Furthermore, it is relevant to ask to what extent the post-war turn towards the heritage of Roman law in European legal culture was due to the affective need to find a replacement for that genuine experience of true communality. As much as the German legal historians of the 1950s attempted to review the meaning given to the national (and European) past, they were at the same time explaining the events they had confronted both as individuals and as a group of legal scientists. This also worked vice versa. Wieacker’s and his contemporaries’ scholarly works had implications in the real world. If scientific paradigms are perceived as entirely value- and emotion-free, thoroughly rational cognitive constructs, science becomes an isolated playground in which scholars do not have to care about ethics or the consequences of their thoughts and teaching.

Merely adopting the idea that historiography evolves consistently with historical and political changes, is not, however, as such a sufficient point of departure for a study of the history of ideas. Placing a speech by Hitler next to a contemporary legal historical text and scrutinizing their similarities and differences does not necessarily bring about scientifically valid information. One needs to take into account, for example, the particular way that academic histories are written.


58 This is the central theme in Dominick LaCapra’s work and from this problem he derives his demand for paying attention to mechanisms of working through and acting-out in historiographical texts (LaCapra 2001, 1–43). On concrete examples of the effects of legal scientific works, see Herlinde Paul-Studer & Julian Fink (eds.), Rechtfertigung des Unrechts. Das Rechtsdenken im National-Sozialismus in Originaltexten. Berlin, Suhrkamp 2014.
Furthermore, when comparing a speech by Hitler and a history – and if it is a presupposition of this study that the particular history was indeed affected by the speech – it seems almost impossible to determine to what extent the latter was influenced by the Führer’s infamous presentation. It is hard not to fall into an either/or way of thinking, where the historical text is explained either as an intellectual heir of the speech, or as being completely free of its sphere of influence. Finally, (and if one still assumes some sort of relation between the two representations), how does the speech explain the nature of the historical text? Did the author absorb the doctrines of the speech into his personal worldview and began to see the past accordingly, thus writing a biased history? Or was it that the social reality, the community where the writing was being conducted, was so defined by the speech (or vice versa) that the historian automatically had to direct his research questions and task along its lines? The similarities could also remain solely on the technical level of the text. Possibly, the contemporary language, with respect to both scientific concepts and fashionable expressions, was simply contaminated by the rhetoric of the speech, preventing the scholar from expressing his argument in any other way?

Franz Wieacker’s historical texts were not produced in a mechanical relation to the ‘political sphere’ of Germany or legal historical tradition. Political changes and scientific ideas did influence his texts, but they were always adjusted to his moral standpoints about society, his personal understanding of historical development, and his idea of the role of science in relation to the national and public good. Previous studies on Franz Wieacker’s works and his scholarly persona agree that Wieacker’s engagement with the politics of legal science was at times quite exceptional, and his ability to conceptualize the legal spheres of justice and rule of law highly unusual. Without doubt the change in his intellectual context – from a participant in a fascist research group to a prestigious figure in an “untainted” academic discipline – as well as the lasting influence which he has had on continental legal science, indicate that a straightforward categorization of his scholarly endeavours is fruitless. Thus, a study which aims at analyzing a change in his ideas has to define carefully what the intertwinement of the public and private sphere in legal science and historiography actually means, both in general and with respect to Franz Wieacker’s texts.
3. Theory and Methodology: Deconstructing the historiographical act

Academic historiography as a way of writing has its own rules and norms which separate it from fiction or pure propaganda, and it cannot be straightforwardly analyzed as a literary endeavor or a self-reflexive report about the relationship between the community and the scholar. The economic and political circumstances create a framework in which the scientist works, and the traditions and scientific authorities that he leans on, mold the research questions and view. But even for established research the past is absent. It is gone, impossible to submit to personal inspection. The power of historiography lies in its ability to bind large-scale events – noticeable in space and time – and people’s personal narratives in an explanatory way. This makes the past’s representations such influential and moldable discourses in our society. “Absence” can become a canvas where elements (hopes, emotions, motives and rhetorical explanatory tools) from our time are projected.

When writing history, historians aim at interpreting ‘the past’ in a way that distinguishes their work from previous elaborations, but also and always the intention is to shape the meanings given to ‘the past’ in a way that has an actual effect on their contemporary circumstances. Thus, Franz Wieacker not only studied the past, but through writing history proactively wanted to influence his society. But, if one studies the ‘desired effect’ of a given historian, it is not necessarily accurate to equate his intentions either with any particular policy of his time or with the scientific tradition which preceded his representations. Franz Wieacker’s historical representations were more or less contiguous with the current po-

59 After decades of arguing the mainstream perspective is that historiography is not comparable to historical fiction, and academic historical writing is directed by its own principles. Thus, the “truth claim” it states about history must be taken to have a different value than, for example, the “truth” of a historical novel. In short, academic historiographical studies are not first and foremost narratives, but justified, dialogic presentations of the past. Historical philosophers such as Richard Evans have moved the focus from historical “accuracy” to historiography’s “validity.” Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History. London, Granta Books 2012. See also John H. Zammito, ‘Post-Positivist Realism: Regrounding Representation,’ in Partner & Foot (ed.) 2013.


61 Eelco Runia parallels individuals’ and societies’ need to give meaning to a ‘sublime’ event by placing it next to previous episodes. He cites Ranke: “[Historians try] to bring recent history into harmony with what happened before.” Runia 2007, 319.

political atmosphere and were related to the tradition of legal history, but always reflected most the principles of his scholarly identity.\textsuperscript{63}

So Franz Wieacker’s texts embedded both an affective level (a desire towards an ideal kind of society) and an attempt to have an effect on his contemporary circumstances (to steer society towards that desirable end), but not in a straightforward way. To Wieacker, the core of any legal system relied on people’s thoughts, thinking and mentalities.\textsuperscript{64} In Wieacker’s legal historical studies the timeless values of justice and the rule of law were described as concrete historical processes and structures. The fundamental quest for the legal historian was to understand the underlying streams of thought, give a proper reading of them, and, in representing their development and state as properly as possible, influence the essence of the contemporary forms of justice and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{65} The past and present were connected in a living bind. The thoughts, beliefs, patterns and valuations concerning law had their own, distinctive rhythm, and the principles of this way of seeing the world had been adjusted and were adjusted to the shifting historical circumstances.\textsuperscript{66} Franz Wieacker did not believe that the past could be replicated in the present, but maintained that studying the origins of current legal thinking could offer more ethical foundations on contemporary practices dealing with morality, justice and values.\textsuperscript{67}

Franz Wieacker’s legal historical works, like modern historiography in general, can be seen as an affective practice to build a figural worldview. By means of historiography, Wieacker intended to explain his own experiences as resulting from and relating to a wider meaning, namely the narrative of German and Euro-

\textsuperscript{63} This identity, however, was not a restricted individual fantasy, but a worldview which was shared by a group of close colleagues, and it sometimes transformed asynchronically according to public opinion and changing scientific paradigms. On ‘scholarly identity’ see Jorma Kalela, ‘Jatkomenoinen uudistaminen. Politiikka historiassa ja historiantutkimuksessa,’ in Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 103 (2005):3, 294–297; Slavoj Zizek, Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences. London, Routledge 2004, ix.

\textsuperscript{64} See e.g. Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1952, 10.

\textsuperscript{65} Wieacker 1952, 8: “Wir verstehen Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit als Geschichte des Rechtsdenkens und seiner Wirkungen auf die Wirklichkeit der modernen Gesellschaft.”

\textsuperscript{66} Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe. Oxford, Oxford UP 1995, 4: “The ‘developments’ of doctrines are really only developments in people’s consciousness, in the convictions and practices of existing legal communities, and we think that doctrine has its own history only because the communication of doctrine between past and present is continuous.”

\textsuperscript{67} Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 483: “[T]he legal scholar and legal historian have a task to perform, namely to preserve as if they were iron rations the invaluable stock of solutions which have been offered in the past, so that the future generations do not have to learn them from scratch. In this sense […] there is very little in past thinking about law and justice […] from which lessons cannot be learnt for justice in the future.”
pean thinking. In other words, Franz Wieacker wrote to clarify both his own experience of the world and that of his audience. When he argued that the undistinct social and political phenomena of his time had their analogical counterparts and roots in the past, he – intentionally and inadvertently – constructed the reality of his contemporary world. In a compelling scholarly work like Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, his experience and explanation of the temporal became a shareable historical idea.

Obviously, historiography in general, and Franz Wieacker’s texts in particular, possess other, equally important dimensions, which serve the needs of constructing a modern society. Academic historiography still needs to have and still does have its reference to actual events. It is established around true depictions about the past, but as a narrative or an illustration of the past it also negotiates with motives beyond or on top of normative prescriptions about the world. Via the process of historical writing, the subject matter of the historian turns into a compelling, coherent and prestigious claim about the past. Within the practice of historiography, the historian’s experience and explanation of the temporal becomes an understandable, shareable and effective historical idea. The rules and conventions guiding the writing process in academic historiography shape his representation of the past into an understandable poetic reconstruction. This historiographical form can be called and analysed as a *figura*, a narrative, or as a historical metaphor.

We encounter Franz Wieacker’s powerful representations about the European legal history, such as Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, as *figuras*, narratives or historical metaphors. As aesthetic illustrations of the past they enable reader to

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68 The way in which Franz Wieacker used historiography to give meaning to his personal experiences as well as to uncertain contemporary perceptions of the meaning of the world of social affairs has been noticed by recent intellectual history, but it has not been systematically addressed to elaborate the structures guiding his attempt; cf. Rückert 1995.

69 If written history is analyzed only as normative claims, and its evaluation only considers the epistemic bases and ‘rational’ connections it has to its contemporary society, some constitutive parts in its essence are neglected. How could one, then, explain the feeling of the “depressing vanity of historical meaning” which seems to take place when historiography’s possibility to reach an objective past becomes more and more questionable? Why in a time of crisis and blurred collective values does history “rush in”? See Alun Munslow, ‘Editorial,’ in Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice 17 (2013):4, 435–436, and Rik Peters, ‘Actes de Présence: Presence in Fascist Political Culture,’ in History and Theory 45 (2006), 362–374. See also Kalle Pihlainen, ‘Rereading Narrative Constructivism,’ in Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice 17 (2013):4, 509–527; Michael Roper, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Making of History,’ in Partner & Foot (ed.) 2013, 322–323.

70 Auerbach 1938.

71 Ankersmit 2012.

72 Kövecses 2002.
attune themselves to the past; a written event of the past continues to live in a reader’s personal world of experiences, it is supplemented, and it reaches its fulfillment in one’s narrative identity where similar experiences, memories, and schemas, are recollected to support the proposed temporal order.\(^73\) Hence historiography becomes ‘a natural truth,’ which covers and evades the irrationality and detachedness of a temporal experience. Wieacker’s texts were written both to clarify the experience-world of the historian, but also to fit the historical representation to the world view of the audience, and further to steer it in a desired direction. In his representation, Wieacker’s endeavor was to produce an epistemologically resilient claim, but also an emotionally coherent one. Borrowing the words of Marci Shore, Wieacker works were “emotional-intellectually entangled” and enhanced “necessary contingency.”\(^74\)

In this historiographical study – and in order to deep interpret Franz Wieacker’s texts – I question the division between “public” and “private,” common opinion and personal view, in writing history. I assert that such a division is, if not non-existent, often at least insignificant, since not even a historian can understand historical change without comparing it to his or her personal experience. Historians construct their narrative within the framework of scientific tradition and on the bases of their subject matter, but interpret the tradition and subject matter through their personal, and learned experience. Thus, I claim that (a) Historians use their scholarly identity as a tool and an interpretative sphere to understand the past. This tool is usually called a vision, sense or touch (\textit{Geschichtsauffasung}).\(^75\) Franz Wieacker preferred (reife) \textit{Erfahrung}, ‘(mature)\(^76\)


\(^75\) Hayden White considers the \textit{figural worldview} a preconfiguration of temporality, allowing one to build a narrative order to the past, where previous actions and intentions seem to reach their ‘fulfillment’ in the later events of history. Hayden White, ‘Auerbach’s Literary History: Figural Causation and Modernist Historicism,’ in Seth Lerer (ed.), \textit{Literary History and the Challenge of Philology: The Legacy of Erich Auerbach}. Stanford, Stanford UP 1996, 124–139. Cf. Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen, ‘Leopold Ranke’s Archival Turn: Location and Evidence in Modern Historiography,’ \textit{Modern Intellectual History}, 5 (2008):3, 425–453; Torbjörn Gustafsson Chorell, ‘Desire for the Past?’ in \textit{Rethinking History, The Journal of Theory and Practice} 19, (2015):4, 569–582. Different conceptualizations of this mental tool express a close relationship with the affective sensations of one’s body; astonishingly many historians from different times and cultures have articulated their research attitude with words suggesting physical involvement. See e.g. Pentti Renvall, \textit{Historiantutkimuksen työmenetelmät}. Porvoo, WSOY 1946: “In history, one sees himself in others.” This “seeing” – placing oneself in history, an endeavor to understand and feel intentions and presence of the people in the past – is a multi-
Wieacker was a historian to the core; he was always inclined to see social phenomena in their temporal context. Thus, in the following text when I write about Wieacker’s scholarly identity I often use the term ‘historical vision.’ It underscores the fact that the affective, personal level in Wieacker’s works was obtained by identifying with the past, historical world. It is also essential to mention that I do not perceive Wieacker’s historical vision as a rigid dogma, personality trait nor individual fantasy. His historical vision evolved over time, and it changed due to social and ideological transitions, which were assimilated and understood as a member in a group of colleagues.

level process. Cf. Emily Robinson, ‘Touching the Void: Affective History and the Impossible,’ in *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 14 (2010):4, 503–520. In addition I approach this mental tool from the bases of cognitive psychology. It allows me to understand the historiographical act of Franz Wieacker from the point of view of obtaining confidence over temporal change and constructing meaning in historical time. The ‘historical vision’ or ‘mature experience’ are not merely invented conceptualizations, but applications of the human way to discern significance from the undirected flow of time. According to a substantial body of research conducted in cognitive sciences, achieving meaning in the temporal world is based on a constant act of interpretation, in which an individual in accordance with his culture and personal narrative absorbs emotions and information about his understanding of the world. See e.g. Dorthe Berntsen and David C. Rubin, ‘Understanding Autobiographical Memory: An Ecological Theory,’ in Berntsen & Rubin (ed.), *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches.* New York, Cambridge UP 2012, 334, 336–341.

Franz Wieacker utilized his historical vision to deal confidently with temporal change and to construct meaning in historical time, but in a way that his reading audience could understand and attune themselves to his narrative. His works were not mere self-reflexion, but historiography, which inspired generations of scholars and laymen to appreciate the exceptional development, significant features and particular nature of the European past. They were epistemologically “correct” but from the point of view of the reading audience they carried along with them an understandable, persuasive historical meaning. Thus, I assert that (b) The extent to which Wieacker used his historical vision, as well as the actual places within the chain of argument where he utilized this vision, are revealed through concepts and metaphors. The concepts and metaphors within historiography work as cognitive tools, which connect the personal worlds and experiences of the writer and reader. They enable “a representation of the past” to be transformed into “our history.” It becomes *figura*, a semantically structured cognitive means, which is used to emphasize congruence and bring confidence amidst and in time.\(^77\)

**a) The emotional-intellectual entanglement:**

*Cognitive bases of historical vision*

There is a level of personal insight as well as a reference to current, common opinions in every historical study. These traits are usually hidden in language, through generalizations, concepts, juxtapositions and other rhetorical means typical for historical writing. This domain can be called the *aesthetic* level of historical writing.\(^78\) In historiographical work, the aesthetics is comprised of axiomatic rules, the “un-written” part of a scholarly work, which define the reasonings and choices of a researcher’s writing process.\(^79\) They are rarely explicated and remain invisible under the surface level of the text, but nevertheless they form a


\(^78\) Tracking the aesthetic in scholarly work can begin by distinguishing the descriptive and prescriptive statements of given historiographical work (Stolleis 1998, 39), but my aim is to show that such a distinction in the end is not sufficient since aesthetics (however descriptive it might seem) also takes a normative stance while illuminating the past (cf. Ankersmit 2012).

\(^79\) The concept is Frank Ankersmit’s (Frank Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience*. Stanford, Stanford UP 2005). It is a part of the research process in which the scholar is in imaginative dialogue with his public about how the concepts and chains of reasoning which he uses, adjust to public history, e.g. to the vision the public holds of history. However, these processes are largely disguised, and reasoning chains which affect a composition are hidden from the reader’s sight. See also Ankersmit 2012. On the imaginative dialogue between the scholar and his/her audience, see Jonathan Gorman, ‘History as a Fiction: The Pragmatic
foundation for the historiography of an individual historian. To put it another way, it is the level which is preconceived by the researcher’s scholarly identity.

According to Arthur C. Danto, analysis of the aesthetics of a cultural product should be divided into two parts: surface analysis and deep interpretation.\(^80\) When scrutinizing the surface intentions of a text, one concentrates on the conscious references that the author of that particular text has made and connected to his or her work. Consequently, a deep interpretation means tracking those links which define the view of an author outside the articulated process that guides his or her text. For example, one can argue (and it has been argued by Franz Wieacker) that Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s legal theory was at the surface level an endeavor to historicize the study of law in society, but in a more hidden way and possibly unconsciously his writings were guided by his reluctance and distrust of social change in contemporary society.\(^81\) This preconception shaped the meaning of Savigny’s texts; it appeared and can be read on the aesthetic level of his works. Underneath the explicit references of Savigny’s works lay his scholarly identity, which defined his stance and approach towards the historical subject matter and research questions. Wieacker put this mental working model into words as follows:

The legal historian’s attitude to his subject matter is akin to that of the individual reflecting on his own past behavior, who asks “How did this come about?”, “How did we fare in the situation?”; the historian should similarly feel that the answer is significant to him personally.\(^82\)

So, it is worthwhile to analyze the aesthetics of Wieacker’s works, since he himself saw it as not only possible, but important to study the intertwinement of personal experience, tradition and one’s subject matter in legal history. In order to make a deep interpretation of a historiographical text – to track the historical vision of its author – one has to make an attempt to understand the larger worldview of the historian and find the structures of thinking that this particular researcher does not actively reflect or question, but takes them as axiomatic rules of the social world and of human behavior. In other words, analyzing the aesthetic level of historiography means addressing the interpretative space of a given historian, where the demands of the social context, personal valuations and the requirements of epistemological coherence in a historical representation merge. It was this space which Wieacker called ‘mature experience’.\(^83\)

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\(^83\) Cf. fn. 76.
ty, no matter how learned it might be and cultivated with abstract knowledge, is, nevertheless, an affective identity. The self-image of a scholar is no more rational nor immune to beliefs, emotions and presuppositions than any other self-image. Rather, scholarly identities too, are worldviews where emotional and intellectual domains of human understanding intertwine, combine together, and co-operate.

Many cognitive theories hold that the concept of a human being, our understanding of ourselves, is based on memory and response. The self-image of a person consists of a cumulative number of memories, experiences, and learned ways of acting, which are stored and organized in that person’s autobiographical memory. This accumulated data about human interaction comprises the person’s social agency, the actions and thoughts of which loosely follow a certain pattern. In short, we are narrative creatures. The ‘self’ is a story constructed on the bases of distinguished memories and schemas, where previous experiences seem to verify one’s interpretation of the present and open up new perspectives and possibilities for an individual.84

The narrative self-image is molded in constant interaction with other people, and in a way it comes to life when it is translated into words and shared with others. Our identity is tested through joint reminiscences with other people, creating a cycle whereby one’s personal experience is shaped by others and a joint understanding of such cultural phenomena lives and develops through single interpretations.85 In order to maintain a confident and stable identity one needs to find congruence between socially appreciated values and one’s autobiographical narrative.86 It is this congruence between a confident self-image and socially appreciated meaning that people try to reach in social interaction. The ways to achieve compatibility between a personal narrative identity and a historical meaning (a publically held master narrative about the nature of the world) in or-

86 Thus, a cycle of identity formation is also about compatibility between one’s autobiographical narrative or the internal model of emotions and language, and the cultural idea of ‘significance’ as it displays itself in communication within social occasions and cultural traits. H.R. Markus & S. Kitayma, ‘Cultures and Selves: A Cycle of Mutual Constitution,’ in Perspectives on Psychological Science 5 (2010), 421; S.A. White, ‘Learning to Communicate,’ in Current Opinion in Neurobiology 11 (2001), 510–520.
order to achieve confidence concerning the bases of one’s subjectivity, varies depending on culture and place.87

To sum up, there is no stable ground for the ‘I,’ and it is instead created in constant interaction and revised to fit a changing environment. If surety in its continuity for some reason ceases to exist, the identity of a person is felt to dissolve, since each and every new event will appear to be a challenge to one’s identity. The premise for a temporal ‘I’ is the certainty of a capability to create schemas and bind emotions to an autobiographical narrative which gives rise to the understanding, direction and meaning of the ‘self’ moving in time.88 In fact, it is the certainty of both a personal life script but also its counterpart, a culturally upheld ‘significance’ in history, which need to be reached in order to gain individual sense of meaningfulness to one’s personal narrative, to the story of ‘I’ among others.89

A breach or a blow to a personal ability to create temporal order can be called a trauma. A trauma challenges the presumption of the stability and continuity of one’s identity. It shatters the predictable and secure cultural norms of behavior. Thus, it paralyzes the individual skill to bind and divide things into past, present and future. One starts to see its echoes in upcoming events and in interaction, and it corrupts the new phenomena with a feeling of strangeness (unheimlich) or uncategorized anxiety.90 The explanation given to the world we live in might be strong, but it is built on sand. The collapsing of the order people have adopted for the events which influence their daily routines, otherwise blurred in unrestricted eternity, is a constantly hovering possibility which is evaded by reproducing and strengthening the explanations they have come up with.91

87 Becoming a competent subject thus means participating in an ever-evolving network of activities and practices, where “sociality” is not only “comprised of normative order, rational agents, discourses, intersubjectivity or material structures” but also of evolving patterns of doings, “which carry their agents and are at the same time carried (out) by them.” Andreas Reckwitz, ‘Affective Spaces: A Praxeological Outlook,’ in Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice 16 (2012):2, 248.
88 See e.g. Cozolino 2010, 151–161.
89 Robyn Fivush, ‘Subjective Perspective and Personal Timeline in the Development of Autobiographical Memory,’ in Berntsen & Rubin 2012, 239.
91 “For whenever and wherever we engage with life in its details, it is undeniable that we and those close to us experience injustice on a daily basis. To be able to bear with equanimity what happens both generally and to us personally we need to have an intimation of a plan for
I. Introduction

The possibility of an all-shattering trauma is, however, tangible with respect to the collective life as well. The same need for an explanatory ‘plan’ also involves social entities, which also face the futile task of finding solid and sustainable explanations. How should one compare and evaluate experiences if the order and hierarchy they are given, which distinguishes or merges them into other events, proves to be inaccurate? How can we (as a collective) make sense of temporality if everything is in constant change, and more importantly and devastatingly, when no one is outside this same tide as an observer? To avoid both collective and personal trauma at all cost is a human way to enable one’s basic social life. To build figural relationships between phenomena distinct in temporal dimension is our way to make the world a more comprehensible and easier space to conduct social action. These relationships provide the scale and measure for personal earthly tragedies by revealing the absolute idea of sacrifice and sorrow. If it is to be removed, a structural ontological similarity between a personal pain and a transcendental model of sorrow vanishes, and some aspects of the cultural sense of being understood and accepted are lost. This absence of a scale with which to measure one’s experiences, and consequently the horror of an undirected flow of time, is avoided by cultural means like historical writing.

Historians rarely write about their own scholarly identity – the unquestionable principles, fears, dogmatic theoretical axioms and desires in their historical works. Often, however, they comment on the identities of other (past) scholars. It is not far-fetched to claim that at the same time, in an indirect way, they expli-

92 Rik Peters (Peters 2006, 373) finds this ‘horror of historicity’, in Fascist Italy but also in present modern societies, which are inspired by the changeability of the world, where nothing is absolutely given: “At the same time, the belief that reality is history is the most uncanny [unheimlich] awareness humans can have. For how can we live in a world in which nothing is given, no principles, no truths, no fixed points, in a world in which historicity in itself is not given, but always appears as a construction of our own?”

93 Hayden White concludes on Auerbach’s thoughts: “Indeed, if, in many respects, Mimesis is ultimately the story of how Western literature came to grasp historicity as humanity’s distinctive mode of being in the world, this mode of being in the world is represented as one in which individuals, events, institutions, and (obviously) discourses are apprehended as bearing a distinctively figural relationship to one another.” White 1996, 137; cf. David Carr, Time, Narrative and History. Indianapolis, Indiana UP 1986.

cate their own historical vision. Similarly, Franz Wieacker wrote about the emotional presuppositions which guided the work of Rudolf Jhering:

As he matured, he turned from intellectual fantasy to social realism. These feelings were in tune with the times. Jhering’s personal experience was characteristic not just of his fellow jurists but of all his contemporaries; most original thinkers of the mid-century felt the joy or horror of waking up, of turning from dream to action. All Jhering’s subsequent work must be seen in the light of this Damascus.

Jhering faced the ‘experience of waking up,’ that is, the explanation he had given to the world of social affairs was not in accordance with reality. The scale which he had used to measure experiences was no longer valid. Nevertheless, through a process of ‘maturation’ Jhering was able to overcome that ontological breach and produce textual works in which his vision of historical meaning was congruent with the needs of his time. This process was not merely a rational decision to shift one’s scientific view. Wieacker describes it through a metaphorical reference to the abrupt revelation which Apostle Paul experienced on the road to Damascus. So, to Wieacker, the mental tool which legal historians utilize in their works is not comprised solely of “epistemological rules” and “norms,” for this worldview is more close to identity. It was just as much based on an affective understanding of the world of social affairs.

b) Historiography as an affective practice and the historical vision in action

In the previous section we saw that when a historian writes history, frames out the temporal experience from time, plots it, and links this historical idea to his/her culture, the writing process from the beginning is a mixture in which “objective and subjective dimensions are always already intertwined and perpetually interact with each other.” In the research process a scholar is in a dialogue with the historical sources and cultural truth as defined by the scientific community. Writing on the other hand means adjusting one’s scientific questioning and priorities to the public “need” for historical results and persuading people to understand and uphold the importance of this viewpoint and research. In order to

95 Such a method was emblematic e.g. to Carl Schmitt in his quest to illuminate German legal history. Mehring 2014.
98 This distinction between researching and writing history is indeed an important feature for my study. To many scholars, writing history is more a task of adjusting, choosing and deciding about source material and putting one’s experience and vision into words. Jorma Kalela
make the past relevant to one’s audience, a historian needs to link the phenomena he is studying to contemporary society. He has to translate bygone events and adjust them to our perception of the world. In short, historiography is juxtaposing phenomena from one’s time to (allegedly) similar events in the past through language.\textsuperscript{99}

Within this process, however, a historian faces the unavoidable gap between the past historical experience and the present one. This constitutive gap in historiography has also been articulated as an incongruity between language and reality, or the distance between historical experience and writing.\textsuperscript{100} Where should one place “the glossators” of our culture? How should one consider such expressions as “the enthusiasm brought about by the Industrial Revolution” or “the conservative worldview of the 19th-century liberalists”? The historical traces that encouraged historians to assume that such phenomena existed, have to be linked to other events and be supplied with cause and consequence in order to be understandable.\textsuperscript{101} While interpreting sources through one’s historical vision, researchers come to fulfill the incomplete presentation with “other accepted facts” from their society or personal history, thus allowing them to give a coherent representation of history.\textsuperscript{102} In their attempt to fill this gap between the reality of a historical event and an understandable elaboration of it, historians deploy the tool of historical vision, but in such a way that the reader understands their personal interpretation of these historical events. Historical vision has to function in a way that it mediates between the experience of a historian and the experiences of the reading audience. This underlines the fact that in the realm of academic historiography, historical vision is not an individual fantasy but is connected to a scholarly identity, which in turn is tied to the vocabulary provided by tradition and by scientific paradigms.\textsuperscript{103} The individual scholarly ‘experience’ or ‘vision’ talks about reconstruction and argumentation. Jorma Kalela, \textit{Making History: The Historian and Uses of the Past}. New York, Palgrave Macmillan 2012, 132–145; cf. Tosh 1991, 1–2, 26–27.

\textsuperscript{99} Tosh 1991, 38–40; Kalela 2012, 94.
\textsuperscript{100} See Ankersmit 2012, 59–64.
\textsuperscript{101} Robinson 2010, 504.
\textsuperscript{102} Paul Ricoeur, \textit{Time and Narrative Vol. 2} 1990, 155; Or in other words, historians use the same emotional styles that they apply in their personal lives to create narratives in and about the past. Gammel 2012.
\textsuperscript{103} Jorma Kalela asserts (Kalela 2005, 294–297) that every scholar has “one’s thing” which they keep working on throughout their writings. This “thing” is a group of conditions for cognition, a collection of very personal opinions which are not necessarily associated with any scientific school or political stance of a scholar. They still nevertheless frame research and form a base for a vision that connects the scientific works of a researcher. “One’s thing” is divided into three levels. 1. \textit{The ontological level} of defining mechanisms behind recent and distant societal changes. It holds the scholar’s answers to the questions concerning \textit{what exists}? The
3. Theory and Methodology: Deconstructing the historiographical act

is translated into concepts and expressions which are emblematic of academic historical writing, and are familiar both to the historian and to his audience.¹⁰⁴

As a result, the actual work of the historical vision – bridging the gap between the past historical experience and the present one as well as overcoming the otherness of the past – on the level of the text is performed with the help of established linguistic tools, such as narratives, metaphors or concepts.¹⁰⁵ The argument behind this book is that historical narratives, metaphors, and concepts, ‘the bridging tools’ deployed by the practice of historiography are not only linguistic structures, but cognitive means in conceptualizing the world of experiences. In this way history is made shareable and accessible to other people in a way which mediates emotional coherence and continuity, confidence rather than incoherence.¹⁰⁶ Narratives, metaphors and concepts are means to express history as a meaningful and substantive part of people’s lives.¹⁰⁷

To Reinhart Koselleck, the normative vocabulary of society, that is concepts, have been constructed through time.¹⁰⁸ A single concept evolves through inter-

answers provide an explanation to an ontological structure of the world; the future as derived from past and present; an outline understanding of historical development and its presence in the scholar’s time. ² The in-group level of shared fears, desires and moral principles, in other words, the researcher’s moral standpoints about society. According to Kalela, the researcher’s intention in all of his works is to defend some statement or proposal about the moral condition of society, present or forthcoming; the distinguishing of ideal, acceptable and disapproved behavior as constructed in the networks of friends, family, and academic colleagues. ³ The scientific level of heretical and respected methods in history as well as the role of science in relation to the national and public good. For the scholar himself, what is the nature of his pursuit? What kind of means is he ready to employ in analyzing reality?

¹⁰⁴ Wieacker himself rejected the idea that concepts could be straightforwardly applied from one culture to another. Rather, the meaning which the concepts embedded had to be translated into terms prevailing in the receiving culture: “Perhaps the genetic model of modern biology is the most appropriate model for the historian of the effect of the ancient civilization on its daughter culture in Europe, for it sees the transmission of life from generation to generation in terms of information: living forms reproduce themselves by means of genetic information, which like a matrix engenders and builds new organisms with the same or similar form.” Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 26.


¹⁰⁷ Barbara Dancygier & Eve Sweetser, Figurative Language. Cambridge, Cambridge UP 2014, 8: “Figurative language usages appear to be pervasive in all languages – and the reason is apparently that they reflect patterns of human cognition.”

¹⁰⁸ Koselleck distinguishes certain ground concepts (Grundbegriffe) from other normative
twinement with social structures, and it is used in different contexts, thus it embeds layers of meanings and contains a metahistorical meaning. As a result, a concept can be utilized in different contexts, but although it might be used to explicate a restricted actual phenomenon, it also manifests meanings beyond the temporal and spatial frames of the phenomenon it explicates. Concepts utilize the abstract past in their task of signifying concrete, everyday events.\(^{109}\) Conceptual historical theories assert that concepts hold within the commending and condemning meaning of language. Concepts reflect the social reality – they are the normative vocabulary of society – but they also concurrently categorize this reality from the stance of the one who utilizes the normative vocabulary.\(^{110}\) How a concept is used in a given time and context should be of prior importance in every conceptual analysis. For example, \textit{Volksgemeinschaft} was not only a word for a certain social constellation. While it was used, it also defined a right kind of social being, as well as its opposite, and the tension between these two positions. Thus, \textit{Volksgemeinschaft} as a word and a concept was a symbol for social change, activity and values.

It is important to emphasize that this work does not analyze jurisprudential concepts, but concepts utilized in historical writing. The usage and purpose of both linguistic tools - jurisprudential and historical concepts – is to create analogies and gather a phenomenon under a textual device, but historical concepts embed a meaning of temporality and existence in time.\(^{111}\) Furthermore, whereas


\(^{110}\) Both Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck emphasize the connection between conceptual history and the study of social structures. E.g. Koselleck 2011, 18: “[C]oncepts are discussed according to their sociopolitical rather than their linguistic function.” To Skinner, significant social structures are essentially rhetorical and refer to values and norms. See e.g. Quentin Skinner, ‘Rhetoric and Conceptual Change,’ in Kari Palonen (ed.), \textit{Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought} 1999, 60–73.

\(^{111}\) Wieacker explicitly rejected the priority of jurisprudential concepts, and a continuous fight against \textit{Begriffjurisprudenz} is a foundational theme in his works stretching from the 1930s to the late 1960s (see Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung revisited,’ [1976/77] 476). Nevertheless, he did conceptualize history, but called his terms “types” of European history (see Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 6 fn. 9). Accordingly, \textit{Rechtswissens} and \textit{Rechtsgewissen} were not jurisprudential concepts, but were terms used in elaborating the
Reinhart Koselleck was mostly interested in the way concepts were used in political language, this study focuses on the theme of how concepts are used in the legal historical texts of an individual scholar. As a result, I will have to take into account the distinct manner of writing scientific historiography. In other words, while analyzing the use of concepts in a given body of legal historical texts, one has to acknowledge the instructional influence of the historiography preceding the body of texts under scrutiny. Scientific historiography is always contextualized within a tradition and is related to the arguments of other scholars.

As a practice within modern society, academic historical writing, nevertheless, also serves affective purposes. Historiography encourages a trust in cultural and individual tools deployed to find and/or create analogies between phenomena distinct from each other in chronological measure, thus providing a temporal order for unrestricted and unlimited time. Historiography makes the ‘I’ more grounded in a world of change and in the world of others, not only by producing normative information about the world, but also allowing one to create an emotional coherence to time as a subjective experience. One could say that historiography, among other affective practices deployed to come to terms with temporality, is a means to find certainty or confidence in experienced time, to overcome the otherness of the past. It is both written to give meaning to unattached temporal events, but also used as a proof of a correct interaction between people and their culture. Thus my approach to the concept within historiographical texts departs from that of Koselleck’s and Skinner’s with respect to the metaphorical relationship between norms and attitudes or experience (cf. Wieacker, ‘A History of Private Law’ 1995, 2).


113 Runia (2007, 319, 323) elaborates how a “sublime historical event,” either experienced or committed, produces a need to make a new standpoint habitable or understandable. It can later turn into an ‘ontological homesickness,’ “a desire to get into contact with the numinosity of history.” See also LaCapra 2001, 48–52; cf. Habermas 2012, 46–49.

114 Emily Robinson (2010, 504) vividly expresses how the re-enactment and physical presence of historical material produces an ambiguous sensation of ‘pastness.’ On the other hand it produces an ‘unavoidable awareness of its absence,’ and on the other ‘a feeling of genuineness.’ The latter emotion has also been described as ‘credibility,’ ‘firmness’ and ‘emotional knowing.’ It seems that it is this feeling about ‘real historical knowledge’ which historians still pursue, although the task of writing a totally objective historical representation is widely considered to be impossible.
and interpretative latitude I give to concepts. In its attempt to bind past, present and future to a coherent whole, metaphorical means are essential for historical writing.

In his 1963 article ‘Die Fortwirkung der antiken Rechtskulturen in der europäischen Welt,’ Franz Wieacker attempted to represent the multifaceted phenomenon of the diffusion and reception of Roman law to the later legal cultures of Europe. To explicate the complicated phenomenon in a short and textual form was difficult, so he used metaphors to illuminate the process: “Like the descendents inherit the hereditary factors of their parents, so does the ‘daughter culture’ inherit the characteristics of the ‘mother culture.’” In another context, he described the mentality which had prevailed in German culture towards the idea of Rome by referring the historical juxtaposition to a parable in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, asserting that the idea of Rome has been perceived as “the Grand Inquisitor.” Furthermore, he pictures the increasing awareness of ancient culture in medieval Europe as the growing up of a child: “[I]n the same way as individuals come to understand their parents better as they

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115 Despite the fact that Koselleck here and there explicitly labels concepts as metaphors, and acknowledged the translational and interpretative performance they involve, he never took his analysis further in that direction. Mostly this decision seemed be due to a lack of time and resources. See Koselleck 2011, 33–34; also Timo Pankakoski, ‘Carl Schmitt Versus the ‘Intermediate State’: International and Domestic Variants,’ in History of European Ideas 39 (2013):2, 241–266.


118 “Wie die Abkömmlinge die Erbfaktoren der Eltern übernehmen, so erbte die ‘Tochterkultur’ Eigenschaften der ‘Mutterkultur.’”, Ibid. 80.

themselves mature.”

In this, of course, Wieacker was not alone. Historiography does not juxtapose ‘true’ phenomena in a loose way, but instead emphasizes the genuine bond and similar essence between ‘real’ objects. The figural relations between events, the claim that phenomena distinct in chronological time can be labelled under a historical meaning or that a later event can somehow be defined by a former, is backed by metaphorical language. A very common metaphorical claim of the 1930s that “fascist Italy is like ancient Rome” is a temporal, historical argument. It puts two social, complex entities in a correlative relation, where the entities of both fascist Italy and ancient Rome define and explain each other, and more importantly, fascist Italy is seen as the later fulfillment of ancient Rome, in history and in essence. But a metaphorical connection involves an affective sphere. In a metaphorical frame, temporally distinct phenomena – which in the case of historiography have been reconstructed from textual traces and as such are without emotional content – receive an affective dimension. In other words, in its task to bridge the gap between language and reality, historiography also uses emotional means when it gives us the feeling of continuity amidst infinitude. Consequently, acknowledging the metaphorical aspect enables the researcher of past historiography to take into account the affective, personal dimension of figurative language and of historical writing. Accordingly, Joanne Bourke argues

122 Cf. Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village 1294–1324. Bungay, Richard Clay 1984, 338–339: “Today Catharism is no more than a dead star, whose cold but fascinating light reaches us now after an eclipse of more than a half a millennium. But Montaillou itself is much more than a courageous but fleeting deviation. It is the factual history of ordinary people. It is Pierre and Béatrice and their love; it is Pierre Maury and his flock; it is the breath of life restored through a repressive Latin register that is a monument of Occitanian literature. Montaillou is the physical warmth of the ostal, together with the ever-recurring promise of a peasant heaven.” In these metaphors, LeRoy Ladurie places within the text elusive feelings of warmth, love and communality which seem to emerge from the ‘factual’ history of this Occitanian village. LeRoy Ladurie suggests that in the text of Montaillou human emotions are translated into action and they emerge as ‘naturally’ placed in this written history within their correct premises and conclusions. The presupposition is that when one reads Montaillou one can share and embody these emotions by observing the actions of past people.
123 The semantic analysis of metaphors is a rapidly growing discipline, which has benefitted substantially from the results and approaches of cognitive sciences. See e.g. Zoltán Kövecses, Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling. New York: Cambridge UP 2000; Lakoff & Johnson 2003; Gibbs 2008; Dancygier & Sweetser 2014.
that metaphors within history and in historical texts need to be studied in terms of the domains of language, culture and affections.\textsuperscript{124}

For example, when Carl Schmitt asserted that in German history “Jews are like parasites,”\textsuperscript{125} his offending metaphor referred implicitly and explicitly to the preceding anti-Semitic representations already existing in German culture.\textsuperscript{126} Furthermore, the parasite-metaphor exploited the common and current assumptions in capitalist society, where individuals whose behavior (especially with respect to work) diverged from the communal average were accused of sucking at the fruits of other’s work as well as at the vitality of respectable folk.\textsuperscript{127} Thus, Schmitt’s metaphor was bound to and referred to the domains of common language (fashionable expressions and linguistic categorizations used in explaining common world) and cultural meanings (traditional anti-Semitism). In addition, the metaphor also mediated the affective meanings from the author to the receiving audience. Parasites can be felt. This metaphor produced a bodily sensation at the receiving end. By the means of a metaphor, Schmitt was able to communicate his emotional experience of hatred and scorn of Jews to contemporary readers, who might not share his antisemitism, but nevertheless understood his emotions, since the dread of parasites was and is a basic and common emotion.


\textsuperscript{126} Of course, Schmitt referred first and foremost to Hitler’s rhetoric (see e.g. Adolf Hitler, \textit{Mein Kampf}: “The Jews’ life as a parasite in the body of other nations and states… ”, “[H]is existence as a parasite on other people…,” quoted in Benjamin C. Sax & Dieter Kuntz, \textit{Inside Hitler’s Germany: A Documentary History of Life in the Third Reich}. Lexington, D.C. Heath & Co. 1992, 200). Nevertheless, Hitler was not the first to use this offensive metaphor (cf. Eva Holmberg, \textit{Jews in the Early Modern English Imagination: A Scattered Nation}. Burlington, Ashgate 2011, 147). The underlying and very common anti-Semitism of early twentieth-century Europe is a widely acknowledged fact (see e.g. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, \textit{Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. 3. Band: Von der “Deutschen Doppelrevolution” bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges 1849–1914}. München, C.H.Beck 1995, 924–34, 1063–66). The parasite metaphor was widely used when abstract prejudices or negative emotions were channeled into discriminating and violent social acts.

A semantic analysis of the strategically placed metaphors within the historical argumentation, such as the above-mentioned example by Schmitt, nevertheless does not quite reach the wider affective practice of historiography, which seeks to bring confidence to otherwise irrational or unorganized temporal experience. In post-War Germany, scholars often in their correspondence struggled to articulate their overflowing emotion of unattachedness. The time seemed to lack meaning, and any actions felt futile. The extent to which historiography was used to bring meaning into everyday life was evident and at the same time puzzling.\footnote{An example of this kind of usage of history is the common phenomenon of “academias” established in POW camps after the Second World War. Franz Wieacker, Helmut Coing, Fernand Braudel, among others, lectured about history in these camps. The purpose was to bring confidence and comfort to prisoners, whose previous idea of the social world was being demolished in the war. Cf. Liebs 2011, 28–29.}

Historiography was utilized in order to evoke an affectively-colored notion of continuity and confidence, not only in the abstract historical world, but in the experience world of its audience. To address this phenomenon, one needs to analyze the figural use of history and the historical metaphors it is constituted of.

Frank Ankersmit (2012) argues that a historical representation as a whole is like a metaphor in its three-step reference to the past. What differentiates the historical metaphor from other rhetorical concepts is that a historian’s representation not only constructs a narrow analogy of a text and reality, but a metaphorical connection in history envelops the whole reality surrounding the sources and subject matter deployed by the historian.\footnote{Ankersmit 2012, 68–69, 103; Ankersmit’s historical metaphor comes quite close to the notion of \emph{conceptual metaphor} as defined by Zoltan Kövecses (2010), where an abstract conceptual domain (for example ‘real life’) is understood through another more coherent, concrete, organization of experience. A conceptual metaphor (such as ‘life is a journey’) is distinguished from other, smaller linguistic metaphors (‘He is without direction in life’) which map and make use of this more comprehensive discourse in language. Zoltan Kövecses, \emph{Metaphor: A Practical Introduction}. New York, Oxford UP 2010, 4–8.} In historical metaphors, emotions are not only used as fundamental building blocks in constructing the represented connection within time, they are also the factors that make the argumentative claim personally recognizable to the audience.\footnote{Kövecses argues that in language (as well as in historiographical texts) ‘emotions are forces’ (Kövecses 2000, 61–62).} The coherence which a metaphorical connection embeds enables one to emotionally attune to the past; a historical account can be assimilated into one’s narrative identity and utilized as evidence of a correct interaction between people and their culture.\footnote{See fn. 122: metaphorical language enables the reader to perceive a historiographical argument as a historical metaphor. Thus, \emph{Montaillou} by LeRoy Ladurie is a representation of life in a distant Occitanian village, although ‘life’ is crafted from partial textual sources and grafted onto the text. It is such emotions, connected and interpreted as a part of larger cause-ef-}
I. Introduction

Presentation can arouse an experience in the reader: ‘Think about those people, so distant in time but still so recognizable in their being!’ The life in the abstract past was like our life. This verbalization of the reader’s undefined senses is something that Paul Ricoeur calls ‘the pleasure of recognition.’ A recognition of similarity, of a congruence between emotional narratives of the historiographical text and the autobiographical identity of the reader, not just between detached emotions or cause-effect sequences, will occur as ‘emotional knowledge.’

Erich Auerbach calls this comprehensive, temporal metaphor established in the realm of history a *figura*. *Figura* as a linguistic (and emotional) tool has a temporal dimension, which produces an affective perspective on history, enabling one to evade ‘the horror of historicity’ and deal with past events like they were personal experiences. Figural interpretation withholds the idea of reading a script, of seeing the continuity and connection in time and achieving truth. Although figural relationships reveal only a partial truth about the world, they are found and constructed in the hope of uncovering a general ontological truth about the world people live in. To explain history as figurally fulfilling for the interpreter conducting it, contained an idea of his or her ‘fixed point’ outside the stream of time, from which the world could be commented on ‘seriously’ or with ‘high style.’


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133 Like Tillman, Habermas (Habermas 2012, 37) states, “[S]ubjectivity and meaning in a temporal world, which seemingly lacks any direction, are constituted through ‘motive-consequence links’ that give a sense of agency and direction to a life and help bridge change and development in the individual” (emphasis mine).

134 Auerbach 1938.

135 Through figural interpretation one could see the general ontological order (veritas) in a particular truth (certum). The figural interpretation of the connection between two events was at first a spiritual act, linked to God’s meaning, and later a mode of close reading, with confidence about the “true nature” of the fulfillment [Erfüllung]. Auerbach 1938, 72–74. Similarly, Eelco Runia (2007) treats historiography as a “metonym”: as a metaphorical depiction of a partial representative of the whole.

136 Auerbach 1959, 547; In the words of Fernand Braudel (Braudel 1982, 23): “To describe, analyze, compare and explain usually means standing aside from historical narrative: it means ignoring or willfully chopping up the continuous flow of history.”
‘rebirth’ of an era in the succeeding times by means of such concepts as ‘continuity,’ ‘reception,’ and ‘renaissance.’ He concluded that in order to explicate the historical meaning of continuity from the world of Antiquity to medieval Europe the researcher had to use ‘mediating concepts’ which translate the ‘indeterminateness’ of the historical reality into a truthful ‘presentation’: “Without such concepts [Here Wieacker uses the word Bild (‘picture’, image’ or ‘figure’) but refers to the above-mentioned concepts and metaphors] the historian of culture and legal order cannot subsume and make visible the immense diversity of the interaction of effects.” The most important feature however in Wieacker’s text is the way in which the truthfulness of a given ‘presentation’ is measured:

The cultural historian will most likely find such a picture [Bild: which again refers either to a metaphor or concept] in line with his or her scientific experience of the effects of an older culture on its following culture.

Wieacker acknowledges the metaphorical dimension of the ‘mediating’ concepts by seeing no distinction between them and metaphors. The problem is not whether the researcher’s ‘presentation’ mediates affections to the audience, after all the ‘continuity’ of ancient legal cultures is very much a continuity of “moral and intellectual judgements”, but whether the given ‘presentation’ is congruent with the researcher’s ‘scientific experience,’ that is, his historical vision or scholarly identity. In order to mediate the idea of continuity from Antiquity to the modern world, which for Wieacker was not only obvious but also a foundational feature in European legal history, he relied on ‘concepts’ which were personally recognizable to the audience. These concepts had been used before in historiography, they were understandable in the light of the common culture in which Wieacker wrote, but they also evoked a personal affection for continuity and a confidence in the reader. In other words, the linguistic devices Wieacker utilized in expressing the idea of continuity and confidence were constructed concurrently comprising the domains of language, culture and affections.

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139 “Ein solches Bild wird der Historiker der Kulturen noch am ehesten im Einklang finden mit seiner wissenschaftlichen Erfahrung von den Wirkungen einer älteren Kultur auf ihre Tochterkultur.”, Ibid. 80. Emphasis mine.
140 Ibid. 81, “moralischen und intellektuellen Grundwertungen.”
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Such was the case also with the concepts Wieacker used when he described the ideas of the common understanding of the rule of law and justice within history. These entities he represented using the terms *Rechtsbewusstsein* and *Rechtsgewissen*.

For reasons of succinctness and readability, I have in this book often used the translations ‘legal consciousness’ and ‘legal conscience.’ These concepts were key terms in Wieacker’s attempt to analyze and have an effect on legal culture. Semantically, both words are constituted by connecting the German word ‘law’ with a term that describes a mental or spiritual action. Thus already in their semantics they bridged the social sphere of norms and individual perception. The concepts were established expressions in the tradition of German legal science. Not only Wieacker, but also other scholars applied and sometimes redefined them, within a similar or slightly different context. In Wieacker’s texts these words were not mere meta-level tools. To him, they had an empirical equivalence both in the minds of European individuals as well as in the German legal system and in correct application of the law. Naturally, Wieacker was not dogmatic in using these concepts through his long career, but they did nevertheless always express a dual ontology. They illuminated the juridical havoc of modern society as well as the persistent mentality inside a European mind. The concepts formed a bridge between distinct historical phenomena. Juridical developments inside the European continent, separated by time and national cultures, could all be related to these ways of thinking. Using *Rechtsbewusstsein* and *Rechtsgewissen* as uniting abstractions, he represented the past as an entity which sustained a meaning and direction and was significant to people on a personal level.

A preliminary reading of his scientific writings revealed four thematic domains, which not only regularly appeared in connection to the common understanding of the rule of law and justice, but remained as significant entities within his texts throughout his career, from the 1930s to the 1970s. I have labeled these themes *Stand*, *Bildung*, *Schöpfung* and *Kameradschaft*. It is argued that these themes relate to the concepts of *Rechtsbewusstsein* and *Rechtsgewissen* as sub-concepts. With their help, through the affective and evaluative tension they withheld, a scientific concept, nominally emotion- and value-free tool, was further filled with social meanings. Whereas the themes of ‘Perfection through education’ (*Bildung*), and ‘An estate based on abilities’ (*Stand*) are related to the concept of *Rechtsbewusstsein*, *Rechtsgewissen* was partly defined with the

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141 On *Rechtsgewissen* see Liebs 2010; on *Rechtsbewusstsein* see Avenarius 2010.
142 e.g. Wieacker, *Privatrechtsgeschichte* 1952, 260.
143 I will further elaborate the sub-concepts of *Bildung* and *Stand* in chapter II. For now, on the relation of *Bildung* to *Rechtsbewusstsein*, see e.g. Wieacker, *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus* 1955, 55: “allgemein Bildungshöhe” explained the (temporal) success of Eastern Roman “legal
help of ‘Scientific creativity’ (Schöpfung) and the ‘In-group of alike’ (Kameradschaft).\textsuperscript{144}

In order to find answers to my research questions, I will focus on the conceptual change in the terms Rechtsgewissen and Rechtswissen sein. My attempt is not to study these concepts per se, but instead the way Wieacker used them. I argue that in scrutinizing what these concepts exactly signified in Wieacker’s texts and how those meanings changed in time, I am able to clarify Wieacker’s view of society – his historical vision – as well as the continuities and discontinuities in his historiography. Along the lines of the above-elaborated theoretical stance, I take Wieacker’s Rechtsgewissen and Rechtswissen sein to comprise the domains of language, culture and affections. In other words, these notions were related to the previous scientific tradition (language). The overall social and political changes in Germany had an effect on their meaning (culture), but these changes were always perceived through Franz Wieacker’s historical vision. In other words, the domain of culture was always being referred to and compared with his scholarly identity, the worldview which he shared with his close colleagues (affections), and as a consequence it shaped the meanings of his texts.

\textsuperscript{144} Schöpfung and Kameradschaft will be dealt with in depth in chapter IV. For now, on Schöpfung, see e.g. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 17: [The European understanding of law as] “einer fachlich-geistigen, d. h. im weitesten Sinne wissenscahftlichen Schöpfung”, and 18: [Roman law as] “Fachschöpfung”; Wieacker, ‘Der Standort der römischen Rechtsgeschichte’ 1942, 55: “[the tradition of Roman law as an exemplary] Rechtsschöpfung”. On Kameradschaft: Wieacker uses the term Kameradschaft rarely (see Franz Wieacker, ‘Das Kitzbeberger Lager junger Rechtslehrer [1936]’, in Wollschläger (ed.) 2000, 163: “Kameradschaftliche Beziehung”), but Wieacker consistently and explicitly writes on the importance of “community” in scientific work. I have chosen the term Kameradschaft to represent the emphasis on “communality,” because this enables me to better depict the interaction between Wieacker’s ideas and social change. Thus, with Kameradschaft I represent the phenomenon which Wieacker also called “Gemeinwesen,” “Kreis,” “Genossenschaft” and, most often, “Zunft.” See e.g. Wieacker, ‘Friedrich Carl von Savigny’ 1960, 42: “der Juristenzunft [of nineteenth-century Germany]”; Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 447: “Gemeinwesen [of Roman Jurists]” and 446: “freie Zunft [of Roman lawyers]”; Wieacker, ‘Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtswissen sein’ 1944, 24: “fachlichen Berufsgemeinschaft.”
4. Structure and Methods

The previous biographies of Franz Wieacker enable me to construct a chronological timeline of the events he encountered in 1933–1968. I will complete the picture with respect to the network of friends and phases that have not previously been sufficiently elaborated, with the information found from his correspondence. So in chapter two “The biographical background of Franz Wieacker in the collapsing bourgeois society before 1934,” my attempt is to show the social position of Franz Wieacker in the fields of his contemporary legal science, higher education and German citizenship.

While analyzing Wieacker’s correspondence I will, indeed I must, follow a hermeneutical process as described by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. Wieacker was, probably even to a larger extent than his friends, a legal scientist. He saw the world as a legal entity. He was also a highly learned scholar. Wieacker enjoyed expressing himself with the vocabulary provided by German literature and humanistic culture. Throughout his career, he searched and experimented with different ways to address social reality as perfectly as possible. Thus it is often very difficult for me to examine the meanings and messages in his letters. His arguments are frequently so intertwined and cross-referenced to contemporary legal theories, poetry or classical texts that a straightforward thematic reading proves futile. In order to understand Wieacker’s ideas, it is necessary to read his letters in a hermeneutical circle: the references and claims found in certain letters are compared to secondary research literature or to other works to which they refer. The knowledge achieved in this way will be adjusted again to the text of the letters in order to further illuminate Wieacker’s ideas, and so on. The aim is not to give a final, coherent and single truth about the sayings and claims of Wieacker. Rather, I attempt to understand the world he inhabited, to see as far as possible the horizon which defined his representations.

In chapters III and IV I scrutinize the concepts Franz Wieacker used in his works. As items for analysis, I have chosen the concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein [legal consciousness] and Rechtsgewissen [legal conscience]. Although these concepts are key terms in Wieacker’s argumentation, he rarely uses them in his correspondence. The themes which these concepts signify, however, consistently circulate in his letters to colleagues. The values, historical ideas and structures as well as interpretations of these entities dominate the discussion in his correspondence, and comprise the domains of his writing for decades. So, in order to

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145 Liebs 2010, 29–30; On textual decisions in my method of analyzing Wieacker’s concepts, see p. 15 f. 43.
deconstruct the scientific meanings they connote, one needs to study Wieacker’s letters and his scientific works side by side.

The metaphorical emphasis determines the structure of my conceptual analysis in chapters III and IV as follows: (a) I take metaphorical language and concepts to be constituted in and mediated between the domains of language, affections and culture. Thus concepts need to be studied as consistently and concurrently bearing these spheres. Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen envelope an affective dimension which is a prerequisite for their metaphorical function. In short, these terms can be felt, both by the writer applying them and the individual reading his text. (c) I consider Rechtbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen to be comprised of smaller normative terms. These assisting, more socially grounded, concepts within a concept mapped the two basic concepts, which were contextualized more often within the domain of scientific language.

It is clear that historiography is not just a self-reflexive activity. Historians needs to adapt their stance to the frame of a scientific way of writing. The restrictions imposed by the tradition, methods and relevant terms have to be addressed if one is to write legal history. In the ‘language’ chapter of both concepts, I analyze the vocabulary Wieacker had at his disposal when expressing the experience of the society of his time. Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen were common concepts whose meanings were not decided solely by Wieacker. So when scrutinizing the meanings that Wieacker applied to history through those concepts, one has to take into account (as Wieacker did) the scientific meanings which were previously and diachronically stratified in them. In this section I will briefly analyze the usage of the above-mentioned core concepts by looking at a number of renowned classics of legal science and certain legal historians. I assume that the vocabulary and argumentation related to Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen in their texts plausibly presents the scientific horizon which also defined Wieacker’s works. I will also utilize previous historiographical analyses which address the academic and jurisprudential diachronic meanings of these concepts. These chapters enable me to sketch the scientific requisites and borders which affected Franz Wieacker’s aesthetics in his legal historical production.

In the analysis of the ‘culture’ domain regarding the concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen, I elaborate the political and social factors affecting society during the emergence of both concepts in Wieacker’s text. With respect to the general mental landscape of Germany between 1933 and 1968, I trust to the comprehensive and multifaceted picture provided by secondary research.

literature on social and mental history. I have categorized the vast body of histor-ical studies with the help of four thematic entities – Bildung [education], Stand [estate], Kameradschaft [comradeship] and Schöpfung [creation] – notions I have found in Wieacker’s texts. Consequently, from the research literature on early twentieth-century German culture, I have picked the works which somehow concentrate on these four themes. Reading them has allowed me to further elucidate the social reality of the concepts used by Franz Wieacker. Furthermore, in discussing the secondary research literature, I have given extra weight to those historical works which concentrate on contexts which were most familiar to Wieacker: academia, formal education, and science politics. Reading research literature will, I hope, reveal the diachronic changes within German society: the layered meanings in social reality and tensions inside and between fashionable slogans and legal historical concepts.

The distinguishing feature of my study, both concerning the conceptual-historical tradition as well as previous legal historical studies on the same subject, is the claim that I am able to reconstruct the interpretative sphere of Franz Wieacker’s scholarly identity by analyzing the language of his academic works and the social reality of early twentieth-century Germany. I intend to track the historical vision which he used to evaluate historical subject matter. This is done with respect to both central concepts (Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein) in the sections devoted to the affective domain (‘affections’). In concrete terms this means that I take the conceptualized social meanings I tracked in the preceding ‘culture’ chapter and compare them to the letters and conversations between Wieacker and his colleagues. The aim is to approach an understanding of the mentality of his in-group. I analyze how those contemporary phenomena, which somehow affected the themes of Bildung, Stand, Schöpfung and Kameradschaft, were handled in their discussions. I attempt to show that within this group, events were not taken as factors which demanded a reaction or explanation as such, but they were interpreted and fitted to a worldview which defined the group’s relation to the social reality. Later this collective world view, an interpretative sphere, guided Wieacker’s historical studies and appeared in the aesthetics of his works.

I will conclude the conceptual analysis of both Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein in chapters where I elaborate how these concepts were used in practice in Wieacker’s legal historical texts. I will scrutinize his works between the 1930s and the late 1960s, and study whether there was a conceptual change, and if so, what kind of change this was. Thus, in discussing Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein, the sections ‘language’, ‘culture’, and ‘affections’ focus on the process in which Wieacker connected his scholarly identity to the social meanings of his time, and in doing so created a historical vision of human affairs. This process
enabled him to understand fragmented historical sources as a part, a metonomy, of the larger field of human activity. I attempt to show how concepts which were constructed on the basis of a scholar’s experiences of contemporary society, were utilized to make sense of the past. Not only did historical vision act as an analytical tool, the analytical process itself was also the object of one’s study. Franz Wieacker used the concepts of Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein to study the same phenomena these concepts signified in Europe’s legal past. Consequently, the aesthetic dimension in his historiography (largely built up with the help of presuppositions, axioms and unconscious references), reflected the contemporary time and social surroundings but also became exceptionally personal and evident.

II. The biographical background of Franz Wieacker in the collapsing bourgeois society before 1934

Franz Wieacker was born on 5 August 1908 in Stargard. His father – also called Franz Wieacker – worked in courts around Northern Germany, so during his early years Franz junior lived in the cities of Stade and Celle before moving at the age of 17 to Tübingen to study law.\(^1\) Wieacker’s social background and upbringing were much like those of his later network of close colleagues.\(^2\) He studied in Stade in a Gymnasium, a humanist-oriented and exclusive form of secondary schooling whose students aimed at higher academic education. Wieacker’s family was firmly situated in the upper-middle class of German society and was (nominally) Protestant. Wieacker remembered the early years with his family as being happy, and he was brought up in the middle class traditions of his time. He was familiar with classical languages and texts, and was especially fond of Roman law.\(^3\) In Tübingen, Wieacker joined the Corps Rhenania, just like his brother and many relatives before him.\(^4\) Although the Corps Rhenania was not a Burschenschaft and did not explicitly adhere to militant and nationalistic worldview, it was a traditional all-male organization for the sons of bourgeois families. At the time it upheld the idea of the nobility of German – which meant conservative middle class – values. It is fair to say that Wieacker grew up in a bourgeois environment and was effectively initiated into its world views from an early age.

This background is not without importance with respect to Wieacker’s identity as a scholar and the aesthetics of his scientific works. Quite the contrary; throughout his career Wieacker emphasized the underlining morality of law, and its nature as an embodiment of social values.\(^5\) The virtues of responsibility, piety, and

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\(^1\) Liebs 2010, 23.
\(^3\) Behrends 1995, XVI.
\(^4\) Liebs 2010, 23.
II. The biographical background of Franz Wieacker

dignity, which he associated with law and legal scholarship can be traced to the world view of the early twentieth-century German middle class, or, to be more precise, the ideal type of social upheld by the German Bildungsbürgertum [educated middle class]. While one studies the intellectual history of early twentieth-century Germany, it is almost a rule that its scholars originated from a middle class environment. Thus, one should not overemphasize the fact that Wieacker and all of his associates came from bourgeois families. Nevertheless, since Franz Wieacker wrote of justice constructed on the idea of personal property, freedom and European virtues, it is vital to acknowledge that these ideas emerged from the intellectual atmosphere of the twentieth-century German Bildungsbürgertum. Franz Wieacker and his colleagues had been acculturated and socialized to this worldview since childhood. This connection is especially important with respect to the notions of Bildung and Stand, which Wieacker frequently utilized in his texts, and which constructed his idea of Rechtsbewusstsein, the legal consciousness of the people. Thus, I will next elaborate the meanings which Bildung and Stand were associated with in early twentieth-century Germany.

1. Bildung and Stand in the early twentieth century Germany

In the German bourgeois ethos, a certain kind of education, Bildung, was both a tool and purpose for a successful life, and an individual’s destiny was tied to the greater cause of the nation through it. Since the state was the provider of aca-
1. Bildung and Stand in the early twentieth century Germany

demic education and by far the most important employer of the academically educated, these two nineteenth-century innovations, university training and the nation state, were connected in the mentality of Bildungsbürgertum. In the rhetorical sphere, German Bildungsbürgertum was created, upheld and defined against other social groups with the help of Bildung.

The “learned bourgeoisie,” Bildungsbürgertum, distinguished itself from the workers and craftsmen in emphasizing social mobility and need for higher education, but also from the nobility and officers, whom the Bildungsbürgertum saw as backward, self-righteous, and tyrannical. In general, the values, beliefs and self-understanding associated with Bildungsbürgertum were strengthened and re-constructed in its own ethos, but also in public discussion, since newspapers, publishing houses and learned societies were very much owned, guided and occupied by middle class agents. The concept of Bildungsbürgertum, as well as its synonyms, such as Gebildete, learned ones, did not solely mean people who had studied a lot or were disposed towards seeing society built upon education, but a group of people with a particular social background, standard of living, employment and common perception of both socially appreciated behavior as well as degrading deeds.

It is not, however, entirely accurate to analyze Bildungsbürgertum as a monolithic whole. There were differences between professions, regional variations, asynchronic lines of development, and divergent attitudes with respect to social change within the German bourgeoisie. But in general terms, one can attach relative exclusiveness in education and professions, an ambiguous relation both to

(Hg.), Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, Teil I: Bildungssystem und Professionalisierung in internationalen Vergleichen. Stuttgart 1985, 9–26; David Blackbourn, ‘The German Bourgeoisie: An Introduction,’ in David Blackbourn & Richard J. Evans, The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century. London, Routledge 1991, 1). The middle class’s work, writings, clubs, and participation shaped a people’s mentality or public discussion. Öffentlichkeit was a bourgeois invention which they very much wanted to keep their own (Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Bd. 1: Handlungs-rationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung. Frankfurt am Main 1981). The great dispute over the German Sonderweg, was mostly a debate about the conditions and opinions of the German middle class, or Bürgertum (Wehler 1995, 482–484).


Habermas 1990.

This bourgeois mentality did not remain a dead letter or an abstraction. In early twentieth-century public discourse it was undisputed that middle class values promoted middle class action; these values were emblematic to people from middle class origins. Even today, in established historical studies, some deeds in the past are interpreted as being caused by the mentality of the Bildungsbürgertum. Cf. Moses 2006, 74–75; Mehring 2014, 92–93.
the state and to modernization, and a heritage of values and communality to the world view of Bildungsbürgertum.\textsuperscript{11} The professions provided by public administration, the church and (higher) education tended to work as reproducers of class division, since often – due to a relative social stagnation – sons followed in the footsteps of their fathers workwise, and in any case the education required for these professions was within reach and was desirable for the children of bourgeois families. The modernization process offered both possibilities but also evident threats to the lifestyle of Bildungsbürgertum. Concerning threats, most had to do with the (bourgeois) division between “Kulturnation” [cultural nation] and “Machtstaat” [power state], where the cultural world of Bildungsbürgertum was in perennial (albeit often reconcilable) contradiction with the administrative attempts of the state.\textsuperscript{12} With respect to actual social changes brought about by modernization, mass society and economic development, Bildungsbürgertum insisted that the modern challenges should be solved by means of bourgeois values. In its ethos ‘responsibility’ and ‘communality’ were virtues, which preceded administrative alterations, not the other way around.

As a concept, Bildung was more like an academic subfield, holding many interpretations and views. Although Bildung stood for a state of learnedness, it also signified a process where an individual through studying allegedly started to see the world in a critical, truthful manner, and emancipated himself [sic] to work on behalf of the greater social cause. Naturally, this kind of learning often, but not necessarily always, was supposed to take place in universities. It meant more than mere training or acquiring some skills in order to manage and find one’s place in society, but instead it stood for personal perfection and constant reflection between I and the other. It signified becoming aware of one’s capabilities and fulfilling a personal quest of growing into a thoroughly conscious subject.\textsuperscript{13} The idea of “becoming” what one should be presupposes a lack of something essential or a state of incompleteness. In the words of Hans-Georg Gadamer:

\begin{quote}
Man is characterized by the break with the immediate and the natural that the intellectual, rational side of his nature demands of him. “In this sphere he is not, by nature, what he should be”— and hence he needs Bildung.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} Gadamer 2000, 11.
Bildung was localized in the ever-recurring movement of the spirit. It meant distancing oneself from the immediacy of natural life and the mind’s control over sensations and irrational stimulus. In short, it meant recognizing oneself in the other, and then critically evaluating one’s previous position. Since the Romantic Movement, from which the idea of Bildung emerged, also emphasized an awareness of and an emphasis on the historicity of things, the common understanding was that ‘elevation’ was best achieved in learning about the past. Especially important were the high cultures of antiquity, which seemed to carry within them the virtues and values relevant for modern society. In them the noble and universal purpose of the human soul was visible – distant yet learnable. Studying the theoretical knowledge of antiquity (its language, art, culture and law) was a process of moving towards or becoming what humankind was supposed to be.

Nevertheless, the concept of Bildung could not float above the social meanings of its present society; contemporary social meanings were placed upon it in arguments and discussions, and in expressing goals, emotions and opinions. Like other concepts of German idealism, it was read and interpreted as intertwined with contemporary social structures. Consequently, the original idea of Bildung became fused with bourgeois ideas concerning education, personal property and social status. It was utilized in discussions concerning the fate and direction of the nation state as well as being a value in itself while creating social rankings and distinctions.

Lawyers were an important and active group inside the Bildungsbürgertum. Due to the impossibility of drawing sharp class-based divisions both in relation to other social groups, as well as inside the educated middle classes themselves, the task of self definition needed to be conducted with new concepts. The studies and terminology of British and French society could not be straightforwardly applied to German society. Hence, lawyers repeatedly and persistently demanded acknowledgment as a Stand, an estate. In the writings of nineteenth-century German lawyers there is a constant need for acknowledgement of the particular challenges this profession faced in the young state and industrializing society. In juridical self-perception lawyers were an intermediate group between state bureaucracy and the people. Michael John writes:


II. The biographical background of Franz Wieacker

Lawyers came to see themselves as ‘organs of the administration of justice’, as a *Stand* whose existence and claims to status were justified in terms of an abstract notion of public service. In this there were many parallels with the bureaucracy’s self-image as a ‘universal estate’.17 Lawyers’ working conditions and horizon were bound to the state. By far, most of those who were legally trained found a job within the public sector. Thus the professional appreciations and commonly upheld virtues were related to this vocational status as “a legal civil servant of the people.”18 The profession was unique in its simultaneous universality and exclusiveness both in terms of international comparison and among other German middle class professions. Contrary to, for example, the British legal class, the work of a lawyer or a judge in Germany was officially regulated in a manner that necessitated a state-provided, special education.19 The lawyer ‘estate’ was by no means a closed profession. Anyone, despite their origin or fortune, could apply. However, one part of this universally available education was a relatively long and unpaid practice, which a candidate had to conduct in an organization that dealt with legal matters.20 Usually it meant a commission in an organ of state bureaucracy, where a jurist could continue to work, this time with salary, after his graduation. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was a regular over-supply of the legally trained in comparison to the posts available.21 Thus, the education itself posed an obstacle for a wide and socially equal entrance to the lawyer *Stand*. Not many could afford the apprenticeship, especially if the income after graduation was insecure, and, in any case, not very generous.

These particular conditions created a culture which strongly upheld and appreciated self-imposed service over economic gain. The financial conditions of the legally trained were of course an important and often referred to matter in the publications of jurists, but complaints and expressions of discontent were direct-

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17 John 1991, 175.
ed to the state, which remained the main source of lawyers’ income. Also, the arguments on behalf of more reasonable compensation to the ‘estate’ were based on its common neglect of economic profit. Contempt for personal economic gain became a virtue, which elevated the jurist Stand above other groups. This same criteria was similarly applied in making inner group distinctions. The Winkeladvokaten [hedge advocates] were legal advocates who took small cases, which lacked any significance in the perspective of the general public or the state, but were at least moderately well paid.22 Thus in the jurist self-definition of the nineteenth (and early twentieth) century the Stand was distinguished from society, and also from other professions in Bildungsbürgertum by the virtue of its inner morals, a visible symptom being the disdain shown to money by its members.

2. The ‘war generation’: Franz Wieacker and the social history of German legal scholarship

Equipped with the ideological premises elaborated above, Wieacker followed in his father’s footsteps and chose a career in law. After Tübingen, Wieacker moved to the University of Göttingen, and in 1930 to the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg.23 During these years Wieacker became acquainted with numerous people whose friendship he valued throughout his life. First of all, in Göttingen he met Fritz Pringsheim, who as a supervisor and mentor represented an academic father figure par excellence to the young Wieacker. In Freiburg Wieacker established life-long friendships with Erik Wolf and Ernst Forsthoff, and it was also in Freiburg, via Forsthoff’s political activity, that he got in touch with national academic celebrities like Carl Schmitt and Ernst Jünger. As the youngest member of Forsthoff “circle” Wieacker participated in seminars where the leading young conservative revolutionaries analyzed the state of the nation and experimented with new ideas.24 In 1932 Wieacker completed his doctoral dissertation with a monograph Lex commissoria. Erfüllungszwang und Widerruf im römischen Kaufrecht and, in October 1933, followed Forsthoff to the University of Frankfurt.25 During that year National Socialist seized power in Germany and started to transform Germany into a totalitarian nation.

24 Meinel 2012, 42.
II. The biographical background of Franz Wieacker

In order to have an insightful picture of Franz Wieacker’s thoughts and actions following the political “revolution” of 1933, and also to understand the later developments in his academic production, one aspect has to be taken into account. Franz Wieacker represented the “war generation,” a generation of Germans born between 1902 and 1908. Thus to Wieacker, in addition to the ideological premises elaborated in the preceding pages, the generational experience of the First World War and its consequences became a basic factor behind his perception of society during the interwar years. The European nation states had already standardized upbringing, education and the media when they engaged themselves in a new kind of total war in 1914. The war generation, which was just old enough to understand but too young to participate, experienced the events of the First World War from the “Heimatfront” [home front]. From this safe distance, and innocently unaware of the true horrors of the battlefield, they nevertheless with the help of mass-media gained a strong experience of nationalism and were aware of the outrageous death-toll. This cohort, protected from the horrors of the front, but very open to war propaganda, gained a personal experience of the Great War that was often patriotic, dominated by national feeling, and directed against outside dangers.

Ernst Forsthoff, Werner Weber, Erik Wolf, Gerhard Dulckeit, Karl Larenz, Friedrich Schaffstein, Hans Welzel, Ernst Rudolf Huber, Wolfgang Siebert, Karl Michaelis, Georg Dahm, Martin Busse, Hans Thieme and Franz Wieacker were all born between 1902 and 1908, Wieacker being the youngest of this group. Not only was the First World War a decisive key experience in their life history, they also witnessed at first hand the struggles of the Weimar Republic and the empty liberal promises it failed to deliver. They felt the consequences in their own everyday reality, in their families and personally as young students.

There were concrete and indisputable reasons for the feelings of disintegration and for suspicions about one’s personal and collective future. Germany had lost the war and, it was felt, had been maltreated by the victors and neighboring countries. The shadow of Bolshevism was a constant reminder of how civic society as they knew it could be threatened. The social contract between classes, groups


27 On the threat of Bolshevism, see Max Weber, ‘Politik als Beruf [1919],’ in Johannes
and parties had lost its legitimacy after the Revolution and Civil War of 1918–19. The Reichstag was inefficient and made democracy seem powerless. Violence in the streets was more a rule than an exception. Hyperinflation and the Great Depression had ruined the possibilities for improved living conditions for millions of people.\textsuperscript{28}

Values which for decades had unified the middle classes even on the level of manners and gestures, and which had defined the mental status quo of the Heimat, ceased to have the same significance in the chaotic years immediately after the First World War. The bourgeoisie now felt that the norms controlling society were artificial, unrelated to the actual needs and goals of the people.\textsuperscript{29} In short, many felt that society, both in everyday practices and with respect to future expectations, was undergoing a disastrous change and individuals could no longer achieve the standards which were previously valued as comprising a good life.\textsuperscript{30}


\textsuperscript{29} Geyer 1998, 379–382. This was clearly how Franz Wieacker thought, both in private and in his publications. The latter part of Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, roughly from the French Revolution onwards, is a critical and pessimistic presentation of the development in the European legal system and consciousness. Wieacker was not alone in his cultural pessimism. Cf. Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Welthistorische Perspektiven. Beck 1923; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations. [1929]. Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1996.). About the degeneration of bourgeois virtues, see Moses 2006, 79.

\textsuperscript{30} This was not, however, the whole picture. The end of the Wilhelminian Empire and its estate system meant the possibility of social upgrading for a large number of the younger members of the lower middle class. (Hans Mommsen, ‘Generationskonflikt und Jugendrevolte in der Weimarer Republik,’ in Thomas Koebner, Rolf-Peter Janz & Frank Trommler (eds.), “Mit uns zieht die neue Zeit.” Der Mythos Jugend. Frankfurt am Main, 1985, 50–67.) It is probable that the deep cultural pessimism, expressed especially in academia, was a symptom of a relational degradation. Whereas insecure future prospects and unclear economic situation of the early twentieth century were nothing new for the tenants and workers, to the bourgeoisie generation the degradation of their own economic conditions seemed as the infinite structures of the society were shaking. With respect to economic possibilities and secured career options, the bourgeoisie found itself on the same level with the lower social classes. Since the vague but important notion about the “social quality of life” is constructed in referring the living conditions and future prospects of one’s community to the preceding times, but foremost to other social groups, to the young bourgeoisie the social changes of the 1920s and 1930s represented a disaster.
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This sense of loss was accompanied by feelings of envy and injustice. As the structures of the German way of life collapsed or were dismantled, some individuals seized the moment for personal gain, tearing up the cultural guidelines for what had previously been regarded as accepted and decent. In sociological terms, the German middle class faced both a generational and a class crisis.

That was especially noticeable with respect to personal property and income. The hyperinflation of 1923 cast some into immediate and unexpected poverty, while some, widely resented, made a fortune by speculation. Nevertheless, this new wealth tended to disappear as quickly as it came.\(^{31}\) The end result, however, was a widespread notion that personal property was no longer the anchor it had once been. While pursuing the good life, one could not place trust in the personal property or wealth of one’s family, nor even the security of a stable income. Instead, those who seemed to benefit most from the situation were immoral opportunists who ignored traditional values. The winners were those who detached themselves from the cultural frame and aimed for their own selfish good, while at the same time preventing others from their rightful share. The word egoism often occurred in public discussions and in texts.\(^ {32}\) It came to mean an attitude and acts which despised the common good and instead ruthlessly pursued individual gain. To cultural conservatives egoism was a plague of Weimar society, which, notwithstanding that it could be linked with socialism or particular persons, lacked an elaborated definition and was often used as a universal curse word.

Thus, the economic turmoil of the 1920s and 30s for the German middle class meant an ontological crisis. The bourgeois values of the middle class were bound to their personal property, work, accommodation and a secure future.\(^ {33}\) The recession and inflation devalued virtues and collectively esteemed symbols of a good, respectable life. A common explanation for this crisis in values, whose visible symptom was the surrounding economic turmoil, was to blame either socialists or liberals, or both. Bolshevism as an ideology seemed to challenge everything the middle classes believed in. It emphasized the importance of economics as a predetermining historical force. It was allegedly based on the same ‘force’ that in modern capitalism had stripped the middle classes of all the things that they perceived to be most significant: the social status accrued in service of the state, the dignity provided by personal possessions, and formal education as

\(^{31}\) Wildt 2009, 32–36.
a superior force shaping the destiny of the nation. According to the conservative bourgeoisie, socialism was a misunderstanding of a perennial kind. Bolshevism was an obvious enemy, but since it could not be associated with any concrete social group or visible, common symbol, it remained a primitive, undefined threat that needed to be stemmed.

The educated middle classes had a patronizing attitude on the lower classes, which they combined with the demise of nationalist ideology. The nationalism of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century had presented the nation as an organic whole. The insurmountable cohesive corporation of the people was placed on a pedestal labelled the nation. Furthermore, the bright future of the nation was defined by its cultural essence, the Geist, which was in the possession of, and was formed by, the educated classes. The nation was perceived in relation to and as opposed to other ethnic units. This background constituted the nationalistic double-bind of the conservative bourgeoisie. On the one hand, the nation, the unity of the German people, had proved to be a clear misconception. Not all German-speaking people respected the national (cultural conservative) values, which the cultural elite perceived as foundational. Nor

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35 Naturally, the political parties SPD and KPD were associated with Bolshevism, but it was somewhat difficult to accuse the socialists of the destruction of the national and personal bases for property. In the end, it was the workers who suffered the most from hyperinflation and the recession of the early 1930s. Also the conservative and reconciliatory discourse after the Civil War was concerned with the souls of the lower classes. If the workers were isolated and overly punished for their engagement in socialist movements, they would only be further radicalized, which would lead to the accelerating division and weakening of the nation. Cf. Mosse 1991, 121–132.


37 Anderson 2006, 4–8; The First World War was widely welcomed as the initiation rite of this unified organic unit (Mosse 1991, 155–162). However, the Civil War and the unstable social reality of the Weimar Republic smashed this ideal to pieces. Obviously, some parts of the population had not shared the romantic ideals that the learned had carefully constructed during the fin-de-siècle.

38 Kühne 2005, 51.
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were all Germans willing to live under the same social norms or prioritize similar material or cultural matters that the educated did. On the other hand, the implicit theme in German idealism was that truly meaningful artistic and scholarly work could only be created in association with the *Geist*, the national spirit or tradition. The necessity of a culturally unified whole was countered by the impossibility of gathering all Germans within the same community.

The relational plight to which the post-war years drove the bourgeoisie did not mean to them merely economic recession; it meant that social dignity and personal prospects faced a chaotic future. Hyperinflation and recession ate away at the certainty of continuity for upper-middle class children; a fixed economic status vanished when a salary ceased to be anything more than a provider of subsistence living standards. Universities in Germany were multiplying and growing bigger, and the total number of graduates was increasing every year. In addition, the new academic fields of economics and the social sciences produced professionals who were ready to compete for the jobs which had traditionally been the domain of jurists. Education no longer had the distinctive meaning that it had previously possessed. The socially acknowledged status which lawyers as the ‘organs of the administration of justice’ had had, existed no more.

Whereas Hitler’s succession has traditionally been explained by the frustration of the lower middle classes, I agree with scholars who hold that this view is too simplistic. Having said that, this does not eradicate the fact that serious frustration, disappointment and bitterness existed amongst the bourgeoisie, and on some levels the behavior and ideas which those emotions generated, supported the rise of the Third Reich. My argument is that Franz Wieacker, along with other scholars in his circles, experienced firsthand the change in bourgeois ideals which were brought about by the social and political developments. Wieacker studied the preceding tradition from the perspective of Weimar, as well as reflected on the explanations other scholars had given about the contemporary world, but far from merely repeating these discourses in his writings, he used that material as a conceptual resource in expressing his historical vision. This becomes evident in his ideas on the rule of law and justice as expressed by the concepts *Rechtsbewusstsein* and *Rechtsgewissen*.

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39 See fn. 180.

III. Rechtsbewusstsein:
The cruel reality and human awareness

In this chapter I scrutinize the ways in which the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein, legal consciousness, appeared in Franz Wieacker’s scholarly texts. I analyze the ways he defined the concept in congruence with his personal experience of the surrounding society, as well as how he used it to explain social phenomena in the past. To Franz Wieacker, Rechtsbewusstsein signified a wider mentality prevailing in a given society or constellation, and its study presented a starting point for a researcher in his quest for commenting on the rule of law and legal historical development. It was a common mental perception of the legal system of his time, and as such it was a temporal understanding of the relations between the state, its people, and the law. In other words, legal consciousness was the people’s opinion on the rule of law.

This understanding, of course, had to do with the concrete institutions of law and jurisprudence. Nevertheless, Wieacker always regarded legal consciousness as welling from – and thus it had to be understood in relation to – the social structure, its distinguishing cultural values and virtues, and the status of an ideal kind of education prevailing in society. In his works he emphasized the mental sphere of legal systems. Hence, the historiographical concept of Rechtsbewusstsein was also comprised of the narrower entities of Stand and Bildung. The treatment and value which a given time and society gave to Stand and Bildung, were reflected in that society’s legal consciousness. On the other hand, in his own circumstances, Wieacker believed that German legal consciousness evolved according to the changes he experienced as a member of the Juristen-Stand and as a learned scholar who was devoted to the task of studying the high spiritual achievements of past thinkers, and aware of the value this past knowledge enshrined.

In analyzing the meaning of the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein in Franz Wieacker’s texts, one cannot treat it solely as a legal tool, a fashionable slogan, or a personally constructed idea. Rather, the meaning as it emerges in Wieacker’s texts, was based on his learnedness in previous legal theories, the prerequisites of the current political and social situation, as well as his individual interpretation and experience of those two domains – the scholarly tradition and changing so-
III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness

cial circumstances in Germany. Thus I intend to study Wieacker’s idea of Rechtsbewusstsein—along with the terms which he also used to depict that abstraction—as a result of the intertwining of personal experience, historical development, and scientific discourse. My claim is that although Wieacker studied the legal consciousness of the past and derived from them his comments on present society, in reality his research process was more like a circle. Through his experience of the contemporary legal consciousness (the current situation regarding Stand and Bildung) he perceived the historical events and texts, and then via that construction made a claim about the nature of his contemporary society and what it should become in the future.

Since I study Wieacker’s concepts as metaphorical linguistic tools, I have divided the forthcoming analysis into three spheres. The term Rechtsbewusstsein was not Wieacker’s own invention. It had been used by earlier legal theorists and was an established concept in the legal scientific discourse of twentieth-century German jurisprudential vocabulary. Thus, in the forthcoming section on language I briefly elaborate the meanings that the concept had, and explore the vocabulary which Wieacker had at his disposal when writing about the past. It also illuminates the means by which other scholars studied the past phenomena which Wieacker was interested in.

In the section on culture I analyze the social and political changes which took place during the timeframe of my study, and which affected the ideas of Stand and Bildung. This general historical development overshadowed Wieacker’s understanding of legal consciousness, but by no means predetermined his thoughts and writings. Thus, following the section on culture, I present how Wieacker personally conceived the society of his time, and scrutinize how the political and social changes were perceived through the shared world view of a group of scholars (see III 3. on affections). I show that a scholarly culture of understanding the contemporary world existed. The focus of this scholarship related to national development, but it also distinguished distinct virtues and valuations. This section on the relation between the national and scholarly cultures is mainly concerned with analyzing Franz Wieacker’s correspondence with his friends as well as elaborating the meanings that other scholars in his close group of colleagues gave to contemporary phenomena. Finally, I compare my results to Wieacker’s scholarly texts and clarify how the meanings in the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein changed in the course of his career.

The section on language provides the overall historiographical usage of the term Rechtsbewusstsein in the discourse of German legal science, and covers the period from 1933 to 1968. In order to avoid repetition, and to highlight the conceptual changes in Wieacker’s texts, I have split the timeline into two periods. I analyze the general political and social change, the cultural view upheld by
Wieacker and his peers, and the change of meanings in Wieacker’s scientific texts (in this order) first from 1933 to 1945, and then scrutinize the post-war situation from 1945 to 1968. In line with the research questions posed at the beginning of this book, the following analysis will focus on these questions: What did Rechtsbewusstsein actually signify to Franz Wieacker? In which ways was it related to the general social and political change of twentieth-century Germany? What part did the notions of Stand and Bildung play within the concept? And how did the use of the concept in Wieacker’s legal change over time?

1. Language in Rechtsbewusstsein: The scientific horizon and the previous tradition of the concept

Bewusstsein has been translated as “consciousness” or “awareness.” These words however fall short of the meanings which the German concept connotes. Bewusstsein (as well as Gewissen and Schöpfung) carry along with them whole intellectual weight of historism, i.e. the attempt to redefine tradition in the fields of social interaction and scholarship. Thus the romantic counter-effect, especially in Germany, was to defend the holistic idea of man, society and history. To Hegel (as well as Hume, Kant, and Husserl) science and the cultivated mind were to be understood as the co-work of the senses and experience, where experience meant accumulated and categorized information.¹

The concept of Rechtsbewusstsein needs to be analyzed against the idealist background as it appeared in Carl Friedrich von Savigny’s texts.² Savigny as a legal theorist belonged to the Romantic counter-movement which questioned the enlightened and utilitarian formulations of jurisprudence and justice. The legal tradition emerging from the French Revolution, Napoleonic codification, and, for example, Jeremy Bentham’s radical philosophy, treated law as an unattached system that was legitimate and functional regardless of time and place.

Savigny emphasized the cultural background and history of a legal system. Far from being disconnected rational constructions, legal systems were an organic part of the culture and the people whom it served. According to Savigny, laws needed to have reference to the sense of justice of a people. This sense, Rechtsbewusstsein, emerged from the collective experience of the people. Thus, it was created over time, it had features which distinguished it from the awareness of

¹ Carr 2014, 8–30.
other ethnicities, and it could not be reduced to “mere” reason. As such, it also represented all the sides we attribute to human behavior, not only the rational, easily understandable, goal-directed and clearly articulated visible action, but also affect-based, unconscious and malevolent actions. To successfully utilize and study law, one had to have an understanding of the social context in which it operated, which also meant that a society and its legal consciousness, *Rechtsbewusstsein*, were in continuous development and the law as well as scholarly presentation about it had to adapt to this process. This feature was not only a decisive factor in Savigny’s formulation of the concept, but was closely contingent with his view on the world of science in more general terms. To Savigny, the political level of society moved fast and often in an opposite direction to the most “natural” and beneficiary one from the point of view of people’s consciousness of law. In his own time this was concretized in the social reforms of the estate system, in education and the economy, and in making administrative rearrangements to actions that were not ethical or just.

The problematic was picked up and further developed by the German free law movement, the *Freirechtsschule*, among whom could be counted Hermann Kantorowicz and Eugen Ehrlich. Whereas Savigny was content to describe the division and incompatibility between politics and law, between norms and social reality, *Freirechtsschule* wished to challenge the whole education and understanding of legal matters in order to have an effect on the political reality. To Kantorowicz and Ehrlich, law had distanced itself from the social reality (*Wirklichkeit*). Codified and parliamentary legislation could not keep up with the social changes which people faced in their everyday world. Neither were the traditional theories of, for example, the Historical School flexible enough to describe society. Thus, legal science’s contribution to society had become insufficient to provide solutions to the perennial problems of freedom, justice, and authority. To Ehrlich, law was a social psychological phenomenon, and the state’s legislation and norms should not be perceived as the only or most important form of law. In order to study the law one had to acknowledge the *opinio necessitatis*, i.e. the belief that an action is carried out as a legal and social obligation.

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4 Ibid., 45.


6 To Ehrlich, *opinio iuris ac necessitatis* was a feeling, awareness or hunch that one needs to yield to a behavior dictated by a social norm (e.g. queuing). *Usus*, the behavior dictated by this social norm, is constantly reproduced by the social norm itself. Marc Hertogh, *Living Law: Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich*. Portland, Hart 2009.
concentrated on the sociological bases of the law within society and tried to historicize its practices. He stressed the significance of a lawyer class and praised the values it upheld or should uphold.\(^7\)

Legal positivism and the jurisprudence of interests acknowledged the same dilemma as Savigny and the Freirechtschule, but took a totally different point of departure. In the influential texts of Hans Kelsen, law was firmly separated from the realm of commonly appreciated values.\(^8\) To legal positivists, law was an isolated construction of norms which created a system of its own, and it could only be studied and analyzed as such. Furthermore, and according to especially Kelsen, legal interpretation had to be conducted from within the hierarchical system of law. The meaning of a given norm could only be understood through its relation to another, more general and higher norm. The task to understand the original intentions of the lawgiver was irrelevant in applying the law, nor was it fruitful to scrutinize the variations of a given norm in different circumstances and times.\(^9\) In later times ‘legal positivism’ became a curseword among legal scholars, since it seemed to allow the fragmentation of a previously coherent legal system and consequently led to the legal disarray emblematic of the late Weimar Republic.\(^10\) During that time the rapidly changing social situation was handled – or at least that seemed to be the plan – by giving detailed and incoherent laws and in order to extend the government regulation to all possible aspects of social interaction. Such a situation was being lambasted by Carl Schmitt as “motorized” legislation.\(^11\)

In the 1930s the aversion to legal positivism among legal scholars was widespread. Not only Carl Schmitt, the conservative revolutionaries and the new generation of National Socialist lawyers, but also other conservative scientists like Paul Koschaker attacked the “immoral” theories of legal positivism and the jurisprudence of interests.\(^12\) The combination of failed Weimar legislation and legal


\(^{9}\) Kelsen 2008.

\(^{10}\) Cf. Schmitt 1996.


\(^{12}\) See Paul Koschaker, Die Krise des römischen Rechts und die romanistische Rechtswissenschaft. München, Beck 1938.
positivism was one thing, the removal of scholarly interpretation in legal decisions, to which it in practice led, was another. Not only was legal positivism perceived as a low point in the long line of legal development where theoretical frames and constructions of legal systems subordinated the value of individual juridical consideration,\(^\text{13}\) but also the codification and systemization of law eradicated the status of legal interpretation, which had traditionally been in the possession of the class of lawyers.\(^\text{14}\) When the focus in preserving the legality of the nation moved from the judgments and contracts of the legally trained to the actions of the lawgiver, the parliamentary state, it had consequences for the relative social status of the lawyers and judges, but undoubtedly it also awakened many serious difficulties considering the applicability of the laws in varying situations. To legal scholars the law and reality were still (and possibly even more than ever) too separated from each other.

Thus the task which the legal scholars of the war generation, Franz Wieacker included, took over, was to redefine old and invent new conceptual legal tools in explicating the common mental space between legislation and the changing social reality to which it referred. This task necessitated an understanding of what society really was, and the kind of pursuits, standards and competing organizations it was comprised of. Since legislation and legal interpretation were supposed to be grounded on a national awareness of justice, which elements in society were the most important, noble and decisive ones with respect to the national mentality concerning law and legitimacy? And furthermore, since the national legal consciousness was a developing and evolving entity, what particles and principles regulated this change, from where did it come and where was it headed? The concept which was supposed to answer and involve the explanations to the above questions was named *Rechtsbewusstsein*.

One cannot gather all the legal scientific streams, schools and thoughts of 1930s Germany under one banner. The influence of Carl Schmitt’s concrete order-thinking was eminent, as was the conviction that something totally “new” was being done in the field of jurisprudence.\(^\text{15}\) Many scholars of the war generation, however, were dealing in one way or another with the problem of *Rechtsbewusstsein*. One reason was the state of legal science, which had to answer the misgivings of the previous, positivistic theories, but a more concrete and timely


inducement was the *Machtergreifung*, the seizure of power, of the National Socialist party. The NSDAP announced that it embodied the will of the people, and that will should become the guiding principle in all areas of society, including law. Thus, young conservative lawyers competed in conceptualizing this will and spirit of the people, and tried to define how it should direct jurisprudence, where it had emerged and how it could be studied, of what parts it was comprised, and in which situations it should be utilized and in what ways. Erik Wolf wrote that legal sources and ideals should follow the unity of the “new *Rechtsbewusstsein*.” Karl Larenz underlined the inevitable unity of norms and “the living order” in the “general consciousness” of the people.

Although theorists like Ernst Forsthoff or Carl Schmitt did not use *Rechtsbewusstsein* as a conceptual tool in describing their theories of legal reasoning until their war-time writings, the endeavor to redefine legal thinking in opposition to the claims of legal positivism and according to the new political climate prevailed. The *Rechtsbewusstsein* utilized in the writings of 1930s concerning ‘legal renewal’ had similarities with the renewal Savigny had formulated in the nineteenth century. Law had to be addressed as an inseparable part of the “people,” although the *volk* of which Savigny and scholars of the ‘legal renewal’ wrote about was a different matter. For the legal scientist of the 1930s, the correct kind of legal thinking that aimed at a just result had to draw its premises from actual life, from the values of the people. However, their understanding of what “actual life” consisted was heavily influenced by the ongoing political situation and was not in accordance with empirical social reality in general nor with Savigny’s ideas on topic.

Although it might be possible to analyze the ‘New legal science’, as upheld, for example, by the *Kieler Schule* as a continuation of the older theories of the nineteenth century, the war generation itself was certain of the radically novel

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16 Quoted in Rüthers 1992, 21.


18 Forsthoff preferred the more multifaceted and sophisticated concept of *Daseinvorsorge* (Meinel 2012, 153–180).


20 Okko Behrends, ‘Von der Freirechtschule zum konkreten Ordnungs- und Gestaltungs-
nature of its work.\textsuperscript{21} Especially important was to redefine legal concepts so that they reflected the ‘völkisch revolution’ and detached the spheres of jurisprudence from the false thinking of the previous generations.\textsuperscript{22} To the conservative young lawyers of the ‘New legal science’ the liberal ideas of individual rights and a sociality based on compromise were detached from actual reality. Consequently, the whole enlightened idea of the liberal state as the provider of just social norms had to be rejected, and the relation between people and society had to be understood from the point of view of institutional legal thinking, or \textit{concrete order}, meaning that the tradition and habits of a given group of people were superior to any outer interventions of a lawgiver, which referred especially to the parliamentary procedure of the Weimar Republic.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, a legal system for the future needed to be developed and maintained to conform to the actual legal reality of the people to whom it related. From these two preceding points emerged the inevitable conclusion that an individual could have and should have an inner notion of justice, since he was the one who observed and experienced the reality of the ‘concrete order,’ which was in itself comprised by him and his peers. The juridical position of an individual was being defined through a “moral bind” he or she felt towards the national community.\textsuperscript{24} In constructing a legal system and analyzing it, it was necessary to take into account this bond between an individual, his community, and social justice, and furthermore, such a dynamic starting point should be embodied in the legal tools and concepts which the ‘New legal science’ used.\textsuperscript{25}


Unlike many other concepts which surfaced during the ‘legal renewal’ of the 1930s, Rechtsbewusstsein remained rather uncontaminated. In the end it was a classic legal sociological expression and could be used in the post-Second World War German legal scientific vocabulary. Many concepts, such as Konrete Ordnung, Erbhof, and Berufstand, had to be silently buried, although the legal questions they were used to depict might still exist. The significance of the fundamental dilemma of the distance between reality and norm, was after the Second World War more relevant than ever before. The havoc of the German legal system in the face of the National Socialist challenge called for healthy and sound explanations. Thus, many scholars continued their work on the subject, and some stuck to Rechtsbewusstsein as a conceptual vessel in approaching the problem.26

One of the scholars who adopted Rechtsbewusstsein as a permanent term in his scholarly vocabulary was Franz Wieacker. In his post-war works on European legal history, the idea of legal consciousness was of fundamental importance, although the meaning of the concept had changed from its original usage. I will return to this point in the following chapters.

It has been noted that the conceptual core or methodology of German legal science altered surprisingly little after the point zero of 1945.27 Thus Rechtsbewusstsein could be used by the same scholars who had used it to back up ‘legal renewal’ in order to find a new theoretical framework for a just legal system in the Federal Republic, but characteristic to the concept in its post-1945 usage was that it now contained religious or metaphysical connotations.28 Since “heartless” and “cold” legal theories were perceived to be a prior reason for the failure of jurisprudence, the legal vocabulary of the 1950s and early 1960s leaned heavily on mystical or religious grounds.29 Rechtsbewusstsein fitted well to the natural law theories so fashionable in 1950s Germany. The usage of the concept seemed to enable a way between strict normativism and metaphysical speculation – with-


out falling for the caveat of an over-rigid theoretical construction – and to maintain some sort of contact with the theoretical work carried out during the preceding decades.

This paradigmatic development defined the scientific prerequisites in the meaning of the concept of *Rechtsbewusstsein*. Merely situating Wieacker’s text in this framework would not, however, reveal anything from the point of view of his historical vision. In order to track the conceptual change in his production and study the ideas within them, beside the legal scientific discourse, one needs to attach the concurrent political and social development, and scrutinize how Wieacker and his group of friends understood it. Hence, in the following chapters I concentrate on the social reality of early twentieth-century Germany in general, and especially analyze how the domains of *Stand* and *Bildung* altered. I also re-review Franz Wieacker’s personal experience on the changing circumstances through his correspondence.

2. Culture in *Rechtsbewusstsein* 1933–1945:
The breakdown of the Weimar Republic and National Socialism in academia and legal science

To Hitler and the Nazi elite the place of academics and universities was clear from the beginning. It has been disputed whether the Nazis had any strategy or educational policy, but it is clear that they considered higher education in general to be degenerate and unmasculine. To National Socialists all training and education should proceed from physical attributes and be designed for warfare.

The administrative actions of the Third Reich were often confused, overlapping and insignificant, but they were carried out in order to fulfill Hitler’s vision of education. The ultimate purpose for National Socialists policy was to synchro-
nize, *Gleichschaltung*, all aspects of society with the Nazi worldview. A holistic stance on education was not (and is not) a National Socialist principle. German fascists wanted to seize universities, not to decide on the direction of higher education, but in order to silence critical voices, suppress the autonomy of the universities, and shape German youth to triumph in the inevitable war for survival.\(^{33}\)

To the Nazi elite the only important form of learned knowledge, or academic culture, was the code of the military and of war. In their texts ‘education’ [*Bildung*] was a synonym for arrogant ignorance they pursued to characterize. An educated man represented a culture of hierarchy and authority. This culture was defined exclusively in terms of relations between men. Thus, *Bildung* found expression in inter-male attitudes: “respect,” “reverence,” “courage,” “discipline,” “distance,” “obedience,” “integrity,” and above all, “loyalty.”\(^{34}\) Culture and education, in this twisted fascist meaning, were significant since they marked the essential gap between the masses and the distinguished individual. The latter was worthy, the former not. Surprisingly for many commentators, since the idea of education upheld by Hitler and the SA could have not been further from the original meaning of *Bildung*, the capture of German academia was an easy one. There really was no serious resistance. Fascists like Bernhard Rust, Ernst Krieck and Hans Frank quickly took their place as leading officials with respect to national education, and figures like Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt and Gerhard Kittel loyally echoed them and the National Socialist message.\(^{35}\) To translate this into contemporary slogans, “thinking with the blood” became curiously synonymous with the “concrete order.”\(^{36}\)

Since academia did not form a resistant bulwark against the National Socialist attempts, the Nazis were able to adjust their ideas on training and learning in universities rather early. The first restrictions on higher education were placed in April 1933, in order to banish all “foreign” elements, including personnel and ideas, from the academic realm. Though the first laws reserved some exceptions for war veterans, their implementation meant that the vast majority of teachers and students of Jewish descent were dismissed and excluded from the universi-

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\(^{35}\) See Fritzsche 2008, 25–37. Cf. Martin Heidegger, ‘Bekenntnis der Professoren’ [1933]: “We see the goal of philosophy in servitude. The Führer has awakened this will in the whole nation and has fused it into one single will. No one can be absent on the day when he displays his will.” Quoted in Koontz 2003, 46.

\(^{36}\) On the importance of “concrete-order” thinking, see Stolleis 2003; Rüthers 2012, 277–301.
III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness

ties. At the University of Freiburg the purge was conducted by the newly-appointed rector Martin Heidegger. Kiel University received a dynamic dean in K.A. Eckhardt who, in close cooperation with the SA wing of the Nazi party, devoted himself to transforming the Kiel faculty of law into a ‘stormtrooper law school’ of the Third Reich and its ideologies. In Frankfurt, Ernst Krieck was elected the principal of Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität in the spring of 1933. Krieck was the first university rector to come straight from the ranks of the Nazi party, and he immediately started to lecture in support of the “revolution in education” and to rearrange the university to meet the standards of the new regime. On an ideological and racial level the national Gleichschaltung in universities was completed between 1933 and 1935, when the Nuremberg laws finally cemented the racist doctrines of the NSDAP to the social reality.

Gleichschaltung was a process which was conducted in the early years of the Nazi coup, and Hitler was at this point cautious not to reveal the true destructive anti-Semitism of his worldview. The very visible grassroot anti-Semitism of the NSDAP, mainly evident in the SA and student organizations, did not seem to meet with a similar zeal on the administrative and political level. This frustrated hard-core Nazis and members of fascist student organizations, who practically seized the power in many universities, boycotting the lectures of unwanted staff, and threatening, demonstrating against and disrupting the teaching whenever it did not conform to their idea of the regime’s official line. As a result, in 1933–1935 there were many people working and studying in the universities, who did not fulfill the definition of an “Aryan man,” and who became the target of a vigorous bullying campaign by National Socialist organizations. The confu-

\[\text{39 Koontz 2003, 17–45.}\]
\[\text{40 First of all there were those Jews to whom the April laws of 1933 did not extend, namely war veterans, } \text{Frontkämpfer, } \text{and their families. Additionally, the definition of the } \text{“Jude” had not yet been implemented (Friedländer 1998, 145–177). There were some active teachers who were of distant Jewish origin, who themselves might have thought that this heritage was unimportant. Also some parts of the teaching staff lectured, wrote about and supported theories which were hostile to the National Socialist worldview. See Wolfgang Ernst, } \text{“Fritz Schulz” and Tony Honoré, } \text{“Fritz Pringsheim” in Jack Beatson and Reinhard Zimmermann (ed.), } \text{Jurists Uprooted: German-Speaking Emigré Lawyers in Twentieth Century Britain. Oxford, Oxford UP, 2004, 105–232.}\]
\[\text{41 Wildt 2003, 43–55. For the University of Kiel, see Grothe 2005, 170; also Eckert 1992, 41–43.}\]
2. Culture in Rechtsbewusstsein 1933–1945

ision between the public statements of the Party, their implementation by the administration, and the collective meaning given to fascism, were all part of the messy picture of German higher education in the 1930s. After the manic and concrete actions of 1933, with the purging of libraries and burning of books, the Gleichschaltung of schools and universities seemed to grind to a halt in a state of administrative and ideological quarreling. This feature might also explain why some “mistook National Socialism as a conservative movement.” The precise aim, ideology and policy of the new regime was foggy. Rather, it seemed to be constituted of visible individuals whose actions might or might not resemble the ‘true’ goals of the new political elite.

The National Socialist bureaucrats responsible for national education attempted to bring the substance of higher education in line with the party ideology. The Nazi Machtergreifung and reformulation of German legal studies occurred at the same time, but in the beginning they were unrelated. The new curricula for teaching law at the universities (Studienordnung) was inaugurated in 1935. The groundwork for the renewal of legal studies and the training of judges had been a long process, and the reasons for rearranging the content and focus of the studies were based on incompatibility between the education provided and the demands of the jurist’s profession. The widespread general opinion in the discipline on the necessity of cultivating an awareness of the historical foundations of law and its relation to ‘social reality,’ was translated by Nazi-oriented officials into

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42 This is a feature of Nazi Germany (and any other totalitarian regime). One important factor in the successful seizure of power by the National Socialists was the disorganized administration, where overlapping offices and power-hungry officials fought against each other. This state of affairs was maintained by Hitler himself. Views on the intentionality of this chaotic administration are divided. (Reinhard Bollmus, ‘Zum Projekt einer nationalsozialistischen Alternativ-Universität: Alfred Rosenbergs “Hohe Schule”,’ in Manfred Heinemann (ed.), Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich. Teil 2: Hochschule, Erwachsenenbildung. Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta 1980, 127 fn. 3). Nevertheless, Hitler’s incongruous briefing of subordinates and reality-detached rhetoric, enabled him to stay above practical business (Sax & Kuntz 1992, 165–170). Further it fostered an environment in which the “Nazi ideology” and its implementation was on many levels created by middle-level functionaries who competed for the favor of the Führer or the upper members of the party hierarchy (Koonz 2003, 140). The case of Carl Schmitt is illustrative. For many academics he was the personification of the new order in academia, and his favor was eagerly pursued by many. From his own point of view, he was stuck in an endless and bitter battle for power, and in the end he never reached the place beside Hitler which he so desperately sought (Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: A Biography, translated by Daniel Steuer. Cambridge, Polity Press 2014.).

43 Koonz 2003, 140.

44 Mehring 2000, 314.

associating legal education with the National Socialist Weltanschauung on the nature of social reality. As a result, to fascist-minded professors the new Studienordnung was an attempt to incorporate National Socialist ideology into practical legal training. National Socialist officials in education took care that the new curricula were in keeping with fascist ideas of the superiority of unity and power over learnedness. These curricula emphasized the “Neuzeit,” modern world, at the expense of the previous focus on German and Roman traditions and varying aspects of the national legal system. In brief, the Studienordnung of 1935 concentrated on the unity of the law, its transformation into a modern phenomenon, and on the divide between public and private law. One could interpret this change as a strong attack on Roman law education and tradition in Germany.

This claim is in a sense true, given the outspoken resentment which the Nazis felt towards Roman law. The Party program of the NSDAP, which contained overall 25 key points, stated in paragraph 19: “We demand that the Roman law, which serves the materialistic world order, shall be replaced by a legal system for all Germany.” This demand was amplified by many Germanistic scholars, who either sincerely perceived Romanist influence as “foreign,” or were ready to champion their own field of study at the expense of research on Roman law. Many contemporary scholars, however, saw the “replacement” as merely a rhetorical obstacle. The new curricula stressed the importance of assimilating legal studies with a personal understanding of the meaning of law. To many scholars of Roman law, that had been the true essence of ancient jurisprudence. So in a way, and according to new Studienordnung, law was again taught as emerging from within society, and when legal history managed to retain its place in the curricula, many researchers of ancient legal history felt relieved. The initial grand announcement of wiping out Roman law was forgotten along with the

49 Sax & Kuntz 1992, 72–75.
51 See e.g. Ernst Schönauer, ‘Vom Bodenrecht zum Bergrecht. Studien zur Geschichte des Bergbaurechtes,’ in SZ RA 55 (1935), 183; cf. Winkler 2014 162–172; Franz Wieacker himself interpreted §19 of the NSDAP party program to be targeted against the twisted Roman law tradition, which had taken place since the Reception of Roman Law in Germany. Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1939, 55.
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many other disputes and empty denunciations of the Nazi administration. The actual judiciary in the Third Reich, a primary concern of the NSDAP, was synchronized with the fascist principles with more robust actions and arrangements. The disfavor of Roman law, however, continued to play a part in academic power struggles. The persecution of Roman law was an experience felt especially among the Romanists, and after the Second World War, the narrative of the untainted core of jurisprudence could be built upon that memory.\(^{52}\)

In 1933, however, it was clear that the new order was hostile to Jews, willing to dismantle the traditional sovereignty of the universities, and, at least on the rhetorical level, against Roman law. Accordingly, on 26 October 1933 Carl Schmitt gave a talk to the German-European Cultural Association about the harmful influence of Roman law and the “outsider-race” which cultivated this foreign heritage in German society.\(^{53}\) One month later, on 30 November 1933, Fritz Pringsheim issued an open letter to Schmitt where he asserted:

As this theme that has already been voiced several times is being received here for the first time from a German legal teacher, I may allow myself as a teacher of Roman law these very humble questions: (1) which time period is considered? (2) which outsider-race is meant? (3) could perhaps personages be named, who would have exercised such influence? You understand, it must be important for every teacher of Roman law to either let himself be convinced by this thesis or to oppose it. That can, however, happen only after an examination, which can only occur after my questions have been answered.\(^{54}\)

In his blunt response, Schmitt merely advised Pringsheim to read his (Schmitt’s) works. To Pringsheim, the tradition of Roman law stood above any political turbulence or Party Programs. Roman law was German, and moreover, to know Roman law was to be ‘learned’ (gebildet); under its banner lay a civilizing legacy thousands of years old.\(^{55}\) He understood clearly that the biggest threat to this

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\(^{53}\) Mehring 2014, 305.


\(^{55}\) Ibid.: “Selbst ein neues Parteiprogramm hält den Einfluss dieser geistigen Macht nicht auf […] Täte man das erste, so würde man die Deutschen zu den Ungebildeten der Welt machen, aber nicht ändern können, dass das Römische Recht durch die Macht der Geschichte in unser deutsches Recht eingegangen ist.”
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tradition, which he held to be characteristically German, was the new political elite and the scholars who were willing to follow its ideological guidelines and implement the fascist doctrines inside academia. The public talks of the leading academics, such as Schmitt, and the government’s intervention into education was not “just politics,” but resembled a greater struggle for the fate of German Bildung.

If one takes Fritz Pringsheim as the representative of the values descending from imperial Germany and as a defender of the tradition of legal science, Carl Schmitt might be seen as the other extreme in the field of legal science. After a short period of hesitation following the National Socialist coup, Schmitt became the most distinguished scholar to provide academic support for Hitler’s regime. Schmitt had been a central figure in the conservative revolutionary movement, but participated in what seems to be wholehearted engagement in public discussion, rationalizing the crimes of the Nazis.\(^\text{56}\) On closer scrutiny, many of the scientific texts written by the younger generation of scholars were built on and dealt with the concepts and doctrines Schmitt had developed for years, and which he now bent to justify Nazi totalitarianism.\(^\text{57}\) It was also primarily Schmitt who steered this anti-formal, legal-sociological discourse to confirm to the racist, exclusive worldview.

Whereas the war generation of young legal scholars, including for example Ernst Forsthoff and Erik Wolf, but also more established figures like Rudolf Smend and Julius Binder, all found their scientific nemesis in Hans Kelsen’s “pure theory of law,” it was Schmitt who manifested this theory as “Jewish” in essence.\(^\text{58}\) Yet, after a few celebrated years as the highest scientific authority of the Third Reich (Schmitt was referred to as Staatsrat or crown jurist), Schmitt was replaced by a group of young and racially passionate lawyers, such as Otto Koellreutter, Theodor Maunz and Reinhard Höhn, who were also more successful than Schmitt in the power struggles within the Nazi party.\(^\text{59}\) To the majority of academics, however, the division lines within this redefinition of Heimat and Bildung, national education, were not that clear. Nevertheless, and especially the war generation of young scholars, found the suddenly fashionable discourse of revolution in legal science intriguing. Karl Larenz, Ernst Forsthoff and Ernst Rudolf Huber among others contributed to the heated discussion following the

\(^{56}\) Mehring 2014, 275–290.
\(^{57}\) e.g. Grothe 2005, 172; Rüthers 2012, 277–278; Meinel 2012, 36–38.
Nazi coup of power, preaching a renewal of the understanding of the basis of the legal system, and the relation between the people and law.\textsuperscript{60}

The “New legal science” (\textit{die neue Rechtswissenschaft}) was the vague definition which the young, conservative scholars of the war generation gave to their own orientation.\textsuperscript{61} The constellation to which the name referred was not unanimous or theoretically coherent, but the most important common denominator was that the ‘New legal science’ was comprised of young scholars who represented the war generation.\textsuperscript{62} They were also united in their battle against legal positivism, legal language inherited from the enlightened tradition, the liberal idea of the relation between a citizen and the state, and the form of academic practices and education that had appeared during the late years of the Weimar Republic. In their scientific perspectives these young scholars leaned mostly on neo-Hegelianism, Carl Schmitt’s theory of concrete order, or outright racist ideology. In the ‘New legal science’ the people were primarily connected to their society through value-based ties like “responsibility,” “communality,” and “honor,” and this institutional and communal foundation should also guide the perception of future jurisprudence, as well as shape legal education and regulate the textual and linguistic tools which German lawyers used. The academic endeavors of the new generation of scholars found congruence with the National Socialist view of society and the political purposes of fascist administration.

Legal scientific texts were used to support a racially based, oppressive policy.\textsuperscript{63} Just as young scholars sought to reverse the liberal concepts of law, to

\textsuperscript{60} Stolleis 2003, 9.


\textsuperscript{62} The ‘New legal science’ was not, of course, a closed establishment. It was a term which Wieacker himself used in attempting to give shape to a movement of young scholars to which he himself contributed (Wieacker, ‘Das Kitzeberger Lager [1936], 163–176). One impartial way to map the participants of the ‘New legal science’ is to follow Wieacker’s elaboration. Nevertheless, when Franz Wieacker later wrote of the contributions made by the ‘New legal science’ he referred to his acquaintances and friends from the universities of Frankfurt, Kiel and Freiburg. Basically, this meant the scholars of the \textit{Kieler Schule}, Ernst Forsthoff, Werner Weber and Erik Wolf. Cf. Wieacker, ‘Die Stellung der römischen Rechtsgeschichte’ 1939; Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit der deutschen Bodenrechtswissenschaft der Gegenwart. Über die Umgestaltung des Grundstückrechts durch die heutige Bodenpolitik [1942],’ in Wollschläger (ed.) 2000, 431–462.

\textsuperscript{63} To what extent the legal scientific texts actually had an effect on the practical work conducted in courts is debatable. Rüthers posits legal theory before practical implementations, thus shifting the responsibility for the immoral judicature of the Third Reich onto the ‘New legal science’ (Rüthers 2012). It seems that at least in criminal law new positions taken by a younger generation of legal scholars did have a real influence (Pauer-Studer & Fink 2014, 532–542).
Goebbels, for example, ‘enlightenment’ and ‘capitalism’ were plots against the German people.\textsuperscript{64} When Ernst Forsthoff, Karl Larenz and many others wrote in support of an institutional, concrete understanding of the law, National Socialists demanded the priority of racially pure \textit{Volksgemeinschaft}, the people’s community, which should be the starting point and a point of reference for all common activity.\textsuperscript{65} And finally, whereas the \textit{Kieler Schule} upheld the idea of the morality of law, and its personal significance and binding nature for individual awareness, the totalitarianism of Hitler demanded absolute submission of all citizens.\textsuperscript{66} In pointing to the, to a degree coincidental, parallels in the legal scientific discourse and Nazi rhetoric, I do not wish to diminish the responsibility of the academics at that time. In the end, it was they themselves who redefined their theories and paradigms so that they became loyal and submissive to National Socialist ideology. Likewise in legal science, the process of “coming together” with the Nazi ideology was more of a process of \textit{Selbstgleichschaltung} (self-synchronization) then outer \textit{Gleichschaltung}.\textsuperscript{67} Furthermore, when the legal scientific culture was transformed to reflect the fascist worldview, the committed heralds and apostles of this science of the Third Reich were found amongst the scholar class.

Some kind of a high-point in fawning of the new political elite of NSDAP in legal science was reached at the 1935 meeting of the National Legal Teachers Association (\textit{Reichsgruppe Hochschullehrer}).\textsuperscript{68} There Carl Schmitt laid out the new racial norms that forthcoming scientific works should follow. Scientific writings should not refer to the works of Jewish scholars; no Jewish scholars should be mentioned by name; no mention could be made of Jewish accomplishments, or if necessary their deeds could be noted as an unnamed and abstract influence. Most importantly, the future generations of scholars should see Jews as degenerate parasites, merely a momentary setback for German culture.\textsuperscript{69} The

\textsuperscript{64} Matthew Lange, \textit{Antisemitic Elements in the Critique of Capitalism in German Culture, 1850–1933}. Oxford, Peter Lang 2007, 289–296.
\textsuperscript{66} Sax & Kuntz 1992, 255–262.
\textsuperscript{68} Meinel 2012, 229.
\textsuperscript{69} Carl Schmitt, ‘Schlusswort des reichsgruppenwalters,’ in \textit{Das Judentum in der Rechtswissenschaft. Ansprachen, Vorträge und Ergebnisse der Tagung der Reichsgruppe Hoch-
network around Wieacker, scholars who had not yet established themselves as authorities in the field of legal sciences, to a degree followed Schmitt’s example, but were more hesitant and cryptic in their writings. For example, in his *Totale Staat*, Ernst Forsthoff labelled the degenerate force threatening the social order of Germany as “Jewish,” and Erik Wolf defined the false interpreters of domestic legal culture as “foreign and non-Aryans.”70 This use of racist rhetoric in the works of ‘New legal science’ scholars is evident, but it remained at such an ambiguous level that these scholars were later able to argue that their texts merely reflected the pressure coming from political leaders and administrative policymakers rather than expressing their true beliefs.71

After 1936, perspectives became clearer. The “renewal” of the society and higher education started to take the totalitarian shape which the NSDAP had aimed for. The ideological struggle and confusion about the virtues and values of the “new national culture” was over.72 Concurrently, the injustices committed by the fascist administration could no longer be bypassed as merely the unintentional side effects of administrative rearrangement. Everyone had a friend, relative or acquaintance who had suffered on account of the applied racist doctrines. Hitler ordered political murders which were carried out openly, such as when the Nazi party was “purged” during the so-called “Night of the Long Knives.” The persecution and exclusion of Jews was evident in the everyday reality of jobs, public spaces and the media. Saul Friedländer asserts that at least after the “Night of Broken Glass” of 1938, the major part of the German middle classes felt anxiety about the unleashed violence which the new government exercised publicly.73 This social reality of the nation state constituted, or at least should have constituted, an impossible dead-end for legal scientists in their attempts to interpret the fascist actions in good faith and scientifically approve the compatibility between the German *Geist* and National Socialist ideas.74


71 Another excuse, but also a peculiar fact, was that most of these young scholars had good friends of Jewish descent. Arnold Ehrhardt and Ernst Forsthoff, for example, had a very close friendship; Erik Wolf’s and Fritz Prigsheim’s connection continued up until Pringsheim’s death in 1967.

72 Stolleis 2003, 9.


74 Of course, everyday reality in the late 1930s was a complex affair. After the War when scholars and the officials of the occupation administration attempted to distinguish between
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In universities the emigration of Jewish scholars to the United Kingdom, the US and Switzerland reached vast dimensions. Within legal history and Roman law Fritz Schulz, Ernst Levy and Fritz Pringsheim were lucky enough to escape; Otto Lenel died bitter, unable to understand why his Heimat had turned against him and his family.\footnote{Pringsheim, ‘Die Haltung der Freiburger Studenten in den Jahren 1933–1935,’ 535–537.} Arnold Ehhardt, a good friend of Wieacker and Ernst Forsthoﬀ, found refuge in England after having been bullied and mistreated by both the administration and university students. Like Lenel, Ehhardt was both patriotic and conservative in character and had even in 1924 volunteered for the Freikorps to fight against the Bolsheviks in Latvia. His service in these proto-SA troops, was not however sufficient reason to be given decent treatment.\footnote{Leonie Breunung, & Manfred Walther, Die Emigration deutschsprachiger Rechtswissenschaftler ab 1933. Berlin/Boston 2012, 576; Meinel 2012, 53.}

Many “Aryan” scholars who had previously advocated the “revolution” and hailed the destruction of the Weimar Republic were disappointed, and tried to withdraw from public collaboration with the new administration. Martin Heidegger stepped down from his post as Rector of Freiburg University. Erik Wolf made a similar decision earlier. Ernst Jünger, who had never agreed to co-operate with the National Socialists, isolated himself and started to write his satirical book On the Marble Cliffs.\footnote{Koonz 2003, 217; Safranski 2002; Christoph M. Scheuren-Brandes, Der Weg von nationalsozialistischen Rechtslehrern zur Radbruchschen Formel. Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag 2006; Elliot Y. Neaman, A Dubious Past: Ernst Jünger and the Politics of Literature after Nazism. Berkeley, University of California Press 1999, 45–46.}

The young scholars of ‘New legal science,’ among them Franz Wieacker, continued to pursue their place in first-class scholarship. The dismissal of Jewish professors left many chairs in different universities open, and competition for these vacancies was fierce. Young scholars continued to publish their works, but now they had no choice but to toe the Third Reich line. The arguments in the ‘New legal science’ had to be compatible with the demands of the political ideology of National Socialism, and the worldview upheld by the fascist administration. In order to address the questions why this alliance took place, how established legal scientific concepts like Rechtsbewusstsein intertwined with National Socialist ideology, and why Franz Wieacker among other scholars of the ‘New legal science’ adopted, utilized and further developed the legal language to meet the ‘revolution,’ one must study the intertwining of the personal and public spheres of society. That is, one must analyze the individual perception of social development, and the meaning which the respected individual gives it in discus-

“active” and “passive” Nazis,” it proved difficult to define when the exact “revelation” of the criminal nature of the National Socialist regime might have reached the individual. Remy 2002, 151–155.
3. Affections in Rechtsbewusstsein 1933–1945

In 1935 new national instructions for legal studies (Studienordnung) in Germany were given. The doctrine was prepared under the surveillance of K.A. Eckhardt, a committed National Socialist and the professor of legal history at the University of Kiel. In his official announcement on the new curricula, Bernhard Rust, the Third Reich Minister responsible for higher education, commented on the historicizing and politicizing of the legal sciences, at which the instructions aimed: “The German legal sciences must be made National Socialist.” Three decades later, in the second edition of his Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1967), Franz Wieacker commented on the reform and especially the way it emphasized some parts of the BGB: “In this sense, it [the Studienordnung] was not politically motivated.”

The state of German legal science in the early years of the Nazi regime concentrated on this, at first glance, impossible contradiction. To Minister Rust Studienordnung was an achievement and embodiment of Hitler’s ‘thinking with the blood’. It was a plan to bend higher education to make it serve the needs of a fascist state; to raise soldiers who valued the physical over the intellectual and found their strength in physical dexterity rather than from the mind. K.A. Eckhardt and Reinhard Höhn saw it as a vital extension of the National Socialist ‘revolution’ to the field of legal science. The content of university curricula was formally decided in a “Conference for university teachers” held in Berlin on 20–21 December 1934. The participants were summoned by Carl Schmitt and K.A. Eckhardt, and the speakers included Hans Frank and Alfred Rosenberg, Rosenberg’s talk being “The Worldview, Law and the Paragraph.” Only two weeks later the curricula were published. On Christmas Day 1934 after returning from the conference, Wieacker wrote to Erik Wolf about the reform:

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78 Grothe 2005, 196.
79 Grothe 2005, 199.
82 Winkler 2014, 140–143.
All presentations on the reform of the lecture plan kept a certain standard, and the final resolutions seem to me, apart from their experimental trait which is inherent of every thoroughly rearrangement, quite well done.\(^{83}\)

The main thing for Wieacker was that the compulsory lectures on legal history had not been wiped out from the curriculum.\(^{84}\) To Wieacker (and, among others, to Ernst Rudolf Huber and Karl Larenz) \textit{Studienordnung} was first and foremost a manifestation of the new kind of jurisprudential stance to legal theory and history. It was a generational achievement targeted against the stiff and dogmatic majority of the academia.\(^{85}\) Its content celebrated the intertwining of practice and knowledge. The point of departure for ‘New legal science,’ and accordingly for the new \textit{Studienordnung}, was anti-positivism. The sweeping opinion in the legal academia was that the politically corrupted nature of the legal language of previous decades had to be renewed. German jurisprudence needed to be purified from foreign and unhealthy features. The intention was “again” to connect positive norms with the spheres of morality and justice.

The other side of the coin was the thorough renewal of national legal science to coincide with social change and the National Socialist ‘revolution.’ The ‘New legal science’ attempted to redefine legal language, thinking and practices just as the National Socialists were (allegedly) renewing the fundamental structures of society. Even if one leaves aside racial exclusion, the themes which young scholars called for, namely experience and awareness, in some respect corresponded with those called for by National Socialists like minister Rust. From the perspective of our own times, it is difficult not to perceive the 1935 \textit{Studienordnung} as politically motivated. Its groundwork had started well before 1933 but it was the Nazi party who sought to benefit from it by using it for racist goals.\(^{86}\)

Wieacker participated in ‘legal renewal’ with a notable contribution, and published regularly in journals whose ideological stance was unmistakenly National Socialist.\(^{87}\) He often concentrated in his texts in the 1930s and 40s on the way in which the new political order could be assimilated into the substance of legal science. In addition he joined in National Socialist associations, most notably the NSKK, and in the end, enlisted in the National Socialist party (NSDAP) on 1
May 1937. Naturally, Wieacker was no exception in the field of legal science. Since the research task of this book is to study conceptual change, one cannot simply derive conclusions on the nature of Wieacker’s perception on law, the people and culture from the common culture of German academia in the 1930s. A more detailed view is necessary, including acknowledging the existence of mixed intentions in (most of) the legal scientific works during the ‘legal renewal.’ An example of the mixed intentions in scholarly works following the Nazi coup are the texts of Erik Wolf. Wolf was promoted as a vice-dean by Martin Heidegger in 1933, and for a short while Wolf’s writings loyally echoed the wishes of the new order, and the scientific elite to which he had now been upgraded. In his Richtiges Recht im nationalsozialistischen Staat (1934) Wolf wrote: “Foreigners and those who are racially of a foreign origin count among the non-Aryan peoples, who hold no civil status.”

The text as whole was for the most part a blunt reproduction of nationalistic slogans. In January 1934 Wolf sent the manuscript to Wieacker, who responded:

In my eyes the good word from Richtiges Recht receives [in your treatise] a purer meaning than its abusive utilization by [Rudolf] Stammler. Your explanations from page 6 ff. on the fixation of thinking on the purpose of legal history, were for me – for private use – a strong grip. The entire treatise assists in the efforts to read property and family law, so that the contours of the new developments and jurisdictions become discernible under the fabric of the shattered history of ideas of the 19th century. I am very grateful to you for this.

Wieacker did not take part in or bathe in the racist rhetoric of the Third Reich. In the letters I have succeeded in collecting, there is not a single racist remark nor any signs of willingness to propagate fascist ideology. He was, however, willing to work with scholars who devalued the rule of law, echoed the racist rhetoric of the Third Reich, and openly supported the totalitarian regime. Of course, the

90 Wolf did not continue on this path, and later in 1934 he resigned from administrative responsibilities and distanced himself from Nazi ideologues and ideologists. This was not the case in early 1934, however, nor in his argument in Richtiges Recht. Cf. Scheuren-Brandes 2005.
National Socialist attack on the rule of law was camouflaged as a counter-reaction to legal positivism. Wieacker found it easy to participate in this ‘fight,’ since for him legal positivism represented the greatest imaginable threat to the legal sphere of society in degrading the authority of law. Wieacker saw the time as a great challenge to legal science, legal consciousness and German society. This challenge was raised by legal positivism and scholars who “utilized abusively” the law, stripped it of its authority and thus endangered the historical and juridical basis of German society. The twisted use of history and the meaning of law was personified by Rudolf Stammler, who represented the positivistic stance on legal science, and to Wieacker, was equivalent to Hans Kelsen and his ‘pure theory of law’. What connects Franz Wieacker’s pre-war texts is the idea of the new generation of jurists, some of which National Socialistically oriented, who resembled the “new structure and new jurisdiction” in the society, and primarily fought against old twisted legal theories.

As mentioned in chapter II, Wieacker moved from Freiburg to the University of Frankfurt in 1933. From Frankfurt he steadily reported the events and tones, which he either witnessed or personally experienced, to his Freiburg mentor and friend Erik Wolf. At the time Wieacker was invited to the university, it seemed a dynamic and ambitious faculty where a young scholar could make a career, despite or because of the newly-elected, Nazi-minded administration. It is obvious that in moving to Frankfurt, Wieacker believed he would soon receive a permanent position there. The structure of legal education in Frankfurt was planned by Ernst Forsthoff with the help of Franz Beyerle. In practice this meant a “concrete order” view of jurisprudence and a nationalistic treatment of German law and legal history, thus implementing the principles that the ‘New legal sci-

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92 Cf. above.
95 Forsthoff seemed to believe that Frankfurt was a progressive university because of its declarative National Socialism. Meinel 2012, 52.
96 In the early days of 1934 Wieacker reported to Erik Wolf about the sudden uncertainty plaguing the University in Frankfurt, which left many important decisions open. “Wie sich meine Beziehungen zur hiesigen juristischen Fakultät gestalten werden, […] ist ungewiss.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
ence’ emphasized and the war generation appreciated. Wieacker was enthusiastic about the Frankfurt legal curriculum. The break with the “old ways” was evident, and, unlike before, universities again seemed to cultivate true Bildung. Law education now proposed creating jurists who had assimilated a body of legal historical knowledge, and could adjust it to various contexts. This new generation would be in direction communication with both reality and with the values of their community.

On another level, the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität of Frankfurt was in the eye of the storm in 1933 and 1934. During the spring of 1934 fascist student organizations demanded changes to the education and the dismissal of staff members who were either Jewish or not supportive enough of National Socialist ideas. One of the victims was Wieacker’s friend Arnold Ehrhardt, who was no longer able to teach due to resistance from student organizations as well as from some university officials. Although the April law restrictions did not extend to Ehrhardt, who had a Frontkämpfer status and was considered Halbkde, in practice he was not allowed to work. Wieacker refers only indirectly to these tensions in his letters to Erik Wolf. Mostly Wieacker was worried about the fate of the faculty of law in Frankfurt. He reports about the uncertainty plaguing the university during the 1934 spring term. There were rumors that Ernst Krieck was about to leave the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, which according to Wieacker “causes serious anxiety around here.”

In May 1934 Krieck did indeed leave for Heidelberg and at the beginning of April it seemed that the faculty of law would be subject to serious cuts and reduc-

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97 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 19.11.1933, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
101 In fact, Wieacker only mentions Ehrhardt in his letters after the latter had fled to Switzerland: “Ehrhardt ist in Lausanne ausserlich ganz zufrieden; doch lässt sich nicht voraussehen, was am Ende daraus wird.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.12.1934. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. Wolf nevertheless knew Ehrhardt (possibly through Pringsheim, possibly because Ehrhardt had worked at the University of Freiburg), and was aware of his situation.
102 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1933: “Kriecks Ruf nach Heidelberg, der sehr beunruhigt ist.” Cf. Wieacker to Wolf 2.4.1934: The worst-case scenario was that the faculty of law would have been downsized and other disciplines, namely economics, expanded unprecedentedly, leaving “juristischen Restbeständen wird zurückbleiben.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
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tions. Wieacker’s hope for a permanent professorship seemed to be in ruins. 103 However, after a few weeks, the original announcement of a major reduction of the faculty was ameliorated to a plan in which the faculty of law would be combined with philosophy department. Wieacker, along with his colleagues, was not sure what to think. In addition, three professors from other universities were forced to move to Frankfurt, among them the prestigious Roman law professor Fritz Schulz. 104 This relocation was a result of Nazi legislation since the newcomers were of Jewish descent, and the decision on both the transfer of “unwanted” scholars as well as the downsizing of the faculty of law at Frankfurt was carried out at the Ministry for National Education (Reichserziehungsministerium). 105 Wieacker described this as a “collapse.” 106 To Wieacker, the fault for the catastrophic situation lay with the bureaucratic tendency to reduce the role of legal science and jurisprudence, and the contemporary urge to move all the institutions of higher education to technical training facilities, thus ignoring the historical and cultural values that legal education should stand for.

By no means does one look into the future with great cheerfulness regarding this matter. At least one has given what was taken from the law (and philosophy) departments to the medical and natural science departments. There it really seems that one is thinking about an expansion, so that the program of having various types of universities becomes more apparent with the expansion of the humanities or the sciences. 107

The situation was especially dispiriting for Wieacker, who had an emotional bond with Frankfurt University. He often wrote of his affection for the natural


106 “Zusammenbruch” Wieacker to Erik Wolf in 2.4.1934. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

107 “Man sieht hier keineswegs mit großer Heiterkeit in die Zukunft. Immerhin hat man, was man der juristischen (und philosophischen) Fakultät nahm der medizinisch-naturwissenschaftlichen wieder gegeben. Dort scheint man wirklich an einen Ausbau zu denken, sodass sich das Programm der verschiedenen Universitätstypen mit Ausbau je der geisteswissenschaftlichen oder naturwissenschaftlichen Seite immer deutlicher abzeichnet.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 18.4.1934. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
environment and cultural surroundings of the region. They generated within him genuine feelings of belonging and beauty; the region and the University was Heimat and everything it represented. Thus, although many of his friends left the University, he felt obliged to stay. With respect to his career, Wieacker’s personal prospects for the future appeared challenging. The plan he had produced and followed had failed and other options, such as returning to Freiburg, were uncertain. The disappointment took concrete form as Wieacker found himself penniless, and in order to carry on his academic vocation he had to ask for Wolf’s help. This to Wieacker was the nadir in his relation to the state. Although in 1934 Germany was already a National Socialist nation, and the new administration could have been blamed (with good reason) for the ‘collapse’ of Frankfurt University, Wieacker saw things differently. The root of the misfortunes was the ‘modernization’ process, of which the Weimar Republic had been a symbol.

Prospects changed however in 1935 when Wieacker received a position from the University of Kiel to work as a outside lecturer [Privatdozent]. During this time, either by coincidence or not, his encounters with Carl Schmitt intensified, Schmitt showing interest in Wieacker’s work. In Kiel Wieacker joined the circle of colleagues who comprised the Kieler Schule, Karl Larenz, Ernst Rudolph Huber, Georg Dahm, Karl Michaelis, Wolfgang Siebert, Friedrich Schaffstein, Martin Busse, and Franz Wieacker comprising the core of the Schule.


110 Schmitt had a reputation for being able to arrange teaching positions for his students (Mehring 2014). Later Schmitt was ready to bring Wieacker to Berlin. See Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 11.7.1944. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.

111 Wieacker did not have the position of Ordinarius at Kiel, but worked there as Privatdozent, which has generated a debate whether he belonged to the actual Kieler Schule or not. See e.g. Winkler 2014, 261, 264; Liesb 2010, 25–26; Frassek 2008, 358.

112 The Kieler Schule was not tied to a specific faculty, and to the participants the most decisive feature of the school was the personal ties they had with one another. To contemporary scholars it appeared as a group to be mostly united by its methodological stance and its relation to the University in Kiel (cf. Heinrich Lange, Die Entwicklung der Wissenschaft vom Bürgerlichen Recht. Eine Privatrechtsgeschichte der neuesten Zeit. Tübingen, Mohr 1941, 11). With these points in mind, I consider the Kieler Schule to be comprised of the above-mentioned scholars. This is also Wieacker’s own opinion, see Wieacker, ‘Kitzeberger lager’ [1936], 163.
Gerard Dulckeit was later assigned to fill in for Wieacker, who left for Leipzig. Walther Schoenborn and Julius Binder were scholars who managed to keep their chairs in the purge preceding the establishment of the Schule, and are sometimes included.\textsuperscript{113} In 1935 the Schule experienced its period of greatest florescence. K.A. Eckhardt, Ernst Rudolf Huber, Georg Dahm and Friedrich Schaffstein had contributed to the creation of the new curriculum for legal studies.\textsuperscript{114} The newly-started legal journal \textit{Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft} devoted its first issue of 1936 to the writings of the Kielians.\textsuperscript{115}

The Schule was established as, and it seemed to represent, the vanguard of the ‘New legal science’ against the old theories and practices of the “old ways.”\textsuperscript{116} In many ways, the members of the Schule represented a typical sampling of the conservative revolutionary and nationalistic circles of early 1930s Germany. They were all young, Protestant, and confident in their world-historical task at a critical moment in Western civilization. The idea of a “new elite” and its nationalistic and speculative theologies of history was promoted by the far-right press, but it also had its supporters in academia. Carl Schmitt in particular legitimized his attack on “neutral” legal science with his conviction that the “last days” of the old world order were at hand.\textsuperscript{117} He actively sought to have an effect on the wider opinion or consciousness of the German people, in which his circle of disciples – including from the Kieler Schule Ernst Rudolf Huber and Franz Wieacker – played an essential role.\textsuperscript{118} Thus, the self-legitimation of the Kieler Schule as the young elite of German legal science was confirmed not only by the new fascist administration, but also by the “public (nationalistic and to a degree learned) opinion” and their academic mentors.

This loose group of colleagues bonded and created a working environment which the participants recollected with nostalgia even decades later.\textsuperscript{119} Although

\textsuperscript{113} See e.g. Grothe 2005, 172. Yet, as I argue in the following pages, there was a decisive difference whether one was among the eight war generation scientists or whether one represented an older generation, no matter what opinions one had of the “political revolution.”

\textsuperscript{114} Grothe 2005, 195 fn. 138.

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft 1} (1936).

\textsuperscript{116} Concerning the significant input of the Kieler Schule in ‘legal renewal,’ see Eckert 1992, 65–68.

\textsuperscript{117} Mehring 2014, 241, 242, 245–248.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 240, 335.

\textsuperscript{119} On the inner atmosphere of the Schule, see Winkler 2014, 470–476. Cf. Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 2.7.1961, when Wieacker and Huber were again able to work together in the same University at Göttingen: “[…] da die mir sich eröffnende Möglichkeit, mit Dir zusammen wieder an der gleichen Hochschule sein zu können, mich so sehr erfreut, dass für mich hinter diesem Prae alles andere, weil technisch, mittelbar und ungewiss, vollkommen zurücktritt. […] In der Tat wäre Dein Hinzutritt zu unserer, richtiger der dann sich bildenden Juristischen Fakultät der beste Gewinn, den die Fakultät seit vielen Jahren gemacht hätte. Wie sehr
the inner climate of the group was informal, supportive and warm, the visible habitus of the young legal scholars adjusted to their suddenly achieved status as the forerunners of legal studies in Germany. There was a good degree of arrogance in the public appearance of the Schule, as Wieacker later recollected. The self-understanding of the young scholars as the most dynamic, informed, and aware legal scientist elite was unshakable. Their advocacy of the ‘New legal science’ was sincere.

It is very difficult to draw a decisive distinction between the ‘stance’ of the Kieler Schule and other discourses in legal scientific debates. On the level of scientific discourse, the Kieler Schule’s orientation diverged from the more party-oriented theorists. Accordingly, Walkenhaus draws a distinction between the groups of “ordo-theoretical Hegelians” and “anarcho-theoretical sympathizers of SA, SS and SD” in the field of ‘New legal science,’ and more general in the Third Reich’s legal discussions concerning the relation between state and law. Whereas the members of the Schule all upheld, albeit to varying degrees, some kind of connection to the Hegelian or institutional theories on society, the ‘party sympathetic’ side was represented by, for example, Reinhard Höhn. To many, schön es gewesen wäre, wenn dieses Resultat vor Jahren ohne Umschweife und Umwege über die Nordseeküste hätte erreicht werden können, ist klar; dennoch kann ich mich noch immer über das Resultat freuen und möchte wünschen, dass sich ein wenig von dieser Empfindung auf Dich übertrüge. Unsere regelmässigen Ferienunterhaltungen gehören für mich zu den Angehängsten, das Freiburg bietet; aber wieviel wichtiger wäre es, sich hier in täglicher Zusammenarbeit zu besprechen.” Cf. Wieacker To Ernst Rudolf Huber 20.11.1957: “Lieber E. R. H, zugleich im Namen von Schaffstein und Michaelis möchte ich erfragen, ob Du Lust hast, uns zum nächsten Wochenende 30/11 / 1/12 (1. Advent) zu besuchen. Schaffstein schlägt vor, bei ihm zu wohnen. Ich schlage vor, gegen Sonnabend früh abzufahren und gegen Mittag hier anzutreffen. Abends würden wir zusammen in einem netten Waldgasthaus eine Ente verzehren; Sonntag uns unterhalten. Montag werden wir vermutlich alle wieder im Geschirr sein müssen.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Ernst Rudolf Huber to Wieacker 25.11.1957: “Lieber Wieacker, schönsten Dank für die freundschaftlichen Einladung, der ich, wie ich Michaelis schon heute morgen am Telefon sagte, gerne Folge leiste […] Grüsse an Schaffstein (mit Dank für die Einladung zum Nächttigen), an Michaelis (mit Dank für den Anruf) und besondere an Dich.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber Bestand 1505, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

123 To Ernst Rudolf Huber (and to e.g. Wieacker) the relation of law and state presupposed an existence of some kind of Stand, a political body of people, whereas Höhn held ‘the people’ and Volksgemeinschaft to be identical concepts (Grothe 2005, 219–220). The breach between these two streams also originated very probably from their relation to Carl Schmitt. Höhn, also...
the *Kieler Schule* distinguished itself in its view of legal education, and thus the vehement opponents of the *Kieler Schule* were mostly against the stance it was seen to represent in the field of legal pedagogics. Nevertheless, to conclude that these disputes made the *Kieler Schule* somehow “less National Socialist” would be incorrect, although that was how Ernst Rudolf Huber saw things in 1945.

The most decisive feature of the *Schule* for its members, which later retained its importance in reconstructing the ‘Kielian narrative’ of the Nazi era, was the fighting stance it took against the old practices of the higher education and older staff, which represented the ‘degenerating bourgeois spirit’. In the spring of 1939, devoted member of the *Kieler Schule* and the professor of legal philosophy at the University of Kiel, Karl Larenz, wrote to Gerard Dulckeit:

The second point [of the letter] is related to our problem child, Julius [Binder]. To my horri-fi-cation he writes to me he wants to preface his “Wissenschaftslehre” by a “general explanation on science as a whole, pure and purposive science, objectivity and other things like that”. The outcome is clear: a worsened edition of the foreword from his *Grundlegung [der Rechtsphilosophie (1935)],* a complete embittered polemic against the “new” German science as it is reflected in Julius’ eyes, a more or less covert attack against the ideology and the National Socialist jurisprudence etc. *You must prevent that!* How? I leave this to your well-proven cleverness and your subtlety.

This letter is no exception in the correspondence between Larenz and Dulckeit. Many of Larenz’s letters from 1936 to 1939 concentrate on mocking Julius Binder, the other professor of legal philosophy in Kiel during that time, and Larenz’s doctor father. According to Larenz, Binder was miserably outdated in his theo-

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124 Cf. Lange 1941.
125 Grothe 2005, 218.
ries. The bibliography and books Binder wished to include in the faculty’s curriculum were simply dull. Nor was his teaching much better; Binder failed to bond with his audience and did not understand the essence of lecturing, namely the education of young minds. Overall, to Larenz his senior college was simply unaware of the contemporary reality in which legal science should also evolve.\textsuperscript{127} The distinction which Larenz draws between himself (together with Dulckeit) and Binder is, however, revealing with respect to the basic attitude of the \textit{Kieler Schule} in general. Binder was by no means a legal positivist or “Kelsenian.” He had established himself as a tireless critic of the Neo-Kantian, for example, Rudolf Stammler’s legal doctrines.\textsuperscript{128} Michael Stolleis shows how Binder in his strongly adjusted Hegelianism draws the legal discipline closer to nationalistic and anti-democratic discourses. In other words, Binder can undoubtedly be labeled a conservative revolutionary.\textsuperscript{129} Binder, however, was not a youngster, and unlike the war generation of the conservative legal scientist, he could not understand, support or accept the way National Socialists were shaping higher education. Inevitably, that stance placed him at odds with the Kiel scholars of the war generation, since their determined aim was to distinguish their ‘school’ from the old hierarchies and academic practices.

In the first part of the 4 April 1939 letter to Dulckeit given above, Larenz deals with the state of the law faculty at the University of Kiel. His main point circles around the question of whom the faculty should hire after Karl Michaelis had left the University and accepted a professorship at Leipzig. The newcomer should be a scholar whose personality, ideological stance and scholarly interests would fit the overall frame of the ‘stormtrooper faculty.’ The first choice would have been Wieacker, whom Larenz had already consulted earlier, but who “after long oscillation” between Leipzig and Kiel decided to stay in Leipzig,\textsuperscript{130} and thus Dulckeit and Larenz were forced to rethink their options. The subsequent part of the letter

\textsuperscript{127} Karl Larenz’s letters to Gerhard Dulckeit, Nachlass Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen.

\textsuperscript{128} Cf. Dreier 1987.


\textsuperscript{130} The fact that Wieacker moved to Leipzig does not mean that he was no longer part of the \textit{Kieler Schule}. The \textit{Schule} was a group, not a faculty (cf. p. 205 fn. 108). Furthermore, the Central administration had plans to turn the law school at Leipzig into a similar ‘stormtrooper faculty’ like the one in Kiel (Grothe 2005, 172). In the light of these plans it is understandable that Wieacker was not alone in moving to Leipzig. Huber, Dahm, Michaelis and Schaffstein also continued their work in Leipzig. Another National Socialist model school was later (1941) established in Strasbourg, where Huber, Schaffstein and Dahm found professorships. Finally, after the war, the members of the original \textit{Schule} continued to foster their \textit{Kameradschaft} at the University of Göttingen. Winkler 2014, 473–474.
suggests some points around which the faculty teaching should concentrate. Here Larenz exhibits the distinguishing grounds which both separated the ‘war generation’ from the older conservative revolutionaries, and made the young scholars such a politically ambiguous group. While pondering ways to coordinate the next semester, Larenz praises the contemporary rector Paul Ritterbusch who, according to him, had succeeded in putting his ideas into action and had achieved impressive results. Larenz concludes the positive results:

Same goes with his university weeks, with the lecturer academy [Dozentenakademie] and now with the conference of his institute which was very well attended from home and abroad and has been very interesting. The contacts with party, city, and navy are, as especially this conference showed, very convenient. The lecturer academy stages besides monthly presentations of certain working groups as well.\footnote{131 So mit seinen Universitätswochen, mit der Dozentenakademie und jetzt eben mit der Tagung seines Instituts, die aus dem In- und Ausland ausgezeichnet besucht war und sehr interessant verlief. Die Beziehung mit Partei, Stadt und Marine sind, wie gerade diese Tagung zeigte, sehr günstig. Die Dozentenakademie veranstaltet ausser monatlichen Vorträgen auch bestimmte Arbeitsgemeinschaften.”, Karl Larenz to Gerhard Dulckeit 4.4.1939, NL Gerhard Dulckeit, Nachlass Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen.}

Larenz suggested that the faculty should deepen its cooperation with Ritterbusch and with the institutions he represented. The intertwining of politics, social change and university teaching was natural, and even desirable, since the means were less important than the end, namely to educate and “engage in fruitful scientific work.”\footnote{132 Ibid.}

The war generation was not hesitant to co-work with the Nazi party and adjusted its teaching to meet the new ideology. It is also here where one can see a decisive shift towards National Socialist legal science on the level of practice. Later during the war Paul Ritterbusch was given the task of gathering together German scientists and shaping a “weapon of war” from their texts and thoughts, hence the \textit{Aktion Ritterbusch} project. Participants demonstrated the value of the humanities, social sciences and law in the “intellectual prosecution of the war” and in the planning of a new Europe under German leadership.\footnote{133 Frank R. Hausmann, »Deutsche Geisteswissenschaft« im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die »Aktion Ritterbusch« (1940–1945). Heidelberg, Synchroen 2007; Schönwälder 1992, 208–216; cf. Karl Larenz To Gerhard Dulckeit 31.1.1940: “Ferner hat Ritterbusch von Ministerium einen Auftrag u. Mittel zwecks “Einsatzes der Geisteswissenschaften im Kriege” erhalten: ich habe ihm bereits einen Plan für die Rechtsphilosophischen unterbreitet u. hoffe nun auf Ihre Mitwirkung. Bei der Zusammenkunft mit Wieacker an der auch Glockner teilnehmen wird, können wir auch über die ZDK sprechen.” NL Gerhard Dulckeit, Nachlass Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen.} Activities in-
cluded organizing conferences and publishing collective works. The project might be regarded as one of the saddest symbols of the alliance between the fascist government and German social sciences. From the original *Kieler Schule* at least Larenz, Huber, Michaelis, Dahm and Wieacker participated in *Aktion Ritterbusch*, and Wieacker’s small part was to convince readers of the similarity between the mentality and base values of German and Roman cultures.134

Larenz was clearly more aggressive in tone and style than Wieacker, but I would argue that in some respects his message can be generalized to describe the culture and mentality of the whole *Kieler Schule*, including Wieacker. The ‘New legal science’ was not only considered to be the correct way to see law and society, but the paradigmatic change from the “old” was an inescapable temporal necessity if one wanted to shape contemporary German society. There were traits of patricide and fascinated “motion-blindness” in the existence of the *Kieler Schule* and its young scholars. Abandonment of the frustrating old codes, a sense of the dazzling possibilities which the new national uprising seemed to offer for bright young minds, and if not support for racial exclusion, at least selective ignorance towards the concrete results to which the racist slurs were taking people, are obvious characteristics of the culture of the *Kieler Schule*.135 A radical breach with respect to the scholarly tradition also occurred in the sphere of practices. The cooperation in the form of camps, direct interaction with society in networking with the party and military, and changes in the University hierarchy as well as in the style of teaching brought about by the new *Studienordnung*, were all aspects that marked an enormous rift in comparison to the way the war generation had started their own studies in the 1920s.136 The practices brought a sense of togetherness and aroused emotions which distinguished Wieacker’s circle from the traditional way to do legal science.

There are only three letters written by Wieacker in the archives of Erik Wolf and Carl Schmitt sent during his *Privatdozent* times in Kiel.137 There is, however,

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134 Ibid. Wieacker’s “Entwicklungstufen des römischen Eigentums” (1942) was an article published in the collection *Das neue Bild der Antike* (Leipzig 1942), edited by Helmut Berve. It was part of the program “Kriegeinsatz der Altertumwissenschaft” directed by Berve, which itself was part of the “Kriegeinsatz der Geisteswissenschaft” led by Paul Ritterbusch. Like many other contributions in “Aktion Ritterbusch,” *Entwicklungstufen des römischen Eigentums* could be seen as either ‘normal science’ or propaganda. Frank R. Hausmann, »Deutsche Geisteswissenschaft im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die »Aktion Ritterbusch« (1940–1945). Heidelberg, Synchron 2007.

135 Eckert 1992, 55, 56, 60.


137 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.7.1935, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv,
an abundance of correspondence where Wieacker recollects those times and compares his present and future situation to the nostalgic memory of the *kameradschaftliche* experience.\(^\text{138}\) I will deal with this theme in more detail in chapter IV. For now, it is suffice to note that the time in Kiel, especially the experience of belonging to a group of like-minded friends, was a decisive feature in Wieacker’s personal life history, according to which he arranged and interpreted the later events and phenomena in his life. The network which formed in Kiel also continued to support its members long after the war, in such universities as Freiburg or Göttingen.\(^\text{139}\)

Wieacker did not find it a problem to be linked with National Socialist-minded scholars in their mission against “foreign and capitalist” traits in German culture, because these notions roughly resembled his own underlying ideas in attempting to conceptualize justice. To Rust, Rosenberg, Frank and Hitler the priority was to purify Germany from anything Jewish-related, to exterminate the Jews. In order to be comprehensive they extended their mission to eradicate ‘racial corruption’ in culture and science.\(^\text{140}\) To Wieacker, however, the ‘racial element’ was irrelevant to science. There was instead a wrong and dangerous kind of weak argumentation by disrespectful people, whose work needed to be set aside for the greater cause of the fatherland and German culture.\(^\text{141}\) Because of this ‘merging of intentions’ Wieacker, like many other young scholars, worked with the National Socialists, and ignored the reality of Nazi injustices. Here lies one reason for the success of the fascist coup in German academia. The National Socialists managed to convince their contemporaries that they were responding to the basic needs of the people, that they were aware of amorphous social changes, and were able to fight against the grievances brought about by modernization. Many scholars advocated ‘legal renewal,’ and like Wieacker celebrated the “improved structuring of studies” which “brought them closer to real life,”\(^\text{142}\) but there was a difference between the older scientists and the war generation with regard to attitudes concerning education and practical engagement in National Socialist programs.\(^\text{143}\)

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\(^\text{138}\) Cf. p. 205, fn. 108.
\(^\text{139}\) Winkler 2014, 470–476.
\(^\text{140}\) Cf. Schönwalder 1992, 32–33.
\(^\text{141}\) Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
\(^\text{143}\) Cf. Schönwälder 1992, 31: although the older generation welcomed the political change in society, they were more reluctant to accept its effects on higher education.
Wieacker was concerned with Bildung and Stand. They presented the ethical foundation of the everyday life (Wirklichkeit) of German society and represented the principles of social justice. He was, nevertheless, intrigued by the possibilities which the changed political atmosphere had brought about from the perspective of educational reform. Thus, in distinction to many older legal scholars, he participated in projects and programs which drew him close to National Socialist Gleichschaltung.

a) The late 1930s and war as Erlebnis

During the war Franz Wieacker found his distinguishing style in studying and describing legal historical phenomena. The understanding that legal concepts should reflect the material bond between the people and normative order remained, as it did for the rest of his career. So too did the claim that law embodied humankind’s triumph over degeneration and superstition – law was the sum of people’s cultural achievements – although Wieacker’s argument took a more sophisticated and versatile form. In his letters the quest to combine law and the reality as perfectly as possibly took a metaphysical turn, and his interest started to turn from contemporary and current legal problematics to historical themes. Scientifically, he was very active. His scholarly work was interrupted when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, and Wieacker was drafted, but he was able to return to his academic duties fairly quickly and he was not called up again until the summer of 1944.144 Whereas the terms Rechtsbewusstsein and Gewissen started to appear in his scientific texts, in private Wieacker struggled to give a precise definition to these concepts. What exact features and meanings did these words signify? What was the distinction between them? Who expressed them and in what circumstances? What were the limits of these concepts in defining social change from a historical perspective?

Wieacker’s ambiguous stance towards the National Socialist regime is evident in the secondary sources from the war years. Party informers produced a report on Wieacker’s political reliability (as they did for most scholars), which stated:

[Wieacker] is completely dependable in the political sense. [...] Pg. Wieacker is filled with the idea of the new state and participates with the utmost diligence to make it come true. [...] The willingness to make sacrifices is present, [his] reputation is good. At least, nothing detrimental is known.145

144 Liebs 2010, 28; Winkler 2014, 456 fn. 3.
Judging by his correspondence, Wieacker was by no means an eager supporter of the regime, and there are no signs of a fascination with war in his letters to his friends. In general with regard to the war, the picture which previous studies on Wieacker creates is similar to most of the retrospective analyses of the inner worlds of people living under Nazi rule. The war was a necessary evil, which individuals often wanted to set aside like bad weather and concentrate on routines or matters of spiritual life instead and as fully as possible.\textsuperscript{146} On the surface, Wieacker’s correspondence repeats the same narrative. If there had been a place for nationalistic zeal in his \textit{Weltanschauung} before the 1940s, war-weariness certainly removed any beliefs in the sustainability of the political nationalism of Nazi Germany. In his letter to Erich Rothacker, Wieacker expressed his irritation towards the war. It constantly interrupted his scholarly work and prevented him from carrying out the meaningful work of studying and writing about law:

Furthermore, the progression of war can put an end to my scientific work for an indefinite period every day. In practice the result would be, that the editors can not expect the delivery of my manuscript for two and a half years irrespective of the other war events burdening their business.\textsuperscript{147}

Viktor Winkler sees Wieacker’s war years as a time when he consolidated previous influences. The identity and vision of Wieacker as a researcher had already been formed earlier; his permanent position at the University of Leipzig enabled Wieacker to put this vision into practice. Winkler correctly shows that during the war, Wieacker wrote many of his key texts which were later brought together in an essay collection, \textit{Vom Römischen Recht} (1944). It is also obvious that the first drafts of \textit{Das Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit} (1952) had already been written in the early 40s.\textsuperscript{148} Wieacker’s correspondence confirms this picture. In his letters Wieacker reported that he had started a new project in late 1941, namely a study on “the scientific consequences of Roman law on the Occident” as well as “the history of German private law in modernity.”\textsuperscript{149} These themes, with different


\textsuperscript{148} Winkler 2014, 172–173.

\textsuperscript{149} “So ist im Erscheinen begriffen eine Sammlung von Versuchen über das römische Recht,
topics and developments, comprised the two major branches of Wieacker’s scholarly works throughout the following decades.

The turn towards historical meaning, the result of both disappointment and new scientific influences, is evident. In his letter to Erik Wolf, Wieacker, both frustrated and curious, discusses how poetry succeeds in capturing the essence of law better than philosophy ever will. Following Wolf’s encouragement Wiecker interpreted Hölderlin’s *Rhein,* and saluted the poem’s ability to display the *Geist* of binding norms:

If I may judge, I find the difficult concept that one can learn from the poet about the existence of law, carefully and productively composed. Very strange, how unipolar and undialectical his [Hölderlin’s] definition of law is. How strictly he excludes the positive definitions of the law from his own ideal. He also deals further in a terminologically meaningful way with the law in *Rhein:* For sooner must law and home hearth crumble, / And mankind’s day turn ugly, before / One such as this could think to / Forget his origin / And the distilled voice of his youth*.150

His suspicion of rational philosophy (Hölderlin is characteristically a poet who rejected philosophical reasoning) as a tool to draft laws, understand legal matters and sustain social justice in everyday reality is a visible feature of Wieacker’s war time writings. Within this theme Wieacker found an appreciative and well-informed counterpart in Carl Schmitt.

Both Reinhardt Mehring and Florian Meinel notice a serious drift between Carl Schmitt and his disciples from 1936 to the late years of the decade.152 They interpret this as a “moment of soberness” on Ernst Forsthoﬀ’s and Ernst Rudolf...
Huber’s behalf, resulting in Schmitt’s attempt to whitewash the murderous purge of the NSDAP during the Night of the Long Knives and his escalating anti-Semitism. On the other hand, Schmitt himself was “dethroned” by SS-minded opposition, which suspected (correctly) that Schmitt’s engagement with the regime was not sincere and wholehearted. After the blurry chaos of the early years of Gleishaltung, the National Socialist policy had become distinctively racist and vulgar. So it is not far-fetched to allege such “soberness” in the case of Wieacker’s orientation as well. Detlef Liebs suggests that around the time of the outbreak of the war, Wieacker was already well aware of the true nature of the Third Reich. Especially the ousting and exiling of Fritz Pringsheim had opened his eyes to Nazi betrayal.

Nevertheless, after a few years of silence between Wieacker and Schmitt, their cooperation deepened considerably during the war years from chance encounters to collegial acquaintance. After the surrender of France, the Germans established a ‘model university’ at Strasbourg. It employed many of Wieacker’s friends, including Ernst Rudolf Huber, and Wieacker himself visited there. On these trips, which sometimes included a visit to the German Institute of Science in Paris, Carl Schmitt accompanied Wieacker. The two also travelled together on a conference to occupied Hungary. Wieacker invited Schmitt to Leipzig for guest lectures, commented on his articles, and inquired into Schmitt’s opinion on some of his ideas. Wieacker obviously admired Schmitt’s intelligence and writing


skills. The relation might have given Wieacker some practical advantage with respect to work positions and publishing, but undoubtedly Wieacker also benefitted scientifically from their interaction. After the war, cooperation with Schmitt was in general disapproved, and the correspondence between the two ended immediately. But like in the cases of so many other scholars, Schmitt’s influence was decisive, and it showed also in Wieacker’s post-war production.

In 1941 Schmitt gave a lecture in Leipzig on French jurisprudence and later sent Wieacker a copy of his article ‘Die Formung des französischen Geistes durch den Legisten.’ The war-time correspondence between Schmitt and Wieacker followed the same themes which they had discussed earlier in 1935. Then Schmitt had asked Wieacker’s opinion on Johan Stroux’s article on Greek influences in Roman legal culture, which gave Wieacker a perfect opportunity to exhibit his expertise on Roman law, but also to defend his vision of the distinct nature and meaning of Roman legal scholarship. In his 1935 letter to Schmitt, Wieacker wrote of Roman law and lawyers:

[The Greek systematization] produces a legal theory from a Greek model for the relationship of natural and civil law that is rather subordinate to classical Roman law. It leads on the other hand to a rationally and logically arranged survey of legal concepts that have been handed down, as they are self-evident to the Greek-educated Roman, and thereby make the somewhat archaic guild-like thinking style of the pre-classical lawyers (comparable to the English Inns of Court) much more interesting. In comparison, I think that the inner structure of the classic jurisprudence almost completely refused to give itself to these influences, and it maintained the ancient Roman style up to Julian’s former revision of the Roman edicts.

In his 1935 letter Wieacker defended his Romanistic views to a distinguished scholar who infamously had blamed Roman law for the ‘scientification’ of Ger-
Being aware of both Schmitt’s earlier announcements as well as his scientific rhetoric and interests, Wieacker – in a very traditional manner – accuses Greek theories of corrupting the pure ‘pre-classic jurisprudence,’ and, curiously, defends true Roman law as being like the ‘English courts of Inns’: ‘guild-like’ and ‘infused by masculine expressions’. In other words, Wieacker defended Roman legal scholarship as a distinct ‘concrete order.’ Wieacker’s response was not mere lip-service to the Staatrat Schmitt. As becomes evident in his 1930s writings, he truly believed in Schmitt’s methodology of analyzing legal entities from the institutional point of view, and later held on to his view of Late Republican jurisprudence as a distinguished community guided by its own traditions and norms. This becomes evident when, on the basis of his 1935 response to Schmitt, Wieacker wrote an article which he sent first to Salvatore Riccobono and which was later published in English. It cannot be constructed from his letters to what extent Wieacker shared Schmitt’s anti-parliamentarism, but his doubt concerning the functionality of a legal system built solely on the virtues of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment is obvious.

Wieacker rejected the idea that some people because of their origins, national or linguistic, would have a “birthright” to a more comprehensive understanding of justice. Furthermore, mere knowledge did not equate with wisdom in legal matters. Nevertheless, some people seemed to succeed better than others, and this more beneficial position intrigued Wieacker. He agreed with Schmitt’s assertion that it was the institutional premises which cultivated the perspective to understand and the ability to apply justice in society. Different people seemed to possess different ways of understanding law and jurisprudence, and this was due to national virtues as well as to institutes of legal praxis and education. In other words, national legal cultures were related to the mentality of their people:

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160 Cf. p.76
162 On Schmitt references in Wieacker’s 1930s works, see Winkler 2014, 268, 277.
163 Franz Wieacker to Salvatore Riccobono 2.2.1940. The personal collection of Professor Mario Varvaro, Università degli Studi di Palermo – Dipartimento di Storia del Diritto, Palermo-Università degli Studi, Palermo. The letters are a concession of Salvatore Riccobono’s family. Professor Professor Varvaro himself discovered the documents in Riccobono’s house. Therefore, they are not stored in an official archive; The article in question is ‘The Causa Curiana and contemporary Roman jurisprudence,’ in Irish Jurist 2 (1967), 151–164.
Indeed, one wonders, if that German systematic-philosophical type of pervasion of the judicial office with a function, which the basic political order assigns to the lawyers, hasn’t failed so far, namely because of that learned-systematic approach. Admittedly, the systematic-normative approach of life for better or worse is significant for life and act, and also the political acts, of the Germans; that school of thought in the German legal science, as it has been established by Windscheid, is by the way actually very German.\(^{165}\)

To Wieacker as a Romanist, the absolute point of reference between different legal cultures was the one prevailing in the Late Roman Republic.\(^{166}\) I will return to the questions of what kind of legal culture the Romans had, what virtues it comprised, and what was its lasting significance from the point of view of modern society later in chapter IV, but for now the focus is on the way in which Wieacker saw the relation between the distinguished legal skill of the Romans and the mentality of the common people. Wieacker presumed that the ‘guild’ of Roman lawyers cultivated its own inner mentality and derived its legal decision from this shared culture, thus it was represented as an ideal ‘concrete order’ which – during the golden age of Roman jurisprudence – defined the essence of Roman law and in more general terms constituted the lawyers estate, *Stand*, inside the Roman culture.\(^{167}\) In 1943, on Schmitt’s request, Wieacker reviewed Valentin-Al. Georgescu’s book *Études de philologie juridique et de droit romain*.\(^{168}\) In his book Georgescu compared the belief-systems of ancient cultures, making no distinction between the Romans and other cultures. Wieacker disagreed, and in his response to Schmitt, laid down some of the fundamental principles of his ideas on legal history and Roman law.

[I am unable to go any further than what I say in “Roman jurist” on the characteristic legal ontology of the Romans, so I cannot say that the autonomous, life-affirming validity of the traditional and professional developed legal structure in ancient Rome could be classified


\(^{166}\) Ibid.: “Ich halte auch den römischen Juristen nicht für den einzigen denkbaren Typus "der" juristischen Begabung, freilich für einen, der einem etwa denkbaren phänomenalen Typs "des" Juristen am nächsten kommt.”


III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness

alongside the consciousness-categories of the magical, numinous, the taboo, Orenda and ethno-
logical auxiliary concepts alike. f69

In this excerpt, Wieacker concentrates on the idea of his masterly article ‘Vom Römischen Juristen,’ (1939) in one sentence, but his review as a whole is dually revealing. 170 First, he presents the essence of Roman jurisprudence as a group of ‘highly educated experts’ as opposed to the common awareness of tribal societies, which was characterized by superstition and primitive forms of thinking. Second, the feature which lifted the original Roman law above any other ‘legal form,’ was that the ‘expert-culture’ with its ‘style of thinking’ overcame the primitive ‘ontological’ explanations of common ‘awareness.’ In other words, the success and prestige of Roman law was due to the authoritative status which the lawyer Stand had retained in Roman society. Furthermore, such status was associated with a particular form of education. This education, which cultivated legal wisdom and further uplifted a group of people to a distinguished position within society, continued to serve as the backbone of the legal order and civilized culture. 171 These requirements were true of legal education in ancient Rome and were equally valid in modern Germany.

The purpose of higher legal education, and concurrently the responsibility of the teacher, was to bring up an ‘estate’, Stand, of legal experts who had assimilated the virtues and traditional knowledge emblematic of the profession, and further would be able to fulfill their duty of guarding and guiding the legal consciousness of the people. This trope or ontological premise was a principle which not only sustained the core of Wieacker’s legal historical writings over the decades, but also provided a key to understanding his vision of the intertwining between society, legal science and people’s way of thinking.

The relation between this ‘historical trope’ and Wieacker’s contemporary society was not unidirectional. He did not merely explain the twentieth-century German society from the perspective of the Roman ideal, nor did he straightforwardly consider that the gestalt of present-day society mirrored that of Ancient Rome. Rather, his legal scientific research task took the form of a circle: from the

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bases and evaluations of twentieth-century German society he sought to understand the Roman world (as it appeared in textual sources), and from that representation he commented on present-day phenomena, which were then again compared to the ideal reference point of antiquity, and so on. In coping with his contemporary society and the challenges which the academic world in particular faced, Wieacker maintained a historical picture of Roman jurisprudence and a vision of the ideal contemporary society. These two spheres explained one another and helped to understand the social change in which Wieacker was personally situated.

The idea of the relation between a Stand of legal experts and the people as a mirror of the justness of a given society was further sharpened by his experiences in the war. The experience which separated, and continues to separate, Wieacker from many historians was his service as a front-line soldier. Wieacker was called up for military service twice, and though he never publicly reflected on these events, nor apparently was he subject to any severe traumas, that experience was a horizon which on the one hand connected him to some scholars, and on the other opened an irreversible breach between him and the younger generation of scientists. Service in the army, fighting for one’s country, was a duty, a natural and correct thing to do. The idea of ‘the inevitability of war’ is a theme and an axiom, which seems to connect the scholars of the early twentieth century around the world despite cultural differences.  

In Wieacker’s letters from the frontline, his frustration and tiredness with fascist propaganda is obvious. There are two countries on whose behalf Wieacker is fighting. On one hand, there is the law-based obligation of a citizen to defend the nation which he inhabits, and on the other the affectionate need to protect one’s Heimat. Wieacker talks of his service as a “duty” (Dienst), but he also combines and conjugates the word in a way which conveys a tone of the distinct “reality of duty.”

In his letters from northern Italy in the spring of 1945, Wieacker expressed his thoughts and feelings in an indirect way by referring to prose classics or well-known characters in German literature. This might have been a means to avoid military censorship, but a more plausible reason was that he typically perceived chaotic and stressful social reality through metaphors and narratives provided by the Western cultural tradition. Thus, while writing from the frontline, Wieacker compared himself to Corporal Gottlieb Köpke from Willibald Alexis’s Isegrim.

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172 Consequently, after the war, European legal historians found a common ground in building a Cold War worldview from the experience of war. Ville Erkkilä & Jacob Giltaj, Interview with Tony Honoré, in Forum Historiae Iuris 26/02/2015. http://www.forhistiur.de/2015-01-erkkila-giltaij.

173 Wiecaker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 6.1.1944[1945]. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
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and described the war and his surroundings with the help of Ernst Jünger’s *In Stahlgewittern*, Shakespeare’s *Macbeth*, and Boccaccio’s *Decamerone*. Such recourse testifies on the impossibility of an individual to exhaustively categorize and give linguistic shape to the distorting reality of war and totalitarianism. But it also suggests Wieacker’s fundamental trust in textual learnedness, *Bildung*, and the significance which the heritage of high culture had in his personal way of perceiving the world. Rather than accepting ready explanations on human beings, Wieacker searched for points of connection from cultural examples which were familiar to him due to his upbringing and the *Bildungsbürgertum* worldview. Likewise, after the Second World War when Wieacker tried retrospectively to make sense of his actions and attitudes towards the National Socialist regime, the explanation was made by referring to the texts of Goethe and Schiller.

In his letter to Hans-Georg Gadamer in March 1945, Wieacker explains that he will adopt in the letter the role of a “scientific travelling novelist” while reporting the things he sees, and in order to understand things he will make some comparisons. To both Gadamer and Wieacker, the tradition of ironic essays based on journeys was familiar. From Jonathan Swift to Montesquieu the meaning of such reports has not been so much to describe the landscape the author had supposedly inhabited, but to comment on the culture where his audience resides and he himself lived before the trip. Thus, in his letter Wieacker in an indirect way expressed his thoughts and feelings about Germany. He refers to Italy (and/or Germany) as an actor in a play. Later in his letter he makes a remark about a Shakespearean tragedy which he had seen in an Italian city some time ago:

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176 “Ich schweife in Reflexionen ab, anstatt zu erzählen. Ich schrieb schon, an reinem Erzählstoff fehlte es nicht; aber teils ist es nicht möglich, teils so leicht, vergnügt und unverbunden, dass es zur Feder stockt, angensicht der allgemeinen Lage und der Not des hier so doppelt vermissten und entbehrt Vaterlandes [.]” Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer 14.3.1945. NL Hans-Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar. A closer example of an indirect commentary on one’s homeland would be Ernst Jünger’s “On the Marblecliffs,” to which Wieacker referred in his letter to Ernst Rudolf Huber on 23.2.1945. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

Something very remarkable in this context was a performance of Macbeth in the theater of the largest city of this land, where I am almost constantly. It was quite good, but continuous self-denial by the players.\(^{178}\)

To Gadamer, Shakespeare’s plays represented a fundamental cultural value.\(^{179}\) Thus, Wieacker’s reference was most certainly understood. Indeed, Wieacker’s metaphor would be evident even to a reader who does not inhabit the time and space shared by Gadamer and Wieacker. Macbeth is foremost a play on political ambition, on yearning for power for its own sake, and the destructive effects of such obsession.\(^{180}\) In the spring of 1945, a character in a play who unwittingly and in stubborn denial fulfills a political tragedy was quite an accurate symbolic description of the Fascist regimes and the ‘official’ public opinion prevailing in them.

Yet the saddening political atmosphere and destruction brought about by the war did not prevent Wieacker from making observations on the time from the point of view of a legal historian. To researchers studying Wieacker’s production, the war seemed to sharpen some of the ideas Wieacker had presented earlier and slightly shifted the emphasis of his overall research orientation.\(^{181}\) It is clear that after the war in his scientific texts Wieacker mostly concentrated on the European legal heritage, the fundamental role of language in legal culture, and the systematic intertwining of people, cultural transition and the word of law in history. In other words, the mentalities, interpretations and thoughts on law took prior position in his quest to describe the essence of European legal history. A distinct research agenda was well on its way as an idea during the late war years, but one can see the wider research stance in progress when Wieacker wrote to Gadamer on 14 March 1945.

What is great and distinctive to us regarding this land, the Antiquity, the Trecento, the hesperian heavens, have certainly nothing to do with the current political conditions and the least to do with the vast, entirely middle European plain in the north. But there is yet something classical.


\(^{179}\) Gadamer recalled later in an interview that it was those texts which for him worked as an antidote to the Prussian war-mongering of his youth. The world of Shakespeare’s dramas and comedies provided a sphere where a true cultivation of one’s spiritual abilities was possible without combining this personal Bildung with the political and ideological necessities of the Zeitgeist. Richard Wilson, Free Will: Art and Power on Shakespeare’s Stage. Manchester, Manchester UP 2014, 299.


\(^{181}\) Avenarius 2010, 151–152.
at present which is the man of this territory himself; and of the man per se remains after all that collective and determinated still a large piece. [...] And even so, what a refreshing wonder each new language is, and what an opportunity it is to interpret the relationships between people and things from their origin.\(^{182}\)

There were points of connection and comparison in the mentalities of European people which had emerged over centuries of cultural exchange. What the war and twisted political intentions could not wipe away was the essence and history of diverse cultures and the people living in them. Wieacker once again realized the intriguing phenomenon of the interplay between language and cultural products, and the people who expressed these abstract entities. To a historian, studying the origins of such phenomenon was not only satisfying, it was also important with regard to understanding diverse cultures and societies. Such a strong conviction in his thought was evident in such post-war works of Wieacker as *Vulgarismus und Klasseismus* and especially *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit*, but the seed of such a stance could already be found in *Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein*, which was more or less the groundwork on which Wieacker built the later representations of European legal culture.\(^{183}\) In those texts Wieacker put an increasingly marked emphasis on the mentalities of the common people in a given time and culture.

Nevertheless, Wieacker continued to be interested in the ‘people’ from the point of view of a conservative jurist and a historian of ideas brought up in the early decades of twentieth-century Germany. Thus, the research slogan ‘back to the people’ did not produce a shift towards an ethnographic interest in the everyday acts of the common people. Rather, his earlier utterance on the necessity of ‘legal anthropology’ in studying the long line of European legal history became even more firm.\(^{184}\) However, the inevitable distance between Franz Wieacker the legal historian and the ‘people’ he studied remained. Wieacker was confident that he, as a representative of a distinguished tradition of thinking and analyzing, was able to interpret the ‘reality’ of the people in a more truthful and accurate way than the people who inhabited that ‘reality.’ Whereas the ‘people’ clung to superstitious

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\(^{182}\) “Was für uns gross und unauswechselbar ist an diesem Land, das Altertum, das Trecento, die hesperischen Himmel, das hatte ja mit der gegenwärtigen politischen Form nichts zu tun, und am wenigsten mit der großen, noch ganz mitteleuropäischen Ebene im Norden. Aber es gibt doch noch etwas Klassisches gegenwärtig, und das ist der Mensch dieses Landes an sich; und von dem Menschen an sich bleibt nur ja hinter allem Kollektiven und Determinierten, noch ein so großes Stück über.[...] Und doch was für ein erquickendes Wunder ist jede neue Sprache und was für eine Gelegenheit, die Beziehungen zwischen dem Menschen und den Dingen von Ursprung an noch einmal aufzufassen.”, Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer 14.3.1945. NL Hans-Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.

\(^{183}\) Liebs 2010, 38–39.

\(^{184}\) Cf. Wieacker, ‘Zum System des deutsche Vermögensrechts’ 1941, 10.
beliefs and religion, Wieacker’s own scientific knowledge and ‘conscience’ would lead to an understanding of the human realm. The ‘strange’ displacement of military service allowed him to study the community in an unusual way.\textsuperscript{185} Wieacker’s war service on the frontline enabled him to observe human conduct in its rawest, most primitive form. Or at least that was how he saw the situation. In his letter to Ernst Rudolf Huber from 23 February 1945 Wieacker writes thus:

But the side stage is also an arsenal of enjoyable discoveries for the historian. The psychology of constituents like the masses and armies, the chemistry, or should I say alchemy, of the times and our circulating culture in its death throes and labor pains, the conditions of culture, language and homeland all give sublime joy to the eye, this fearless organ that does not take part in the graying and destabilization of the other organs of mental function and conscience. A trip through the occupied territories, the (passive) participation in a fighter-bomber mission in the Sch[...], at the edge of the war satisfy one’s need for a meaning of existence to such an extent which could outdo us in a real participation in the war. If only each participant had at all the eye for the divinity that plays in the events and circumstances, if I may express myself so strangely. I myself know, as an example, a large city lying immediately behind the front that, contrary to the untouched old cities in the heart of our homeland, approximately presents the phenomena that Boccaccio recounted on the occasion of the Black Death in Florence: intense feasting by day and the chaos of the war of all against all by night. This relates to my alma mater, which is so glorious in the history of my narrow technical discipline.\textsuperscript{186}

The war allowed Wieacker to take a look at the origins and deep spheres of law. He articulated the war experience as a perennial algorithm, which enabled an observer to read the essence of human existence. War was partly a cold and rational distinguisher, but it also had its ‘alchemy,’ mystical side. It was ‘sub-

\textsuperscript{185} Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 23.2.1945. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

\textsuperscript{186} “Aber für den Historiker ist auch der Nebenschauplatz ein Arsenal von Entdeckerfreuden. Die Psychologie des Einzelnen wie der Massen und Heere, die Chemie oder soll ich sagen Alchemie der Zeit und unserer in Todes- oder Geburtswochen kreissenden Kultur, die Bedingungen von Kultur, Sprache und Volkswesen bereiten dem Auge, diesem fürchtlten Organ, das an dem Grauen und der Erschütterung der anderen geistigen Organe und des Gewissens nicht teilnimmt, unerhörte, sublime Freuden. Die Fahrt durch ein Bandengebiet, die (passive) Teilnahme an einer Jagdbomberaktion in der Sch[...] am Rande des Krieges befriedigten den Sinn für die Existenz an sich in einem Masse, das uns durch die wirkliche Teilnahme am Kampf überboten werden könnte; wenn nur jeder Teilnehmer überhaupt das Auge hätte für die in den Erscheinungen und Zuständen spielende Gottheit, wenn ich mich so seltsam ausdrücken darf. Ich kenne als Beispiel allein eine große, unmittelbar hinter der Front liegende Stadt, die im Gegensatz zu den alten Städten unserer Heimat in ihrem Kern unberührt, ungefähr die Erscheinungen bietet, die Boccaccio anlässlich der Pest in Florenz erzählt: heilige Schlemmerei am Tag und nachts das Chaos des bellum omnium contra omnes. – Es handelt sich um die in der Geschichte meiner engeren Fachwissenschaft so ruhmreiche alma mater.” Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 23.2.1945. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; The city which Wieacker refers to as the ‘alma mater of my scientific knowledge,’ was of course Bologna. In February of 1945 the battles in Italy concentrated very close to the city.
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lime,’ terrifying but nonetheless brought ‘joy.’ The fact that Wieacker defined war using Jüngerian rhetoric points not only to his sophisticated learnedness, but to the deep effect that a conservative and ultimately pessimistic perception of the world of human affairs had on his mind. In the excerpt above, Wieacker articulated his worldview and ontological premises in an unusually pronounced way. It contains features which were typical of his historical vision, and whose roots go deep into the cultural atmosphere of Weimar Germany.

With respect to the Wieacker’s concept of Rechtsbewusstsein this quote is revealing in two ways. First the ‘divinity’ which ‘played’ constantly in human affairs, was disguised to most. The oblivion where the absolute majority of the people remained, was not a moral dilemma; it was a sustaining element and a constituent way of the world. The expressions ‘mass’ or ‘combat’ should not be taken as references to National Socialist language, rather they indicate that in his letter Wieacker described a raw experience of reality, without the distracting structures of the ‘modern.’ Clearly Wieacker thought he witnessed a Hobbesian, original state of being (“bellum omnium contra omnes”), and the cultural illusion through which this chaos was being regulated. This was the reality (Wirklichkeit) from which modern jurisprudence had been alienated, and that reality was cruel. Such a view of society is very Schmittian, but can hardly be interpreted as an export of scholarly ideas from some other influential thinker. Nevertheless, it is an orientation which can explain Wieacker’s attachment to certain theories and theorists, and his views on historical development.

Second, to become aware of ‘divinity’ was to know the culture. The masses did not have an understanding of the terrors and conscience in the world. They lacked the ‘eye’ to observe the reality provided by the cultural building blocks. This possession of knowledge was what separated the ‘Master’ from unnamed people. To understand ‘divinity’ was terrifying, but elevating, and it seemed to be the ones who were destined to remain within the mass who did not have the courage to engage themselves in ‘combat’ in order to reveal the truth about human societies.

Earlier in his correspondence Wieacker had adopted the role of cynical witness with respect to the war, but now the air raids were destroying German cities, and this had a special meaning to him personally. Hamburg, Bremen and Hannover represented Heimat, now turned to ashes, as was the main building of Leipzig University. The culture, knowledge and values to which he was attached, seemed to suffer most from the war. At the same time he and the scholars of the

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190 “Hätte ich nicht so an Würde und Flor der Leipziger Universität gehangen, würde mir
‘New legal science’ shared a conviction that the people in their irresponsible and irrational war mongering were basically to blame for the consequences, but at the same time the masses lacked the understanding of what had happened and what was going on.191

It is notable that Wieacker sees this blind struggle of the people as belonging to the ‘psychology of the masses.’ Wieacker rejected the view that Rechtsbewusstsein and the transmission of cultural awareness within European legal history was essentially a group-psychological phenomenon.192 This argument was obviously a statement against Freirechtsschule and Eugen Ehrlich’s formulations of law as primarily a psychological phenomenon.193 But, and as the above quoted letter clearly expresses, underneath the law there clearly affected psychological, irrational forces. However, if one understood this feature, emblematic to all human civilizations, it ceased to be group-psychological or irrational. The distinction between ‘The Eye and the masses’ was irreversibly transmitted to the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein. While the ‘divine play’ of war and destruction repeated itself over and over again in history, there were always people who understood, explained and controlled it. So Rechtsbewusstsein signified the blind (“without an ‘Eye’”) and infinite participation of the masses in the battle between cultures, and at the same time the existence of a Stand of people who were aware of the rules and magic of this battle. The ability of the Stand to read the historical meaning, ‘existence,’ of social reality was due to its knowledge of culture, hence Bildung. People were easy to deceive and believed in myths, but it was the scholar’s responsibility to bring awareness of the circumstances dictating the social reality, the ‘divinity which played in the phenomena,’ and thus to take care that social justice was realized in one’s society.

In the following section I analyze the way Franz Wieackert utilized the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein in his scientific works. My aim is not to construct the legal reference-world of Wieacker’s argument, nor weigh the jurisprudential sharpness of his texts. Instead I attempt to study how he used the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein (and the terms and vocabulary surrounding it, signifying the same ontological meaning) in his texts as a heuristic tool in understanding society, and as depicting the relation between the law, people and the community.

191 Cf. Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
193 Cf. p.68.
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The concept was a tool to connect the past and the present, attaching their connections with meanings which were then transmitted to the reading audience.

4. The concept of property

A scientific theme which Wieacker elevated to the first rank of importance in the 1930s was the question of ‘property’ (Eigentum). Wieacker sought to redefine the concept to better match the social reality and changing temporalities of the post-Weimar Germany. It was high time for a reconceptualization both in light of the longer legal development and jurisprudential discussion concerning the theme as well as regarding the National Socialist attempt to redefine the relations between subjective rights and the state’s rule over its people. From a legal dogmatic point of view the concept of ‘property’ certainly needed rethinking. The legislation in the German Civil Code (BGB) and the Weimar constitution fell short and dragged behind the new forms of merchandise and ownership which the rapid economic and technological development produced. The social norms and laws concerning property in many respects belonged to the time of the nineteenth century.

The First World War meant a drastic and violent deployment of ideas on the state’s entitlement to common and even private property within its sphere of influence. This ‘War-socialism’ did not come out of the blue (as Franz Wieacker later showed), but it was a turning point which changed the perception and regulation of ownership and the individual rights related to it for good. In Weimar the commanding power of the state was handed over to the Parliament. In practice, this meant that the norms regulating the administration/individual relation on property, were decided by parties and groups whose ideological divergences on the meaning, form and essence of wealth and ownership were perennial. Moreover, the dominant stream in the parliamentary quarreling over the changing idea of property seemed to stem from socialists and laissez-faire liberals, both of whose views were understandable in light of the massive economic dilemmas facing the Weimar Republic as well as the dissolution of the state following the Revolution of 1919.

Whereas the fundamental structures of society vis-à-vis the idea of individual property had undergone a total transformation, the bourgeois values of the educated elite changed more slowly. In the Wilhelmine Empire the personal property of the middle classes had been guaranteed by a solid judicature, which derived its authority from the monarchy and the privileges of the estates.\textsuperscript{197} Within this field the separation of social reality (the bourgeois acknowledgment of things) and the legislation (meaning the ‘sad' performance of legal positivism) appeared even more concrete than usual. It was thus no surprise that the ‘New legal science’ emphasized the importance of the theme, and took ‘property’ to be one of the key terms in its task of redefining the legal concepts of the “late-liberal state.”\textsuperscript{198} It would be incorrect to assert that the interest the young and conservative legal scholars showed in the question was solely motivated by the National Socialist seizure of power. To the Nazi party the question was naturally fundamental given its aim to build a totalitarian nation and demolish subjective, state-provided rights, but obviously in 1935 the concept was at the center of political endeavors and of immediate concern.\textsuperscript{199} In retrospect, the 1930s discussion concerning the concept of ‘property’ reflects the wider picture of the rise of National Socialism in Germany. Whereas some attempts at social change were motivated by the need to exclude and oppress, some interpreted these attempts as acts to revive the ‘good old’ core of society and confining every harmful aspects of the ‘modern.’ When in 1935 Wieacker wrote many of his texts on the concept of ‘property,’ the context and discussion in which the concept was used contained many views and intentions. These ranged from fascist and conservative ideologies to ideas about generational clash and the struggle between academic cliques, and often these influences were intertwined.

To Wieacker the conceptual change in the notion of ‘property’ during the early twentieth century appeared to reflect the larger historical development of European legal culture, and throughout his career he maintained that the problematic it embedded reflected the “degradation-history of law.”\textsuperscript{200} The accumulating tendency of the state to intervene in the sphere of legal affairs, eventually leading to

\textsuperscript{197} Meinel 2012, 197.
\textsuperscript{198} Meinel 2012, 201; or redefined them from the point of view of “institutional legal thinking.” Rüthers 1992, 24.
\textsuperscript{199} See Reinhard Höhn, \textit{Rechtsgemeinschaft und Volksgemeinschaft}. Hamburg, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1935, 65; Ernst Forsthoff, ‘Kriegswirtschaft und Sozialverfassung,’ in Konrad Hesse (ed.), \textit{Kriegswirtschaftliche Jahresberichte}. Hamburg 1936. However, the National Socialist battle against liberal subjective rights simplified the multifaceted concept of ‘property’ and the academic tradition which sought to define it. Mostly formulations concentrated either on how the regime could confiscate as fully as possible, or connected the concept to a dull “farmer mythology,” Meinel 2012, 201.
\textsuperscript{200} Cf. Winkler 2014, 53.
the “crisis of justice,” became actualized in the early twentieth-century German “social-state,” which upset the balance between the people, the state and law.\(^{201}\)

Within this larger context, Wieacker’s conceptual study was an exploration of the changed idea of individual freedom and existence within the temporal framework of administrative power. Whereas in his later works the theme of ‘property’ represented a case study in a broader historical development, the 1934–1936 contributions where mostly arguments situated within a debate on how should one study and understand the concept, and suggestions on which bases legislation relating to it should be arranged.

The starting point for Wieacker’s argumentation was the evident failure of the Weimar Republic. The failure was not only about inoperative legislation. To Wieacker, Germany in the early 1930s had experienced an unprecedented ethical dilemma considering the authority of individual subjective rights and legitimacy of state’s ruling, and as consequence, the former were ignored and latter constructed falsely. He argued that when the “liberalist state” tried to regulate and define the changing world of ownership, work and trade, the end result at its worst looked much like the judicature of the Weimar “late-individualistic” Republic.\(^{202}\) The origins of that failure were, however, in place over a hundred years before. Societal and legal development after the French Revolution had created a “political tension” within the jurisprudential perception of ‘property.’ The administrative practices of the state, carried out in all post-Enlightenment societies, were characterized by this same tension between the ruler and the ruled, shifting the “unsolvable antithesis” to legal language and modern theories on society.\(^{203}\)

The high point in this distinction between the language of the law and legal reality, in which the ‘property’ was actually being constituted, was to be found in positivist heories on law. Positivism comprised a legal doctrine which announced “everyone for oneself” and accepted that “the legal freedom of one could harm the legal freedom of another,” and hence it ignored and violated the “pre-juridical German life-order on which property was based.”\(^{204}\)

To Wieacker, German jurisprudence, along with positivism and the liberalist view on law, had lost its connection to the real world and the reality and tradition of the people. Legislation had shrunk the broad legal world of property to individual rights and the ownership of “things” (*Sache*). Such legal language forgot


\(^{203}\) Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 127.

and ignored the fundamental link between the concepts and the reality. The source of the law as justice was not a matter of regulation and law-giving, but of legitimacy, which was achieved in the congruence of positive law with the common perception of the rule of law. The law-giving had to follow the “absolute”, un-written, constitution of the people. The people, for their part, were comprised of different groups and traditions, whose life conditions could never fully be grasped by merely positive norms. Seen within this context, in legal reality, the individual was not just a package of rights and obligations wrapped together as a legal subject, but a “systematic position” (Ordnungslage) which carried within itself intertwined meanings and duties:

It [the legal subject] is rather a legal systematic position substantiated in the structure of the people’s order […], which constantly regenerates the measure and content of rights and binding obligations from itself, without separately confronting legal authority and legal obligations at all.

As a result, the concept of ‘property’ in Wieacker’s texts in 1934–1936 was defined (i) through its relation to the cultural entity of people and (ii) in reference to the varying value systems of professions with their own distinctive norms within the nation. In other words, norms and rules concerning German ‘property’ could only be correctly analysed if understood as being part of ‘concrete orders’:

No longer the formal prestige of the few, as can still be commonly affirmed for all things, but rather the concrete orders of the law for currencies, inherited lands, allotments and livestock determine the material meaning of our legal conditions of property.
The legal order structuring the allocation of goods within the community should bear in mind the innate bond between an individual and his community. Since ‘property’ was inevitably bound to the actual life of the community, Wieacker stressed and even prioritized the values the concept contained. The community was not a mere heterogeneous compilation of people, but a group held together by a deep spiritual togetherness.\(^{210}\) In describing this community Wieacker used examples and terms relating to the body, the home and the family.\(^{211}\) By this he was able to exhibit the “beyond-legal” values and emotions which should guide the legal system.\(^{212}\) The values of ‘responsibility’ and ‘honor’ could not be distinguished from the ‘property,’ thus they should be acknowledged while studying the concept, and more importantly, while making laws concerning it.\(^{213}\) According to Wieacker, those values had previously (in the liberalist and modern legal theories) remained outside the jurisprudential “concept-creation.” Moreover, the previous legal theories had in their twisted inner politicization, their idea of autonomous will, and their emphasis on subjective rights equated ‘honor’ and ‘responsibility’ with money.\(^{214}\) A law which disregarded the immaterial values embedded in different properties, different histories and purposes for ownership was not only bad, it was unjust: “Every system of land laws refers directly to transpersonal values of the people.”\(^{215}\)

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\(^{210}\) See e.g. Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 134.

\(^{211}\) Wieacker emphasized the meaning of “Erbhof.” He also defined different communities as “limbs” in the “body” of society. See e.g. Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 31.


\(^{214}\) Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 81; also Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 134: “Die Einteignung mit voller Geldentschädigung ist im eigentlichen Sinne keine Enteignung mehr; sie ist mehr die Verpflichtung, den Bodenwert in einen Kapitalwert einzutauschen.”

4. The concept of property

Nevertheless, in the new National Socialist regime, these values were to be assimilated in the language of law, hence the new definition of ‘property.’ "Nevertheless, in the new National Socialist regime, these values were to be assimilated in the language of law, hence the new definition of ‘property.’"

Acknowledging the values which the *communality* brought about was not only vital for making just and usable laws, but would strengthen the moral atmosphere of the national community.217 While prioritizing the cultural entity of people or the natural constellation of the community – in line with National Socialist legal theories – Wieacker was hesitant to use the concept ‘people’s community’ (*Volksgemeinschaft*), and preferred the term ‘people’s order’ (*Volksordnung*). On a semantic level this distinguishes him from scholars like Reinhard Höhn, and signifies a theoretical difference between them, although whether one used the term ‘*Volksgemeinschaft*’ or ‘*Volksordnung*’ in the legal scientific discourse of the 1930s had, with regard to the reading audience, little relevance. In practice, Wieacker’s ‘*Volksordnung*’ was defined with roughly similar attributes as the later more notorious ‘*Volksgemeinschaft*’:

The concept of “to each what he deserves” first assigns accountable stewardship to those who were property owners up to now, then to those who are related by ancestry. The suprapersonal collective which the authority of the peasant is executed for is the blood bond collective of the peasant’s House (not the nuclear family). The House is the sphere of people’s order (*Volksordnung*) where the property of entailed estate is connected with it. This order is not based on abstract legal entities, but on the connection of concrete individuals by a blood-relationship.218

The new legal space for an individual derived on one hand from belongingness to the natural community of people (*Volksordnung*), in practice the German nation,219 but on the other hand to a distinguished group of people united by their vocation and profession (*Stand*). The “vocation estates” (*Berufsstand*), acquired their inner values, binding social norms and sense of communality from a unifying orientation to a particular task within the larger community of the *Volksord-
The idea of a national community (Volksordnung) based on a corporative organic society, was very traditionally conservative and not new at all. In Wieacker’s legal sociological descriptions, the estates or corporates, Stand, were connected to a larger whole like limbs connected to the body, and likewise conducted a necessary task in relation to and on behalf of the larger collective. Such a view was not revolutionary or originally National Socialist.

In the long line of German social conservatism, it was an undisputed principle that individual freedom could only be achieved by merging the alienated and the isolated ‘self’ to the organic idea of the state. The argument was that since the ideal was perceived as more truthful than its concrete historic variations, it was necessary for individual citizens to subordinate themselves to the greater cause of the fulfillment of the national cause. In order for the material and ideal to coincide on the national level, everyone and everything had to have their natural place and task within the community. To Wieacker, the structures of the ‘people’s order’ and ‘vocation estate’ were innate and original formations of communality which predated any legal theory.

The older conservative ideal was nevertheless made fascist and emptied out of any constructive meaning in the National Socialist rhetoric. Also, the division of ‘the people’s community’ to the particles of Stand, was a cliché in the Third Reich and in National Socialistic legal science. The old vocabulary was used to camouflage the political coup and make it seem like a legal and social reform. Likewise, Wieacker’s texts repeated the message of the exceptional nature of the ‘legal renewal’ in relation to previous tradition; the strength and revolutionary essence of the new (National Socialist) legislation concerning ‘property’ relied on its way of defining individuality as well as the individual’s relation to ownership, trade and inheritance on the basis of the communal order. Nevertheless, and paradoxically, to the young conservative legal scholars, the justification of ‘legal renewal’ came exactly from its alleged ability to rise above ‘empty words’ and implement the ideas – which had grown out of real and material conditions of the people – to the contemporary legal reality.

Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 144: “Der Sinngehalt des Eigens wird am deutlichsten sichtbar, wenn wir gegeständliche Einzelordnungen aufsuchen, in denen der Angehörige eines Berufsstandes mit einer Vermögenseinheit umgeht, die einer engeren berufständischen Aufgabe bestimmt ist.”


Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 148.
4. The concept of property

It is noteworthy, though, that the necessary homogeneity of ‘vocation-estates’ and even ‘the people’s community’, is not in Wieacker’s texts based on racial distinctions. Rather, the idea of *Berufstand* for Wieacker enabled a renewed view of society. Acknowledging their essential meaning, and their significance for the national community allowed the scholar to bring forth values and emotions as vital communal factors, and further helped lawgivers to define laws which would take into account those values and emotions. While understanding the nature of the individual’s *existence* concretely, the ‘New legal science’ was able to introduce a more just definition of the connection between the personal and the community.

While the community recognizes the individual member as a part of it, it recognizes him as a capable and needy member responsible for an existence and a task. [...] the true meaning of possession and the self-protection, however, is all the more based in the fabric of the people’s order and justified by its necessities.224

Wieacker’s conceptualization of ‘property’ gained appreciation for its highly contemporary theoretization – utilization of fashionable neo-Hegelian and Schmittian ideas – but also for the author’s ‘material’ and historical orientation. Wieacker’s 1930s texts on ‘property’ indeed followed the dull rhetoric of the National Socialist ideology, and referred to fascist principles concerning the apparently unproblematic (in)division of political power and the abolishment of subjective rights. In elaborating the historical background and the political circumstances of the law concerning property, Wieacker relied heavily on Carl Schmitt. The view on law in relation to ‘concrete orders,’ the ideas of the political tension within legal concepts and the ‘neutral state,’ and the conviction on positivism’s inability to overcome the breach between the social justice and norms, are not only themes which Schmitt brought into the scientific discussion, and on which Wieacker built, but Wieacker also explicitly refers to Schmitt’s works while elaborating these themes in his own works.225

224 “Indem die Gemeinschaft den Genossen als zugehörig anerkennt, erkennt sie ihn als verantwortliches, einer Existenz und einer Aufgabe fähiges und bedürftiges Glied an. [...] der wahre Sinngehalt des Eigens und des Eigenschutzes aber um so fester in das Gefüge des Volksordnung selbst gestützt und aus ihren Notwendigkeiten begründet.” Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 142.; cf. 138: in Weimar, under the formal legal order, an individual “was threatened in his existence.”

225 Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 30 fn. 27 (a reference to Carl Schmitt’s *Der Begriff des Politischen*) and 102 fn. 110 (a reference to Carl Schmitt’s *Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens*); Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 127, fn. 1 a (reference to Carl Schmitt’s Epilogue in Heft 17 of *Der deutsche Staat der Gegenwart*) and 136–137 (a reference to Carl Schmitt’s *Die Auflösung des Enteignungsbe griffs*, [JW 1929]).
Wieacker’s stance has also been categorized as neo-Hegelian by Bernd Rüthers.\(^{226}\) The implicit connections and explicit references to the Hegelians of the Kieler Schule can easily be traced.\(^{227}\) This is not surprising given Wieacker’s firm position in the intellectual context of the Kieler Schule. The unproblematic use of the value-based connection between the individual and the whole might also be considered neo-Hegelian. Whereas in Wieacker’s later texts the variations between and within different emotional communities became the benchmark of his history of legal mentalities, in the 1930s formulations on ‘property’ and the link between the personal and the communal was straightforward. In this respect Wieacker’s works were in congruence with those of, for example, Ernst Rudolf Huber. Wieacker, too, adapted Carl Schmitt’s vaguely constructed concepts, and sought to reinterpret the legal tradition by contrasting it with Schmitt’s powerful slogans charged with ‘material’ substance and (occasionally) a Hegelian orientation. In the case of both Wieacker and Huber it is clear that they admirably succeeded in addressing the inconsistencies of the German constitution, but also offered tools for the politicization of the rule of law.\(^{228}\)

On the semantic level, Wieacker did not use the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein in his articles about ‘property.’ The meaning of that term was yet “un-conceptualized” and unformulated in the text. Nevertheless, in these works one can already see the embryos of scholarly thinking which he carried through to the times of the Federal Republic, and which were later conceptualized under the term Rechtsbewusstsein. To Wieacker, the legal definition of ownership, i.e. the concept of ‘property,’ reflected the abstractions of freedom and justice, and legislation concerning ‘property’ mirrored the value which each time and place succeeded in giving to those fundamentally European ideals. Wieacker’s elaboration


\(^{227}\) See e.g. references to Wolfgang Siebert in ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 50; to Ernst Rudolf Huber ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 25 and ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 139; to Karl Larenz ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 24, 117 and ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 141, 142; to Georg Dahm ‘Eigentum und Enteignung’ [1935], 147; to Martin Busse in Franz Wieacker, ‘Familiengut und Erbengemeinschaft’ [1936] in Volksläger (ed.) 2000, 191.

\(^{228}\) Cf. Mehring 2014, 239. Wieacker’s and Huber’s contemporaries did, however, distinguish their work from that of, for example, Reinhard Höhn. Höhn was closer to the structures of the NSDAP, and more often echoed the exact ‘will’ of the party—which the former members of the Kieler Schule were quick to point out after the war. For Wieacker’s criticism against Reinhard Höhn, see e.g. Wieacker, ‘Eigentum und Eigen’ [1935], 110, 112. In retrospect, the difference between these two views remained on the academic level, and it mostly derived from a disagreement on what weight should be given to, and how should one use, the idea of ‘concrete order.’
was both ‘existential’ and ‘material.’ The economic, ideological, juridical and political justifications which a given society provided for the allocation of goods and the protection of privacy varied. However, these arguments could be used against each other and they were not universally valid. What was essential was how a legal culture managed to link its legal tools and concepts to the material – concrete and everyday – life of its people.

Wieacker’s approach to the case of Germany, and the way in which he provides proof for his elaboration, is, however, carried out via historical review, where he argues for the necessity of structuring and perceiving the society in corporates, Stand. In these ‘estates’ the ideal spiritual and virtuous form of German society exists; it exists as an atemporal order, but it is reacheable through legal historical comparison. This starting point, originally Hegelian and social conservative, was a leitmotif on which he based his further analysis on German and European legal history. Wiecker asserted that the positive norms did not constitute the realm of social justice. The sense and understanding of the law came from the everyday practices of the people. It was the task of legal science to acknowledge this value-binding as the result of the material life of a particular group of people. In a correctly formuated legislation and legal judgments, norms should echo the valuations of the community which they seek to regulate. The principle of basing positive law on the communal mentalities which emerged from the material life of the people, dominated Wieacker’s historical vision as early as 1935:

The concept [of ‘property’] has been primarily changed by the binding of the German people, not by the binding of their property. It is correct that the requirements for new legal conditions of property are produced through personal, especially through professional or farm constitutio nal measures.

Embedded in Wieacker’s thesis, however, is the experience of the failure of the liberal Weimar state. In its judicature the Weimar Republic (and along with it the legal scholars who advocated the values on which the Republic had been built) had conducted policy which was at odds with the conservative ideals of the Bildumsbürgertum. As presented in chapter II, to the ‘lawyer Stand’ personal

229 Meinel 2012, 204; Behrends 1995.
231 “Dass begriff [of ‘property’] sich primär durch bindung der deutschen Menschen, nicht durch bindung des Eigentums geändert haben. Es ist richtig dass die Voraussetzungen für die neue Eigentumsverfassung durch personliche, insbesondere durch berufsständische oder bäuerliche Verfassungsmaßnahmen hervorgebracht worden ist.”, Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 112 fn. 5.
property was tied with the notions of social dignity and status. Money was excluded from the ideal of ownership as individual freedom; rather, fiscal matters were disdained as a corrupting force and perceiving things through their monetary value was seen as a symptom of the lack of inner morals. The point of comparison was to be found from the ‘golden ages’ of history, either from the national past or, in Wieacker’s case, from ancient Rome. Allegedly, during these epochs, abstract values such as honor, discipline, freedom and willpower were the yardsticks for evaluating ‘property.’ On the other hand, the recollection of the concrete and personal experience of the war generation represented the dissolution of the bourgeois ideal after the First World War. The ‘property’ which was supposed to guarantee one’s social status and bright future was being devalued in the political and economic turmoil of the Weimar Republic. Since the legislation regarding ownership, trade and heritage was now increasingly a result of a parliamentary process, the phenomena and opinions which eroded and nullified the Bildungsbürgertum’s idea of ‘property’ became associated with the natural social ‘other,’ the communists and liberal leftist politicians.

5. Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein (1944): The historicization of the relation between mentality and law

If the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein is still indefinite in Franz Wieacker’s texts on ‘property,’ the situation had changed in his 1944 article Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein, which was originally presented as a lecture in Leipzig in the preceding year. The text constitutes a key argument in Wieacker’s later attempts to describe the long line of European legal history, and it was included in the collection Vom Römischen Recht (1944). In the 1944 article Rechtsbewusstsein appears both as a means to understand the past, but also a phenomenon which should be the target of legal historical study. To analyze law in different times and cultures (inside the European tradition, descending from

232 See e.g. Wieacker, ‘Familiengut und Erbengemeinschaft’ [1936], 195: “[I]n dieser Gestalt wurde die Erbrechtsordnung in Deutschland rezipiert. Entsprech sie im antiken Recht eigentümlichen und konkreten Aufbaubedingungen der römischen Bürgerverfassung, so wurde sie der Begegnung mit der deutschen Lebensordnung des ausgehenden Mittelalters zum Werkzeug weiterer Zersetzung der geschlossene Erbfolge in Sondergüter.” See also the comparison between the “liberal components from 1789” and “the law of antiquity [based on values]” in Wieacker, ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ [1935], 17–18.

233 Meinel 2012, 199.

Roman law) was to understand the attitudes, emotions and perceptions (the mentality) of the people in relation to the legal institutions and norms of a given time and place. Thus the neo-Hegelian idea of the value-based relation between an individual and the whole, was further enriched by a concept whose development and different forms could be subjected to a historical study. This concept was no longer a vague principle and necessity, but a temporal structure. Yet consistently, Wieacker held that this conceptual phenomenon could only be understood with respect to the material, concrete reality of those who expressed it.

On one hand, Wieacker posits the text in the contemporary discussion where legal science attempted to determine the place of German law within the European context. After 1941 the Nazi regime tried to present the German law and legal development as essentially European. The concrete measures in this ‘cultural war’ were such projects as *Aktion Ritterbusch* as well as the conference journeys the German scholars made in the occupied countries. The purpose was not only to persuade foreign cultural elites to adopt a more conciliatory stance towards German occupation, but to inveigle the Europeans to unite against the Eastern threat of Soviet Union and advancing Red Army. On the other hand in his article Wieacker was able to explicitly present the vision he had held since the times of his apprenticeship with Fritz Pringsheim; the superior essence and aesthetics of Roman law.

As elaborated in section III.2, National Socialist legal science was not supportive towards Roman law. Moreover, the contemporary jurisprudential paradigm was that Roman law with its emphasis on the individual and ownership had corrupted the national legal tradition, which was mostly the reason for the legal turmoil of the late-liberal state. The violent intrusion of Roman law was embedded in the prevailing legal historical narrative of the reception of Roman law, which stressed the rational administrative tendency which the application of Roman law brought to the German culture. Because of the Reception, the dominant narrative argued, the people and the state had been separated for good. This was the prejudice which Wieacker sought to alter by means of his article. Detlef Liebs asserts that Wieacker’s research task was a courageous act, since it could have brought him unwanted and dangerous censure from fundamentalist legal

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235 See p.96–97.
III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness

scholels backed by the SS.238 Here, however, I do not attempt to study Wieacker’s contribution in that respect. I will instead investigate how Wieacker conceptualized the relation between common national values and law with the help of the abstraction Rechtsbewusstsein, scrutinize what kind of meanings the concept contained, and further analyze how his stance might possibly have changed from the 1930s.

In weighing the positive law’s changing relation to social reality, Wieacker in Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein elaborated three viewpoints concerning the phenomenon, which commented and challenged the existing understanding of German legal history. These viewpoints can be categorized as (i) the phenomenology of the wrong turn taken by the legal culture in the advent of modern era, (ii) juridical humanism and scientification (Verwissenschaftlichung), and (iii) the estate-based essence of the new class of lawyers. Wieacker starts his argument by briefly presenting the prevailing prejudice of the harmful nature of Roman law and its role as the defining factor in the tragic division between the state and the material reality of the people. This actual breach had been exhibited as the distinction between the self-feeling of the bourgeoisie and the rational, administrative language of the legal rhetoric.239 Wieacker rejected any attempts to turn back the wheel of time and return to the times when the law was made and interpreted by laymen, a time when there (allegedly) was ongoing contact with the national, common understanding of justice. Wieacker argued that the rational essence of the law in the modern state was a fact one needed to acknowledge, and the efforts to “purify” law from “foreign” particles would not “seal the gap”:240

So would the scientification of our law be nothing else then a dreadful wrong track away from the community off to the presumptuous domination of the intellect over life? No. With such a judgement we have to reject the state of the modern era itself.241

According to Wieacker, whereas the scientification of the law was a matter of fact, a better understanding of the structures, development and attitudes involved in that process would benefit contemporary legal science in its quest to make and interpret laws in congruence with the people’s reality. To Wieacker the Reception was a historical event guided by larger social and intellectual historical forces of

238 Liebs 2010, 38.
239 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 4, the “Selbstgefühl” versus “Rechtssprechungmonopol.”
240 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 5, 44.
economic change and rationalization. During the Reception the living conditions of the people and the ruling elite rapidly developed, resulting in dramatic alterations in the mentalities of both individuals and the community.242

Wieacker stated – in congruence with contemporary estimations of the medieval world – that in the world of the late middle ages jurisdiction was firmly built on the personal prestige of the elite which ran the courts. The replacement of the natural economy with the monetary system, and the differentiation of society deriving from specialization in the labor market, produced more complex administrative challenges, of which the laymen or the sheriffs were no longer able to handle by means of their personal, practical knowledge.243 In other words, the material, historical development brought about an unbalance in the foundations to which the authority of the law was anchored. The ideal of the pre-Reception judicature was noble, but alas, shifting circumstances separated “status-based legal knowledge” and the individual “sense of law” of the laymen from the actual needs of the community.244 The language of the law (as expressed by laymen) was no longer in accordance with legal reality. In the long run, the changed legal environment resulted in a distinction between the general communal awareness of the rule of law (Rechtsbewusstsein) and the functioning of the courts.245

Here Rechtsbewusstsein, a consciousness of law and legality among the people, is irreversibly bound to the material conditions concerning work, social hierarchy, appreciated skills, and future prospects prevailing within an actual community, very much like in Wieacker’s 1930s texts on contemporary legal concepts. Nevertheless, Rechtsbewusstsein in the 1944 context also signified the erring nature and false expectations of the people. The idea of justice, to which a given Rechtsbewusstsein – since there were many different Rechtsbewusstsein246 – was inclining, did not understand the meaning and variation which the general

244 Wieacker, *Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein* 1944, 24.
245 Wieacker, *Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein* 1944, 25: “[S]eine überlieferte Spruchpraxis nicht mehr als zureichende Leistung galt, und seine durch geistiges Gesetz und verstandesmässige Schlüsse nicht fassbare Entscheidung auch nicht mehr der Ausdruck eines starken Rechtsgewissens war,” also 40–41. It is important that the relation between Wieacker’s concepts of Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein is not yet clear. The legal perception of the sheriffs, thus laymen, could (in 1944) be elaborated as Rechtsgewissen, legal conscience.
historical development added to the requirements of the working legal practice. The communal awareness or consciousness of law was founded on the authority of its judicature. In a comparative manner, from the viewpoint of legal historical scholarship, that authority was functional (brought justice) if it applied an interpretative model in giving laws and verdicts, which again reflected the material needs and valuations of those who were being ruled. To put this in the language of Wieacker’s concepts: the Rechtsgewissen or the Rechtsgefühl of the judges was the spiritual skill behind their verdicts. If a legal system was functional, that skill cultivated judgments which matched the Rechtsbewusstsein, the values of the people; the language of the law and the social reality were compatible. This enabled the judicature (or the judges) to enjoy the trust of the community, and be counted as authoritative.

People’s consciousness of law was a feature which guaranteed the continuity in the legal system. Some axioms could not be switched with every new scientific theory or policy. The material law was “reality-entangled,” and it carried along with it older perceptions and cultural traits. Rechtsbewusstsein changed like an organism. It grew, became more mature, and was transmitted from one generation to another like an accumulating knowledge of life. The peculiar feature of the legal consciousness of the German middle ages was, however, its primitivism with respect to the legal language. To Wieacker, the authority of pre-Reception German law was inevitably temporal, since the language this judicature used to describe and categorize legal phenomena was neither transmittable nor rational. Here by rationality in a appreciating sense (since ‘rationality’ often bore a negative significance as an expression of ‘scientification’), Wieacker meant a combination of linguistic capability, the acknowledgment of previous legal achievements (i.e. tradition), and skillfulness (kündig) in understanding life more broadly. The Reception, or to be more precise, the historical development it included, separated the German legal consciousness and the administration of the state for hundreds of years, and the German legal consciousness has remained in this state of irrationality ever since. The ‘experience-bility’ of the law was lost.
With respect to Wieacker’s historical vision, the meaning he gives to humanism within his narrative of German (and European) legal history is important. That entity encapsulated the problem of ‘scientification,’ which in the contemporary German social, legal and humanistic studies were perceived as the root of all evil. Scientification introduced a division between the state and the people, a division which the Nazis and more broadly even legal scholars, intended to overcome in order to find the true essence of German society. Previously, Germanistic scholars had blamed Roman law for the rationalistic tendencies in German culture, which had allegedly originated from the Reception.\(^{253}\) Wieacker attacked these arguments asserting that it was not the law which was rationalistic, but the power which utilized the law.\(^{254}\) The humanist revolution of the late middle ages had “unsealed the spiritual eyes” of the people, who now yearned for more advanced techniques in administration, commerce and governing. There was a strong need for universality in the German culture of Reception, stemming from the “feeling of life” and “spiritual experience.”\(^{255}\) These streams, however, carried along with them the seeds of future anomalies. Humanism appreciated above all the “higher spiritual meaning of Form,” which later resulted in the formalistic and material theories of law and society.\(^{256}\) Roman law as a superior technique addressed these demands and offered a “spiritual force to control life itself.”\(^{257}\)

The evolution of Wieacker’s thoughts with respect to his previous arguments on the legal sphere is most evident in the way he conceptualizes the Stand of jurists in the text of \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein}. In 1941 Wieacker had contributed to the contemporary discussion on the need to define a new \textit{system} for German law.\(^{258}\) Following the political discourse, the new system had to be freed from the corrupting tendencies of liberal and economic necessities and stress the togetherness of the German people. To Wieacker, such a task should be started from an elaboration of the material conditions leading to the contemporary situation, as well as the need to scrutinize the flaws and virtues of previous theories. In ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögenrechts’

\(^{254}\) Wieacker, \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein} 1944, 45.
\(^{255}\) Wieacker, \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein} 1944, 28, 29.
\(^{256}\) Wieacker, \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein} 1944, 28.
\(^{257}\) Wieacker, \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein} 1944, 15.
(1941) Wieacker had argued that a functional system of law had to be independent of the formalistic construction of natural law-based theories and instead rely on a communal understanding of principles, acts and ideas. He expanded his previous argument on a society built on “vocation estates,” and asserted that the most sustainable statements on and creations of law, could be obtained within an estate which material task was to deal with the law. Such a constellation would be that of a “juridical estate.” An insurmountable historical example of such a Stand was the guild of jurists in the Late Roman Republic. At the same time, Wieacker gave credit to the natural law scholars like Pufendorf and Grotius who, despite their many disadvantages, understood “juridical anthropology,” meaning that the ideas of the lawyers were also historically situated, they were “the material ideas of law.” It is important to acknowledge that the existence of the “juridical-estate” and “the material ideas of law” was not to challenge any belief in metaphistorical or timeless legal principles. On the contrary, utilizing these starting points would bring forth an understanding of “beyond-legal” axioms within the law, and in this way a legal system would be more related to legal reality.

Consequently, Wieacker’s representation of the German Reception was a narrative of how such a Stand of lawyers had arisen in the German legal history. The point of departure was the conditions which brought about social change, which in turn created a need for new kinds of professionals: “[T]he new kind of administration [state], with its neutral ruling and decision techniques needed skilled men who were familiar with such techniques.” The rapid development of the administrative sphere, reaching all fields of society, could no longer be managed by means of individual capabilities, nor could such a machinery rest on the personal prestige of the elite. It was vital to accommodate a “community of skilled and committed officials who enjoyed the respect of the regime,” and who were able to guide and uphold the state. The feature which distinguished this new generation of lawyers from the preceding officials was their learnedness in Ro-

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261 Here (in ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögensrechts’ 1941, 7) Wieacker refers to his own article ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939.

262 Wieacker, ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögensrechts’ 1941, 10 “juristische Anthropologie,” “materialen Rechtsidee.”

263 Wieacker, ‘Zum System des deutschen Vermögensrechts’ 1941, 10.

264 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 29.

265 Wieacker, Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein 1944, 24: “fachlichen Berufsgemeinschaft.”
man law (since according to Wieacker, the new generation was actually the offspring of the social elite, who had served as sheriffs or laymen in the courts).\textsuperscript{266}

The foundation of his decision-making was, however, the authority of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, in which expert opinions, precedents and scholarly literature accumulated to traditional lessons, or land law that had been issued from the sovereign: his application of law was determined by the logical subsumption of each isolated case covered by the norm. These documentations were, however, completely inaccessible to the unlettered.\textsuperscript{267}

Applying his conviction of the material bases of legal ideas, Wieacker argued that the emergence of a new generation of lawyers and the new legal instrument in the service of the state, was ultimately a social historical event. For example, sending one’s offspring to South Europe in order to be educated in Roman law was an attempt by the bourgeoisie to raise the social status of one’s family.\textsuperscript{268}

Wieacker’s text turns towards social history, when he distinguishes three different groups within the new generation. First there were the “ethical ones” who exhibit the highest virtues both in their studies and in following a career. The second group was comprised of advocates; they were the semi-educated, who were helpful in carrying out small practical tasks for the “ethical” group. Thirdly, Wieacker posits the “juridical proletariat,” who were only concerned with money. The last group came into existence because in the beginning the borders defining the \textit{Stand} were not strict enough. The bad name which some historical sources give to lawyers is on account of this last group.\textsuperscript{269} It is curious that Wieacker also applied a similar categorization for the guild of Roman lawyers.\textsuperscript{270}

No doubt this was a convenient way to uphold the idea of the spiritual superiority of the lawyer-estate and deal with the historical subject matter. The historical sources which spoke of the immorality of the lawyers, could be treated as stories about encountering the lesser material of the “estate,” not with the true virtuous “core.”\textsuperscript{271}

The new generation of lawyers (during the Reception), however, possessed all the virtues Wieacker perceived as fundamental with respect to the modern legal

\textsuperscript{266} Wieacker, \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein} 1944, 28, 32.
\textsuperscript{267} “Seine Entscheidungsgrundlagen aber sind die Autorität des Corpus iuris, in der Gutachten, Präjudizien und gelehrtem Schriftum angesammelten überlieferten Lehre oder das vom Landesherrn erlassene landrecht: seine Rechtsanwendung war durch logische Subsumption des Einzelfalls unter die Norm bestimmt, diese Unterlagen aber den ungelehrten, d. h. allen nicht rechtswissenschaftlich ausgebildeten Deutschen, grundsätzlich unzugänglich.”, Wieacker, \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein} 1944, 41.
\textsuperscript{268} Wieacker, \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein} 1944, 43.
\textsuperscript{269} Wieacker, \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein}’ 1944, 31.
\textsuperscript{270} Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 446–447.
\textsuperscript{271} Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 447: “Kern des Standes.”
system. The newly-erected *Stand* of jurists comprised a system of correct ‘attitudes’ towards jurisprudence. Their ‘legal thinking’ was virtuous since it was, for the first time, connected to the superior legal tradition and *Bildung* in the form of knowledge about ancient sources.²⁷² Their science was not modern for it started the process of ‘scientification,’ but in a way their praxis was more just than the modern counterparts, since it was built on an actual bond with ancient wisdom: “it was not the concept and system, but rather the authority of the word and the teachings of the tradition, that controlled legal life.”²⁷³

The *Stand* possessed and utilized their own distinguished *Rechtsgewissen*; a “spiritual technique” which enabled them to become “the true master [Herr] of the written and learned processes.”²⁷⁴ Here the *Stand* mirrored the greatness of the Glossators of Northern Italy. After all, to Wieacker, knowledge of the *Stand* came directly from the institutions which the Glossators had reinstated. Thus the ‘spirit’ which the *Stand* manifested, although advanced, was not modern in a negative sense. Rather than being subordinated to social forces, it offered a tool to control the society. It was ancient wisdom usable through different times and spaces:

[T]he science of the corpus iuris, as well as the ideal of rome itself, continued to be a spiritual power for the time being which claimed power on life itself rather than contrariwise wanting to serve “life”. It [the science of the corpus iuris] was a great monument for the creative power of pure theory in service of an absolute belief.²⁷⁵

In his 1944 article Wieacker for the first time with utmost explicitness connects the sub-concepts of *Stand* and *Bildung* to the scientific concept of *Rechtsbewusstsein*. The national consciousness of law is formed in relation to the themes of ‘Perfection through education and studying’ (*Bildung*), and to an ‘estate based on legal abilities’ (*Stand*). If one was to study the history of legal consciousness those sub-concepts would have to be involved. Also, he argues for the principle that the modern state cannot be understood without, and is built by, the official,

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²⁷² Wieacker, *Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein* 1944, 35.
²⁷³ Wieacker, *Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein* 1944, 35. “Denn nicht Begriff und System, sondern die Autorität des Wortes und der überlieferten Lehre beherrschten das Rechtsleben damals.”
²⁷⁴ Wieacker, *Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein* 1944, 42: “geistige Technik,” “Geistige Macht der Wissenschaft”; also 41: “Trotzdem ist er früh der eigentliche Herr des schriftlichen und gelehrten Prozesses geworden.”
²⁷⁵ “Bei alledem blieb die Wissenschaft vom Corpus iuris wie die Romidee selbst zunächst eine spirituelle Macht, die über das Leben selbst Gewalt forderte und nicht umgekehrt dem “Leben” dienen wollte, ein großes Denkmal für die Schöpferkraft reiner Theorie im Dienste eines absoluten Glaubens.”, Wieacker, *Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein* 1944, 15–16.
academic and therefore learned jurist-estate.\textsuperscript{276} I will return to the phenomenology of the concept of \textit{Rechtsgewissen} later in chapter IV, but the 1944 article is foundational also in the manner which Wieacker uses Savigny’s concepts in the arguments of which he had already given, but not yet with such clarity. However, in this text the concepts of \textit{Rechtsbewusstsein}, \textit{Rechtsgefühl} and \textit{Rechtsgewissen} are still used in a somewhat inexact manner. In Wieacker’s text the concepts often overlap and the hierarchy between them is not always clear.

It may seem surprising that Wieacker decided to introduce Savigny’s concepts as late as 1944, and his idea of the materiality of legal science did not necessitate such concepts, as he had proved in his previous articles on ‘property.’ From the publishing of \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein} on, he nevertheless used the concept of \textit{Rechtsbewusstsein} in his task to trace the unchanging historical and legal principles from the past. The concept offered him a heuristic tool to understand history, but also the cognitive means through which he was able to communicate his findings to his reading audience.

There are many possible reasons which might have led Wieacker to pick the concept of \textit{Rechtsbewusstsein} at that particular moment and in that particular text. The more opportunistic explanations point to the fact that Carl Schmitt had decided to use the concept earlier in his \textit{Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft} (1943).\textsuperscript{277} During that time the acquaintance between Schmitt and Wieacker was at its most intense phase, Wieacker spending his time with Schmitt, and commenting on the texts which he sent him. Clearly, he was impressed by Schmitt’s endeavors to depict and capture the essence of the European legal heritage. Also, the larger search to describe and analyze the basis of a common European legal thought relates to the explicit policy conducted by the National Socialist administration, whose aim was to unite Europe under German rule against Soviet Russia. Introducing a concept which enabled the comparison and evaluation of different legal systems in time and space made this task much easier.\textsuperscript{278}

\textsuperscript{276} Wieacker, \textit{Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein} 1944, 5: “beamten, fachlichen und daher auch gelehrten Juristenstand.”


The above reasons alone, however, produce only a one-sided picture of the methodological shift in Wieacker’s scientific works. Even to Schmitt, the study of the “Asylum for the European legal consciousness,” as expressed in *Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft*, was a camouflaged representation of his disappointment with the results of the ‘legal renewal’ of the 1930s. During the ‘legal renewal,’ *Rechtsbewusstsein* had been equated with the unsurmountable and ahistorical consciousness of the German people, which the Führer had revealed and harnessed. During the war, at the latest, the conservative legal scholars understood the hollowness, cynicism, and unscientific nature of the construction.²⁷⁹ Thus writing about ‘legal consciousness’ was an attempt to proceed from the low point of legal science of the 1930s. Although in a very indirect and fumbling way scholars started to challenge and question the prevailing dogmatic truth of the relation between a people and its law. In practice this turn was evidenced by studying past time, reviewing natural law theories or concentrating on very abstract, particular and detailed legal phenomena.²⁸⁰ The wrong turn which academia had started to take in 1933 was not of course as such addressed. One had to wait for roughly twenty years for the first honestly reflective legal scientific works, where scholars considered their collective and personal engagement with the regime. Nevertheless, their disappointment during the early 1940s on the ‘legal renewal’ promised by National Socialism was genuine.

As elaborated in the section III.3, Affections in *Rechtsbewusstsein* 1933–1945, Franz Wieacker had also processed the idea of legal thinking and the dilemma of how some sophisticated styles seemed to reproduce themselves throughout history. His conclusion started to lean more towards the direction that the base of a legal system could not be formed from a mere idea of common national values. The *Rechstbewusstsein*, legal consciousness, of the people was (a) erring, and (b) consisted of different layers. Some forms of thinking were more vulnerable to short-sightedness and more unaware of larger social and historical forces than others. The contexts where Wieacker first presented his lectures and articles are also not without importance. *Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein* was originally a speech given in Leipzig to commemorate and honor the destroyed main library. To Wieacker, that distinct incident, unsurprisingly, was a metaphor for the meaningless devastation of the war. Thus, his speech was more of a wishful assurance that, despite the prevailing harsh situation, the balance between the people’s idea of justice and material conditions could be obtained.

²⁸⁰ Stolleis 1998.
In many ways one can call the year 1945 in Germany ‘point zero,’ at least in the material sense. Detlev Poekert wrote:

The dreamed ‘people’s community’ stood by no means at the end of the Third Reich and the World War that it staged. Instead the society lay in ruins, not only in its bombed-out material substance (which, as became apparent after the war, had proven surprisingly solid), but also mentally and morally and with respect to its social conditions.

Hunger, unemployment and homelessness had an inevitable effect on the way people perceived the meaning of their everyday life and that of the future. The visible ruins of the material living conditions were joined with a feeling of “loss of tradition” and suddenly non-existent “standards of social relations.” The reconstruction process seemed to necessitate radically different values than those of the preceding years. Since the economic and material conditions were of highest priority, ‘the modern’ rushed in with an aggressive manner. The relocation of millions of inner-state refugees, rebuilding the infrastructure, redirecting the economy to follow the rules of the free liberal economy and securing the democratic constitution in binding citizens to support the administration by means of a social security system, all this demanded a shift in the relation between the state and the people. In practice, Germany had no choice but to rapidly transform itself into a “social state” in which the public administration upheld, maintained and regulated the social structures, but on the bases of a strict, almost dogmatic, constitutionalism and parliamentarianism. With respect to the preceding years, extending also beyond the totalitarian era, this meant a novel and abrupt categorization of citizenship and community. To many conservative writers, Germany’s transformation meant an irreversible degradation in the spiritual essence of the national style of living and an unforeseen burden for the people, not only in public regulations, but in the type of social expectations they faced.

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283 See e.g. Helmut Schelsky, Der mensch in der wissenschaftlichen zivilisation. Köln, Westdeutscher Verlag 1961.
One part of the wider picture was of course academia. The question of the re-opening of German universities became an urgent matter in the fall of 1945. In the Potsdam conference the Allied forces had agreed on a decisive re-orientation of German education, punishment for those responsible for distorting the system and worldview within this field, and the deployment of Germans themselves in this task in order to retrain the people in democracy.284 The project was called the denazification or Entnazifizierung of education. With respect to universities, the direction of this goal was after a short while left mainly to the Germans, since the occupation administration lacked manpower, knowledge and even interest in the arrangement of higher education. The staff in the newly-opened universities had to answer special questionnaires (Fragebogen) and sometimes go through an interrogation, based on which the university board in cooperation with the occupational officials decided on the ‘suitability’ of each candidate.285 The cases of more suspicious figures were handled in Spruchkammern, local civilian denazification tribunals, where the crimes of the defendants where decided according to a four-level scale.286

Ernst Forsthoff’s racist rhetoric of the 1930s was for many reason enough to distance him from academia. Forsthoff underwent a Spruchkammer process where he was declared a Mitläufer, “fellow traveller” with respect to the National Socialist actions of transforming Germany into a totalitarian nation. Thus, he had to wait for a considerable time before receiving an official teaching position at the University of Heidelberg.287 Of the members of the Kieler Schule Georg Dahm and Friedrich Schaffstein faced serious accusations of cooperating with the Nazi regime. Georg Dahm had as the Rector of the University of Kiel (from 1935 to 1937) ensured the exclusion of scholars and students of Jewish descent from the university.288 Schaffstein had had a visible role in turning criminal law

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284 Remy 2002, 126.
286 Clemens Vollnhalls, Entnazifizierung: Politische Säuberung und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen 1945–1949. Munich, DTV 1991, 259–338. Based on the information gathered by a questionnaire and by occupational officials, the tribunals charged individuals according to these categories: (1) major offenders (Hauptschuldige), (2) activists, militarists, and profiteers (Belastet), (3) those with probational status (Minderbelastet), (4) followers or fellow travelers (Mitläufer), and (5) those exonerated (Entlastet). In all of West Germany by 1950, 3,660,638 cases had been tried, and of those, 1,005,874 resulted in Mitläufer verdicts. 2,579,622 cases had resulted in either exoneration or amnesty on other grounds. In 1,167 cases the defendant had been judged as Hauptschuldige. Remy 2002, 178.
287 Forsthoff, however, had indisputably had quarrels with the Nazi administration and the SS press. He also had a distinguished supporter in Gustav Radbruch, who publicly spoke for Forsthoff’s rehabilitation. Meinel 2012, 304–306; Remy 2002, 158–159.
288 Gerhard Paul & Miriam Gillis-Carlebach (eds.), Menora und Hakenkreuz: zur Geschichte
into “political criminal law,” where the offences of an individual were interpreted as crimes against one’s duty to the community. This train of thought provided the intellectual bases for National Socialist judges to sentence people for crimes against the Nazi ideology.\textsuperscript{289} Both were allowed to return to any university only in the 1950s.

Among the legal scholars (if one excludes Carl Schmitt) Ernst Rudolf Huber’s case caused the most heated dispute. Huber appeared to be an archetype of a jurist who had sold his talents to the service of the Third Reich. Huber’s 1930s texts were indisputably fascist, and contained attacks against \textit{Judentum} in science and politics. Huber had been a visible figure in the National Socialist regime, one of the most notable in jurisprudence, and his editorship of fascist journals, his active contribution to constitutional discussion and his colleagueship with Carl Schmitt connected him irreversibly to the National Socialists.\textsuperscript{290} In private, Huber did go through an era of self-examination. Retrospectively, he did see a congruence between the National Socialist reasoning of a totalitarian nation and his own studies in the 1930s, although he could not see himself as having advanced the National Socialist cause. He gradually cut connections with his mentor and colleague Carl Schmitt, but was still not allowed to return to the teaching profession for years, which struck him as a major injustice.\textsuperscript{291}

All modes of inquiry were insufficient and too rigid in their attempts to make sense of the multi-faceted and complicated reality of the preceding twelve years.\textsuperscript{292} It proved to be very difficult to conduct the denazification of universities in such a way that all education would be given by formally competent anti-Nazis. Neither were there enough such people available, nor sufficient time for reliably inspect of who were truly “anti-Nazis” and who were indisputably in the category of “primary perpetrators” (\textit{Hauptschuldige}). It was almost impossible to find a common understanding of what “anti-Nazi” meant, or even a more modest common concept of what a “non- follower” signified. Who had been an “active” Nazi? What did it mean to be a passive one? Providing a juridical definition of to what extent a given individual had assimilated and supported the crimes of the Third Reich proved to be a matter of interpretation.\textsuperscript{293} In time, the pressing...

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\textsuperscript{289} Pauer-Studer, ‘Einleitung’ 2014, 80–83. \\
\textsuperscript{291} Grothe 2005, 317–321. \\
\textsuperscript{293} Sentencing university professors was very difficult, partly because of the largely prevail-
practical necessities obliged officials to hurry the process. Due to the catastroph-
ic death-toll of the war, the four occupation zones lacked enough skilled and
educated Germans to maintain a working society. It was also obvious that young
people needed somewhere to spend their days productively. In addition to the
practical impossibility of an exhaustive denazification of the universities, the
academics themselves where hesitant to accuse other academics of the injustices
of the Nazi era. Finally, the foreign political situation of the Federal Republic
assured leading politicians that the biggest threat to the nation did not come from
within but from the east. Thus, the resources of the nation had to be utilized to
counter communism, not on aggressive litigation of past behavior. This led to a
sweeping amnesty for civil servants, academics and writers from the Nazi period
by the Konrad Adenauer government.

The need to come to terms with the past in post-war Germany appeared in all
discussions involving the present and future of the society. Fitting the irrational
National Socialistic crimes to a temporal frame, and providing the totalitarianism
of the Third Reich with a cause and purpose was a necessity in reconstructing the
German community. The varying explanations and opinions comprised a debate
over the policy towards the past (Vergangenheitspolitik or Vergangenheitsbewäl-
tigung). The fields of science and higher education likewise were engaged in a
dispute over the meaning and heritage of the preceding years as well as their ef-
effect on academia. Since the breach between “what had been” and “what was” in
itself was hard to confront with concrete measures, the public discussion on the
national tradition and orientation conducted among scholars focused mainly on
Bildung. In this debate all of the above-mentioned views merged.

Was Bildung part of a process in which society turned against itself, namely
against the helpless ones who in the modern political ethos it should have pro-
tected? How should one safeguard the heritage and virtuous core of German
universities and German scholarship? From whom should it be rescued or which
discourses should be excluded from the academic sphere? Was the root of all evil
in the administrative endeavors of the politicians, the over-equalizations of the
socialists, or the false conclusions of corrupted scholars? Some officials of the
occupational administration and a substantial group of German intellectuals be-

294 Remy 2002, 130, 149.
297 Moses 2007, 131–159.
lieved that indeed the university system was partly responsible for the successful Nazi seizure of power. The conservative atmosphere embedded in the structures of higher education had exposed the academic culture to outer political intentions, and contributed to its inability to resist the National Socialist Gleichschaltung. The British occupational administration produced a “Blue Report” in which they suggested a structural rearrangement of German universities in order to link it more directly to the public sphere and to more open decision-making. Although the practical implications of the report were minor, the direction of the development regarding the purpose and status of universities as institutes within the field of national education was set. In the forthcoming years the universities transformed from being providers of educational facilities for the social elite to ‘mass universities.’ The ideological framework supporting the latter emphasized equal opportunities in achieving higher education, the significance of university training from the point of view of social cohesion, and its relation to other sectors of society. Such a view did not in many cases concur with the idea of Bildung which the conservative scholars of the war generation (not to mention their teachers) still appreciated.

For conservative scholars the universities represented the essence of German culture. Not only did they educate the citizens and passed on the knowledge of previous generations, in scholarly work the characteristics of a living, healthy culture became apparent. Academics worked with and utilized the national spirit (Geist), and as a group contributed creativity to cultural rebuilding. The autonomy of universities against any outside interventions was essential in preserving German culture as well as the ‘Occidental’ (abendländische) tradition to which it adhered. The peculiar status of German universities derived from their original definition as autonomous establishments outside the political sphere of society, but nevertheless as embodiments of the nationally significant values, and as concrete institutes which fostered the emergence and impact of these values in the social reality of the nation.

Rightfully, the Humboldtian university system was perceived as an important European invention, but opinions on who or what exactly embodied the idea of

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298 Moses 2007, 132–133.
301 The values concerning education were nationally significant since they were universal, a notion not foreign to the Romantic worldview. Cf. Karl Jaspers, Die idee der Universität. Berlin, Springer-Verlag 1946, 9–13.
III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness

the university in the Federal Republic or for what reasons it had originally been constructed, clashed. In other words, despite the fact that Humboldtian universities were supposed to live separately from national politics, the major political crises of the twentieth century had always extended and continued to extend inside the realm of university education. Consequently, university education suffered from repeated “crises,” “uncertain core ideas,” and seemed to be in the need of “inevitable reform”.302 When crises in higher education occurred, the subsequent explanations and coping strategies with respect to the actual crisis were constructed by relating the current situation to preceding crises in order to find out the “true core” of Bildung. This “untainted” ideal would then serve as the foundation for the succeeding academic culture.303 However, the explanations tended to be more on the side of conservation, the ‘Humboldtian ideal’ being used to redefine the meaning given to the institutes and idea of education, but also to make sense of the relation which the educators, the professors, had with respect to the national past, the present and the future.

Gerd Tellenbach, a friend of Franz Wieacker and a colleague of Fritz Pringsheim,304 narrated the crisis of higher education following the end of the Second World War in 1946.305 In his narrative, which dealt with the essence and ideal of higher education, he reflected on the emotions and experiences of the conservative educational elite during and after the Nazi reign. Tellenbach saw the 1930s and 1940s as an era in which a brutal attack had been made on the scientific and cultural heritage of German universities. “[T]he state had raped the universities,” intervening in their centuries-long administrative authority. Thus, German universities were the victims of the politicizing actions of the fascist administration. The relative guilt that the universities (and their staff) bore lay in their lack of belief in the virtues and values of Bildung, and the lack of devotion in cultivating that ideal in practice. Tellenbach saw that particular feature as a factor which explained the success of the Nazi attack on education.306 Furthermore, the post-War task of the universities (and their staff) was to find again the “Occidental

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304 See, Korrespondenz mit Franz Wieacker, Bestand C0157, Signatur 431, Universitätsarchiv der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br. See also Nachlass Gerd Tellenbach, Tod von Fritz Pringsheim, Bestand C0157, Signatur 447, Universitätsarchiv der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br.
305 Gerd Tellenbach, ‘Zur Selbstorientierung der deutschen Universität,’ in Die Sammlung 1, 1946, 530–43.
306 Tellenbach 1946, 534.
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tradition,” which had shaped the virtuous core of German and European culture long before the traits of the industrial revolution and modern political selfishness had perverted the social and communal reality of the Western world.\footnote{307 Tellenbach 1946, 535–537. See also Lena Foljanty, Recht oder Gesetz: Juristische Identität und Autorität in den Naturrechtsdebatten der Nachkriegszeit. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2013, 115–116 and the post-War use of the concept of Abendland, which as a “slogan” turned conservative spiritual values into a geographical term.}

Tellenbach’s explanation was by no means an exception in its emphasis on the “idea of the spiritual nobility,”\footnote{308 Paletschek 2006, 245.} but what gave it its particular explanatory power was the comparison between the conditions prevailing in the Weimar Republic and the ‘point zero’ of 1946 Germany. In Weimar, the “modernization process,” the redefinition of the meaning given to the universities and higher education within society, had been explained as the degeneration of the essence of national cultural.\footnote{309 Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community 1890–1933. Cambridge: Harvard UP 1969.} It had threatened to destroy the world of the Weimarian Bildungsbürger, and that threat seemed similar to (or at least it was interpreted as the same thing as) the phenomena which were appearing in the post-Second World War social reality. Again, the harsh conditions and allegations which the learned faced seemed to represent a dissolution of binding national values.\footnote{310 Sylvia Paletschek, ‘The invention of Humboldt and the impact of National Socialism. The German University idea in the first half of the twentieth century,’ in M.Szöllösi-Janze (ed.), Science in the Third Reich. Oxford: Berghahn Books 2001, 37–58.}

To scholars, Bildung was both a sphere which was separated from politics – and as such opposed National Socialist barbarism – and was connected to the “Occidental tradition.” Often the learned saw the destiny of the nation depended on the value it gave to Bildung. Bildung was not just simply training, it provided a general humanist education in which scholars became the guardians of Occidental tradition. Because of this link with the “healthy core” of Bildung, the conservative university staff who had retained their working place during the years of National Socialism, and had consented to the demands of the regime to varying degrees, saw themselves as “apolitical,” whereas National Socialists themselves had committed a crime in politicizing the realms of science and culture.\footnote{311 For example, both Eugen Fehrel and Wolfgang Panzer defended against the charges in the Spruchkammer process, referring to their scholarship as “apolitical.” Remy 2002, 185, 190.} In seeing the Nazis as a phase in a larger development, the war generation – the academics born between 1902 and 1908 – could link the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century and the post-Second World War reformation efforts towards the academic realm as symptoms of a larger phenomenon which was distorting the basis of society and law. This modernization process, which was also defined
as ‘politicization’ and ‘scientification’ (Verwissenschaftlichung), further explained the new interventions by the state bureaucracy against the educational elite as ‘politically’ motivated, as opposed to the ‘spiritual’ motives of scholars.\footnote{Thus, Tellenbach asserted in another context, that “Geistigen Aufbau des Abendlandes […] um die dämonischen Kräfte der Technik binden zu helfen und sie ihrem eigenen grenzenlosen Weiterwachsen ins Unmenschliche zu entziehen. Es ist klar, daß der Humanismus irgendwelcher Art für sich allein diese Bindung nicht erreichen wird, sondern daß nur die letzten und tiefsten religiös-sittlichen Bindungskräfte dazu imstande sind” quoted in Paletschek 2006, 245; cf. Martin Heidegger, \textit{Die Technik und die Kehre} [1962]. Pfullingen, Verlag Günther Neske 1988; Carl Schmitt, \textit{Nomos der Erde: im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum}. Greven 1950.}

Tellenbach’s narrative was not a thoroughly misleading or retrospective distortion, after all already in 1933 many, including Fritz Pringsheim, had interpreted National Socialism as destroying education and tradition by submitting them to politics.\footnote{See p.79.} In addition, during the modernization process of Germany the administrative power of the state had arguably replaced some structures of communal decision making and deprived the people of some traditional symbols of freedom.\footnote{Max Weber, ‘Politik als Beruf’[1919], in Johannes Winckelmann (ed.), \textit{Max Weber: Gesammelte politische Schriften}. Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr 1988.} However, the sweeping explanation which Tellenbach’s narrative – and common academic opinion on the totalitarian era – provided, ignored the more subtle and controversial aspects the 1930s also possessed. With some acts and representations the ‘tragedy of modernization’ gave less convincing explanations. The contradictions of conservative narratives like Tellenbach’s should not be considered surprising. In the end, it is the function of communal narratives to deal with disturb and complicate social phenomena; in evoking continuities and discontinuities they dwell on the ‘untainted’ past in order to make the present circumstances and their causes understandable.

The discontinuities which conservative narratives made understandable, included the more general change in the political field and in ideological power relations. The coupling of fascism and late 1940s political interventions on higher education enabled scholars to create a retrospective explanation of their position vis-à-vis the fascist regime and its ideology, but also to define their position with respect to a new threat that communism seemed to represent to the traditional way of life. Bildungsbürgertum had been hostile towards socialism since the end of the First World War, and already in the Weimar conditions domestic communism appeared to threaten national values.\footnote{See p.62–63.} But whereas in the 1930s conservative discourse, communists had been treated as the misunderstood masses, in the Federal Republic their conviction to eradicate social classes and harness
formal education to produce workers to serve the state was seen as a real menace to the life style of the educated class.

The wider discussion on the fate of and the relation between Bildung, the national institutes of higher education and the post-War social change of Germany in many cases overlapped the narrower legal scientific discourse. Academic discourse on legal and political sciences ultimately concentrated on the fundamental question of the relation between the state and society, or to be more precise between the rule of law and the welfare state, or as translated in the terminology of 1950s German legal theory, between the Rechtsstaat and the Sozialstaat. In particular, scholars argued over the extent and essence of the values which supposedly held together the national community, and about the meaning one should give to the transformation of the social constellation with respect to economic development, industrialization and political group formation. In a more political sphere, the possible threat whether “Bonn would become Weimar,” that the fragile democracy of the Federal Republic would collapse just like the social order of the 1930s, was a practical implementation of this legal scientific search for the stable, systematic and solid common values of society. The two main sides in the dispute over the ideal essence of German society were the “Schmitt School” and the “Smend School,” which comprised the former students of the two scholars.

Amidst the political reconstruction process and the rapid social change following the end of the Second World War, the intellectual geography of the Federal Republic took a peculiar turn. Now it was the former conservative revolutionaries of the war generation, such as Ernst Forsthoff and Werner Weber, who defended in a libertarian manner the rights of the individual against the regulatory actions of the state. On the other hand, the scholars of the Smend School, who often leaned to the left, advocated social cohesion and common values. The ‘conversion’ of, for example, Ernst Forsthoff was not however a sudden turn at all. His arguments – and more generally those of the Schmitt School – were based on a deep mistrust not of the state in general, but on the newly-drafted Republic, which was ‘artificial’ in the sense that it neglected the conservative value-base on which the community was supposed to be built. The organic and natural whole of society, constituted of different Stand, which the Schmitt’s stu-

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318 Müller 2003, 70.

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dents had tried to articulate in their 1930s texts, continued to represent an ideal which could not be translated to the social and political reality of the Federal. In other words, the Federal Republic was not a concrete order, and thus it should not act like one.320

It also has to be acknowledged that the ‘modernization’ narrative did serve as a fruitful context for many novel conceptualizations of Western society and its history. It was as if no traits remained which linked Germany to the rest of the world or to its own past. The war and the preceding totalitarianism represented an enormous obstacle to any optimistic narratives about future development. Whereas the ‘modernization tragedy’ narrative of the war generation of Franz Wieacker and Ernst Forsthoff, as well as to some older scholars like Hans Freyer and Carl Schmitt, was partly a personal apologia for a bygone era, to the younger generation of “45ers” it appeared a truthful theory of why the world possessed no meaning.321 It was easy, especially for the ‘skeptical generation’ of the post-war years, to see little hope in the Cold War’s intergovernmental processes and Germany’s destiny within them.322 The Weltbürgerkrieg, worldwide civil war, into which the world inevitably seemed to slide, symbolized to Carl Schmitt, Ernst Forsthoff and Franz Wieacker a continuation of the Weimar disarray. The younger generation represented by, for example, Helmut Schelsky and Reinhart Koselleck found it a useful tool to explain their experiences of war and imprisonment.323 Thus, the deep mistrust towards ‘modernization’ and the world of technology was a common stance in academia, not because it reflected the reality more truthfully than other theories, but because it connected the worlds of the (conservative) older and younger generations of scholars.324

320 Müller 2003, 73–75.
321 The sustaining influence which authors who could explicate the scarcity and “abyss of emotions” of the post-war society to the younger generation of lawyers and social scientist has been documented in numerous studies. Teachers like Ernst Forsthoff, Ernst Rudolf Huber and Franz Wieacker were able to transmit some sense of continuity, dignity and reason to their students; Moses 2007, 76; Müller 2003, 61–62; Liebs 2010, 38.
323 The concept of Weltbürgerkrieg was Carl Schmitt’s and its diffusion in one part also mirrors his strong position as the scientific mentor of young scientists and post-War scholarly circles. Schmitt 1950. About Koselleck, war-experience and Carl Schmitt, see e.g. Manfred Hettling, Bernd Ulrich: Formen der Bürgerlichkeit. Ein Gespräch mit Reinhart Koselleck in Manfred Hettling (ed.): Bürgertum nach 1945. Hamburg 2005.

Wieacker felt, with good reason, lucky to have survived the war. After returning from a POW camp, he found his parents alive and relatively healthy. Although the family property had in large part been destroyed, Wieacker was alive and able to continue working in the field he loved. In February 1946 Wieacker wrote to Erik Wolf:

It is about as ordinary and normal with me as for all young people who had the luck or skill to survive the war fully intact. I mean, after all, the luck in the sense of “opportunity” to restitute themselves and do their part to restitute the nation.325

As his correspondence and early 1940s works demonstrate, Wieacker’s earlier scientific stance was not deflected but rather sharpened due to the war experiences and Germany’s defeat.326 In many aspects, with respect to methodology for example, his orientation did not undergo any drastic changes. The notion that Wieacker’s works from the 1950s to the 1960s are reconstructive in essence – i.e. that they sought to find and synthesize common patterns in history – is tangible in the light of his war experiences and his consequent vision of German legal culture being partly constituted on a historical misunderstanding.327 However, post-1945 events also affected Wieacker’s thinking and writing. During the post-war years, Wieacker’s ideas on the relationship between scholarly work and the political sphere changed. In his personal adjustment process after the war Wieacker tried to understand the changing world with the help of his personal life history and in interaction with his closest friends.

Towards the end of the war, Wieacker’s view on the nature of the worldwide catastrophe and the reasons which had led to such chaos began to take on an increasingly clearer form. The intoxicated and unaware masses had provided an opportunity for criminal individuals to seize power and command the nations to war.328 This fatal error in judgment did not lie solely with the common people or ‘masses.’ The false conclusions of historians who had drawn from the national

325 “Sie ist bei mir so alltäglich und gewöhnlich wie bei allen jüngeren Leuten, die den Krieg im ganzen intakt zu überleben das Glück oder Geschick hatten; ich meine doch: das Glück in Sinne von “Chance” sich und mit sich zu ihrem Teil die Nation zu restituieren.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.2.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
328 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946: “Und wo ich solches begegne – was immerhin häufig vorkommt, denke ich mit Schrecken daran, wie wenig ich gewusst habe, wie den
past had created an atmosphere in which national development and European culture were in conflict. The incorrect belief in a national culture distinct from the wider tradition was according to Wieacker the root of the tragedy of the twentieth century. To him, Germany was possessed by a hostile national mentality towards any influence of European (Roman) legal culture. Pre-Enlightenment “juridical humanism” had caused a national counter-reaction, based on a false understanding of the legal tradition, and this had created a belief in a vanguard culture fighting against alien influences.³²⁹ Again, Wieacker was confident that explaining the historical development in a truthful manner and offering scientifically constructed arguments for fixing the nature of things, required emphasizing the consciousness, Bewusstsein, of the people.

Wieacker found the field of legal science, and himself as a scholar within that scientific paradigm, in a situation where the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein needed a twofold redefinition. Wieacker still firmly believed that there was such a thing as common awareness and a common experience of law – a cultural mentality concerning law – and legal historical studies should concentrate on that phenomenon. Yet, both the actual convictions embedded in that mentality, and the scientific elaborations presenting the development of that mentality, were in error. As a result, the German legal consciousness was plagued by an illusion of the foreign and arbitrary essence of the European legal tradition. The first part of the redefinition, to represent the historical development of the law-people-state interaction (in other words the process of emergence of the German Rechtsbewusstsein) in a more accurate way, was well underway during the last years of the war. The first steps had already been taken and explicated in his correspondence with both Erik Wolf and Carl Schmitt.³³⁰ The founding textual work exhibiting that rethinking process was his article Das römische Recht und Deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein. In 1944 Wieacker interpreted his own stance within the field of legal sciences as contributing to the continuing struggle against the original miscomprehension of German Rechtsbewusstsein, and participating in a ceaseless scholarly debate concerning the history of that legal consciousness.³³¹

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³²⁹ It was not that “juridical,” “second,” humanism had not affected Germany, it was that it had created a misunderstanding about the relation between the state, the people and law. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 11.4.1944. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
³³¹ Wieacker’s presentations in conferences after the Second World War concentrated very much on themes related to Rechtsbewusstsein. For example, Vom römischen Staat als Rechtssystem (1949) and Ursprünge und Elemente des europäischen Rechtbewusstseins (1955) were both originally talks given in legal history conferences.
The second task for Wieacker’s ontological premises, however, was set by an unexpected demand to reconsider the previous intellectual practices. After the war, the crimes of the Nazi regime were revealed in their full enormity, and legal scholars and the discipline of legal science had to clarify their involvement and possible participation in those crimes. On a general level, German jurisprudence had not been able to maintain a sober relation with totalitarian ideology and administration, but it also seemed that Wieacker as an individual scholar had contributed in morally dubious fascist projects, which cast a shadow on the legitimacy of his scientific attempts to define ‘justice’ in history and society. No one could deny that as a whole the unconditional obsession with the ‘will of the people’ in the legal scientific works of the preceding twelve years had been a misjudgment.

The scholars of the ‘New legal science’ strongly claimed that their intentions had been sincere and were unrelated to the destructive policy of National Socialism, but nevertheless they faced considerable pressure to further distance themselves and their scientific contributions from the legacy of the totalitarian regime. The consequent personal and scientific task in forthcoming scientific presentations was to redefine one’s earlier thoughts as unattached to totalitarian ideology, but at the same time to maintain some kind of connection with the arguments of earlier works. To a historian, a total displacement of one’s historical vision from preceding thoughts, principles and discourses – starting from scratch – would have been a mission impossible in any case. In this chapter I will concentrate on Wieacker’s post-war process of working through the ‘dilemma of totalitarianism’ with respect to higher education and the meaning of science in society. In other words, I will focus on the spheres of Bildung and Stand. In chapter IV I will scrutinize how Wieacker dealt with the ontological challenges concerning his personal past and the idea of justice as a scholarly practice.

The original principle that Rechtsbewusstsein in Wieacker’s earlier texts had signified, was no longer adequate. The idea that a mental attribute, shared by the people and shaped by their culture, could be used in defining a rightful interpre-

332 It seems that many war generation scholars were honestly surprised by the accusations made against them. Wieacker did not accept the allegations concerning, for example, Ernst Rudolf Huber and Huber’s consequent suspension from any formal teaching positions in institutes of higher education. Wieacker considered the denazification process to be a “gamble” (Glückspiel), and hoped that his friend could return to his work: “Im übrigen bin ich recht unglücklich, dass ich meinem Wunsch, Dich recht bald wieder an der Dir zukommenden Stelle und Rang tätig zu sehen, bei meiner geringen Qualifikation anders als mit Empfindungen und Worten nicht Ausdruck geben kann; denn was kann meine Stimme unter den heutigen Umständen gelten?” Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.10.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Ernst Forsthoff perceived the denazification at the University of Heidelberg (partly led by philosopher Karl Jaspers) as “Jasperle-theater.” Meinel 2012, 304.
tation of positive law in accordance with social justice, had not proved to be a sustaining idea with respect to the morality of historical representations. The fundamental question was whether Rechtsbewusstsein could still be used as a methodological tool for the scholar in trying to make sense of the rule of law, both in the past as well as in his contemporary society. Wieacker – like many other scholars – did not want to abandon the concept, rather he adjusted it on the bases of his earlier works and personal experiences. As a result, Rechtsbewusstsein proved to be useful not only in describing the unimaginable legal havoc of European civilization, but it also fitted very well to the explanation which Wieacker gave to the dilemma of totalitarianism. Before I analyze Wieacker’s scholarly texts and the post-War use of the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein, I need to elaborate how Wieacker’s personal experience of the people, the state and law related to the public discourse of post-war Germany, which further influenced his vision of the German legal consciousness.

**a) Wieacker’s hearing and the conclusions derived**

Wieacker himself was also accused of disseminating the National Socialist worldview. In 1946 Ludwig Schnorr von Carolsfeld, professor of civil law at the University of Erlangen charged Wieacker with advocating and propagating fascist views during the Nazi reign. Wieacker’s involvement in the Kieler Schule and the texts published in fascist journals were also reasons enough for an official, legal processing of his relation with the totalitarian state. The allegations came to a head in the winter of 1946/1947, and Wieacker was prosecuted by the local tribunal, Spruchkammer, in Göttingen. As was the custom, Wieacker had to provide the board with evidence of his (sincere) motives and intentions during the Nazi regime. Several scholars delivered reports on their view of both Wieacker’s involvement in National Socialist actions, and on the extent of Wieacker’s assimilation of fascist doctrines. Mostly their statements emphasized Wieacker’s scientific worldview, which he had not compromised in the face of totalitarianism. In addition, Fritz Pringsheim took the side of Wieacker, and

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333 See section III.4 ‘The Concept of Property’.

334 “monströse Denunziationen eines leider aus dem Gleichgewicht geworfenen (Schnorr v. Carolsfeld) erstaunen [...]” Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber [beantwort 21.2.1946]. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.


336 The scholars included Erik Wolf, Wolfgang Kunkel, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Franz Bey erle, Fritz Pringsheim and Werner Heisenberg, all to a degree Wieacker’s friends and distin-
defended his former student. Wieacker was judged as a ‘fellow traveller’, Mitläufer, to National Socialist crimes.

One of the charges presented in the tribunal process dealt with Wieacker’s conduct in one of the Wissenschaftslagers (in Todtnauberg) in 1933 and his subsequent enlisting in a National Socialist association. This allegation Wieacker saw as coming directly from Ludwig Schnorr von Carolsfeld. The original state of affairs in the camp, led by none other than Martin Heidegger, had been blurry, but in any case, Wieacker had been sent home abruptly and prematurely from Todtnauberg. Expulsion was due either Wieacker’s ironic remark, which had upset Heidegger, or was according to a plan which Heidegger had drafted well before the actual camp. Startled by the incident, Wieacker assumed that his career as a legal scholar was about to end before it had even properly started. Wieacker decided to show some commitment to the new elite and – encouraged by Erik Wolf – enlisted in a National Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK).

In 1947 and in the Spruchkammer process the allegation was, however, that during the Todtnauberg camp in October 1933 Wieacker had offended the church distinguished scholars, Heisenberg even Nobel laureate. According to their statements Wieacker had been an “uncompromising opponent of the NS state” full of “hate” against the ideology which had “destroyed his spiritual world and its best values.” The most tentative report came from Wolfgang Kunkel, who acknowledged Wieacker’s contribution to the ‘New legal science’ and claimed that Wieacker had “sought the favor of National Socialist students and the administration,” but he [Kunkel] could not judge whether Wieacker had “believed in finding a political homeland [Heimat] in National Socialism.” Winkler 2014, 463.


On the former option see Liesb 2011, on the latter alternative see Winkler 2014. In any case Wieacker insisted that by that date (spring 1947) he was not sure why he had been expelled from Todtnauberg: (“dessen Gründe mir bis heute nicht klar sind[,]”), Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.2.1947. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

The NSKK (Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps) or National Socialist Motor Corps can hardly be considered a concretization of the National Socialist race war, nor was it an association close to Wieacker’s heart. It is likely that joining the NSKK in 1933 truly was a precautionary move on Wieacker’s behalf.
III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness

– which had led to his expulsion from the camp – in a way that his later enlistment in the National Socialist association did not appear as a reluctant precaution, but as a natural continuum.\textsuperscript{342} This particular instance, and the allegation, appeared important with respect to the overall decision of the \textit{Spruchkammer}. Since leaving the University of Leipzig after the war, Wieacker did not yet have a professorship, and the future chances of a position in any German university were dependent on the tribunal process and its decision.\textsuperscript{343} Wieacker reached out to Erik Wolf, who as respected fellow at Freiburg University and as a former vice-dean of the University, had been involved in sorting out the original case at Todtnauberg in 1933.\textsuperscript{344} Wolf delivered a statement where he explained Wieacker’s actions in the camp as a misunderstanding and the consequent enlistment as a necessary procedure amidst the blurry circumstances following the National Socialist coup. Both Wolf and Wieacker subtly emphasized the responsibility of the leader and arranger of the camp, Martin Heidegger.\textsuperscript{345}

The effect of the ‘Todtnauberg incident’ in the overall judgment might have been a minor one, and in retrospect it does not stand out as the most decisive event with respect to Wieacker’s relation to National Socialism. From a certain perspective, Carolsfeld’s accusations were correct, and this might have been the reason for the interest the local tribunal in Göttingen showed on the event in 1947. Schnorr von Carolsfeld held Wieacker’s relation towards Christianity as a proof of Wieacker’s fascism, and, indeed, Wieacker had never thought highly of the church. His attitude, however, was not the same as the attitude towards religion of the SS wing of the Party, which wanted to abolish churches and set up a Hitler cult instead. Wieacker simply did not believe in the revered position of the church and the particular significance of the religious vocation in the German

\textsuperscript{342} To make things even more complicated, Heidegger was, despite his past, a very influential figure at Freiburg University in 1947. Wieacker pleaded with Wolf not to involve Heidegger too much in the clarifications concerning the inquiry on Wieacker (“Es muss möglich sein, über diesen Vorfall zu gutachten, ohne Heidegger (zu sehr) hineinzusiehen, das würden Sie nicht wünschen, und ich ebenso wenig.”) Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.2.1947. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.


\textsuperscript{344} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{345} Wieacker to Erik Wolf 11.5.1947: “Mein Entwurf für die Rechtfertigungsschrift stellen die Sache genau so dar; er betonte ausdrücklich, daß der damalige Dekan” in “Sorge für eine politische Befolgung des durch das Lager unter anderen Umstände ‘belasteten’ Nachwuchskräfte nahegelegt habe usf.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
This conviction was nevertheless one that Wieacker had to suppress during the Spruchkammer process. Wieacker’s atheism could have been interpreted as sign of sympathy towards National Socialism. Frustrated by the process, and especially the charges of Schnorr von Carolsfeld, he wrote to Ernst Rudolf Huber:

I feel in myself the great need to lay out before you my state-theoretical explanations that arose from the sheerly naive contemplation of reality. I mention only one: As I feel myself, by virtue of defect, not particularly bound by the Christian-European ideas of the history of the world (fundamentally Iranian ideas, ideas of history as the history of salvation and decision) as one of a suspenseful, once incipient, moral drama, I am fundamentally apolitical, pre-political: State (and Church) have no transcendence for me. On this transcendence, however, and the conviction that the people (do not do the same, but rather) should be of the same mind are based the unrelenting religious wars and persecution psychoses of Western civilization and its ideological poisoning. This was virtually non-existent in ancient times [and] in the Indian and Chinese worlds, which was no disadvantage to their extent of religious depth, if my interpretation is correct.

To Wieacker, most people were driven by beliefs and superstition, of which ideologies and religions for most part came. There were, however, some spheres which were less contaminated by the ‘persecution psychoses.’ Such islands were cultures of antiquity (Rome) and law. Since Wieacker had devoted himself to a lifelong learning of these entities, he argued that his textual contributions were not associated with the contemporary world of “politics.”

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346 Cf. e.g. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 18.10.1940. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau, and Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 1.9.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
347 The sentences given in the Spruchkammer could be mildened because of the religious conviction of the defendant, if he was able to assure the tribunal that such a conviction had remained even during the Third Reich. See e.g. Remy 2002, 190, 193.
348 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.5.1947. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. “Ich empfinde selbst das starke Bedürfnis, meine aus der blossen naiven Anschauung der Wirklichkeit hervorgegangen staatstheoretischen Aufstellungen vor Dir geordnet auszubreiten. Nur eines sei angedeutet: da ich mich dem christlich-europäischen, im Grunde iranischen Gedanken der Geschichte als Heils- und Entscheidungsgeschichte, der Welt als eines entscheidungsträchtigen, einmal anfangenden, moralischen Dramas kraft irgend eines Defekts nicht so verpflichtet weiss, bin ich im Grunde apolitisch, vorpolitisch: Staat (und Kirche) haben für mich keine Transzendenz; auf jener Transzendenz aber und der Überzeugung, dass die Menschen (nicht das gleiche tun, sondern) gleichcr Meinung sein sollen, beruhen aber die unablässigen Glaubenskriege und Verfolgungspychosen der abendländischen Geschichte und ihre ideologische Vergiftung, dergleichen es in der Antike kaum in der indischen und chinesischen Welt so gut wie gar nicht gegeben hat, wenn ich recht sehe, nicht zum Nachteil ihrer Größe in religiöser Tiefe.”, Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.5.1947. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
349 Wieacker considered both Schnorr von Carolsfeld and Heidegger’s intentions to be political as opposed to his own actions. He always thought of himself as being ‘apolitical’: “Ich
firms that after the war Wieacker maintained his view on the irrational nature of history. That position reflects largely the apology his peers upheld when explaining their relation to National Socialism.

**b) Bildung and Stand in the social reality of the Federal Republic**

The constant underlying feeling that Wieacker possessed during the post-war years was that of a lack of justice. Partly this was due to the prosecution of Wieacker and his friends and the disarray brought about the denazification process. More broadly it originated from the subjugated position of the scholars and lawyer class within society. Like Wieacker many scholars had been forced to leave their homes and working places and, finding support only from other scholars, were obliged to search for a new home and circle of colleagues in some other part of the country. The status of the universities within the national cultures became concretized in the living and working conditions of scholars. Since, when the “army of the homeless learned” desperately tried to find a new place to continue their careers, it appeared to Wieacker as if the millennia-long foundations of the European culture had been shattered. Since in the German culture legal scholars had traditionally been privileged a self-sufficient position between the state and the law, the relative (and concrete) alterations in the practice of legal scholarship seemed like interventions in the binding norms of the society. It is noteworthy that during the Nazi years Wieacker did not feel as if the building blocks of society and the cultural way of life had been threatened, but in the post-war scarcity he saw the destruction of European culture.
It has to be acknowledged that the ‘experience-world’ of the scholars was a narrow one. For example, to Wieacker the sad material conditions following Germany’s defeat and the most blatant symptoms of injustice were those relating to higher education and the treatment of scholars, Bildung and Stand. Thus in January of 1947 he wrote to Rudolf Smend, who had offered to Wieacker and several former members of the Kieler Schule a working place at the University of Göttingen, as follows:

Therefore I feel moved to express my most earnest gratitude for the great kindness, with which you as a rector have made possible the incorporation of exulanten into this university, and with which you have given the spirit access to academia.354

“Exulanten,” to which in his letter Wieacker equates himself, and for example Wolfgang Siebert and Karl Michaelis, were Protestant expatriates of the 16th and 18th century who had to leave their homeland due to cruel religious persecution. From the perspective of the twenty-first century it is difficult to see the fate of the post-war legal scholars as tragic, as like refugees who had to flee for their lives due to their religious convictions, nor see the question of the ‘spiritual well-being’ of the nation depending on whether the legally trained found suitable places of work. That was, however, the experience of the learned themselves in the years following the end of the Second World War. Their inexorable conviction was that the ‘just order’ of society depended on the status which society gave to legal science and to scientists. When legal scholars had to renounce their traditional right to interdisciplinary self-definition with respect to society and the state, to give up their self-proclaimed entitlement to announce the current form of social justice, it appeared as if the authority of law had been degraded and the Geist of the nation lost.

The chaotic times were concretized in the threat which Bolshevism constituted to the value base of the German nation. The hazard was a real one since the Soviet Union and German communists announced an explicit intention to overrule the social order of Germany. Indeed, the changes which were carried out in Soviet East Germany – and which socialists in the West supported – already aimed at removing of the bourgeoisie, and at transforming the institutions of formal

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education to produce workers in the service of the state. Communism was being interpreted as the absolute dissolution of Western culture, as the extreme opposite to the appreciation of law (legal science), and as an irreversible alteration to the national tradition.\(^{355}\) Conversely, the last fortress of hierarchies which comprised the European cultural heritage, the *Geist* and free creativity, was to be found in academia. In his letter to Erik Wolf of 14 March 1946 Franz Wieacker wrote about the “red alienation” of Leipzig University and the eastern provinces of Germany.\(^{356}\) In addition, and in congruence with conservative narrative of the time, he compared the “inhuman” development of the east of the disaster of the Nazi regime.

Here [in Göttingen] the matters are naturally not that clearly apparent due to a strong desire for intellectuality and great exhaustion, but how rejoicing it would be if one could perceive a real re-establishment of the old works. Unfortunately many characteristics that one ascribed to the Nazis alone until the great crash; intolerance, egoism, sycophancy, self-opinionated dogmatization, the desire to oppress, a war-mongering spirit [...] are back again.\(^{357}\)

In the letter Wieacker sees the communist restrictions on academic life and the “scholarly spirit” of West German universities as opposites in the larger picture of the fate of European culture.\(^{358}\) The communist assault on higher education was true totalitarianism, and as such a direct heir of National Socialism and all the expressions of ‘modernization’ which preceded it. The rise of these totalitarianisms was not a sudden phenomenon. The process of alienation had started long before, when the common value-base and connection to reality had fallen apart in ‘technicalization’ and modernization, which represented the opposite force to the values associated with ‘humanity,’ or *Bildung*.\(^{359}\) Thus, along with

\(^{355}\) Cf. p. 142–143.

\(^{356}\) Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946. See also: “Die Umwandlung dieser (etwa vor allem in der philosophischen Fakultät) so vortrefflichen Universität in eine Arbeitervolkshochschule (was ja ganz sinnreich sein könnte) hat sich in Formen vollzogen, die für lange Zeit jeden ‘Wiederaufbau’ unmöglich machen.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.


\(^{358}\) Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\(^{359}\) Wieacker cynically stated that it was too late to strip modern society of its aberrations, and distortions as old as the industrial revolution were to be resolved only if “diese Auflösung wäre einmal möglich durch eine Selbstzerstörung der technischen Welt, sodaß nur mehr Acker-
the communist threat and its intention to rearrange the traditional order of academia, the German community was overwhelmed and oppressed by sentiments which deprived them of their affection towards culture and tradition, the key attributes in pursuing social justice. And conversely, actions stemming from the destructive emotions of hate and revenge were incapable of rebuilding a just society.

To Wieacker in 1946, the force that threatened social justice, and spread values opposite to the virtues of Bildung, was that of “barbarians.” The natural contrast to the barbarian worldview was the culture appreciated by himself and his group of friends. Scholars faced barbarism from many directions and in many forms. The hypocritical attitude of the victors, in bemoaning the depths of National Socialist totalitarianism, was not only “gullible” but also in part “barbaric.” It was as if the nature of war had surprised the Western world. The attempts to rearrange higher education on the basis of a alien political ideology seemed to Wieacker a “brutal crime,” ignoring both the cultural heritage and the affective attitude which scholars had for their work as torchbearers of tradition.

The most acute and explicit features of “barbarism” were, however, the demands on behalf of the political realm for scholars to back up the newly-drawn constellation of society. Wieacker wrote to Huber:

I find that it is not my (or our) task to further help with removal and destruction so that a new heaven and earth may emerge. At any rate, we take action against our culture if we want to go along with the promising barbarians.

360 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 14.3.1946: the tendency to dismantle the tradition of higher education as embedded in the Humboldtian ideal of the university was “gegen die wissenschaftliche Ausbildung, die wir in Sacksen in den letzten Jahren mit allen zugrundeliegenden Instinkten mehr als lieb kennen lernten.” Cf. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.2.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

361 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946: “die Zerstörung des politischen Welt (seit langer Zeit).” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

362 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946: “[A]ber die [gutglaubigen und barbarischen] haben ja doch kein Urteil, und keinen Wissen zum Urteil.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

363 “Ich finde, es ist nicht meine (oder unsere) Aufgabe, weiter mit Abtragen und Zerstören zu helfen, damit ein neuer Himmel und eine neue Erde entsteht. Wir jedenfalls handeln gegen
Whereas the “brutal” attacks on the core of the legal tradition of the continent were observable in all areas of contemporary society, “free will” and the “will-power” of history prevailed in the circle of scholars, most notably in the group of his friends and their mentality.\textsuperscript{365} Although the sad conditions of the time, in the form of negative sentiments, extended to the \textit{Stand} of lawyers, it nevertheless constituted a constellation which carried on the “spirit of the tradition” and which was able to rebuild the cultural foundations of society. Wieacker wrote to Huber:

And further, the billow of reluctance and persecution within the estate ought not to be overestimated, because everybody is too much involved with himself and also the immediate struggle for life to have much time for resentments.\textsuperscript{366}

The shady years of legal science during the Nazi regime had not eradicated Wieacker’s unquestioning conviction of the distinguished moral skill brought by legal historical knowledge and the common culture of scholars. Wieacker was confident that he and his friends had the gift of speaking on behalf of and utilizing the “spirit of tradition.”\textsuperscript{367} This capability sprang from their learnedness, their assimilation of past wisdom and their knowledge of the past generation of legal thinkers. Amidst the total destruction and the following widespread scarcity, scholars could evaluate and weigh the importance of things, and give advice on the emphasis of the reconstruction. It was only scholars who had a larger understanding of the causes and consequences of the “collapse.”\textsuperscript{368}

The consequent scholarly task, which Wieacker assigned to himself, was the one of teaching and writing history. The rebuilding of the German and European \textit{Rechtsbewusstsein} had to be left to experts on justice, namely legal scholars.
Since intervening with anything that had to with politics was out of the question, the rebuilding had to be conducted in the spheres of education and legal historiography. Not only was the educational assignment noble and meaningful from the point of view of the nation, Wieacker was also genuinely worried about the actual living conditions of students. In general he was concerned about the direction in which young people – who had grown up in a totalitarian society – were able to take the country.

Sad and touching is the helplessness of the young people; because the time in which they have been growing up has, except for a few favored by the grace of the situation or their own strength, taken the wits to reason with which they could find new directions.

It was the duty of scholars to educate the younger generation capable of making and willing to make righteous judgments in reconstructing the society. Since students, in National Socialist state, had been trained to follow, not to criticize, the first task of teaching was to convince students that an ability to carry out critical evaluations was essential for a prosperous future for both themselves and their nation. Only then could teachers provide students with the means to decide and evaluate. To Wieacker the purpose of higher legal education was to introduce students to the rich world of legal tradition, with all its exemplary virtues and ‘love for the spirit.’ Such knowledge would ‘emancipate’ and cultivate ‘free will,’ which on their part would produce practical solutions for the problems plaguing the ‘inhuman’ contemporary society. Analytical thinking and jurisprudential skill necessitated the awareness and assimilation of tradition. Thus, the process of reconstruction, to which Wieacker devoted himself, and which he hoped students would continue, was to rebuild the cultural (i.e. legal historical) premises of Europe.

It was in the attitudes towards the European legal heritage where the juxtaposition between the ‘inhuman spirit’ of the time and the values appreciated by Wieacker (and his colleagues) became most apparent. The war had cut the origi-

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III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness

Cultural bond between the Western cultures, whose rebuilding was increasingly vital in the face of the dark prospects for Europe. Europe was in a state of division, but more sadly, faced the danger of being “united” through mere power politics. Wieacker’s Europe was a “historical ideal” that had to be reconstructed taking into consideration its wider meaning. The significance of ‘Europe’ in Wieacker’s correspondence was on account of its peculiar existence both in the past and concurrently in the present. To Wieacker, the foundations of the great past legal cultures resided in their acknowledgment of the authority of law. On the other hand, that exact feature was a thing that contemporary Germany and Europe lacked. Thus, in order to rise again, Germany (and Europe) needed to learn from the past the means and virtues which enabled the restoration of the authority of law and legal science.

Wieacker hoped for the Europe that had once existed in history, “A united Europe on a co-operative basis.” Such a Europe would not be one built on nations. Contrary to Ernst Rudolf Huber’s ideas Wieacker rejected the priority of the state and asserted that Europe was built on legal tradition. The state had done what it had to do. Now was the time to build on law:

Therefore I give you law, if you do not yet wish to give up the state (not yet a supranational organization) as the bastion of culture, justice and humanity. On the whole I believe, of course, that the state has played out its role for this culture, and that a dissolution of this whole hardened and petrified power entity is required.

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374 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.2.1946. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

375 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946: “ein vereinigtes Europa auf genossenschaftliche Basis.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

376 “Daher gebe ich Dir Recht, wenn Du den Staat (noch nicht eine überstaatliche Organisation) als den Bürgen von Kultur, Gerechtigkeit und Humanität noch nicht preisgeben willst. Im ganzen freilich glaube ich, daß der Staat für diese Kultur seine Rolle ausgespielt hat, und daß es erst wieder einer Auflösung dieser ganz verhärteten und versteinerten Machtgebildes bedarf.” Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Already during the war Wieacker had been suspicious of the argument that the state was the original expression of the people’s will (the Schmittian idea of the gemeinsinwillen). He thought that Rechtsidee was at least as old as Rechtsbewusstsein. See Wieacker to Erik Wolf 11.4.1944. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
But the aim of law becoming the ‘fortress of culture, justice and humanity’ in contemporary society, necessitated a subject who would bring about the triumph of law. In order to understand the law one needed to be aware of the European tradition, and furthermore, in order to conduct a successful interpretation of tradition one had to have an education conducted along classic lines. The solution lay in the style of one’s legal thinking, and in this an example was already available in European legal history. The essence of the European tradition could be found in the style of thinking developed by classic Roman law.\footnote{Cf. p. 125–126.} The spiritual ability associated with Roman jurisprudence had brought about positive legal achievements in European history, but it had also provided a lasting model according to which lawyers should be trained. Moreover, the style of thinking of past cultural heroes was ‘European,’ and by this means the looming catastrophe could be evaded and a more civilized Europe achieved. In concrete terms one needed to study the history of legal thinkers, especially those who mastered Roman law, not just its texts, but the minds behind the representations. The idea was to become like them on the level of thought. This assimilation of legal tradition – first and originally obtained by the Late Republican lawyers in Rome – would allow the modern legal scholar to teach and cultivate a \emph{Stand} competent enough to steer the common legal consciousness of the nation (and Europe) in a healthy direction. Only in connection to the wisdom of this tradition could lawyers as an ‘estate’ cultivate their own legal capability – a mental ability to make value judgments – in practice. This would bring justice into social reality, and restore the authority of law in the legal consciousness of the people. Wieacker stated:

Indeed, the greater culture that has corroded contains, therefore, some elements that we best use to serve the future, in conserving and proclaiming the past. The men of late antiquity who collected, constricted and kept the old traditions in full consciousness, could not also know why they did so, and it was nevertheless gloriously worth the trouble after the High Middle Ages and later, as soon as the formerly barbaric pupils became ripe for reverence. To have an effect on the historical sequence of events no longer makes sense, if the empirical course of history has decayed into a new series of catastrophes. Outside these “Histories” lie the categories of our future fields of work of the smallest and greatest activities, “the next ones”\footnote{“Vielmehr enthält auch die nun zur Rüste gegangene große Kultur somit einige Elemente, daß wir der Zukunft am besten dienen, indem wir das Vergangene bewahren und verkünden. Die Männer des späten Altertums, die vollkommen bewußt das Alte sammelten, verengten und bewahrten, konnten auch nicht wissen, wofür und es hat sich doch seit dem Hochmittelalter und später herrlich gelohnt, sobald einmal die einst barbarischen Zöglinge zur Ehrfurcht reif wurden. Auf die geschichtlichen Abläufe zu wirken, hat keinen Sinn mehr, wenn sich der empirische Geschichtsablauf zu neuer Folge von Katastrophen zersetzt hat. Außerhalb dieser “Geschichte” liegen also die Kategorien unserer künftigen Arbeitsfelder des kleinsten und des}
A scholar’s duty was to educate, to rebuild the tradition, to find again the untainted core of jurisprudence, and, in order to succeed, study the legal thinkers of the past. In this way, the learned would again be able to educate the ‘barbarian youth ripe for reverence’ like their historical models in Late Antiquity. To reconstruct the European cultural whole, to rebuild and prevent a disaster occurring again, meant studying the tradition of law with the style of thinking contained in Roman law. According to Wieacker, the metaphorical comparison of himself and Huber to the Glossators was apt also with respect to the aim of their historical works. The Glossators were unable to foresee the fruits of their work, but focused on “guarding” the tradition. Accordingly, the contemporary historiography should not be a report on the levels of guilt, or concentrate on the faults of the recent past, but instead “history” should constitute a support for the larger goals of inner “emancipation” and “freedom.” The shadow of the totalitarian past affected all attempts at interpreting recent developments. In order to produce “mature” and “spiritual” results one had to go further, to the cultural heritage of antiquity, and concentrate on the minds of the great thinkers. To learn from history meant to be like the learned ones in history, those who had guarded and applied the tradition. This future-oriented learning from the past, identifying with the thinking of the tradition, or in other words, the merging of tradition and a personal experience of the law, was at the heart of Wieacker’s view on legal history and jurisprudence.

The shift in purpose of the scholarly work (or rather a return to origins) also meant the abandonment of ‘politics’ as they had appeared in the modern world. The key for both a sound basis for future jurisprudence, and a meaning for one’s personal attempts to study history, was to be found in the healthy core of tradition. Along the lines of the classical understanding of Bildung, the process of learning from the past was not only socially moral but also a path for personal perfection. Like the Bildungsbürgertum in the Weimar Republic, Wieacker want-

379 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946: “Freiheit” “Freilassung.” Also “Auf die geschichtlichen Abläufe zu wirken, hat keinen Sinn mehr”. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
380 Avenarius 2010.
381 Cf. p. 157 fn. 369.
ed to return to a world where all the disturbing elements of ‘modernization’ had not yet appeared. The challenges had changed, ideals had not.

In the scientific level of Wieacker’s texts this ‘process of maturation’ appeared as a change in the concept of Rechtsbewusstsein. To merely identify the sense of justice with a vaguely defined group of people, as in the Rechtsbewusstsein of Savigny or ‘legal renewal,’ ignored the human tendency to slide into irrationality and mass psychosis. To express the skill of interpreting the norms through a personal sense of Rechtsgefühl (as Jhering had), could not take into account the distinguishing force of the correct kind of Bildung. Some senses of justice were more accurate and directed more towards a sophisticated cultivation of the mind than others. During the late years of war, Wieacker realized that the exceptional legal ability, inevitable in creating ethically sustainable laws, conducting justified judgments and reading the contemporary legal system as a part of the long line of European legal tradition, could exist only in relation to a proper context. This context was the common legal mentality prevailing in a given time and society. Thus, in Wieacker post-war texts, Rechtsbewusstsein became as the context of the true distinguished legal ability. This legal ability Wieacker started to call explicitly as ‘legal conscience’, Rechtsgewissen. In order to preserve its authority the ‘legal conscience’ had to be aware of the development of Rechtsbewusstsein – the two had to be related but nevertheless distinct from each other. Now, in post-war Germany, however, the common understanding of the rule of law or legal consciousness – Rechtsbewusstsein – was characterized as a battlefield between a sober understanding of law and justice, which the experts represented, and a constant attraction of sliding into beliefs, degeneration and superstition. Or at least that was how Franz Wieacker saw the development. Due to the disarray of the context (Rechtsbewusstsein) the distinguished legal ability (Rechtsgewissen) was lost in Federal Republic.

This ‘maturation’ – a conceptual change in Franz Wieacker’s scholarly works – was based on the experience of the contemporary social tragedy. If it had not been for the rethinking process that Wieacker had to go through, the transformation of his historical vision might have been different or not as sharp. Wieacker found congruence and proof for his ontological view of legal historical meaning from the everyday acts and ideas of the post-war “anarchical years” of the Federal Republic.\[382\] To conceptualize this phenomenon along the theoretical frame of my thesis, Wieacker’s experiences of the post-war years, produced a changed understanding of the social reality. When applied to the writing process, it be-

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\[382\] Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber [beantwort 21.2.1946]: “Geht es aus dieser Katastrophe nicht unablängig in dauernde Anarchie hinein, so wird sich auch bald ein Platz zeigen, an dem jeder von uns w[...]=]en kann.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
came a *historical* vision, an ontological stance on the meaning and direction of history. It was not that Wieacker was disappointed about the binding mentality of his own in-group (the scholars of the *Kieler Schule*), or found that it was constructed on biased principles. It was the behavior of other scholars, the alleged lack of justice in occupied Germany, and the irrationality of the common people that drove him to conceptualize the domain of the common understanding of the rule of law in a new way.

Wieacker’s research premises expressed themselves and became intertwined with the entities of higher education, scholarly work and Germany’s relation to the European tradition, in other words in the themes of *Bildung* and *Stand*. Wieacker drafted his attitude on the basis of his previous experiences, which were referred to contemporary events. Thus this set of prejudices (or *Vorurteil* as Wieacker called it, and not in a negative sense of the word)\(^{383}\) enabled Wieacker to categorize the constantly changing political and social reality of the Federal Republic, but it also had an effect on his scientific works, were he interpreted historical sources through this ontological view of the world. This conviction of the ambiguous nature of *Rechtsbewusstsein* amidst changing historical circumstances, overshadowed his works during the immediate years following the end of the war. The relation between the one reading the tradition and the *true* meaning of that tradition remained, at this stage, an unresolved question. I will deal with this topic in more detail in chapter IV. In the next section I elaborate how this conceptual tool, ‘legal consciousness,’ appeared in Wieacker’s works in relation to the legal history and destiny of Europe.

*Rechtsbewusstsein* and the collapsed legal order

In *Vulgarismus and Klassizismus* Wieacker’s explicit attempt was to methodologically review the study of vulgar and Byzantine law. By vulgar law scholars have meant the diverse Occidental laws, which emerged after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Previously (according to Wieacker) the emphasis had been on the breach between the classic law of the Empire as well as on the “outer” influences of Greek and Germanic cultures. To Wieacker these elaborations remained one-sided since they did not take into account the larger conditions, cultural and sociological events which occurred during the “vulgarization” of the classic Roman law. Just as modern law was being studied as part of society, the historical

analysis of vulgar and Byzantine law should be a holistic endeavor to understand the entirety of past phenomena and all the aspects this involved. In particular, previous research had undermined the psychological sides which the process of “vulgarization” contained.\textsuperscript{384}

Again Wieacker’s view was ‘material’ in the sense that he intended to scrutinize the living conditions of past people and then derive the mental states the change in those conditions caused. This “affective change” affected the law.\textsuperscript{385} Wieacker’s research task was bold, namely to study historical changes behind the normative system of law while concentrating on language, interpretation and education as they were expressed and appeared in legal sources. As “previous accounts” Wieacker first discussed the studies of Heinrich Brunner and Ludwig Mitteis,\textsuperscript{386} although he based his main argument primarily on the works of Ernst Levy, Fritz Schulz and Fritz Pringsheim.\textsuperscript{387}

In the text of \textit{Vulgarismus und Klassizismus} the comparison between his own ideas and the preceding ones is marked by a recognition of the merits and virtues of the previous contributions. In 1949 when Wieacker started to concentrate on post-classical Roman law, his attitude was quite different. Schulz’s stance in particular was evaluated using categories familiar from Wieacker’s wartime writings. In the draft of his article, Wieacker labeled Schulz’s premises as “formalist and materialistic.”\textsuperscript{388} Thus, the results Schulz (and his disciples) drew from their analysis of legal historical phenomena, were inevitably contaminated by their ‘materialistic’ view on the relation between law and society. Since Schulz was not a legal positivist, by ‘materialistic’ Wieacker meant the (alleged) contemporary political bias of Schulz’s writings. According to Wieacker, Schulz quite explicitly used historical meaning (reconstructed from historical, textual sources) to argue on behalf or against a contemporary political tendency.\textsuperscript{389} In


\textsuperscript{386} Wieacker, \textit{Vulgarismus und Klassizismus} 1955, 7.

\textsuperscript{387} See e.g. Wieacker, \textit{Vulgarismus und Klassizismus} 1955, 7 fn. 2, 9 fn. 12, and 24–25.


one way or another this was the way in which Wieacker (like every other historian) weighed the significance of a given historical “fact,” but Schulz had clearly argued on behalf of the “old legal scholarship” and against the ‘New legal science.’ Wieacker considered Schulz’s compositions biased as a whole. To Wieacker, although Schulz was a skilled historian and researcher, the interpretation of past events was overshadowed by his opinions, which were constructed from the bases of the present social and political situation.

Wieacker thought he saw in Schulz’s works the dogmatic tendency against which the ‘New legal science’ had fought; the attachment to liberal and abstract legal theories which penetrated the conclusions of the historian. To understand law as “close to life itself” and as an “awareness” brought about by real engagement with society, were solid heuristic innovations, which Wieacker had realized during the previous decades, and which he saw as lacking in Schulz’s attempts to elaborate European legal past. So although the tone of Wieacker’s rhetoric was more moderate in *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus*, and he did not explicitly challenge Schulz’s results, *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus* is not only a continuation of Wieacker’s own construction of the long line of European legal history, but also another argument against the ‘materialistic’ view of legal history. The text exhibits Wieacker’s fundamental distinction between the ‘material’ study of legal history and ‘materialistic’ presentations of the past. In ‘material’ research orientation a scholar takes into account the wide spectrum of possibly involved variables effecting on the object of his study,390 ‘materialistic’ orientation is the way of *writing* history, in which the purpose to which a legal historical argument is put is more important than the process of understanding the past.391

In *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus* Wieacker on the one hand wants to show the continuity between legal cultures within Europe, on the other he argues against the paradigm of acknowledging the “scientific” (*Wissenschaftlich*) legal system of the Eastern Roman empire as the heir and successor of Roman jurisprudence.392 Especially in analyzing the vulgar law of Western Europe, Wieacker uses *Rechtsbewusstsein* as a conceptual tool in scrutinizing the change in legal reality which appeared in Europe after the third century AD. In comparison to Wieacker’s preceding works, the concept has been further developed, and it distinctively emphasizes the tension between the irrational and rational aspects involved in legal worldviews. In addition, Wieacker applies his idea of Reception, which he has now enlarged into a universal model to explain interaction between different legal cultures.

392 Wieacker, *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus* 1955: on continuity and vulgarization as an example of Reception, 12–14; on the “alien” essence of East Roman “scientific” law, see 50 ff.
The following analysis of Wieacker’s article concentrates on three traits within it, which, I argue, express the sustaining elements in his legal historical works, namely the process of interpreting history according to one’s personal life history and previous key experiences. Such traits are (i) the existence of a distinguished lawyer *Stand* within Roman society – emblematic of the Roman view of world – as a structure which safeguarded the overall ethicalness of society; (ii) the idea of a latent irrationality affecting all legal cultures; and finally (iii) *Bildung* as a spiritual asset and a concrete structure in legal reality, which maintained the wisdom of past cultures, and especially that of Roman jurisprudence.

Wiecker acknowledges the difficulty in defining the essence of ‘vulgarization,’ and the diverse ways in which the shift from Classical Roman law to post-Classical jurisprudence had been conceptualized. Was it mainly a phenomenon of style, administration or rhetoric? Was it degeneration, Germanification, or should one talk about unique legal cultures of vulgar law and Byzantine law? Wieacker asserted that in order to fully understand the essence of ‘vulgarization’ one was compelled to first give a comprehensive picture of the historical reality of its predecessor, Roman law, and not just its appearance in the Empire, but the “true great jurisprudence” of the Late Roman Republic. Wieacker’s focus was on the *culture* of Roman law and its afterlife in the European context, thus Roman law was not just a matter of “administrative practices” or “style,” but the “spiritual creativity” of a group of people united in their education, vocation and way of perceiving the world. To describe Roman law narrowly as the jurisprudence prevailing in the Roman Empire was, according to Wieacker, a mistake. During the late years of the Empire, lawyers and jurisprudence had been assigned a special task to serve the needs of the Emperor, but the legal work of the *consilium* was not the highest form of Roman law, rather a restriction to the previous sphere of creativity.

To Wieacker, the roots and *geistig* essence of Roman law were in the sociological exceptionality of the lawyer class in the Late Roman Republic. They formed an “expert-culture of a distinct and upper social class.” ‘Noble jurists’ were not

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396 Wieacker, *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus* 1955, 19, also 25: “Beschränkung der Aufgabe des Juristen auf die qaestio iuris.”
exceptional only with respect to their social background – which placed them in the social elite, if measured by their cultural knowledge and learnedness – but in the virtues they expressed while interpreting law and acting as the legal authorities within Late Republican society. The inner culture of the lawyer *Stand* affected the legal norms of the Republic, and the statutes concerning contracts, merchandise and inheritance were constituted on and supported by the virtuous codes for behavior presented by the *Stand*. From his Late Republican example Wieacker induced a general legal sociological principle: in any particular society in history, the conditions of and valuation given to the lawyer *Stand* mirrored the essence of its legal culture. The ‘special-culture’ of the ‘legal-experts’ (the existence of such a *Stand* was a characteristic of a decent legal order) was a structure in which cultural virtues and social requirements were combined and administered in a just manner. Thus, the legal expressions produced by the *Stand* were (and are) not just theoretical abstractions of reality-detached scholars, but an inseparable part of practical life:

Just one look on the Anglo-Saxon jurists, and altogether the classical Roman jurists, reveals the equation of expert legal special-cultures with academic legal doctrine to be unfounded [...] Today as before, heritage, sentiment, and the cognitive power of a legal culture’s officials are decisive for its mood and the height of its style.399

So the study of the appearance of vulgar law in Late Antiquity had to be conducted bearing in mind the significance of the *Stand* in legal cultures, and in comparison to the legal system – the insurmountable predecessor – of Roman society. Consequently, Wieacker insisted that research on vulgar law should focus on “non-governmental associations” that lay outside of legal “science.”400 By ‘science’ Wieacker meant presentations which were theoretically categorized, and the rejection of such legal systemizations was due to the principle that ‘true great jurisprudence’ had been free of such Greek influence. While concentrating on

Adelsjuristen, vertieft und geläutert durch logische und ethische Entdeckungen unter dem Einfluss des Griechertums [.]”


‘non-governmental associations’ Wieacker was able to analyze the historical continuity of cultural particles outside the indisputable collapse of the common culture and legal institutions of Rome. Wieacker acknowledged that administration and law usually went hand in hand, and in the sources which a historian had at his disposal, distinguishing between a “culturally coherent way of thinking” and the actual social conditions and requisites of a situation was often difficult. Thus, Wieacker admitted that the “implementations” of law were always intertwined with the temporal administrative power, but also strongly maintained that in the Roman Empire these “implementations” were above all “creations of legally trained experts, which formed a legally qualified group.”

What distinguished Wieacker’s argument from other contemporary representations, is the “material” extension he gives to the mentality of the Stand. While scholars like Friz Schulz and Fritz Pringsheim were more than willing to use the idea that the Roman lawyer was above the common people, and the legal culture of the Rome was a virtuous “Golden age” of European jurisprudence, it was Wieacker who situated this culture in the wider surroundings of European social history. To him, the superior rationality, the mentality of a Roman lawyer was the result of educational, sociological and demographical factors, and scrutinizing these factors as well as their continuities in European history would result in both a truthful narrative of European legal culture as well as an ideal towards which European law should be developed.

Consequently, Wieacker rejected Ernst Levy’s argument that vulgarization manifested itself in the form of practices. To Levy, since post-Classical communities did not have the institutions and rituals which constituted the premises of Roman jurisprudence, the vulgar law of Occidental was a system where the distinction between laymen and jurists, juridical concepts and popular terms blurred. Wieacker objected mainly because the whole division between practice and theory was superficial. Moreover, he argued, “great jurisprudence” did not derive its power from administrative premises but from exceptional thinking. To Wieacker, the jurisprudence of Roman lawyers, was both abstract and

401 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 15.
404 To Wieacker, Roman jurisprudence managed to abstain from the characteristics which marked other legal cultures in the past: “Die meisten geschichtlichen Rechtskulturen stehen indessen zwischen diesen äussersten Möglichkeiten [either ritualization through “taboo” or relating the “idea-world of its specialist to the cosmos”]. Ihre Rechtsvorstellung ist naturalistisch; sie versucht den gedanklichen Ausdruck eines rechtlichen Zustandes oder Vorganges entweder der allgemeinen unbefangenen Anschauung eines Lebenverhältnisses oder den – was
thoroughly practical, “close to life.” The higher task of jurisprudence in Rome was to act as a guide and resolve problems arising from everyday situations. The wisdom of Roman jurisprudence was *phronesis*, an abductive handling of experiences where a cumulative knowledge of legal matters resulted in truthful abstract expressions, namely in precise juridical rhetoric and legal concepts.

[The Late Republican jurisprudence was] both the utmost abstraction of specialized legal artificial ideas of the concrete and socially relevant living conditions and the strict reduction of legal technical terms to a minimum level of simplistic ideal models.

The jurisprudence of the Classical period was “truly living” (*wirklich lebende*), meaning that it had originated in a fruitful interaction between everyday actions (in relation to actual jurisdictional questions) and solid assimilation of the awareness or idea of the law. Moreover, due to this practical binding, it was adjustable in different historical conditions. The ‘great jurisprudence’ was an ethical and vital force within history. Roman lawyers “were experts of the highest practice.” Vulgar law in some sense reflected this skillful way of thinking and, to a degree, it was an “applied example” of this “practice of thinking.” So, like Levy, Wieacker holds that the institutional practices of Classical Roman law ceased to exist in the legal world of Late Antiquity, but the true ‘living’ practice of Roman law, the style of thinking, lived on in the heritage of *Stand* and *Bildung*. Roman jurisprudential reasoning and its textual expressions suppressed the irrational traits which affected every historical community, and produced knowledge and judgments which ruled over and were in the dominion of social affairs; as such these judgments were not subject to the whims of human behavior and perception.

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Of course, vulgar law was a degradation, and the great jurisprudence, along with the material phenomena of *Stand* and *Bildung* to which it was contextualized, faced eradication in post-Classical times. But the distinguishing feature in Wieacker’s article, and also a reason why *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus* has remained a classic, is the way in which Wieacker bypasses the actual economic, administrative, political and environmental disasters which followed from the destruction of Roman Empire, and concentrates on the mental shift in legal consciousness, *Rechtsbewusstsein*. Obviously, that cultural change in *Rechtsbewusstsein* was caused by concrete change in the living conditions of people, but the altered essence of the post-Classical legal consciousness was a universal phenomenon of “naturalization” rather than a case of a particular legal havoc in history.\(^{409}\)

To Wieacker, every legal system carried within itself the seed of slipping into a state of unreliable judicature, which was marked by superstition and corruption rather than rational and just tradition. Accordingly, not even the legal culture of the Late Republic had been totally free from degrading aspects. Nevertheless, because of the “spiritual tension of the great jurisprudence” and the “pressure from the carefully planned legal order [characterized] by collective essence and expert jurists” these traits remained in the margins of the legal system of the Late Republic.\(^{410}\) In short, the *Rechtsbewusstsein* of vulgar law derived its essence from the lack of ‘spiritual power’ of the class of legal experts, which gave way to a more irrational, common understanding of law in society, and which consequently appeared in the ways of reasoning and the linguistic expressions concerning law and legality.

Wieacker asserts that the “naturalization” process of the vulgar *Rechtsbewusstsein* was a side effect of the dismantling of the Roman cultural entity, causing various group-psychological phenomena to surface.\(^{411}\) Unlike before, the Western European societies of Late Antiquity were unable to sustain the differentiation between the higher intellectual ethos and the archaic need to “formalize” legal inspection and execution and to make taboo the world of common human existence.\(^{412}\) Such a legal culture was the result of “vulgar psychology,”


\(^{412}\) The naturalistic legal idea was: “[D]en gedanklichen Ausdruck eines rechtlichen Zustandes oder Vorganges entweder der allgemeinen unbefangenen Anschauung eines Lebenverhältnisses oder den – was meist dasselbe ist – seiner typischen Sozialfunktion anzupassen.”
or to put it another way, the realization of the Rechtsbewusstsein of the post-Classical societies of Western Europe.  

Wieacker represents the psychological takeover of the legal system built on rationality as a very human phenomenon. It springs from:

[T]he need on the one hand for meaningful visibility of the legal procedures, on the other hand for impartial implementation of the social functions of a legally protected right. Both come from the naïve aspiration for purpose and from the unrestrained aspiration for a characteristically, emotionally-determined view of reality that was not emotionally subdued by professional reflection.  

Further, the penetrating psychological tendency of “vulgar society” remained not only in art and literature, but it took over the legal rhetoric. In the “language-psychological” process the words depicting legal entities and procedure were replaced by more “sensual” terms, that were “forceful” and “emotionally loaded.” They referred to the common world of senses, untamed by reason, and the virtues of the specialists. The terms expressing evidence, rights, judgment and litigation forgot abductive abstraction, the logically derived style of previous masters, and became, rather than concepts “grounded on the Logos of a methodological expert art,” words for “emotional expression, self-interest and contestation.”

The distinction between possessions and property, ownership and rights blurred. Another vulgar process was that of replacing social goals with the immediate needs of the people. Since law was no longer based on higher virtues and the rationality of the expert class, legislation became a tool in achieving the objects of the more powerful classes. The legal rhetoric contaminated by group-psychological processes together with the unconstrained economic purposes of the ruling elite determined the judicature, and thus muddled the previously separated worlds of political endeavors and social justice.

Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 21; See also wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 20.

413 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 29, 30.


415 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 22; also 23: “Vermöge ihrer direkten, spontanen und affektiven Wirklichkeitsausfassung is die Vulgäre Stilhaltung auch nicht bereit, juristische Kategorien zu trennen, deren Grenzen nicht durch die Anschauung, sondern durch den Logos einer methodischen Fachkunst gesetzt sind”; 24, “Fühlweisen,” “Willenseinstellung.”

416 Wieacker, Vulgarismus und Klassizismus 1955, 24: “Wenn auch diese neuen Unterscheidungen zum guten Teil mehr auf wirtschaftspolitischen Zwecken der Gesetzgebung als auf
The practice which guarded against “naturalist” tendencies was Bildung.\(^{417}\) Bildung – meaning both the common culture of the great jurists and the way of transmitting that culture to succeeding generations – was the opposite of the ‘naturalistic world view.’ The ‘spiritual power’ of Roman law was preserved in its textual expression. Thus learning from and applying the example of great Roman jurists was to hold on to the healthy essence of the tradition. As such, the historical development in the Byzantine Empire presented an opposite to the one taking place in the Western part of the Roman Empire, since in the East law schools continued to study classical Roman law as practiced by the great jurists of the Late Republic.\(^{418}\) However, the legal culture in the East Roman Empire was not like the great jurisprudence – it was not grounded on Stand and Bildung like the ‘true great jurisprudence’ – but was a scientific distortion of it.\(^{419}\) For example, the compilators of Corpus Iuris let the over-theoretical principles of Greek descent corrupt the original meaning of law as expressed by the great lawyers.\(^{420}\) The pre-requisites of the great Late-Republican jurisprudence, where the law had been first and foremost derived from material life, was forgotten.

To Wieacker, the root of this distortion lay in the process where the political purposes of the Justinian government sidelined the legal work done by the scholars of the Byzantine world.\(^{421}\) Thus, the East Roman legal culture, and along with it the Corpus Iuris, preserved some elements from the era of true classic jurisprudence, but as whole it was ‘legal science’ (Wissenschaft) and its legal education and expressions that were intertwined with political intentions. This opened up the possibility of the later abusive treatment of law as found in the theories of Begriffjurisprudenz and Pandectism. A healthy example of the cultivating practice found in Bildung was the independent, provincial legal schools of Western

\(^{417}\) Wieacker, *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus* 1955, 24; Also 51: “Eine Renaissance klassischen Rechtes insbesondere ist nur möglich, wo die erhaltenden Bildungsschichten zugleich Träger der gesetzgebenden und rechtspflegenden Gewalt sind.”

\(^{418}\) Wieacker, *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus* 1955, 52.


\(^{420}\) Wieacker, *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus* 1955, 54.

Roman Empire, which conserved the textual and linguistic heritage, thus expert-jurisprudence, in their education.\textsuperscript{422}

The picture which Wieacker draws is both compelling and puzzling. On one hand, Wieacker firmly emphasises the natural and familiar nature of vulgar law. Unlike previous theorists he does not renounce vulgarization, but on the contrary manifests the process as common. In addition, vulgar law is not a breach, catastrophe or perversion; it is not only a part of the continuation in the European legal tradition, but a vital particle and a fruitful stage in the development of what we now understand as European legal culture. \textit{Vulgarization und Klassizismus} is in a way a “rehabilitation” of vulgar law.\textsuperscript{423}

As a by-product, such a historical picture and narrative provided an explanation for the immediate European past. In the 1950s, the recent process where totalitarian governments managed to seize the power and lead humanity into an unforeseen destruction, was an unsolvable puzzle. To the legal scholars a more concrete mystery was the fact that their field had not been able to prevent this degradation, indeed it contributed to it. The injustices had been conducted by the ‘civilized’ and by those within the realm of European culture. How was it possible that the European legal culture had slid to such a perversion? What was Europe as a legal phenomenon if it was capable of such actions and so vulnerable to such a metamorphosis?

The anatomy of the destruction of a legal system, which Wieacker presented in \textit{Vulgarismus und Klassizismus}, answered these perennial questions. The process of vulgarization which Wieacker described was not, as he explicitly stressed, restricted to the post-Classic world.\textsuperscript{424} Indeed one can find similar tendencies from his works elaborating the legal development of, for example, middle-age society, and, moreover, the description of the latent devastation inside the European legal consciousness extended also to modern societies. The takeover of the destructive elements within the legal consciousness – and embedded in all legal cultures and systems – was an ever present option brought about by the dichotomy between the masters and the mass, or to put it in another way, between the “expert culture” and “naturalism.”\textsuperscript{425} As Wieacker had stressed before, and continued to emphasize in his other writings, the mental degradation that appeared

\textsuperscript{422} Wieacker, \textit{Vulgarismus und Klassizismus} 1955, 51: it was just that the Western legal schools had to work without the structures of a functioning society, and thus “Den Trägern der westlichen Bildung fehlte die Verfügung über die öffentliche Gewalt, die für die Neubildung einer klassizistischen Rechtskultur neben allem Bildungsbewusstsein unerläßlich ist.”

\textsuperscript{423} Cf. Winkler 2014, 25–26 Wieacker describes the middle ages as a “vital” era in the narrative of European legal culture.

\textsuperscript{424} Wieacker, \textit{Vulgarismus und Klassizismus} 1955, 30, 32.

\textsuperscript{425} Cf. p. 110–113.
in the realm of juridical language and the “pursuit-based” logic of twisted juris-
prudence, was the pet peeve of failed modern legal systems. For example, the
legal concepts of Weimar jurisprudence were overwhelmed by the “political ten-
sions” within them, whereas the true linguistic expressions of legal conscience
were marked by “spiritual substance.”426 Thus, it was not surprising that the Eu-
ropean legal consciousness had collapsed into a state of ‘barbarism,’ indeed it
 seemed as though it was inevitable.

The main theme of Wieacker’s text, however, is constructive. There was such
a thing as European legal consciousness, which should be analyzed in order to
prevent further tragedy, and upon it the peaceful coexistence of the future had to
be built. Unpleasant tendencies, moreover, needed to be acknowledged. Europe
could not escape its past nor deny the fragile basis of its (Christian) culture. The
tolerance Wieacker showed towards the vulgar and Christian attributes within
European legal culture is shown in the discussions he engaged in with Erik Wolf
and Ernst Rudolf Huber. In many respects Wieacker did not share their views on
the relation between law, the people and the state (the Rechtsbewusstsein of the
German people), but all the same he appreciated their thoughts and acknowled-
ged their value.

Nevertheless, vulgarization was inescapably a degradation of the previous
high culture. The culture and mentality of the Late Republican lawyers was that
of virtuous moral behavior, which unquestionably transmitted to their rhetoric
and writings. Their common culture and interaction was characterized by “eth-
ics,” “ethos,” “rigor,” “duty,” “responsibility,” “ascetism” and “will-power.”
Such a virtuous core existed only in a distinguished association united by a
shared value-base and education, the Stand of lawyers.427 The Stand represented
the power which held the legal consciousness of a given culture together. By the
means of their ‘spiritual power’ they guarded the language, practices and legal
thinking, so that the people’s mentality in general would not collapse into anar-
chy. As the dichotomy between ‘naturalism’ and ‘expert thinking’ was eternal, it
was possible to establish social structures which maintained the ‘spiritual’ herit-
age of the great jurisprudence. The British example, which Wieacker again took
up, showed that it was both possible to maintain a ‘spiritual’ Stand in modern
society, and appreciate the social corporates which cultivated justice within soci-
eties. After all, in the time of worldwide legal havoc, the British had been able to
retain their legal consciousness and soberly stick to their legal tradition.

Wieacker’s study on the ambiguous roots of European legal culture as present-
ed in Vulgarismus und Klassizismus were later repeated in Ursprünge und Ele-

426 See p. 116, 118.
mente des europäischen Rechtbewusstseins (1956) and in the second edition of Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1967), in which Wieacker explicated and extended the dichotomy between ‘naturalism’ and ‘expert-thinking’ into a coherent narrative of European legal history.\textsuperscript{428} Thus, in Ursprünge und Elemente des europäischen Rechtbewusstseins Wieacker defines the European Rechtbewusstsein as a conceptualization in which the knowledge of European history merged with the common experience of recent years. It provided a tool for a legal scientist to understand the history and idea of Europe as based on both tradition and atemporal scholarly experience:

Especially in the details of his [the specialist’s] work he learns that the phenomena of the legal history of Europe can only be appropriately depicted if the historical world of Europe is to be understood as a single social, political and cultural organization of human coexistence. Europe’s unity was neither convention nor postulate for the legal historian, but rather a working hypothesis that has proven itself in the course of his scientific work \textsuperscript{429}. The European Rechtbewusstsein of the twentieth century was built on the foundations and mentality following the collapse of the “high culture” of antiquity. The European legal conscience was comprised of three particles: the “expert-spiritual creation” of Roman lawyers, Christian ethics, and the “vital” heritage of societies following the Migration Period and their “living feeling.”\textsuperscript{430}

These elements [the three particles] determine the European legal consciousness up to the beginning of the High Middle Ages, perhaps with the exception of the fringes. The strength of these origins is clear to the modern observer as soon as he removes the sediment of the later European revolutions and reaches bedrock.\textsuperscript{431}


\textsuperscript{429} “Gerade im Detail seiner [der Fachmann] Arbeit erfährt er, dass die Phänomene der europäischen Rechtsgeschichte nur richtig abgebildet werden können, wenn die geschichtliche Welt Europas als eine einzige soziale, politische und kulturelle Organisation menschlichen Zusammenlebens begriffen wird. Für den Rechtshistoriker war also Europas einheit keine Konvention und kein Postulat, sondern eine Arbeitshypothese, die sich im Laufe seiner wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten ebenso bewahrt hat[].”, Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 105.

\textsuperscript{430} Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 106; on the heritage of Roman law see e.g. 107: “endlich aber das Verständnis des Rechtes als eine wissenschaftliche, d. h. als eine fachlich-geistige Scöpfung. Kürzer: dass Rechtsstaatliche Machtscöpfung ist und zugleich geistiger Besitz, haben die Europäer von den Römern gelernt.” (emphasis mine).

In Wieacker’s 1956 presentation the relation between justice and *Rechtsbewusstsein* is more complicated than in the case of ‘vulgar societies’ as elaborated in *Vulgarismus und Klassizismus*, but nevertheless, Wieacker maintained that the heritage of vulgar law continued to affect European legal reality. In *Ursprünge und Elemente* Wieacker argued that the world of Late Antiquity witnessed an exemplary legal culture which combined “belief” and “reason,” or in other words, the “conscience” and “social reality.” The Glossators were able to synthesize their learned logic and reason into an experience of tradition and come up with a cognitive apparatus which enabled them to apply law in concrete situations within the social reality. Such a European achievement was however lost, and the succeeding intellectual streams ignored the practical wisdom of the Glossators and their jurisprudence. Only in England (and with some reservations in the Netherlands) did certain societal aspects prevent the legal consciousness from degenerating. This was especially due to the strong position which the *Stand* of jurists managed to retain in British society, but also because the corrupting effect of the “rationalism,” embedded in philosophical theories of law, did not extend to the “thinking” of the lawyers of the British Isles.

To Wieacker, the *Rechtsbewusstsein* of Occidental however, was overwhelmed by misleading theories and ideologies – especially of Rousseau’s idea of the “common will” – and had lost the shared value base and order necessary for the actualization of social justice. Thus, it was vulnerable to the attacks of “tyrants,” “demagogues,” “dishonest lawgivers” and “a technical bureaucracy which lacked heart and overall vision.” Usually a “solid legal consciousness” would have been able to resist such tendencies, but Europe’s fate was different because of a “jurisprudence of interest,” which broke the last binding value which was left of the common European legal consciousness. In its determinist ethos, “jurisprudence of interest” presented law as a mere reflection of the intentions of individuals and the lawgiver. It demolished the authority of the law. Wieacker argued that this incident was the basic reason for the “disasters following 1914.”

“Europe was indeed an entity, but precisely the disease of this single organism evoked the mortal enmity of each new civil and religious war […] These wars must end in self-destruction.

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434 Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 110, 112.
III. Rechtsbewusstsein: The cruel reality and human awareness

unless the reversal of personal conscience calls back reason, which recognizes, that no part of a sick organism can thrive alone.\footnote{“Europa war zwar von je eine Einheit, aber eben die Erkrankung dieses einen Organismus rief die Todfeindschaften jener neuen Bürger- und Glaubenskriege hervor[...] Diese Kriege müssen in Selbstzerstörung enden, wenn nicht die Umkehr der persönlichen \textit{Gewissen} die Vernunft zurückruft, die erkennt, dass in einem erkrankten Organismus kein Glied für sich allein gedeihen kann.”, Wieacker, ‘Ursprünge und Elemente’ 1956, 116.}
IV. Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history
and in legal science

In Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit Wieacker built his narrative of European legal history on the concept of Rechtsgewissen, ‘legal conscience,’ which, he asserted, would present a solution to the ‘crisis of justice’ which had plagued the European legal culture throughout modern history. Thus, the meaning of the concept of Rechtsgewissen was fundamental not only for the Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, but for Wieacker’s legal scientific legacy in general. I argue that in order to analyze the longer line in Franz Wieacker’s legal scientific works, understanding the relation between the concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen is crucial.

As analyzed in chapter III, Rechtsbewusstsein, legal consciousness, was about the people, social structures and law. Rechtsgewissen, legal conscience, on the other hand, signified a more personal (and exceptional) understanding of the law. Whereas legal consciousness signified the common perception of the rule of law, legal conscience was a distinct understanding of justice. Within a common legal awareness of the people (Rechtsbewusstsein), Rechtsgewissen was a mental tool for the more informed, capable and aware experts, who by means of this skill were able to give judgments in a way which benefitted the whole social constellation and brought about social justice. If the legal conscience was allowed to guide the judicature of a given society, the people of this society would be able to adapt and deal with the economic, political and historical change the society confronted: if this occurred the legal consciousness of the people would be in line with reality. Whereas any European legal system usually included a distinguished class of legal experts who took care that the legal decisions were conducted according to the common idea of the rule of law (the legal consciousness), the authoritative expert position of this ‘estate’ was due to the fact that it was able to foster and apply the mental skill of Rechtsgewissen, legal conscience. Whereas Rechtsbewusstsein was bound to time, place and cultural principles, Rechtsgewissen was timeless, acting beyond and despite temporal and spatial axioms.

This clear conceptual distinction, however, did not occur in Wieacker’s first legal scientific texts. The conceptual change emerged over a period of time and
signified a broader development in his historical vision. This vision reflected the changes in the material, political and scientific circumstances of his surroundings. Thus a study of that conceptual change is also an expedition to uncover the reasons which defined and influenced the evolving Weltanschauung of a given intellectual historian. Whereas Rechtsbewusstsein was comprised with the help of the spheres of social status and learnedness within the nation (which I named as the sub-concepts of Stand and Bildung), Rechtsgewissen was constructed on the ideas of scholarly togetherness and legal wisdom. I have named these sub-conceptual entities Kameradschaft and Schöpfung, which also include all the terms Wieacker used to signify his belonging to a certain group and the wisdom this group (and its historical paragons) possessed. In order to analyze the conceptual change of legal conscience, I will proceed just as in the preceding chapter. I study the intertwining and interaction between the spheres of culture, body and language in the meanings the concept of Rechtsgewissen involved, and then analyze how Wieacker’s utilization of the concept altered during the turbulent era from the 1930s to the late 1960s.

Thus I study the same historical circumstances which I dealt with in the preceding chapter, but now my focus has shifted. I now concentrate on how the ideas of communality and wisdom introduced by legal science developed and evolved amidst the changing social world, how these entities were handled in the correspondence of legal scholars, and ultimately, how they emerged in Franz Wieacker’s scientific texts. First, however, I briefly review the domain of language of Rechtsgewissen. That is, how this concept was used by scholars other than Wieacker. I attempt to present the scientific and diachronic meanings that have layered into the concept, and discuss the scientific prerequisites which Wieacker had to take into account when using the concept.

1. Language in Rechtsgewissen: The preceding and contemporary philosophical approaches

Franz Wieacker was well aware of the preceding work done in the field of legal philosophy, sociology and legal history. He drew inspiration from the argumentation of the previous scholar generations, and then gave an unmistakenly personal representation of a given legal scientific and historical dilemma. Thus to track the exact and scientific foundation for his ideas on legal conscience is a futile task, but clearly one influential thinker was Gustav Radbruch. Radbruch utilized the concept of Rechtsgewissen during the Weimar Republic period. Radbruch’s ideological stance after the First World War has been labelled legal positivist,
I. Language in Rechtsgewissen

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even relativist,¹ but the breach between his late 1940s writings and his original ‘formalist’ stance might not be so vast as post-war legal historical research has presented. Radbruch was always interested in the objective principles anchored in ‘reality’ according to which the law should evolve. Though not (yet) a scholar of natural law, in his 1920s writings Radbruch introduced the idea of *Rechtsgewissen*, a notion which enabled judges to weigh between conflicting interests in society.² To him ‘legal conscience’ emerged as a judicatory tool to make sense of the drastically evolved, value-loaded essence of legal questions. The dramatic and violent social changes that had taken place in Germany – from an estate society to a parliamentary democracy in the space of 20 years – brought new variables and different ethical aspects to the awareness of lawyers and judges when delivering a judgment on a given legal case. Where previously there had been a monarchic hierarchy of social values, suddenly a multitude of interests and competing groups existed each with their own distinct appreciations and aims.

Radbruch’s earlier writings are, nevertheless, more on the systematic side, and the essence of *Rechtsgewissen* was very much bound to the written norms and provisions enacted by the legislator.³ Radbruch’s ‘legal conscience’ certainly was not what Rudolf von Jhering had conceptualized as *Rechtsgefühl*, the ‘sense of justice,’ in his 1872 book.⁴ To Jhering there was an idea of justice, reachable to human senses, which was located outside of positive, temporal law. It was not that positive law and *Rechtsgefühl* were totally separated; *Rechtsgefühl* was being cultivated within people, living under and being aware of the law. So the ability of ‘sensing justice’ had emerged through experience and socialization, and it could be used to measure the justness of legal decisions and current law.⁵ Although Jhering’s *Rechtsgefühl* and Radbruch’s *Rechtsgewissen* were not synonymous, both scholars sought to upgrade their concepts from what Carl Friedrich von Savigny had called *Rechtsbewusstsein*.⁶ The idea of legal capability

usable in weighing options and legality was a more diverged and specialized mental faculty than Savigny’s common legal mentality of the people. In the works of subsequent legal theorists, and in the legal scientific discourse of Weimar, the ‘sense of justice’ and ‘legal conscience’ were increasingly attached to special legal education, and had a connection to the attempts of the legal scholars to define their field and profession against other disciplines and specialists.\(^7\)

In the Weimar Republic and due to the deployment of the German codification of law (BGB), the wider idealist problematic in legal scientific discourse concentrated on more narrow and specific questions. How should one turn the inner feeling of justice into a scientific concept – a textual and heuristic device – which would enable jurisprudence to meet the changing social conditions? To this discussion Franz Wieacker also contributed. Wieacker’s position in the discussion was constructed around the concept of *Schöpfung*, whose importance to German legal scholarship has been, and is, vital.\(^8\) In the early decades of the twentieth century, the concept referred to the situation where the word of the (codified) law did not itself provide the means to decide in a given case. On what bases, and according to what principle or faculty, should a judge interpret the meaning of the law? On the other hand, the theme also referred to the division of tasks between the courts and legislators: Whose responsibility was it to bridge the gap between the norm and an emerged social demand? The dilemma evoked a vast body of legal scientific literature during the Weimar era, of which a few were Romanist, especially because article §242 in the German codification (BGB) announced that such an act of interpretation should be conducted within the borders of *Treu und Glauben*, good faith.\(^9\)


\(^8\) Rüthers 2012, 9. See also 55, 215, 266. As Rüthers acknowledges, the modern understanding of the dilemma owes much to Wieacker’s framing, especially his “Zur rechtstheoretischen Präzisierung des § 242 BGB” (1956). Nevertheless, the ideas about the ‘creative’ usage of law and ‘living law’ are already found in Eugen Ehrlich’s works. See E. Ehrlich, Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft [1903] reprinted as ‘Judicial freedom of decision: its principles and objects,’ in Bruncken & Register, Science of Legal Method. Boston Book Co., 1917.

the authority of the written law, but also engaging himself in a determined study on the historical origins of the concept, and highlighting the various attempts of different legal cultures to apply this legal virtue of Roman law. Emblematic of Pringsheim’s production was the notion of the inevitable degradation of the original appearance and usage of *bona fides* in history.\(^{10}\) In his works on *Schöpfung*, Wieacker adopted many principles introduced by his mentor.\(^{11}\)

The other dimension of the dispute over *Treu und Glauben*, and wrapped up in the dogmatic controversy, was its direct effect on the nature and social value of the work conducted by those using the law. The war generation yearned for the possibility of a ‘creative’ usage of law since the codification had seemingly robbed the traditional privilege of the lawyer *Stand* to interpret and further develop law to match social equality and people’s understanding of the law. In other words, it used to be the responsibility of the legally trained, by means of their creative handling of the law, to seal the gap between law and reality, and produce decisions which were in line with people’s *Rechtsbewusstsein*. Thus the prioritizing of *Schöpfung* in the ‘New legal science’ was eminent and widespread. Both the new *Studienordnung* of 1935 and announcements of ‘legal renewal’ emphasized the meaning of *Schöpfung*, which legal positivism had temporarily made impossible.\(^{12}\)

From an administrative perspective the above-mentioned theoretical constructions and idealist representations, when (if ever) applied in practice, were mainly academic matters. Thus, during the revolutionary atmosphere of ‘legal renewal’ all of the concepts, *Rechtsgewissen*, *Rechtsgefühl* and *Rechtsbewusstsein*, were often used to explain the same phenomena, and there were no serious attempts to scrutinize the philosophical differences between them. The main theme in German legal science following the *Machtergreifung* was to acknowledge the superiority of the will of the people, and Hitler as its representation. Hence, just as *Rechtsbewusstsein* was used in National Socialist propaganda, so too *Rechts-\


\(^{11}\) Winkler 2014, 67–76.

gewissen came to mean a legal extension of German Volksgeist. The Third Reich Minister of Justice Franz Gürtner stated in 1936:

For us, the healthy national sense is the embodiment of the legal conscience, the outlook of the just thinking people.13

To many National Socialist legal scientists, the German Rechtsgewissen was a feeling of law, deriving from the racial togetherness of the German people. It was an affective knowledge of justice, actualized in history, and could again be obtained in a society united under the will of the Führer. This national awareness enabled the racially purified Volksgemeinschaft to uncover the real meaning of law beyond the written statutes.14

After the war it might have been impossible for a long period of time in Germany to write about social justice with the help of the concept of Rechtsgewissen if it had not been Gustav Radbruch, who decided to undertake such a task in 1946.15 Yet, after the Second World War Radbruch’s writings were strongly influenced by his religious convictions, and thus it seemed as if he had radically converted from his previous positivist stance to a proponent of natural law theories.16 Radbruch attempted to conceptualize the relation between totalitarianism and legal thinking. He sought to explain the breach in legal tradition at the same time aiming for a solution which would enable the post-War jurisprudence to be based on moral foundations. Radbruch’s texts addressed the immorality of the judicature during the Third Reich, concluding that the judges as a profession should not be blamed for this aberration, rather the degenerating effect of triumphant legal positivism had allowed a politicization of law which had led to social injustice.17 Thus, the concept of Rechtsgewissen in its post-war deployment included both an explanation of the immediate historical past, and a passage away from it. Radbruch’s intention was not to conceptualize the continuities and discontinuities in the national legal culture as a whole. His Rechtsgewissen contin-

17 Radbruch 1946, 106.
ued to serve as a concept of and for the legal professionals, and it comprised a moral point of reference in his narrative of legal scholarship.

Akin to Radbruch, Wieacker in his *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit* (1952) attempted to explain what in general had happened in the history of German legal culture, and build again the premises of awareness of morality in legal scholarship and jurisprudence.\(^\text{18}\) Wieacker’s intention was to present the problem of the ‘aberration of jurisprudence’ within the long line of the legal history of ideas, nevertheless providing a solution for the current jurisprudential dilemma which he called a “crisis of justice.”\(^\text{19}\) The solution was conceptualized with the help of the *Rechtsgewissen*, legal conscience. Since such ‘spiritual’ ability for a just decision was contextualized in the vast history of European legal thinking, Wieacker’s concept of *Rechtsgewissen* was explicated with help of the themes which, for example, Savigny and Jhering had scrutinized in their texts. The skill of ‘legal conscience’ as argued in *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit*, took into account the mental sphere of law and legality, just as Savigny and Jhering had insisted, and was comprised of such elements as ‘experience,’ ‘a sense of justice,’ ‘the creative use of law’ and ‘tradition,’ as found in the accounts of romantic legal scientists. *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit* was not, however, a mere duplication of previous, romantic works on social justice and jurisprudence. Wieacker’s *Rechtsgewissen* was an enriched conceptualization, which discussed such contemporary methodological discourses and theories as those of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Josef Esser.\(^\text{20}\) The ‘legal conscience’ was situated within the tradition of legal scholarship, the body of law, and the judicial decision-making of a particular community.\(^\text{21}\)

So in distinction to Gustav Radbruch’s *Rechtsgewissen* – and to the ‘school of Rechtsgefühl’ – to Wieacker the part of Gewissen, ‘conscience’, in the concept was decisive, and here he differed significantly with what Radbruch had meant by ‘legal conscience’. The similarities between his and Radbruch’s concept lay in the utilization of a similar word and in the objective of analyzing the recent ‘aberration’ of jurisprudence and producing a solution that would enable an ethical reading of the tradition despite the looming shadow of the recent past. The two concepts were also built in a similar manner. Wieacker, like Radbruch, built upon a) his previous scientific representations, and conceptualized the continuities and discontinuities in legal discipline with b) the help of his view on contemporary society, and c) his personal life history and (shared) experience during the preceding years.

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\(^\text{20}\) Ibid., 3, 469.

\(^\text{21}\) Cf. Bell 2012, 113.
The ‘conscience’, *Gewissen*, to which Wieacker refers in his scholarly works preceding *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit*, was a form of wisdom. It related to actual jurisprudence in a way that *Schöpfung*, the situation-bound capability to apply and further develop the law, resulted from a more general orientation of possessing practical wisdom (*Gewissen*). Understanding the ‘sense of justice’ as a mode of practical wisdom, or like ‘common sense’ as Hans-Georg Gadamer proposed, enabled Wieacker to outline a morally sustainable jurisprudential tool. That elaboration was very much akin to Martin Heidegger’s formulation of the right and proper way to make sense of human existence. After all, it was Heidegger who equated Aristotelian ‘practical wisdom’ with the German word *Gewissen*, and utilized this concept in his quest to analyze the ontology of (European) philosophical thinking.\(^\text{22}\) Thus, in order to understand the meaning of *Rechtsgewissen* as elaborated in Wieacker’s scientific works, one needs to study the emergence of *Gewissen* in his texts, its compatibility with Heidegger’s presentations, and the channels and moments which might have brought Heidegger’s influence to Wieacker.

Previous research has not sufficiently addressed the relation between Wieacker and Heidegger, nor in the light of my research task is it sufficient to merely compare Wieacker’s and Heidegger’s ideas and analyze the possible influence Heidegger had on Wieacker’s concept of *Rechtsgewissen*. It is however important to acknowledge that in Wieacker’s concept the existential dimension was essential.\(^\text{23}\) Wieacker’s concept of ‘legal conscience’ – like Radbruch’s and even Gürtner’s terms – also worked as a linguistic and cognitive tool to depict the temporal nature of justice, which, when utilized in historiography, claimed to elaborate not only the past, but the present and anticipated future of this social value in the national and European context. The ‘conscience’ part of the term was nevertheless built on a specific, existentialist understanding of the nature of wisdom, which in Wieacker’s historical vision was constituted on the importance of scholarly communality and the creative and distinguished manner of expert legal thinking. Thus, research on the change in Wieacker’s concepts of *Rechtsgewissen* has to address the changes in ideas – both on the national level and in the scholarly sub-culture shared by Wieacker – of communality and learned thinking.

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\(^\text{23}\) Behrends 1995, XIV.
2. Culture in *Rechtsgewissen* 1933–1945: The contested *Kameradschaft* in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich

Why did the ‘legal renewal’ upheld by the young scholars of the ‘war generation’ merge with the National Socialist *Gleichschaltung*? The NSDAP of course had its own purposes and a racial ideology which some legal scholars supported. But even those scholars of the ‘New legal science,’ who in private might have perceived the Nazis as vulgar and their worldview as repulsive, were committed to the ‘revolution,’ which was obviously administrated by National Socialist politicians and civil servants. In 1933 few could foresee what the final tragic results of the *Gleichschaltung* in the legal sphere would be, but its radical and exclusive essence could not be ignored. Furthermore, the outspoken ideology of National Socialism was ‘anti-intellectual,’ which the age acknowledged and accepted.

Why did the ‘war generation’ participate with such enthusiasm? One reason was the notion that the ‘old ways’ of university education, with all the dogmatism that entailed, was being fought, and the young conservative scholars of the ‘New legal science’ felt that they were in the vanguard of this battle. This level I analyzed in chapter III. Another motive, and with respect to this study an important one, was the real experiences of togetherness and communality at that time. This level will be analyzed in this chapter.

The congruence between *Gleichschaltung* and the ‘New legal science’ did not remain solely at the level of fashionable slogans. Rather, the war generation saw themselves as a major element in the ‘revolution,’ participating in and developing educational practices which were intended to eradicate the borders between political society and science, but also expressing their identity with the vocabulary provided by fascist discourse. In 1941 Ernst Rudolf Huber defined the *Kieler Schule*, the “academic *Heimat*” of both himself and Franz Wieacker as follows:

> What has been designated as the “Kiel way” was not a scientific school in the sense of a particular system of theories, but rather a comradely associated working community of younger jurists who through the experience of the events of 1933 were bound together in a mutual scientific effort.”

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26 “Was man als “Kieler richtung” bezeichnet hat, war kein wissenschaftliche schule im Sinne eines bestimmten Lehrgebäudes, sondern eine kameradschaftlich verbundene Arbeitsgemeinschaft junger Rechtsgelehrter, die durch das Erlebnis des Jahres 1933 zu gemeinsamen
The above quote is illuminating on many levels, but here the most important feature is that to Huber the scholars of the Kieler Schule were a ‘camaraderie,’ which at that time referred to National Socialist rhetoric and to a fascist view of society constructed on the virtues of male communality. Huber asserts that the communality appreciated and upheld by the Kieler Schule was analogous with the National Socialist idea of national communality. To understand how this congruence came about, one needs to look at the shifts in the meaning of ‘communality’ both in the national and the academic cultures of early twentieth-century Germany.

In his groundbreaking book Kameradschaft Thomas Kühne analyzes the common way of working through the experience of the Great War in the Weimar Republic. He asserts that the incompatibility between a personal experience of a violent event (the war) and the public explanation given to that event was circulated with the help of myth-making. This meant that an individual recollection and an official explanation could be fitted together and dealt with by means of a commonly-acknowledged symbol and a narrative attached to it. In Weimar, Kameradschaft, brotherhood-in-arms, came to mean a widely accepted social constellation, a physical formation of togetherness, among which one could feel understanding, containment and approval even amid contrary or distorted emotions and reminiscences.

In art, tradition and oral memory the experience of Kameradschaft was uplifted above everyday life. The sense of male camaraderie during the First World War was remembered as exceptional for its level of feelings (compassion, self-sacrifice, caring and friendship) and gestures (unselfish assistance, piety, diligence and commitment), in comparison with the other-worldliness of war. Although this sacred brotherhood necessarily had nothing to do with the reality of battle, the vast majority felt it comfortable and healing to talk about Kameradschaft as if it had been as important and distinguished a phenomenon as the official version suggested. Thus Kameradschaft became a concept and myth which aspired to and cherished the values of togetherness between men, both in the trenches and in peace-time. It was a linguistic tool to express and share emotions relating to the reality of the Weimar Republic. Kühne writes how “socially

wissenschaftlichem Einsatz verbunden waren.”, Ernst Rudolf Huber, ‘Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften,’ in Die Bewegung 9 (1941), H48/49, 7.

27 Kühne 2005.
29 Kühne 2005, 50.
originated emotions were experienced through *Kameradschaft* and were compared and arranged with its help."

Since *Kameradschaft* had become the representation of the national community in miniature, the question of who decided on its master-narrative became a struggle in the public sphere for the power to decide what was good and what was bad. In the beginning *Kameradschaft* was not a word which fitted the National Socialistic ideology. It was a “bourgeois invention” which emphasized “man to man” (human to human) compassion. There was no space for empathy in the “morality of the dead” advocated by the *Freikorps* and Nazi ideologists. In the Nazi ideology the priority was placed on the *Männerbund*, an all-male group, which especially in the SA and *Freikorps* language represented the pure way of social being. Military units and fraternities had special status in this view as organizations which carried the virtues of the nation. These groups were exclusive, defined their activities and interaction according to a strict code, and drew a very heavy line between themselves and opposing “others” in society. Whereas *Männerbund* were violent, misogynist and exclusive, *Kameradschaft*, to some extent, paid attention to women and children, and the concept was also used in workers’ language. Despite the obvious differences, these two concepts could be, and were, merged, since they both encapsulated a longing for a masculine, prestigious and uncompromising world. Such an ideal world was one where men had the will-power to resist, the prestige to judge, and the strength to fight (successfully) against the variety of immaterial and concrete dangers that threatened the reality or mentality of the bourgeois male.

It was, in fact, the NSDAP who ultimately won the battle for the right to define what exactly *Kameradschaft* meant in political and social reality. After April 1933 it was the National Socialists who used the term and gave it substance. In the late 1930s if one wanted to write of *Kameradschaft* it was impossible to avoid Nazi connotations, and most often using the word meant that one was maintaining or re-distributing fascist ideology. The concept was deployed to argue on

31 Kühne 2005, 33, 39.
32 Kühne 2005, 45; Theweleit 1989, 43–46.
34 Kühne 2005, 90, 95, 96.
35 I need to stress that the distance between accepting the Nazi definition for *Kameradschaft* and committing crimes against humanity is vast, and embodying political rhetoric is not comparable to conducting violent or discriminative acts. I also do not want to diminish the guilt of the Nazi perpetrators. Adopting and fulfilling the false realism of fascist rhetoric is not an excuse for illegal deeds, but deconstructing the rhetoric enables one to understand why some
behalf of destructive social and political aims, and because of its rhetorical capital, it was easier for people to consent, obey and participate.\textsuperscript{36} At the same time, the term continued to carry along with it positive associations from the immediate years following the First World War, so that it still signified a strong, pure, and correct kind of communality. Thus, \textit{Kameradschaft} represented the common ground for a better future. In addition, expressions born from the \textit{kameradschaftliche Erlebnis}, the experience of communality with a sense of shared values and shared destiny, were supposed to be both exceptionally close to the national reality and ethical with respect to the way of being of the German people.

In the German academia the idea of communality had its own history. As elaborated in chapter II and III, lawyers perceived themselves as an ‘estate’ inside the \textit{Bildungsbürgertum}. Hence, to Franz Wieacker the idea of a distinguished \textit{Stand} of lawyers was foundational both in history and in the present moment.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, the more abstract and vague ideal of an ‘estate’ distinct in its learnedness had a more concrete realization in the structures of the higher education. The students in German universities were exceedingly organized in student corporations and \textit{Burschenschafts}, and the academic traditions highlighted the ambiguous opposition between professors and students as a community.\textsuperscript{38} The student organizations cultivated a culture of spiritual togetherness, tradition and honor which they presented as the immaterial opposite to the allegedly corrupt worldly affairs, politics and economic realm of the society.\textsuperscript{39} It was within this worldview emphasizing ‘spiritual communities’ within the national community that executed those deeds. The starting point for making a certain collaborative path understandable, in my view, starts from the level of rhetoric.

\textsuperscript{36} Kühne 2005 97, 109–110.
\textsuperscript{37} Cf. p. 57–59.
\textsuperscript{39} It is a fact that the young scholars of the ‘New legal science’ had mostly been members in conservative student organizations or \textit{Burschenschafts} or had first-hand experience of military organizations. This worldview was very familiar to them. Ernst Rudolf Huber, for example, participated in \textit{Nerother Wandervogel}, Ernst Forsthoff in \textit{Deutsch-völkischen Schutz- und Trutzbund} (Meinel 2012, 16). Wieacker was an active member in the \textit{Corps Rhehania} (Liebs 2010), Arnold Ehrhardt had even participated in the \textit{Freikorps}, and Erik Wolf was a \textit{Freiwillige} in the First World War (Hollerbach 1982). On the other hand, that was not in any case unfamiliar to the young men of the \textit{Bildungsbürgertum}. To be totally outside of the clubs and communities characteristic of the Wilhelminian academic and bourgeois culture would have been exceptional. Even Max Weber had been an active member in the \textit{Burschenschaft Allemania Heidelberg} (Dirk Kaesler, \textit{Max Weber: Preuße, Denker, Muttersohn. Eine Biographie}. München, C. H. Beck 2014, 195–197).
Franz Wieacker grew up.\textsuperscript{40} But in the time of \textit{Machtergreifung}, Wieacker’s reference group and culture was the tradition cultivated by university staff. Peter Lambert and Philipp Schofield have written on the academic culture of early twentieth-century Germany:

[The] professoriat contained within its ranks an elite of incumbents of full, established chairs, \textit{Ordinarien}. These were the eminent mastercraftsmen of what German historians came to refer to as ‘the guild’ (\textit{die Zunft}), an imagined community of scholars which gradually developed rules and rituals of admission. The word ‘guild’ is itself suggestive of the past-mindedness of the men who created it. It gave a curiously pre-modern inflection to the highly modern process of professionalization and academic specialization.\textsuperscript{41}

The “guild” of professors was united in their belief of the “aristocratic” essence of their spiritual community, its opposition to the “barbarism” of left liberals and Bolshevists, and trust in the “autonomy” of the “guild” with its inner tradition and detachment from political administration.\textsuperscript{42} Along with full membership in the community of \textit{Ordinarien} came a guarantee of a certain social status, but also a secured financial position. In 1933 Wieacker – like so many other young scholars of the war generation – was not a member of the ‘guild,’ but waited for his opportunity to receive a permanent chair at university. This does not mean that he had not assimilated the value-base of the Wilhelminian academic culture. Rather, the general opinion among the academically trained offspring of \textit{Bildungsbürgerum} was that the political arrangements conducted by the Weimar Republic had hindered their chances of admission to the inner circle of the academic elite.

This Wilhelminian tradition the National Socialists stirred with their educational politics. As early as 1933 the Nazis started to incorporate their idea of \textit{Kameradschaft} into the academic world in the militant manner common to the SA and the \textit{Freikorps}. The tradition, “the knowledge,” of the paramilitary troops was the guideline for education in books like Alfred Bäumler’s \textit{Männerbund und Wissenschaft} from 1934.\textsuperscript{43} The aim was to “introduce the group as the typical National Socialist form of life and education.”\textsuperscript{44} By the means of structural rearrangements, the “group-experience” was intended to become the key peda-

\textsuperscript{40} Cf. p. 53–64, 85–99.
\textsuperscript{42} Lambert 2003, 168, 169, 174.
\textsuperscript{43} Alfred Bäumler, \textit{Männerbund und Wissenschaft}. Berlin, Juncker u. Dünnhaupt 1934.
Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history and in legal science

Further, this experience would usher in a common, ethnic, ahistorical and directed will of the people. This cultivated spiritual force was intended to be superior to all former modes of knowledge and was a prerequisite for the further training of citizens in the National Socialist regime. In emphasizing the significance of experience-based knowledge the Nazi strategy to take over the German academia did not have to go against the grain. Martin Heidegger, Henri Bergson and Walter Benjamin were only a few of the multitude of scholars utilizing and analyzing the meaning of experience in their texts. However, fascist aims were not as sophisticated as were academic pursuits. The Nazis’ overall objective thus was not only to reinstate the form where education, Bildung in a widest sense of the word, was being “produced,” but to influence its essence in introducing the ‘spirit’ of the Männerbund as the root and model for common learning.

Consequently, camps and distinct working groups, arranged in the outdoors for a short period time, with a schedule, theme and a physical curriculum, became an essential part of the education in all its levels. The obsession for communality in the Third Reich was sweeping and penetrated all areas. The administrators responsible for education were eager, though quarrelsome, in practicing this “ideology of communality” along the lines of the Führer’s ideas and as echoed by SA-minded writers. Hans Kerrl, for example, a Prussian politician and official, saw it important to reeducate young people to meet the standards introduced by Hitler. He organized a series of camps which were directed at students and researchers of law. Kerrl writes:

The National Socialist state must know above all that the one who he [the NS state] intends to entrust as a judge or a public prosecutor with exercising the most important public duties of the state has the character of a German man. The character of the man reveals itself in togetherness with others. Only by such togetherness will it become apparent if the man in question will be suitable as a judge or public prosecutor.

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46 Bäumler 1934.
Likewise, the 1935 renewal of the legal *Studienordnung* followed the larger principles of the time. It asserted that all students of law needed to complete the introductory studies, which in practice comprised the first academic year. Ewald Grothe summarizes its meaning:

[It was] intended to be intertwined with the communal experience, which the student has had in the SA, the Hitler Youth, work-service, and thus assists the prospective jurist in evaluating German law from the national basis and in recognizing foreign law.\(^{51}\)

The camps directed towards university staff (*Gemeinschaftslager*, *Wissenschaftslager*, and *Dozentenlager*) represented the dual significance of ‘communality’ in 1930s German culture. First, from the point of view of the Nazi administration, the camps were an important attempt in re-educating academics in a National Socialist manner.\(^{52}\) In practice, if one wanted to have a good chance to obtain a permanent position at any university, active participation in the camps was a must. As expressed in Hitler’s rhetoric, scholars of the bygone bourgeois world with their obsession for unhealthy reading and mastering information, had no role in the destiny of the nation.\(^{53}\) Hence the learned needed to be retrained. National Socialist educators did not distinguish between students and docents; everyone working in the academic realm had to be indoctrinated to sincerely participate in *Volksgemeinschaft* and thus both obey and further express the common will of the people. Second, and with respect to the legal sphere, the concrete symbols of the “healthy communality,” the educational camps directed at students and professionals, were intended to root the “new reading” (*neue Auslegung*) of law to the *Stand* of German jurists.\(^{54}\) The educational camps were the new form of education and a serious attempt to replace the ways that *Bildung* had produced, used and manifested.\(^{55}\) Ernst Krieck, the education ideologist of the party and the principal at the University of Frankfurt designed a special lecturer academy at the University of Frankfurt as examples of the revolution in education:

The lecturer academy as a working group of full professors, lecturers, assistants and advanced students, a community of teaching and learning persons that in German universities had never

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\(^{51}\) Grothe 2005, 199.

\(^{52}\) Schmerbach 2008, 192–216.

\(^{53}\) Scholars were constantly ridiculed in the newspapers close to the NSDAP. Cf. Koonz 2003, 47.

\(^{54}\) Rüthers, 1992, 23.

\(^{55}\) In the beginning of the 1930s scholars were largely unanimous that the new educational curriculums concerning legal affairs should emphasize “general knowledge” (*allgemein Bildung*). The National Socialist plans on *Studienordnung*, by contrast, highlighted the importance of “general knowledge of one’s people” (*allgemein völkische Bildung*) or “political education” (*politische Bildung*). Grothe 2005, 191, 193.
been seen before, was supposed to be the interdisciplinary central body of the university and over time develop to a permanent institution of the new philosophical faculty based on the integrating foundation of the “national-political anthropology” and comprise the “front” of the “young” reformist science. The avantgarde of the “revolutionary science” had a weekly meeting to an interdisciplinary discussion, preceded by a presentation which was freely selected by the speaker but in contact with the objectives of the lecturer academy. In this round of discussions the disciplinary borders were reduced, methodological questions discussed, the relations between science and professional were reflected, the reform of the overloaded degree programs discussed and new research priorities of the “territory-bound”-university were set through recollection of the research on the macro-societal “living space” of each university’s location.56

The words ‘culture’ and ‘education’ remained essential symbols of social prestige. The anchoring of these concepts to the interaction between citizens, and the groups of people which they connoted, was, however, subject to heavy redefinition. Krieck proclaimed in his inaugural talk in 23 May 1933, that the Gleichschaltung with respect to higher education was about “[W]hether the universities as institutions need to be re-installed, as Akademias in the original meaning of the word, which are able to bring the teachers and the students together as a community and towards a common direction.”57

At the level of University administration, combined with the educational reform of the Studienordnung, the intention was to create “stormtroop-faculties” which would carry on and cherish the political spirit of the Third Reich.58 K.A. Eckhardt was, at least at the beginning, the leading figure in the process. He was also personally in charge of guiding one of these faculties at the University of Kiel. Determined to make the “small university, without a trace of the old scientific tradition, to be fighting one and mold it fundamentally new”, 59 he assigned


58 Grothe 2005, 171.

a group of young lawyers to replace the old faculty, which had been largely sacked because of their Jewish descent. These minds of the war generation constituted a school in the sense that they wrote and lectured on the ‘New legal science,’ but also in the ideological sense. They were supposed to comprise “a fusion of the faculty into a politically and ideologically homogenous whole.”

The plan of Eckhardt and the Nazi officials in the Ministry of Culture was to introduce a distinguished institution (geschlossene Kameradschaft) within the University of Kiel, and to make sure from the beginning that the staff of the institution shared the same values and worldview. These values were supposed to represent the Volksgemeinschaft (in a National Socialist manner) in miniature. This entity, a group united by its inner virtues, would produce scientific works and new legal tools for the benefit of the whole national community. These expressions, texts, concepts and education for their part would enable law in the future Germany to be studied, understood and applied according to the Weltanschauung of the original ‘distinguished institution,’ and at the same time, reflect the values of the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft. In other words, the faculty of law at the University of Kiel was supposed to become a ‘concrete order’ within the world of legal science in German academia – not far from the guild-like ideal of the academic tradition – but in a National Socialist, fighting manner. Thus, when the scholars of the Kieler Schule referred to their scientific community they spoke and wrote of Kameradschaft.

The Kameradschaft of the Kieler Schule managed to combine the good sides of the ‘communalities’ of both academic culture and the ‘völkisch revolution.’ The young scholars maintained their distinctive academic prestige and belonged to a ‘guild of the learned’ bound by common virtues and shared purpose. On the other hand, their work seemed to be ‘close to reality,’ meaningful from the point of view of national destiny. The Kieler Schule did indeed produce the results that the Ministry of Culture intended. The new outlook of the Studienordnung and its emphasis on political and ‘völkisch’ education in university training for lawyers and judges was supported not only by K.A.Eckhardt, who had a decisive role in forming the new curriculum, but also by scholars working in the ‘stormtroop-faculty.’

In the legal renewal following the April laws, the scholars of the Schule were a visible group. They also understood the assignment they were given: to introduce a novel view of the legal world from the bases of a new kind of scholarly communality. Karl Larenz referred to the “mission” which the official in the

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61 Grothe 2005, 172.
62 See e.g. Eckhardt 1936.
63 Grothe 2005, 196.
Ministry of Culture had given him, Ernst Rudolf Huber and Georg Dahm when they were recruited to the newly-erected ‘stormtroop-faculty’ at Kiel:

Our group had not been randomly compiled. It was meant to form an intellectual center in Kiel from which the fundamental inspiration on the development ought to start. My special task was to make sure that the state that was now in the process of forming would be founded not in mere power, but rather on the ethical foundation of the idealistic legal and political philosophy, as I had only recently depicted it in the handbook of philosophy.64

Both the National Socialist educators in the Ministry of Culture and the target groups, the students and scholars, called the participants in the camps and the communal higher education *Kameradschaft*.65 The concept of *Kameradschaft* had a slightly different meaning to different people, but everyone considered it desirable. The initiative in practical, camp-like educational reforms came from the officials of the National Socialist regime. Their larger purpose and educational philosophy followed and executed the ideology of the party elite. Since the purpose of National Socialist officials was to raise soldiers, they arranged concrete opportunities for students and scholars to experience togetherness. These solid experiences of communality in the context of National Socialist ideology were supposed to foster thinking and writing which supported the fascist worldview. The intervention was not as abrupt as it might seem at first glance. It did break the hierarchic tradition of learning and teaching in German universities, but to the young scholars of the war generation it managed to combine two ideals which they have not been able to achieve prior to1933: belonging to a ‘guild’ of professoriate and participating in the ‘brotherhood-in-arms.’ Suddenly, for this generation, which had been too young to participate in the First World War and was too inexperienced to be admitted to the inner-circle of science, the chance to gain both in one go was possible.

As intended, this communality brought about a new view of the relation between law and the people.66 I do not wish to whitewash the racial and ideological context in which the educational camps operated, or the results they aimed at, but undoubtedly from these camps genuine experiences of togetherness and joint group-mentality emerged. Whereas the political message of the camps, like in

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66 Cf. Winkler 2014, 279–282. For contemporaries, the *Kieler Schule* was the ideological institution behind the new legal curriculum. See Lange 1941, 11.
the case of Franz Wieacker, was often ignored by the participants, the concrete experience of communality stayed. This experience, *Erlebnis*, remained a decisive event in the life-history of many participants, and affected later perceptions of the significance of personal life, communality and history. It was important that the camps as a pedagogical arrangement marked a decisive difference towards the traditional manner of studying. It was apparent that the structure and atmosphere of traditional academic studies had not evoked experiences of communality or supported collaborative learning. In this sense the camps were revolutionary and even efficient.

3. Affections in *Rechtsgewissen* 1933–1945: Wieacker’s community and legal wisdom

Wieacker’s participation in the *Dozentenlager* and his relationship to the *Kieler Schule* aroused and has continued to arouse disputes on his orientation towards National Socialism. Detlef Liebs explains Wieacker’s connection to the atmosphere and scientific work of the *Schule* and camps as juvenile mistakes and lapses in judgement. Viktor Winkler doubts whether Wieacker as the youngest participant had any true influence on the “synthetic and spiritual” result of either the Kitzeberger or the Todtnauberg camps. Bernd Rüthers, however, asserts that the Kitzeberger lager and Wieacker’s report on it are symptoms of the alienation of the late 1930s academia. In a “strange and comical” atmosphere scholars regressed to a level which not only made serious research impossible, but enabled the Nazis to transform Germany into a totalitarian nation without facing any severe resistance. Both Rüthers and Ralf Frassek see the Kitzeberger camp as a manifestation of the *Kieler Schule*, which for its part was nothing more than an offshoot of the National Socialist worldview. Frassek maintains that the Nazi-oriented legal thinking nourished in and around the *Kieler Schule* continued to have an effect on legal science in Germany even after the Second World War had ended, and, for example, Wieacker’s *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit* (1952) is the fruit of this thought. Thus, different interpretations of Wieacker’s inclination towards the scholarly camp-life of the 1930s remain. More widely, the explanation one gives to Wieacker indicates the interpretation one accordingly

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69 Winkler, 468. This is also Okko Behrends’ view, see Behrends 1995, XXXII.
gives of the wider question of Wiecaker’s possible Nazi sympathies. Furthermore, did the participation result in long-term consequences which emerge in Wiecaker’s texts?

In his texts Wiecaker emphasized the meaning of the “educational consciousness,” which laid the base for the whole European legal tradition. The forms and ethos of the juridical Ausbildung, as well as the relevance which the surrounding society gave to the educational reproduction of tradition, reflected the ethicalness of a given society. The fundamental importance which he gave to the phenomena of “community” and “experience” in legal science and education is also acknowledged. Thus, the relation which Wiecaker had to the new forms of legal education following the new Studienordnung and the administrative compulsion to arrange university teaching around camps, is not relevant with respect to his attitude towards National Socialism, but it is in the context of the birth and development of some of the basic ideas of his texts. Consequently, these ideas need to be studied in a manner which is also characteristic of Wiecaker’s own methodology; one needs to concentrate on the ‘material’ circumstances which cultivated them.

Although Wiecaker’s relation to the “camping” of the ‘legal renewal’ is often reduced to his report of the Kitzeberger camp, that occasion was not the only politically-oriented scientific gathering in which he participated. He also attended at least the camps of Todtnauberg and Bad Elster. Through his correspondence it is possible to reconstruct his attitude towards the pedagogical arrangements of the ‘legal renewal,’ along with the ‘new form of education,’ especially with respect to the teaching which took place at the National Socialist “model university” of Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main.

In September 1933 the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University was nominated a Reichs-Universität. With it came the honor and obligation to work as a torchbearer for higher education in National Socialist Germany. The person in charge of this task was Ernst Krieck, and in April 1933 Krieck asked Ernst Forsthoff to teach at the university. In the coming autumn, Forsthoff received a professor-
ship in public law in Frankfurt, and along the lines of the university’s promotion, he accepted the responsibility of renewing the faculty’s working methods.\textsuperscript{78} In 1933, most likely in October, Franz Wieacker was also called to work as an outside lecturer at Frankfurt University.\textsuperscript{79}

Forsthoff took his duties seriously and started to arrange studies in line with “Carl Schmitt’s orientation,” bringing students and scholars “bound by a common purpose” together to engage in the “communal scientific-political studying and educating.” \textsuperscript{80} The aim was to approach legal training from a very down-to-earth angle, and the emphasis was on the practical jurisprudential problematic. The studies encouraged students to apply their own understanding, trained argumentative skills and logical procedure in a commonplace context. Education was partly carried out in the form of projects, where students and teachers analyzed realistic cases in a collaborative manner.\textsuperscript{81} The pedagogical orientation of the legal teaching in Frankfurt was ahead of its time. Forsthoff’s ideas followed the methodology and aims of the new national legal \textit{Studienordnung}, although it was not officially launched until January 1935. The underlying agenda defining the structure of the teaching and studying conducted in Frankfurt was that law was not an entity separated from the surrounding society. Moreover, the changes in the ideological or material spheres of society produced changes in law. The question was not whether law and politics should remain unattached, rather the problematic concerned to what extent law should be political. Thus the explicit purpose of Forsthoff (with Franz Beyerle) was not that conventional; it was to carry out a “fundamental renewal of our [German] juridical thinking.” \textsuperscript{82}

A fixed part of the curriculum of the academic year were the activities and camps arranged for both the staff alone and with students.\textsuperscript{83} The camps had a


\textsuperscript{78} Meinel 2012, 52.

\textsuperscript{79} On the establishment of special \textit{Dozentenakademie} in Frankfurt, see Mussgnug, Mussgnug & Reinthal 2007, 8 fn. 40; cf. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 19.11.1933: “Ich bin in Frankfurt sehr freundlich aufgenommen worden und habe viele und viel kennengelernt.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\textsuperscript{80} Mussgnug, Mussgnug & Reinthal 2007, 8. The authors note that Forsthoff was able to accomplish “political schooling in the meaning of National Socialism.” Cf. p. 88–89.

\textsuperscript{81} Ernst Forsthoff’s “working communities” (\textit{Gemeinschaftarbeit}) and educational camps (\textit{Wissenschaftslager}) concentrated on actual themes of legal science and education while connecting them to the political atmosphere of National Socialism. The themes included e.g. \textit{Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Rechterneuerung, Erörterung des Wissenschaftsbegriffs} and \textit{Problem der Erziehung}. Mussgnug, Mussgnug & Reinthal 2007, 8 fn. 40; Meinel 2012, 53; Wieacker to Erik Wolf 19.11.1933, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\textsuperscript{82} “grundlegenden Erneuerung unseres juristischen Denkens,” quoted in Meinel 2012, 53.

\textsuperscript{83} Wieacker to Wolf 19.11.1933: “Die Lage in der Studentenschaft ist sehr interessant. Die
settled structure and form. The participants met outside, most preferably in a place where one could hike and some place of historical interest was nearby. Castles or monasteries sufficed very well. In a seminar-like first part, the members gave talks or presentations on a theme, which was comprised of a methodological dilemma bound to a concrete political or judicial question in the light of National Socialist ideology. A free and enthusiastic discussion followed the presentations. The more informal part constituted hiking, songs and competitions. The physical side of the camps was notable, and the participants were truly tested in their physical endurance. The local newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung reported about a particular camp arranged by Forsthoff on 29 July 1934:

The style of the seminar was marked by soldierly strictness and comradely connection. Academic titles were banned from camp language. Sport and marching had their place next to intellectual work as well. The course of the day was strictly planned like a duty roster. The inner, natural connections between the state and the intellectual life of the nation made up the working context of the seminar.

In the report the emphasis is on the physical composition of the educational event, as well as in the way the National Socialist slogans of ‘combat,’ ‘duty,’ ‘leadership’ and ‘togetherness’ were embodied in the appearance of this new manner of conducting ‘spiritual work.’ The camps seemed to promote the new values of the Third Reich in action. Forsthoff’s camps were committedly National Socialist, and marked a serious ideological change from the previous style of university education. From a strictly pedagogical point of view they were also revolutionary. Not only were the studies combined with physical exercises and the conditions were very informal, but also the relation between students and teachers, as well as among teachers, was intentionally more dialogical and...
non-hierarchical. These two levels, the National Socialist performativity around the fashionable contemporary key concepts and the true breach with the academic pedagogical tradition, existed concurrently in the camps. The camps diverged in their nature; some were merely anti-intellectual play. Nevertheless, in order to study the possible effect they had, both levels have to be acknowledged. When one studies how ‘combat,’ ‘duty’ and ‘togetherness’ as experienced in the camps relate to the concept of ‘spiritual work’ in the worldview of a single individual, it is important to keep in mind that camps as an educational experience, like the whole concept of Kameradschaft, bore a wide set of meanings.

The revolutionary pedagogy which the camps seemed to represent is strongly present in Wieacker’s correspondence with Erik Wolf. Of the eleven letters he wrote to Wolf from Frankfurt, camps and working groups are mentioned eight times, and always in a positive light. The Johann Wolfgang Goethe University diverged from Wieacker’s previous studying and working places on account of its milieu, namely the people and the atmosphere of Frankfurt University. He quickly found a “circle” of friends, consisting of Forsthoff, Arnold Ehrhardt, and Werner Weber, who regularly attended and arranged Wissenschaft and Arbeitsgemeinschaft camps as fixed parts of the teaching and studying plan of the university. Wieacker felt physically better in pleasant company. He wrote to E. Wolf on 25 January 1934:

The activities in Frankfurt are fruitful, satisfying and promote, perhaps, the newer maturation better than the lonely years of inspection and giving one’s all before habilitation.

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88 Although these three comprised the core of Wieacker’s network in Frankfurt, he also mentions Franz Beyerle, Friedrich Klausing, Hermann Heimpel, and Fritz von Hippel. See Wieacker to Erik Wolf 3/1934; 2.4.1934; 14.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

89 “Die Frankfurter Tätigkeit ist fruchtbar, befriedigend und fördert/ vielleicht das neuere Ausreifen stärker als die Jahre einsamen Untersuchens, und Aus-sich-herausspinnens vor der Habilitation.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1934; also e.g. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934: “ich würde mich sehr freuen, wenn ich an dem Pfingstferien-lager [in Oberusel], das Sie im Kaiserstuhl planten, teilnehmen dürfte.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. “Die Frankfurter Tätigkeit ist fruchtbar, befriedigend und fördert/ vielleicht das neuere Ausreifen stärker als die Jahre einsamen Untersuchens, und Aus-sich-herausspinnens vor der Habilitation.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 25.1.1934;
It was not just that the working atmosphere in the faculty of law was relaxed, but this new kind of communality elevated the pursuit of academic work to another level.\textsuperscript{90} In his letters, while expressing individual, personal feelings, he used the same contemporary concepts and terminology which occupied the public discourse and sought to emphasize the exceptionality of the national, \textit{völkisch} revolution. The terms ‘togetherness’ and ‘troop’ in Wieacker’s letters are applications of the rhetoric of the Zeitgeist, but nevertheless signify a personal experience; they were embodiments of the contemporary concepts. The mere idea of the near future gatherings with the “circle” [\textit{Zusammenhäng}] brought pleasant emotions to Wieacker:

It seems, according to what I heard, that it is likely that the official camp of the juridical field will still take place in Oberursel, but the seminar and working community camps, that includes the same good clan, of which I told you, will take place in T[riefenstein].\textsuperscript{91}

Behind the common contemporary vocabulary, the existence of a genuine emotional experience emerging from a new kind of scholarly practice is obvious. Wieacker, however, connects the significance of the learning camps directly to the results of academic work. The exercises and togetherness experienced through the communal working method could not be separated from the “spiritual” essence of one’s scholarly pursuits.\textsuperscript{92} Wieacker described them as being “overloaded but uplifting” and they were an important, and pleasant, part of the work of a researcher.\textsuperscript{93} The preliminary work, which Wieacker prepared e.g. for the camp in Oberursel (Forsthoff’s) was substantial, and he perceived it as a

\textsuperscript{90} Wieacker perceived his stay in Frankfurt as an experience of exceptional scholarly activity: “[D]ie umfangreife fachschaftliche Arbeit, deren exemplarische Entwicklung eines der Hauptgründe meines vorläufigen Verbleibs in Frankfurt sein sollte (…),” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\textsuperscript{91} “Es scheint nach dem, was ich jetzt hörte, so zu liegen, dass das amtl. Fachschaftslager nach wie vor in Oberursel stattfindet, dass aber die Seminar- und Arbeitsgemeinschaftslager, die den gleichen guten Stamm umfassen, von dem ich Ihnen erzählte, in T. stattfinden.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 3/1934 NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\textsuperscript{92} Wieacker was confident that Forsthoff’s method, which the faculty of law in Johann Wolfgang Goethe University adhered to was productive, exceptional and transferable. He wanted to take it with him to other universities, possibly to Freiburg, as he wrote to Wolf: “Ich würde mich für diese Arbeit, an der ich in Frankfurt mit großer begeisterter Anteilnahme und Freude teilnahm, sehr gern auch in Freiburg bereithalten […] es wäre für mich sehr schmerzlich, diese Möglichkeit zu einer ganz neuen Ausfüllung des Lehrberufs durch neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit wieder zu verlieren.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\textsuperscript{93} Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.7.1935: “eingefüllt mit verdrießlicher (und mit erfreulicher) Arbeit”. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. The letter was sent to Wolf after the Kitzeberger-camp.
true scientific endeavor. The objective of these camps was to find a new way to do science. To interpret camps as theater is in my opinion a mistake. According to Wieacker’s correspondence, he experienced the camps as significant and authentic meetings because of their scientific contribution:

The camp of the juridical field during the Pentecost holidays will probably take place in Oberursel. It is scheduled that right at the beginning, course and direction will be determined, and we will be given the opportunity to become aware of talents and performances before the term papers will be processed, not at the end of the semester as it was in winter. The addressed public of the camp will be the student leaders of the study groups. Judging from the February results it will certainly be pleasant. The Borken camp was dedicated solely to athletic instruction to strengthen the sense of belonging and we all agree that it was a success in both organizational as well as in its spirit and its purpose. I am very glad that I did not miss it, because mentally I feel more relaxed and do have better nerves, as when the semester had ended. Though physically it was not insignificant.

The camps appeared as elevating experiences, where a scholar could physically feel the essence of the ‘spiritual work,’ which he conducted in academia. Before, cultivating the heritage of national culture in an academic context, in other words conducting Bildung, had mainly been a textual process of reading, writing, presenting and occasionally sensing a meaningful connection with the linguistic cultural entity one was studying. In the camps, however, learning became more of an event of going through and living the meaning of abstract subject matter. The concrete pedagogical shift at which the new administrative actions aimed can be elaborated with the help of two German terms, both signifying an experience: Erfahrung and Erlebnis. Whereas Erfahrung had traditionally been emphasized as the founding phenomenon involved in learning, the new modes of education attempted to make the learning experience Erlebnis. That is, learning was supposed to become a process of going through concrete sensations which would permanently change the view which one had on society and science.

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94 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
96 Cf. p. 188–190.
ying and assimilating information would shift from a metaphorical journey to becoming a more concrete one.  

When the failure of the experiment of Frankfurt University became obvious and the “troop” of colleagues dismantled, Wieacker had to rethink his career and work possibilities:

After all, the uncertainty of the next semester gives the whole job something cheerfully non-committal and at the same time sorrowful: How will things continue in Frankfurt, and in Freiburg, if I should need to go back there? Hopefully the teaching activities in Freiburg would at least be pleasant. The number of students certainly seems sufficient, and at the moment that is certainly the deciding factor for the development of a group of students who are capable of working, because it guarantees selection. Here in Frankfurt we have lost many of the most decent and active in the exodus. The joyful troop of the science camps of the previous winter does not exist anymore.

It is obvious that the sensation Wieacker wrote about was not just a fashionable textual trope. But did the Kameradschaft extend to the work of a scholar? And if it did, how did it manifest itself in Wieacker’s historical vision? Wieacker’s correspondence reveals that by 1934 he had already understood the essence and benefits of group identity, but this notion grew ever stronger after he participated in the practices of the stormtrooper faculty of the Kieler Schule. The sense of a community and the new kind of working method which prevailed in the Kieler Schule were not just Wieacker’s ideas. To Ernst Rudolf Huber, for example, the Kieler Schule was first and foremost a ‘community’ built upon ‘youthful experience’

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98 “Doch gibt die Unsicherheit der nächsten Semester der ganzen Tätigkeit etwas heiter Unverbindliches und Trauriges zugleich: Wie wird es weiter mit Frankfurt werden, und wie mit Freiburg, wenn ich dorthin zurück gehen sollte? Hoffentlich ist wenigstens der Lehrbetrieb in Freiburg erfreulich. Die Frequenz scheint ja ausreichend, und sie ist ja im Augenblick für den Aufbau eines arbeitsfähigen Studentenkreises das Entscheidende, weil sie Auswahl verbürgt. Hier in Ffm. in haben wir viele von den Ordentlichsten und Tätigsten durch Wegzug verloren; es bildet sich nicht eigentlich mehr die erfreuliche Truppe in den Wissenschaftslagern des vorigen Winters.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.12.1934. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau. The rearrangements in Frankfurt, which led to the dissolution of the “circle” of friends meant an end to the “experience of fruitful work”: “Aber sie wird nach unserer aller Erachten an Fruchtbarkeit dadurch sehr verlieren, dass sie später nicht fortgesetzt werden kann; vielleicht zerstreut sich der alte Stamm schon jetzt.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf in 14.4.1934. Moreover, when the uncertainties in Frankfurt actualized, one of the saddest things was that the scheduled camps were also cancelled: “Leider finden nun auch die Fachschaftslager nicht statt.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 2.4.1934, NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

ence,’ which produced novel insights and applications in legal science precisely because of that particular mentality. The education and study in all the forms expressed by the Schule manifested a new kind of communality and a combative stance towards previous models of legal thinking. The Kameradschaft at Kiel signified both an actual experience and a distinct scientific custom when compared to its predecessors.¹⁰⁰

The idea of a revolutionary turn in the academic work, echoing the goals of educational reform, in which Kameradschaft or Gemeinschaft were introduced into academic work, was explicitly reported by Wieacker in 1935. During the summer of 1935 the lecturers of legal science from all over Germany gathered in a camp in the town of Kitezeberger in an already familiar fashion. This time, however, the purpose was not only to reeducate the scholars into healthy and productive work, but to produce a series of foundational scientific results which would help to shape the legal study of the future Germany. Consequently the “summer-school” became both the most renowned and productive conference in the context of “legal renewal” and later a notorious symbol of the politicizing of legal science.¹⁰¹ The event was summoned by K.A.Eckhardt and his creation, the Kieler Schule, with all the involved scholars, was well presented. As a result of the lectures given in the Kitezeberger camp the participants published articles in the volume of the fascist journal Deutsches Recht in 1936. Wieacker’s responsibility was to write a review of both the activities of the camp and the presentations given. In his article Wieacker wrote about the schedule and content of the camp days:

Hikes, marches, early-morning exercise and the little events of camp life create the relaxation and comradely connection in which the conformity of thought becomes absorbed into the fighting work community.¹⁰²

Unlike in Hitler’s talks, where physical education was the prior objective, and cultivating the mental faculties a secondary matter, in Kitezeberger the togetherness and sport activities were a tool to give shape to an intellectual and cognitive achievement:

Beyond the polemic that was promoted and successful everywhere against the requirements of older legal theory in recent years, the new form in which national law will come alive became

¹⁰² “Wanderungen, Ausmärsche, Frühsport und die kleinen Ereignisse des Lagerlebens schufen die Entspannung und kameradschaftliche Beziehung, in der die Übereinstimmung im Denken sich zur kämpfenden Arbeitsgemeinschaft vertieft.”, Wieacker, ‘Das Kitzeberger Lager’ [1936], 163.
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apparent in collective work. This is how the Kitzeberg meeting made the impression on its participants that a new kind of collective work came alive here in the fight for a new jurisprudence: in a camp community the requirements for a fundamental collective attitude are identified, and this fundamental attitude itself was maintained in a series of essential issues.\textsuperscript{103}

One can take the quotes above as mere scribblings, where a young scholar (a 28-year-old docent) repeats the keywords which he has heard and understood as fashionable. On the other hand, and against the former opportunistic explanation, the Kitzeberger report can be categorized as the unintelligent nonsense of National Socialist “science,” like Ernst Krieck’s pamphlets on educational reform. I hold that both explanations do not fully capture the significance of Wieacker’s writings. To lean excessively on either of them makes one’s analysis too narrow, and some essential sides are lost from sight.\textsuperscript{104}

In the 1936 report ‘Das Kitzeberger Lager’ Wieacker presented this particular camp as a ‘visible form of the method of new legal science.’ He seems to assert that inside the informal gatherings of the young scholars, one could find a methodological wisdom, usable in interpreting the past, present and future society. Thus in the Kitzeberger report Wieacker puts into words the methodological vision he not only believed in the 1930s, but to some extent maintained throughout his career.\textsuperscript{105} Judging by his correspondence, Wieacker did not assimilate or find attractive the ideological part of the Kieler Schule or lecturer academy in Frankfurt University. But the foundational principles of the experience as a pedagogical key, and the community as the material context for an “inexhaustible, ideal experience” of law, were important to him.\textsuperscript{106} The pervasive idea of the above quote is that a basic attitude (\textit{Grundhaltung}), mentality, which appears among the similar-minded in a friendly gathering and healthy atmosphere, is the wisdom that a dogmatism needs in order to become science. This notion remains in his thought more or less explicitly through the decades. The spiritual substance of


\textsuperscript{104} In his letter to Wolf, Wieacker describes the work in Kiel and the camp in Kitzeberger: “In ganzen war es sehr schön und außerordentlich anstregend.” Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.7.1935 Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\textsuperscript{105} Both Winkler (2014) and Avenarius (2010) hold that the methodological core of Wieacker’s texts largely remained the same from the 1940s to the late years of his scholarship.

these groups (a) represents the ‘New legal science,’ and which is (b) living, closest to life, and could (c) be useful in scientific work as a methodological tool. At this point Wieacker did not have a specific concept for this mentality he sensed and in which he participated. Later, however, he started to express it with the term Rechtsgewissen.

a) Creative legal thinking as ‘conscience’: The War and the dissolution of the Kameradschaft

Wieacker gained a permanent position at the University of Leipzig in 1937. This did not, however, mean that his network of colleagues would have drastically changed. By 1939, Ernst Rudolf Huber, Karl Michaelis and Georg Dahm had joined him at this distinguished University with its glorious reputation. Moreover, the National Socialist Ministry of Education had plans to transform the legal training at Leipzig University into a similar ‘stormtrooper faculty’ than the one at Kiel University.\textsuperscript{107} Although the original Kieler Schule dispersed, the network and friendships stayed. Moreover, the original Schule managed to man the key positions in model universities such as Leipzig and Strasbourg (and after the war in Göttingen).\textsuperscript{108}

To Wieacker the University of Leipzig offered a highly satisfying working place. Later he recollected it as a “true scientific working community.”\textsuperscript{109} Although the decision to move from Kiel to Leipzig was not an easy decision, the

\textsuperscript{107} Grothe 2005, 171. See also Winkler 2014, 473: The network was “strongly bound personally, scientifically and politically.”

\textsuperscript{108} To Ernst Rudolf Huber, for example, the Kieler Schule was not a faculty tied to one school (Huber 1941), nor did Heinrich Lange mean a physical faculty when he talked about the legacy of the Schule. See Lange 1941; cf. Winkler 2014, 470–476. The members looked after each other: cf. Friedrich Schaffstein to Gerhard Dulkecit 1.6.1951: “Wie Sie gehört haben werden, habe ich es hier in Göttingen ganz gut getroffen. Ich bewohne Sieberts früheres sehr schönes und großes Zimmer in günstiger Lage und stehe in angenehmen, aber losem und rein gesellschaftlichem Kontakt mit der Fakultät. […] Im März u. April war ich 6 Wochen in Tirol zum Skilaufen u. traf dort u.a. auch Hubers u. Forsthoff.” Friedrich Schaffstein to Gerhard Dulkecit 3.7.1952: “[with respect to a book project] Aber dazu bedarf ich sehr der sachverständigen Beratung, die ich mir von Wieacker und Ihnen erhoffe.”; Karl Larenz to Gerhard Dulkecit 21.11.1940: “Schön war es, daß wir in Leipzig Dahm, Huber, Michaelis, die alle mal Urlaub hatten, wiedersehen konnten.” NL Gerhard Dulkecit, Cod. Ms. Dulkecit 5, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen; cf. Wieacker to Huber 21.7.1961: “ich war durch auswärtigen Besuch wie belagert; später noch durch die Tübinger Fakultätenkonferenz aufgehalten (wo ich Dahm und Larenz sah) Wir freuen uns weiterhin auf den nun nahgerückten Tag, an dem Du einen der einge…en angemessenen Platz in unserer Fakultät […] und hoffentlich recht aktiver wirst, in der Du viel Freunde hast, die sich auf die Zusammenarbeit freuen.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

\textsuperscript{109} “echte wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft,” quoted in Winkler 2014, 473.
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history and landscape of this traditional university brought Wieacker pleasure. The most satisfying factor was, however, the faculty, with his old friends and some new acquaintances. One of the new philosophic acquaintances was Hans-Georg Gadamer, who received a professorship in Leipzig in 1938, and with whom Wieacker had a lifelong friendship. With Gadamer, Wieacker extended his scientific curiosity to drama, literary criticism and hermeneutics. During his stay in Leipzig Wieacker established his status as the leading young scholar in Roman law, and published many highly influential and innovative texts on legal history, legal education as well as continuing his work on new conceptualizations in the fields of property and land law. To Wieacker himself, the work conducted in Leipzig was a natural continuum in his career. Although he had moved from the questions of property law in contemporary society to more historically-oriented themes, the original research interest, the “material conditions of immaterial things” stayed.

The dilemma of the ungraspable nature of unchanging and just legal reasoning in changing historical times remained. In other words, how did the entities of expert knowledge (Stand), education in the context of tradition (Bildung) and justice relate and necessitate each other? In his wartime letters and textual works Wieacker started to approach the dilemma from the point of view of Gewissen, conscience. As a professor, with an extended teaching duty and pedagogical responsibility when compared to his lecturer times, Wieacker became more inter-

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111 Wieacker to Salvatore Riccobono 2.2.1940: “Ich bin hier nun seit vier Jahren in Leipzig und habe mich in dieser äusserlich wenig anziehenden, aber wissenschaftlich und künstlerisch bedeutenden Stadt nun sehr gut eingelebt. Nicht nur im meiner eigenen Fakultät, sondern auch Historiker, Philologen und Philosophen verbindet mich dauernde Zusammenarbeit.”


113 Behrends 1995.

ested in matters of contemporary legal training. Engagement in this scientific field was also a logical continuation. After all, in Kiel Wieacker had been part of and amidst the “revolutionary renewal” of higher legal education, which had had an effect on his scholarly identity, especially on the pedagogical level.  

In some of his wartime articles Wieacker transformed his knowledge on land law into a proposal on the essential thematic structures behind this field, according to which future legal education should be directed. Drawing a larger picture, Wieacker’s contribution can be connected to the drafting of and discussion over the new “peoples law” of Germany. This codification, collected and constructed from the viewpoint of the National Socialist ideology, was supposed to replace the old codification BGB. At a practical level the project did not ever really even begin, but it did not prevent scholars from arguing over the matter.  

To Wieacker, legal education had to cultivate the future lawyers’ own mental faculties, as well as initiate them to the virtuous and binding discipline of legal scholarship, where the personal examples as well as textual expressions of the preceding masters exhibited an uncompromising paragon. As already elaborated, to Wieacker the legally trained comprised a Stand, which was comparable to other legal associations in history, and in the long line of different social manifestations of the ‘lawyer-estates,’ the example of Late Republican Rome was the most virtuous and workable. All this he discussed with Carl Schmitt:  

But on the other hand I assign relative priority to the casuistic method of finding justice, because it is most appropriate for the purpose of law to work agilely through individual situations of social existence and with good judge’s disposition. Like strategy, upbringing and similar things bound to circumstances – but yet originated from orienting axioms – are not skills of social action that are attached to norms. I find the logical-exegetical-pragmatic legal expert of France and the philosophical-systematic dogmatist of Germany have equally lost this creative elasticity since the Reception. I believe, however, to the disadvantage of both peoples to whom

115 Winkler 2014, 263, fn. 36.  
117 See Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 6.5.1941. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg. The theme of the Volksgesetzbuch is in itself a very interesting case study on the relation between National Socialist purposes and the scholar’s willingness to respond to those demands. To Hans Frank, for example, creating the new codification was a priority and a fulfillment of the NSDAP party program. Wieacker contributed to the process of drafting the new “people’s law” to some extent (cf. Schubert 1988, 33–36.), though he later denied that he had had any significant part in the planning process. (a.o.o., 17). From the original Kieler Schule, Georg Dahm, Karl Michaelis and Wolfgang Siebert also participated. Wieacker was reluctant about any codifications from a legal theoretical point of view. Systemizations hindered the vital connections between the law and reality.  
the more liberal devotion to the Geist (idea or ideology) has given a higher representative rank but also a lower success in life than that which the Roman or English method can show for. For in contrast to the Greek and continental nations, who live from the Greek way of recognizing the world, both these peoples are true fetishists, but good or reasonable jurists.  

The two-way reference between the ‘great jurisprudence’ and Wieacker’s contemporary legal culture was constantly present. Legal thinking to Wieacker represented an ability to subordinate a given case to a more general principle (not just derive a decision from a rule), and recognize the similarities and differences between legally relevant events. It was a skill not only to use the law, but to further develop it in one’s profession along with previous legal decisions. As such, legal praxis would be Schöpfung, a creative usage of the law, and, furthermore, it would bring just results from the point of view of the community:

If you direct your attention to the specific English, French and German ways of investigating the law, one might wish that [our] doctrine were taken from there [roman jurisprudence].  

The pedagogical discussion in 1940s Germany did not circle around whether the previous dominant status given to Schöpfung should be reinstalled, rather scholars quarreled on which way and following what “axioms” it was to be done.  

Franz Wieacker both individually and as part of the Kieler Schule contributed to this discussion. Wieacker believed that the essence of the correct, “creative,” legal thinking also provided a passage for successful legal education.  

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120 “Wenn Sie die Aufmerksamkeit auf die spezifisch französische, englische Methode lenken, so möchte man wünschen, daß bei uns auch die Lehre daraus gezogen werde[,]”, Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 25.8.1942. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.  


constituted a frame which knitted together his wartime writings. After all, Wieacker’s major project during the 1940s was to complete Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, which was originally meant to serve as a legal historical textbook for legal education, and which is in particular a book on legal thinking. Hence, his enthusiasm for Erik Wolf’s Große Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte (1939) becomes understandable on many levels, and the prominent and continuing feature in the correspondence between Erik Wolf and Wieacker is the interest Wieacker has in Wolf’s book.

Wieacker’s own project of completing Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit seemed to progress at the same pace as he read Wolf’s book. Especially from 1940 to 1943 Wieacker often wrote to Wolf about Große Rechtsdenker. Wieacker’s attempt was to “embody” the characters which Wolf wrote about, and understand their view of the world. In this hermeneutical task he asked for Wolf’s assistance in which he would either confirm Wieacker’s own insight on the intentions of a given Rechtsdenker, or help Wieacker to more fully understand the borders of the horizons of past social theorists. Wieacker proceeded in the project of making sense of the thinking of past paragons in phases; he was clearly and concurrently with the individual translation process trying to conceptualize the long line of German legal thinking. How did the past scientist see justice? What were the axioms which distinguished noteworthy from mediocre theories? What about the unchallenged truths which guided their thinking, and which changes marked a larger transition between the paradigms of intellectual history?

Wieacker recognized a certain style of thinking in the works of past cultural heroes. Although they had not all been lawyers, their argumentation and reasoning followed a juridical pattern. Despite being poets or politicians Wieacker read them as legal thinkers. He started to see the intertwining of culture, the individual and law appearing in the distinct ways of thinking of lawyers, a thinking which education had cultivated:

124 See e.g. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.5.1942: “Jedesmal wenn ich die neuere Privatrechtsgeschichte lese, nehme ich aufs Neue mit neuer Freude Ihre Rechtsdenker zur Hand.” NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
It is great legal thinkers, not necessarily great jurists, who you mention, and I consider this to be no coincidence. “Great” in the traditional sense of historical significance is the statesman, poet, prophet or reformer, musician, artist, thinker and also the legal thinker. Jurisprudence as the intangible but enormously dense life-force of ancestry, the crust of life, capable power is practice itself, is so massive and enormous that its servant, the jurist, could rise to his own summit. Great are, therefore, your legal thinkers with the movements with which they reach beyond their legal functions and become moral philosophers or proclaimers of the legal concept. The Roman jurists are, conversely, not great (the “greatest” of all), but rather Roman jurisprudence.126

There were different types of legal reasoning varying in time and place and these culturally constituted ways of legal understanding could be compared to an ultimate model of legal wisdom.127 In the correspondence, the statutes of positive law (Gesetz) and social justice (Gerechtigkeit) were separated ever more drastically and determinedly. Skillfulness in the former did not necessarily bring about learnedness in the latter. To be able to apply the idea of law, Rechtsidee, was a characteristic of a legal thinker.128 European culture was not in its essence the carefully ordered and regulated social reality of the modern world, rather it was originally based on the capability of the legally trained to be aware of their legal reality and consequently apply the legal ideas of a given society to judgments.

The most important feature of a lawyer, judge or a legal scholar was to understand the particularities of one’s society, to read the ‘existence’ of one’s social and temporal reality. It was understanding the peculiarities and borders of one’s time and its worldview, and in congruence with the preceding legal thinking, and

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128 Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.11.1941. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
utilizing one’s legal education, to deliver a judgment in a single case. In concrete terms, a lawyer, judge or legal scholar had to be aware of, even assimilate, the prevailing mentality of his legal culture. Nevertheless, the legal consciousness of one’s culture had to be addressed from the perspective of the community of legally trained individuals. The sub-culture, the community of the ‘legally skilled’ provided the means for an ‘anthropological’ study of ones ‘being.’ In other words, the underlying virtuous mentality of the scholars’ guild enabled a meta-level scrutiny of the ways of thinking prevailing in one’s time. In 1936 Wieacker had called this shared and uniting mentality of scholars Grundhaltung, in 1939 he continued to use the idea while writing about the Grundgedanken of Roman lawyers, which formed a point of departure in their legal “art”, and in 1942 he wrote of the lost Grundanschauung of medieval Germany.\footnote{See p.204 fn. 103; Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 449; Wieacker, ‘Die Stellung’ 1942, 51.}

In the context of the German legal science of the early twentieth century, Wieacker’s interest in the mental faculties involved in ‘creative’ jurisprudence is not surprising, but it is noteworthy how with the help of the concept he understood and evaluated historical agents and epochs in order to contribute to the contemporary discussion of the interpretative activity of law. As the 1940s proceeded, the essence of legal thinking and the ability to use one’s legal capability, as presented in the letters to both Carl Schmitt and Erik Wolf, were conceptualized with increasing explicitness and sophistication. The position of the ‘true great jurisprudence’ of Roman law retained its place as a superior point of reference even to the legal culture of the modern world. As such, the view which Wieacker appreciated and upheld towards jurisprudence could have been articulated as phronesis, practical legal wisdom, as presented by Aristotles and after him by a subsequent tradition of thinkers.\footnote{Cf. Avenarius 2013, 67; Gadamer 2000, 308, 320–321. In another context Gadamer stated: “Phronesis [...] is the only methodological model for self-understanding of the human sciences if they are to be liberated from the spurious narrowing imposed by the model of the natural sciences,” quoted in Coltman, 1998, 19.}

To Wieacker, however, legal thinking which allowed one to relate an individual case to a more general principle, and through a comparative perception to recognize the similarities and differences between one’s subject matter and existing decisions, as well as the skill to develop law, were explicated with the help of conscience, Gewissen. Such a choice of terminology clearly suggests a strong existentialist influence. It was after all Marin Heidegger who replaced the Aristotelian idea of phronesis with the German concept of Gewissen.\footnote{Coltman 1998, 12.} The influence of Heidegger’s thinking might have been direct, but it was also indirect, stem-
ming from Wieacker’s acquaintance with Hans-Georg Gadamer and Erik Wolf, who used the concept, although in a different context, in their works.\(^\text{132}\) It is also noteworthy that in his wartime correspondence Wieacker started to refer to the social reality more and more as *Existenz*, as a complex web of assumptions, values, beliefs and images, which determined individuals being in the world.\(^\text{133}\)

There were limits to the human understanding of reality, and thus mechanical descriptions of social reality were both inaccurate and spoke of some sort of fear in admitting the finitude of human knowledge.\(^\text{134}\)

This existential tendency was obviously an extension of the familiar attack on legal formalism and naturalism of the preceding generations, but it is notable that contemporaneously, both Ernst Forsthoff and Carl Schmitt took steps in the same, more hermeneutically and existentially oriented, direction in their respective legal theorizations. Forsthoff returned to the teachings of Carl Friedrich von Savigny, analyzed the temporal limitations of legal language, and placed custom before positive law.\(^\text{135}\) Carl Schmitt praised Savigny for his attempts to distance the law from mere legality. Thus Savigny appeared to be pioneer in the jurisprudential battle against the “technicality” and “scientification.” The task of modern legal science was to follow Savigny’s “existential” attempt in order to become “the last safe haven of Rechtsbewusstsein.”\(^\text{136}\)

Whatever Wieacker’s ultimate leanings were, from the point of view of his historical vision, the important outcome was that he started to incorporate the notion of ‘conscience’ into contemporary ideas regarding education and legal ability. The existentialist claim of *Gewissen* as the ontology of the highest form of individual human understanding was combined with the principles of the distinct position of the jurist *Stand*, and the cultivation of cultural knowledge (*Bil-“\(^\text{134}\) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit* [1953]. Albany, State University of New York Press 1996, 7–9.

\(^\text{135}\) Meinel 2012, 261–266; Forsthoff’s turn was familiar to Franz Wieacker. Forsthoff recalled in his letter to Fritz von Hippel Wieacker’s response to his turn towards juridical hermeneutics: “Der gute Wieacker knurrte brieflich etwas ob meiner conservative Grundhaltung […],” quoted in Meinel 2012, 266.

\(^\text{136}\) In Meinel 2012, 261 fn. 186.
Thus Wieacker was able to bypass the fundamental dead end which obstructed the translation of Heidegger’s philosophy into a secular legal science. Now “conscience” could be attached to a tradition of legal knowledge so grounded on common mentality and virtues that rather than a temporal construction it constituted a metaphysical structure.\(^{137}\)

The application of this heuristic historiographical device started to take shape in his 11 April 1944 letter to Erik Wolf. In the letter Wieacker gave credit to Wolf, who in the second edition of his *Große Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte* (1944) added sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theorists.\(^{138}\) At the same time Wolf came to deal with the era of the reception of Roman law as well as the origins of the idea of the state (*Reichsidee*) in Germany. Such themes were, of course, close to Wieacker and he congratulates Wolf for his vivid descriptions of past legal thinkers who “amid the blurring time” conducted their scholarly work without altering the particular spirit of law.\(^{139}\) Wolf’s book was grounded on the same principles as before; without restricting himself narrowly to legal theorists, he included important national figures who (according to Wolf) had contributed to the evolution of German legal culture. Wieacker commented: I can safely tell you that I am also first tempted to get “annoyed” about it here (as with the legal thinkers) due to my restless and more flaring temperament, but it becomes clear to me that this toning down and negotiation are the manifestation of the scientific conscience.\(^{140}\)

Wieacker did not attach ‘conscientious’ thinking only to his friends, like to Erik Wolf; the idea of ‘scientific conscience’ was a leitmotif which gathered the thinkers of the past into a distinguished group, and vice versa, this concept constituted a heuristic tool in understanding the diverse writings, representations and expressions of people in varying times and places.

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\(^{137}\) Wieacker elaborated the problem in 1967 as follows: “The difficulty lies in the very basis of this novel way of thinking, for it sees man as inevitably alone in his situation, and its criticism of post-Platonic idealist metaphysics and its system of values destroys all possibility of any transcendent binding content of law.” Wieacker, *A History of Private Law* 1995, 469. See also Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.11.1953. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\(^{138}\) Wieacker to Erik Wolf 11.4.1944. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\(^{139}\) Ibid.: “Umsicht, mit der Strömungen, die die Zerisseheit der Zeitspiegeln, geordnet und vereinfacht sind ohne dass irgendeine in ihren besonderen Recht vergewaltigt wird

\(^{140}\) “Ich darf Ihnen ruhig sagen, dass ich durch mein unruhigeres und flackernderes Temperament auch hier (wie bei den Rechtsdenkern) zuerst versucht bin, mich ‘daran zu ärgern’; aber es wird mir dann bald klar, dass diese Abtönungen und Vermittlungen der Ausdruck des wissenschaftlichen Gewissens sind.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 11.4.1944. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
In the 1930s Wieacker had connected exceptional legal thinking with the idea of communality among legal scholars and explicated that shared mentality with the fashionable and national slogan of *Kameradschaft*. In the late years of the war, these connections fell apart. Despite the fact that distinct ‘legal art’ yet took place within the ‘estate’ of lawyers, and the circle of his *Kieler Schule* friends continued to represent the ‘academic homeland,’ legal conscience was no longer tied to the ‘legal renewal’ of Germany. The form and core of superior legal knowledge remained, but it could no longer be merged with contemporary politically loaded concepts. Such was the case with the idea of ‘communality,’ previously presented with the concept of *Kameradschaft*, both in public and scientific spheres.

In the public culture of wartime Germany the concept of *Kameradschaft* now mostly signified the togetherness of and culture prevailing in the military troops. Wieacker, however, had no point of connection to this language. To him, serving in the military was foremost a duty, *Dienst*, and it did not contain any spiritual or higher meaning. Moreover, military service was a natural responsibility, but nevertheless a “spiritually laborious duty.” In his letters from the frontline to Ernst Rudolf Huber and Hans-Georg Gadamer he never referred to his regiment as a *Kameradschaft*, nor was it even a ‘troop.’ Wieacker’s frontline letters to Huber contain a repertory of the emotions of disappointment, boredom, and cynical amusement at the bizarre reality of the war. The destruction of German cities saddened Wieacker, and the army unit and military culture provided an environment which Wieacker could do nothing but wonder at with a sneer.

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143 In his letter to Ernst Rudolf Huber from 23.2.1945, after bitterly deploring the bombing of Freiburg, Wieacker cynically reported about his service: “Denn der gegenwärtige Zustand, so wichtig wie immer, ist nicht gerade der regelmässige für den Mittelpunkt meiner persönlichen Bestrebungen. Übrigens ist es ununterbrochen menschlich recht nett und dienstlich unerhört vorteilhaft.” He found constant amusement about his rank and work in the service. See e.g. Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 6.1.1944[1945]. After comparing himself to Corporal Gottlieb Köpke from Willibald Alexis’s book *Isegrim*, he continued: “[D]essen so sehr erfreuliche menschliche (und dienstliche) Eigenschaften ich Dir also nicht erst zu [brauche] [...] ; Unter diesen Umständen fungiere ich [als] Hilfsoffizier, was in sachlicher Hinsicht ein Expert in menschlich-dienstlicher aber sehr angenehm und ansprechend ist. Von den übrigen Umständen, der vorzüglichen Verpflegung wie der angenehmen Unterkunft, der interessanten Beschäftigung zu berichten, versage ich mir heute, weil ich zu müde bin, um weitere Briefseiten zu schreiben.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Cf. Liebs 2011, 6 fn. 11.
The overall tone of the letters is melancholic and lonely. Wieacker even refers to actual battle as a “friend.”\(^{144}\) Bildung, learnedness, distanced Wieacker from most people, since that ability, according to Wieacker, allowed him to understand the common life in a larger, historical context, and to notice connections which were opaque to most.\(^{145}\) He did not perceive the Zeitgeist as a warring for strategic resources, but as an eternal “clash of consciences.”\(^{146}\)

Wieacker’s secondment and following stay in Italy, however, did produce important results with respect to his later scientific view and historical vision. The experience of war enabled Wieacker to further elaborate what Gewissen did or did not signify in modern society. Moreover, the distinction between ‘the people’ and the individual cultivating of Rechtsgewissen was being empirically proved. In a given existence people seemed to resort to different modes of understanding and explanation. In the harsh reality of the war, the different views could be simplified with the dichotomy of superstition and ‘conscience,’ where the former continued to oppress the people, but the latter provided tools to understand reality. In 1945 Wieacker described the Dasein, existence, of the Italian/German people to Gadamer as follows:

The condition of the public of this country is so abominable. These people, without soul, without conscience and destiny in the good and the bad, without humor in the proper meaning of the word, without sentimentality, and without the need to see a new reality that is only visibly transcendent of their own souls behind their own reality – these people are peculiarly a comforting and exhilarating form, and also likeable in the everyday world. To understand the judgement “here without conscience”, I must use these words: instead of the soul, a bright cheerfulness, instead of responsibility, absolution, instead of the conscience, the law, instead of destiny, grace.\(^{147}\)

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\(^{144}\) See p. 111–112.

\(^{145}\) Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 23.2.1945: In the letter Wieacker hopes that Huber would inform him about the latest “spiritual” matters: “Also schreibt selbst fleissig und ermuntere auch andere dazu. Auch über Deine wissenschaftlichen Vorhaben höre ich gern und lasse mich gern auf ein Fachgespräch ein.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

\(^{146}\) See p. 111.

As elaborated, right after the war he announced to Ernst Rudolf Huber (quoting Goethe) that “people should be the object of our actions and thoughts!” In the preceding pages I have argued that this slogan emerged from a conviction to study the ambiguous nature of the relation between the people, law and prevailing social circumstances (the state). This dynamic constellation Wieacker had already started to call Rechtsbewusstsein. Nevertheless, with respect to his quest to study Rechtsgewissen, the war also represented an important point of culmination. Wieacker became confident that in order to prevent such a tragedy occurring again, and to further repair what had been distorted, he had to promote the indispensable importance of distinguished legal thinking, increasingly highlight its origins and different historical phases, and cultivate the art of ‘legal conscience’ within the people.

4. ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ (1939): The historical paragon of community and creativity

One of Franz Wieacker’s most celebrated articles is ‘Vom Römischen Juristen,’ published in the journal Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1939 and later included in the collection ‘Vom römischen Recht’ (1944). The article was based on Wieacker’s inaugural lecture at the University Leipzig, where he moved in 1937. In this particular article Wieacker managed to explicate in an exceptionally vivid and clear way the essence of Roman jurisprudence. The conventional stance, which Wieacker greatly influenced, and not least with ‘Vom Römischen Juristen,’ acknowledges that Roman lawyers worked in a totally different legal culture than contemporary legal professionals. Nevertheless, their art of understanding and applying the law as well as the reasoning it required was an admirable ability, which intrigued and continues to intrigue modern lawyers. Hence, in comparison to the twentieth century German legal culture, Roman law seemed to be an ideal both at the level of the actual work of lawyers as well as in their status within a society.

The article’s influence, however, went beyond a mere description of the historical circumstances which prevailed the in Roman world. In his text Wieacker attempted to explain how the social conditions of the Late Republic shaped the

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148 See p. 159.
149 Wieacker himself, at least until publishing of Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit in 1952, considered this text as the most telling presentation he had come up with. Cf. Wieacker to Salvatore Riccobono 2.2.1940; Wieacker to Gerhard Dulckeit 14.6.1950, Nachlass Gerhard Dulckeit, NL Cod. Ms. Dulckeit 5, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen.
thinking of lawyers, how Roman law became what it was through the interaction of social and cultural structures, and how Roman jurisprudence became transformed into a tradition which seemed to enable lawyers (even modern lawyers) to reach a true and just legal decision. In the article Wieacker continued in the footsteps of, for example, Fritz Pringsheim, who had intended to reinterpret the Roman law and release the discipline from the theoretical frames created by among others Rudolf von Jhering and Carl von Savigny, in order to find a new significance for it within the changed legal system and German society.\textsuperscript{150} Like the scholars of the previous generation, Wieacker defended the particularity and genuine nature of Roman law, and sought to prove its self-standing essence. The bad name which Roman law had in contemporary German culture was due to a misunderstanding and to a twisting of the original, pure idea.\textsuperscript{151} Roman law was a unique craftsmanship for understanding and dealing with the immediate world, and it was fundamentally different from Greek scholastic and modern theories of law. The attachment of these theoretical frameworks to Roman law had emerged in its later historical development, and they had distorted the true core of Roman jurisprudence.

In ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ Wieacker held on to his preceding scientific claims, especially those concerning the idea of property in jurisprudence. Thus, his construction was not at odds with the official line of the Nazi regime. He was also able to place his argument within the field of Roman law scholarship. From the methodological point of view, his study was unlike the Interpolazioneforschung or more conventional stances like those of Paul Koschaker and Fritz Schultz, but addressed a similar problematic as these senior scholars did in their research.\textsuperscript{152} However, Wieacker’s methodology and philosophical starting point was fundamentally original. Wieacker bypassed the earlier epistemological custom, where previous studies were challenged through a more thorough handling of the ancient texts, or where a particular collection was seen as more authentic than the sources which other scholars had focused on. Rather, he sought to understand the worldview of the Roman lawyers. He tracked down the questions they had presented to their sphere of being, and which guided their thinking and acts in their task of constructing a workable society. In other words, Wieacker sought to understand and further analyze the meaning of the common experience shared by the group of Roman lawyers in the Late Republic.

Thus, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ is not significant only from the viewpoint of the canon of German legal and intellectual history; the text lays down the seeds

\textsuperscript{150} Rückert 2010, 84–85.

\textsuperscript{151} Cf. Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942; Wieacker, ‘Die Stellung’ 1939.

\textsuperscript{152} Cf. Winkler 2014, 179–219.
of Wieacker’s legal hermeneutics and was an important point of reference to, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer.\textsuperscript{153} The text can also be read as the outlining of a perfect legal system within a political society. As such the situation of ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ in Wieacker’s scholarly career its relation to the development of the political climate in National Socialist Germany is akin to the turn Ernst Forsthoff’s writings took at the end of the 1930s. Forsthoff, who in his ‘Totale Staat’ of 1933 formulated a very straightforward analysis of contemporary society, which included clear suggestions on the arrangement of social structures and legal practices, by the end of the decade had shifted his focus to more distant spheres of legal history and legal theory.\textsuperscript{154} The conservative legal scholars slowly started to realize that their ideas of the contemporary society were not appreciated by the party or by the fascist administration. Moreover representing such direct claims might even be dangerous. In fact, Forsthoff’s and Wieacker’s texts did comment on the contemporary world, but in a mild, camouflaged and indirect way. In what follows I shall analyze ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ with respect to the concept of Rechtsgewissen, discussing what the text tells us about Wieacker’s foundational idea of legal conscience, and its emergence in the European legal history.

In the article Wieacker continued his study of the ancient legal world in an already familiar manner; in order to transmit the meaning of the bygone legal phenomenon to the modern world, a scholar needed to concentrate on the social and cultural reality on which the phenomenon was situated. He set out to represent the mentality of historical agents, the thoughts, virtues, values and beliefs they possessed. Accordingly, when he formulated the essence of Roman jurisprudence and its lasting effect on modern society, the key structure in his construction was the social constellation of ancient lawyers and their position within society. He called this association of lawyers a Zunft (guild) or Juristenstand (the estate of jurists). It was thus an association solely for lawyers, which at the same time formed an ‘estate’ within Roman society as a whole. Wieacker considered the social mission of the Juristenstand to be an indispensable part of the political functioning of Roman society. The praetors and laymen who were responsible for the political leadership of society, needed to rely on the expertise of those who knew and understood the law. The ‘lawyer-guild’ was a natural and obligatory part of society, a tool for the authorities to rule and direct the people. The indispensability of the ‘lawyer-guild’ was based on the one hand to the overarching significance of law to the Romans, and on the other hand to the highly differentiated and sophisticated nature of this jurisdiction.

\textsuperscript{153} Gadamer 2000, 18.
\textsuperscript{154} Meinel 2012, 226 ff.
Such specialized expertise grows out of practice and consistent tradition. It can therefore only be kept in shape by a group of experts. Since it requires a constant expert concern, this group must necessarily be dispensed from a general political executive authority.\footnote{155}{“Solche Fachtechnik entwächst der Routine und der ständigen Überlieferung; sie kann daher nur von einem sachverständigen Kreis in Form gehalten warden. Und da sie ein ständiges fachliches Interesse voraussetzt, muss dieser Kreis notwendig von allgemeinen politischen Führungsaufgaben dispensiert sein.”, Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 445.}

In formulating the notion of the Roman ‘lawyer-guild’ Wieacker compares it to the English inns of court, which to him and to Carl Schmitt represented a modern constellation where legal knowledge flourished among the like-minded.\footnote{156}{See p. 103–104.}

Wieacker’s guild was a group with closed borders, and it cultivated its inner culture distinct from other groups within society. The acceptance of new candidates into the guild was decided democratically and according to a tradition; participants came from different backgrounds, but all went through an “apprenticeship” and an established “routine” in becoming full members of the circle. The guiding principle in selecting new members was the “high masculine authority” which those nominated were supposed to possess and express.\footnote{157}{Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 446: “Das Auswahlprinzip einer freien Zunft ist notwendig demokratisch […]; Zutritt hat, wen Routine und fachliche Bewährung ausweisen.”; 446: “Die hohe menschliche Autorität steht immer ausser Frage.”; 447: “[Ein Jurist ist] ein makelloser Mann voll Gewicht und Verlässlichkeit.”}

Such divisions enabled him to maintain his idea of the unchanging, moral and spiritual core of the community of legal practitioners within German (and European) history. The historical sources which reported the shady and illegal acts of lawyers, could thus be ignored in the legal historical analysis, and be seen to refer to ‘inauthentic material’ outside the lawyer Stand.\footnote{158}{Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 447: “dem Tross der Winkelkonsulenten und Erbschleicher, die den tüchtigen und ehrenwerten Kern des Standes begleiten.”; cf. p. 59.}

\footnote{159}{Cf. p. 131.}
According to Wieacker, the existence and acknowledgment of the Roman guild of lawyers was based on its ‘authority’. So not only was the circle a necessity for the functioning of society and the administration, but the guild as a whole also enjoyed the respect of citizens and leaders. Authority came from the virtues which the members embodied and expressed. These virtues were Roman, but in a refined manner, since members of the legal fraternity were distinguished from other learned and public figures in Roman society. The lawyer Stand was a special community of experts, which elevated lawyers to an incomparable social and moral status. The experience of togetherness, the acknowledgment of the bond which connected jurists as a distinct entity, was reinforced in their routines of conducting legal assignments and creating legally binding decisions. The “life-form [of the guild of lawyers] was permeated by close male relationships” and the habit of consulting each other in their duty, and as such they represented the rational backbone of Roman society.160

[... the free service to the community, that is practiced through expert opinion and instruction and of which the strictest guarantee is the predominant non-remuneration. This is the difference between the “honos” and the higher professions, also especially the learned but legally trained court speakers, on whose he [the “honos”] looks down with silent contempt of the real expert.161

Another key prerequisite for Wieacker’s construction was that the guild of jurists cultivated a distinct, common mentality, which he calls “common knowledge” or “guild-knowledge” [Zunftwesen].162 The thinking of the guild welled from “class-based spiritual cultivation,” “political freedom,” “interest of the legal experts” and above all the custom of “mutual assistance and collegial advice.”163 The guild was at the same time a vital and fundamentally apolitical organ in the community of Rome. The bonds which attached it to society were strong ties of sacred duty. Essentially, members of this guild were free. They were masters of the cultural tradition, but not restricted by it. The guild rested on individual agen-
cy, but as an entity it formed a tradition. Guided by a worldview of highly specialized professionals, it also had down-to-earth convictions based on common virtues. Hence, it is obvious that Wieacker’s description of the inner culture of Roman Juristenstand managed to include all of the (sometimes contradictory) virtues which he and his time valued. According to Wieacker the mentality of the guild was not explicitly defined in terms of strict principles, code or regulations. It was more of a perception and horizon, founded on common virtues and a common lifestyle. Rather than norms regulating ones thinking, the defining world view of the Roman Jurist-estate was a vocation or conviction.

But they [the roman lawyers] are deeper connected with the religio by common rules of ideas which are embedded in the nature of Roman people. It is the narrow but concentrated imaginative power of a rural human being with a mercantile facet and the brusque discipline of a soldier.  

The important feature with respect to jurisprudence was that this mentality was the starting point for the superior legal skill (Rechtskunde) of the Roman jurist. “Self-aware guild knowledge” formed a common ground and principle which knitted casuistic decisions to a coherent “legal art” and “orientation.” Roman legal culture was comprised of case law, casuistic derivation from previous decisions, and the development of the form of jurisdiction. Actual jurisprudence was based on precedence. In time, with the ongoing differentiation between the economic and administrative spheres of Roman society, the mastering of legal culture became a difficult task. Moreover, the understanding and utilization of Roman law was more than mere political decision-making and law-giving. Wieacker asserts that due to its complicated and sophisticated nature, conducting jurisprudence in Roman culture was more a matter of “creating” than of mere “judging.” Such a creative construction of tradition without ignoring the particular nature of a given legal case, and the way in which a decision was connected to the wider orientation of legal culture, necessitated some guiding principles within legal reasoning. The “guild-knowledge” constituted such “pre-judice”

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166 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 441, 448.

it was an orientation which directed the argumentation of Late Republican lawyers. Wieacker describes the underlining stream [Grundgedanken] in the Roman legal thinking as follows:

For a precedent can only be used when one recognizes the common fundamental idea: the tertium comparationis. This fundamental idea can be used with unconscious contemplation or explicitly formulated and handed down as a rule. Such rules are not abstract major premises but rather guiding principles of future practice that are acquired by contemplation and experience.\(^{169}\)

This quotation captures three essential traits in Wieacker’s article. First, Roman jurisprudence was a ‘praxis’ and a form of ‘practical wisdom’. Furthermore, this wisdom was born out of a shared ‘experience’ of jurists. And finally, this experience-based knowledge lived on as a skill of ‘legal knowledge,’ Rechtswissen. It is striking that the fundamental themes on which Wieacker worked throughout his career, are clearly expressed in a text, which was published when he was no more than 31 years of age. The themes of ‘practical wisdom,’ ‘experience,’ and ‘Rechtswissen’ were lasting ontological principles in his vision concerning contemporary legal science and the legal history of Europe, and one can find these paradigms in Wieacker’s works even in the 1960s. In order to give a comprehensive presentation on the meaning of these themes in Wieacker’s production, it is important to discuss the significance he attached to them in 1939. It is also essential, that these foundational themes emerge as ideals in the context of Roman law, and more precisely, as mental faculties within the guild of Roman lawyers.

In Wieacker’s reconstruction of Roman jurisprudence, Late Republican law and lawyers served as a “golden age” to which he attributed features which he saw as lacking in the present. However, this golden age, an ideal type of society for scholarship, was reconstructed with the help of his contemporary acknowledgment and understanding of society. The things he valued as important and noble remained such in his reconstruction of Roman society, only in an emphasized manner. In what follows I scrutinize more closely each entity of ‘Rechtswissen,’ ‘experience’ and ‘practical wisdom,’ acknowledging that to Wieacker these conceptualizations were not separate domains. Rather they marked differ-

\(^{168}\) Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 449.

ent spheres of the same phenomenon which Wieacker later called legal conscience, 
*Rechtsgewissen*.

Wieacker’s ‘legal experience’ [*Juristenerfahrung*], even on the semantic level, as a term within an individual text, is comprised of many particles. The social status of jurists played one part, as did their common education and deep relationship with each other. The process of legal reasoning, causality and translating recognition into exact verbal expressions were all fundamental. The existence and acknowledgement of a body of accumulated knowledge, tradition, enabled this phenomenon to rise above mere knowing. Words and their relation to reality was the playground in which *Juristenehrfahrung* performed and emerged. It was partly unconscious, but at the same time it was a skill which one could cultivate.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless ‘experience’ was a theme which distinguished Wieacker from most of the scholars working in the field of Roman law, especially in the way he connected it with the spheres of conceptualization and tradition.

Wieacker was confident that the lawyers of the late Republic were exceptionally gifted linguistically. This did not mean that they were mere public speakers, since he saw the rhetorical school – its most famous representative being Cicero – as a contributing to the fall of true Roman jurisprudence.¹⁷¹ Rather, lawyers were able to articulate with high accuracy and creativity the process by which they sought to decide a given case. They managed to develop a legal language [*Rechtssprechung*] which enabled them to connect the elements of a case to jointly and historically created abstractions.¹⁷² In other words, Roman lawyer *Stand* conceptualized some particular spheres of beliefs and actions, which then had an effect on the outcome of many legal cases. This however was not at all the modern “jurisprudence of concepts.” Whereas scholars like Savigny and Jhering had created “another, artificial world” of concepts, “beside the real material world,” the legal terms of Roman lawyers were derived from life itself. The legal rhetoric of Roman jurisprudence had a “different logical and ontological structure.”¹⁷³ This was due to the transmission of a common experience within the tradition of the lawyer guild. The wisdom of the past translated into linguistic tools, which were fundamental in the cognitive process of decision-making. The concepts of Roman lawyers were:

¹⁷⁰ Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 455.
¹⁷¹ Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 453.
¹⁷² Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 455.
¹⁷³ Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 451: “So schafft sie ein selbständiges System juristischer Beziehung, das wie eine zweite irreale Welt neben die natürlich tritt,” “lebendige Wesen”; on the relation between juridical expressions and reality in Roman jurisprudence: “Die Aussagen über juristische Bedeutungen sind nicht wie unsere logische oder ethische, auf Gel tung bezogene, sondern ontologische, auf eine besondere juristische Existenz bezogene.”
IV. Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history and in legal science

Though these figures of thought have a different logical and ontological structure. [...] [T]hey are, incidentally, examples from fixed legal statements that formed from ancient suprapersonal experience and artistic tradition in terms, so to speak, of curdled jurisprudential experience from incontrovertible firmness, as with technical or medical specialized terms.¹⁷⁴

So the wisdom, which pre-classical linguistic constructions contained, was partly ‘symbolic.’¹⁷⁵ These constructions explained reality far more comprehensively than later, more theoretical forms of conceptualization which effected European legal culture. Wieacker described Roman jurisprudence by partly juxtaposing it with *wissenschaft*, science. Here ‘science’ meant a form of theorization and a feature of “Greek justice theories,” “Byzantine thought” and modern “jurisprudence of concepts.”¹⁷⁶ Wieacker asserted that the fundamental misrepresentation with respect to Roman law, which all of the above-mentioned views possessed, was that they treated the works of the classic lawyers as attempts to formalize the legal world. The later ‘scientifications’ of Roman legal practice interpreted the texts of the *Juristenstand* as expressions of some hierarchical cognitive construction or comprehensive theory. Here lay the fundamental misunderstanding, since – according to Wieacker – Roman law was a “practical routine,” and conducted “partly unconsciously.” The process of deciding necessitated “intuition.” Wieacker asserted that probably the Roman lawyers themselves (if asked) could not have been able to explain how they found an ultimate solution in a given case.¹⁷⁷ The ‘art’ of mastering Roman jurisprudence was like a craft, where the skill of completing the process was prior to being aware of all the social and juridical results one’s decision brought about. The Roman lawyers embodied the worldview and “legal skill” of the Free State of Rome; “the [guild of] expert-jurist were themselves their structure and method.”¹⁷⁸ Like a doctor or experienced artist a Roman lawyer did not reflect on what he was about to carry out; the assimilation


¹⁷⁶ Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 454, 461.


of the tradition and solid awareness of real “existence,” enabled him to create laws which reproduced the Roman values and maintained social order.\textsuperscript{179}

His decision lives rather from contemplation, decision and conceptual pathways that are learned from his accumulated experience, and out of which the adept artist or doctor acts spontaneously. In this way the jurist’s own experience not only stands by precepts, but also his situational understanding becomes objective authority through the uninterrupted tradition of experience of jurists that has been consolidated to fixed concepts and principles, of which the jurist is absolutely certain.\textsuperscript{180}

Wieacker added that the theme of social justice was foreign to Late Republican lawyers; what mattered was the relation between a decision and the legal tradition. This tradition, however, was not opposed to social justice. Since the “guild knowledge” of the lawyers was an elemental part of the Late Republic – it was a “limb” in the body of society – the judgments which the lawyers delivered were just from the point of view of the society and the Roman worldview.\textsuperscript{181} Moreover, and in time, the classical jurisprudence of Rome assimilated Greek theories of justice into their tradition. The Roman jurists of the second century A.D. equated (and correctly according to Wieacker) their legal skill with that of social justice. The creative power of the Juristenstand came to mean the process which produced just results, at the same time confirming the “productive” or pro-active essence of the tradition of Roman jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{182} Within the tradition previous intuitive decisions were actually present; the experiences of past lawyers were at the disposal of a Roman lawyer through his own experience while performing the process of reaching a correct decision.

For the connection to the endless traditional casuistry is usually also obtained with the legal reduction. The casuistry’s role is often used unconsciously from experience and tradition.\textsuperscript{183}

Socialization to an ontological attitude towards infinitude within the guild, learnedness in legal subject matter, cultivating an ability to express verbally the

\textsuperscript{179} Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 451: “juristische Existenz.”
\textsuperscript{181} Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 454.
\textsuperscript{182} Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 456.
\textsuperscript{183} “Denn mit der juristischen Reduktion ist in der Regel auch schon der Anschluss an die endlose überlieferte Kasuistik gewonnen, deren rationes dem Juristen aus Erfahrung und Überlieferung so vertraut sind, dass er sie oft unbewusst anwendet.”, Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 456.
spheres of human being and an assimilation of the craft of legal procedure, comprised the Roman legal tradition. Thus the individual experience of being a Roman lawyer was one with the inner justice which the tradition embodied and reproduced.

Their output is objective, thus creation; art not in the sense of an inconsequential skill, but rather of a productive, life-multiplying act of creation. It is fair to present such intuitive, creative legal reasoning within a circle of scholars as Rechtsgewissen. To Wieacker, Late Republican jurisprudence was an incomparable model and ancient paragon for succeeding legal cultures, not only in the sense that the legal terms it had produced continued to inhabit the twentieth century German legal rhetoric, but as material legal order [Ordnung] involving the intertwinement of cultural, religious, linguistic and social systems. Wieacker admits that Roman law as Dasein like this is unreachable to modern lawyers, but nevertheless its example should inspire modern jurists and legal scholars to search for “common knowledge” on which to base their legal system. They should acknowledge “the relation to their völkisch community […], be aware of this community’s basic values, and articulate more powerfully than the jurists of the high-classical times” in order to hear the “living voice of the völkisch Law”.

The skill (practical wisdom) and ontological prerequisites (shared experience) of the Roman lawyers comprised their comprehensive understanding of the legal application [Rechtswissen]. Their Lehre, embodiment of legal practice, was transmittable, learnable and applicable throughout the centuries. Thus, this trinity of wisdom, experience and application comprised the custom which distinguished the lawyers of the Late Republican world from other legal cultures. In the long line of Franz Wieacker’s legal scientific works this trinity sustained its place as a superior paragon to all other legal practices in European legal history. Although not yet clearly explicated, expressions of the custom of ‘great jurisprudence’ as a whole, and as a part of the respected social reality, amounted to legal conscience, Rechtsgewissen. Thus, every given legal mentality studied by Wieacker, within its respected historical circumstances, was related to this legal culture. His construction of the legal conscience of Late Republican lawyers represented a point of reference from which legal cultures which developed later could be evaluated.

Wieacker’s construction of the legal culture of ‘great jurisprudence’ was in line with the previous legal historical works on the division between theoretical

185 Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ 1939, 463.
legal science and ‘living jurisprudence.’ Fritz Pringsheim’s writings clearly had an effect on Wieacker’s formulations, although he did not want to quote Pringsheim directly, due to the restrictions on references to Jewish scholars in the German legal academia.186 Certainly Pringsheim’s work on the differences between Greek and Roman legal cultures, and his claim that a theoretically overloaded jurisprudence could not reach a socially just result, should be taken into account.187 On the other hand Wieacker’s article echoed the legal philosophy of the ‘New legal science’ and Lebensnähe which advocated jurisprudence’s closeness to the values of actual life.188 Wieacker represented the Rechtsgewissen of the late Republican lawyers as phronesis, practical wisdom, which connected his thoughts on scholars like Giambattista Vico and Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Martin Heidegger.

My analysis introduces two sources of inspiration in Wieacker’ ideas of legal conscience or legal experience, which have not been sufficiently considered in the research literature: the influence of Martin Heidegger’s existentialism, and the togetherness experienced in the working communities of the ‘New legal science.’ In his philosophy Heidegger exhibited a novel way of interpreting the European philosophical tradition, but also a new approach of understanding the philosophical act.189 To Heidegger understanding and questioning about the world were always bound to the inevitable finitude of the human mind. Science was only a limited way of gaining information about the world, and should not be equated with the truth. Philosophy, on the other hand, was a way of thinking which was based on robust, everyday practical knowledge on “being-in-the world” (Dasein).190 In describing the existentialist thinking – and Dasein’s immediate relation to the world – Heidegger used the image of a craftsman who almost unconsciously masters his skill but might not be able to explain it to others.191 The knowledge of a master is exhibited in what he does. Knowing how was always prior to knowing that. The concepts and names which people have given to ‘things’ served as tools in Dasein’s attempt to make sense of the temporal world it inhabits, and concepts themselves were not a sufficient passage to truth. Heidegger built his theory on ancient classics, but he did not attach his theory to any thinker too strictly. He was, however, explicit in rejecting Plato’s theory on ideal-world, and instead emphasized the significance of pre-Platonists like Parmenides. His point of departure was Aristotle’s three-level division of

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186 See p. 82–83.
189 Coltman 1998.
knowledge, and he strongly underlined the importance of “phronesis,” practical wisdom.\(^{192}\) This he called Gewissen, conscience. Conscience was a channel in rethinking the complexities of one’s own and others’ Dasein.

In 1933 Wieacker lectured at the University of Freiburg, where Heidegger was rector. Wieacker participated in the Todtenauberg docent camp led by Heidegger, and although the events in the camp were unfortunate from Wieacker’s point of view, Heidegger’s thoughts had a definite influence on him, as they did for a whole generation of young scholars working in Freiburg. In addition, Wieacker’s letter to Erik Wolf from 1947 show that Wieacker had personal contact with Heidegger even after the war, and respected him as a philosopher and thinker.\(^{193}\) One also has to take into account the indirect influence of Heidegger, via Erik Wolf and Hans-Gerorg Gadamer, who were close colleagues of Wieacker from the 1930s onward. Wieacker’s letters to Erik Wolf prove that in principle he believed that Heidegger’s teachings could be highly beneficial in studying legal history, if properly adjusted.\(^{194}\) The image, which ‘Vom römischen Juristen’ provides of from the thinking of Late Republican jurists, is, in any case, very Heideggerian. The legal skill of Roman jurists was an ‘unconscious craft,’ beyond ‘mere definitions.’ In a strange bond, the jurists were one with their tradition, whose wisdom was part of their ‘common knowledge’ and identity, and did not dictate their ‘productive’ creativity. To Roman jurists legal definitions were not detached from ‘practical life,’ but like ‘symbols’ and attached to the ‘things’ to which they related. Their concepts had a different, ontological existence. Even the rejection of Greek theories in Wieacker’s article was justified on the basis that the ‘justice theories’ and ‘rhetorics’ devalued the essence of the craft, or praxis, of the original legal wisdom of Roman jurists.

Nonetheless, as Wieacker himself expressed in Privatrechtsgeschichte, Heidegger’s theoretical guidelines did not in the end provide a foundation for con-

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\(^{192}\) Ibid., 1–7, 9–13.

\(^{193}\) See p. 150 fn. 342.

\(^{194}\) Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.11.1953: Wieacker praises the work of Werner Maihofer, and continues: “Das Schönste ist, dass diesem durch “Sein und Zeit” erweckten denkenden Menschen Gewissenhaftigkeit und Ernst ein [a greek word] zum “uneigentlichen Man” verboten habe. Seine Kritik hat Heidegger mit Recht als eine Hilfe empfinden können. […] Dieser unphilosophische Kopf [Wieacker is talking about himself] möchte sich wünschen, dass das in den Einsichten großer Juristen obiter eingeschlossene ontologische Sachwissen von M[aihofer] bei einer anderen Gelegenheit ans Licht gehoben warden möge.” According to Detlef Liebs this letter could be, however, seen in a different light. The text embeds a veiled criticism on the shortcomings of Maihofer’s doctoral thesis, and Wieacker – who always attempted to keep his polite tone – managed to point out the flaws without affending the doctorand or his supervisor. Even the letter’s praise on Heidegger should be read as complimentary towards Erik Wolf. I am grateful to professor Liebs for bringing this tendency to my knowledge.
structing legal thinking which might be applicable to a community of people. Heidegger’s Gewissen was, after all, interested in individuals. Wieacker’s own legal historical model for legal thinking was contextualized in a group, but not just any group, but a community which was bound by virtues, a worldview, and by ‘basic thought.’ The guild of Roman jurists was a compelling example of a ‘circle of the learned,’ but clearly resembled some of the communities (or ideals of those communities) which existed in Wieacker’ time and society. There are indications that Wieacker did capitalize on some of his own, firsthand experiences when constructing the phenomenology of the guild of Roman jurists. For example, both the guild and the legal communities of the 1930s Germany were guided by a “basic thought” or “mentality.” A more direct point of reference can be found in the expressions which Wieacker used when referring to the Roman guild of jurists and his own community of scholars. In his article Religion und Recht im römischen Stadtstaat (1935), Wieacker writes about the “harmonious and distinct way of existence of the core” of Roman jurists in describing the fundamentals of the Roman legal thinking and the core of the guild of jurists. The “Stamm” (the permanent staff) was also a concept which Wieacker used from his circle of friends in the Dozentenakademie of the University of Frankfurt.

So in this sense the communal working method of the 1930s provided new views on legal history. Insistence on Erlebnis did provide Wieacker with tools in his quest to trace the uncorrupted basis of legal knowledge, which would be transmittable, learnable and applicable throughout the centuries. To Wieacker ‘experience’ (Erlebnis) comprised a shared spiritual property, which was achieved through collaborative scientific work, and a principle on which he was able to build the construction of legal wisdom. This ‘practical wisdom’ – later called Rechtsgewissen – was a construction of the ‘New legal science’ and opposed to the ‘old science.’

5. The articles on legal education: Conscience in contemporary legal praxis

By the early 1940s, Wieacker had already written on the concept of ‘property’ (the mentality of the people) and about the legal culture of Roman lawyers (and

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195 Cf. p. 204–205, 211.
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their infinite legal skill). From another point of view these themes dealt with the legal consciousness (Rechtsbewusstsein) of Germany and the superior legal skill (which was later conceptualized as Rechtsgewissen) of the Romans. In his three articles ‘Die Stellung der römischen Rechtsgeschichte in der heutigen Rechtsausbildung’ (1939), ‘Der Standort der römischen Rechtsgeschichte in der deutschen Gegenwart’ (1942), and ‘Vielfalt und Einheit der deutschen Bodenrechtswissenschaft der Gegenwart’ (1942) he bound the superior example of Roman legal skill to the circumstances of his contemporary society. At the same time Wieacker took his first steps in comparing and contrasting the two jurisprudential spheres of Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen. This was carried out in the context of legal education. After receiving a professorship from the University of Leipzig, his responsibilities concerning practical education had enhanced. His interest in the subject was nevertheless genuine. While contributing to the academic discussion on legal training he was able to further develop the ideas he had had during his stay in Kiel. These involved the more general acknowledgment of the national importance of educating the youth in accordance with the new Studienordnung, but also the conviction of the fundamental significance of ‘experience’ in learning and legal science.

Wieacker’s personal feeling at the Universities of Frankfurt and Kiel had been that a concrete experience of togetherness and common purpose was a key for successful and sustaining scholarly work. Then the Kameradschaft of friends and colleagues had provided him with a premise for invoking academic work, whose results seemed to grow straight out of the emerging social change, and also in return seemed to shape the destiny of the national community. In the articles of ‘Die Stellung,’ ‘Der Standort’ and ‘Bodenrechtswissenschaft’ Wieacker translated his personal recollection of the revolution in education to a model concerning teaching and learning law in the Third Reich. Since Wieacker was not a pedagogist, he did not concentrate on teaching as such, but focused on the way of thinking which should guide the understanding of and learning from one’s own and other legal cultures. The articles scrutinize the premises which necessitate the transmission of the creative use of law, Schöpfung, and the ways in which it should be applied to society.

In the articles Wieacker’s intentions are threefold. First, he sought to secure the position of legal historical studies and especially the teaching of Roman law

198 See p. 206–207.
within it. Here, rather banally, he also tried to prove the significance of proper legal historical study to the National Socialist state. Second, he emphasized the fruitful and groundbreaking work done by the ‘New legal science’ which enabled the studying and teaching of tradition in a novel and useful way. From these standpoints he concluded his stance on the form of legal education in the future. The teaching, learning, and perceiving law should evolve around experience. This opening was one where legal history had a decisive role, since the ‘experience of law’ was not an atemporal phenomenon; it was a mentality which connected the legal consciousness of the present to preceding scholar generations and legal cultures, enabling a multifaceted, thorough and proper understanding of law.

The route to a productive usage of legal knowledge proceeded from acknowledging the experience which characterized the past legal cultures adjusting this enriched understanding of law to the ‘practical experience’ prevailing in one’s contemporary society. Legal history provided an entity which mediated this translational task and enabled the creative use of law. In the end, Wieacker saw such a bona fide legal scientific process – a skill in which law students should be educated – as a work of conscience, Gewissen.

In ‘Der Standort’ Wieacker elaborates the prevailing theories and orientations in the discipline of legal history. From his viewpoint the discipline as a whole had progressed remarkably and had been able to leave behind the unhealthy methodology of the Pandectists and the infiltration of the liberal worldview. Wieacker gives credit to Paul Koschaker’s work, which he includes in the body of novel insights on legal history. Nevertheless, the prevailing orientations – and this also includes Koschaker’s stance – were partly bound to the old “education forms” and did not fully capitalize on the latest innovative improvements which had been introduced into the field of legal science during the recent years. Here Wieacker draws a strong distinction between him and the old generation represented by Koschaker. Later Wieacker called this “old generation” as “wilhelminian generation”, and perceived his wartime writings as a fight against that constellation. By improvements Wieacker meant the works of his network, especially Ernst Forsthoft’s studies, and the possibilities provided by the new legal

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200 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 55.
201 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 49.
203 On the theme of the “wilhelminian generation” see p. 259–260, 267. Koschaker was offended by the criticism Wieacker elaborated in ‘Der Standort’ (Winkler 2014, 207). So the antagonism between Wieacker’s generation and the “older generation” did to a degree take place.
In general, the biggest failure of the old orientations was that they did not succeed in transmitting the wisdom of past generations to students of law. Since the major perversion and corruption in the German jurisprudence was due to the liberal era, the cultures preceding it were seen as healthy in their legal understanding, and learning from them would be beneficial. The lack of true historical contact with the past, which according to Wieacker plagued contemporary legal science, was mostly about the nonexistent relation of the old orientation with the great jurisprudence of Late Republic.

This failure naturally did not concern Koschaker (who was a romanist), but a flaw in Koschaker’s use of legal history was its dogmatic understanding of historical development. It assumed that a “historical form” of the past could be adapted as such to modern legal thinking and education. Legal historians, who in Wieacker’s article were represented by Koschaker, concentrated on the secondary aspect of history, on linguistic representations. In doing so they were more or less still bound to the dogmatic understanding of Corpus iuris, as had been the Pandectists. Wieacker admitted that the linguistic jurisprudential devices of the Roman world were sophisticated, but they were a mere side-product and a historical expression of the true jurisprudential capability of the Romans. To illustrate his claim, Wieacker shows how the German reception of Roman law had produced disastrous results – the “scientification” of German legal culture – in adopting the plain rhetoric of the Corpus iuris. One could not merely adopt alien forms of education from another time and legal culture. The forms had to be adjusted to one’s own legal existence. The adjustment, learning from another culture and applying its legal thinking to contemporary society, had to focus on and occur through experience.

Legal history obtains this new connection to the present and its irreplaceability in legal education not as a conventional form of education, but rather as a unique exemplary experience.

206 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 51: “das recht würde nun nicht mehr erfahren, sondern erlernt; nicht mehr besessen, sondern erlitten”; 52: “So hat sie [the Pandectist] einer literarischen Form, nicht einer Begegnung mit den ursprünglichen Kräften des altrömischen Rechts, also einer echten geschichtlichen Erfahrung, ihre Formen abgewonnen.” In binding his idea of the essence of German Reception to a presentation on contemporary education, Wieacker was, of course, able to introduce his theory of Reception. That example defended Roman law against Germanist accusations of the corrupting and liberal force of Roman law itself. Overall, the pedagogical articles show the multidimensional core of Wieacker’s idea of Roman law, and how it was being forged partly against dismissive claims and partly through a genuine attempt to have an effect on contemporary legal education.
207 “Nicht als herkömmliche Bildungsform, sondern als einmalige beispielhafte Erfahrung
Wieacker’s conviction – and the claim of his pedagogical articles – was that the new way of legal education had to be constructed around the idea of experience, and legal history provided the context in which this mental skill could be achieved and further trained. Wieacker’s idea also worked other way around; by means of proper ‘juridical experience’ German legal history would be able to study past cultures with increased insightfulness. European legal history provided a dual example of the significance of experience in people’s legal consciousness. At the same time these examples offered learning spheres for future generations of lawyers. Via history it was possible to scrutinize the wrong turns taken by legal science and the mechanics defining the life of legal cultures, as in the case of the German Reception. The development and indeed the actual vitality of a given legal culture depended on the way it valued the meaning of legal experience.

Second, through legal history it was possible to learn from the masters of jurisprudence – Roman lawyers. In their superior legal culture the “experience of common values” had been a phenomenon which enabled their jurisprudence to advance to such a high level. The “powerful concepts” and “explosive force” of Roman jurisprudence lay in its close connection with Roman society, for the values guiding Roman legal skill emerged from the community. The capability of lawyers of the Late Republic was not primarily associated with textual sophistication, but based on an understanding of “the concrete conditions of situations.” From this “experience” the Roman lawyers constructed their jurisprudence in relation to the “foundational order,” the gathering ethos, of their society. Thus the “conscientious” Late Republican jurisprudence could not be replicated in the legal reality of the Third Reich, but contemporary scholars and students of law could learn from its “creative tradition.” The creativity of classical lawyers was due to their awareness, experience, of current values and the social ethos. This combined with their technical skills and superior knowledge of tradition enabled their creativity to rise above other legal cultures. With his final comparison between ancient Roman jurisprudence and the society of Third Reich Germany, Wieacker defends the meaning of historically oriented legal education, but also implicitly asserts that Roman legal skill, and indeed the creativity of con-

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temporary lawyers, resides in a distinguished community of those who are legally trained.

Consequently, understanding the importance of the shared horizon of thought behind any functioning legal culture, and comparing one’s vision to other perceptions in history was the only way for legal thinking to be in touch with social reality and consequently produce socially relevant and consistent results. In other words, if legal reasoning attempted to make just claims which were in congruence with the valuations of the present day, it had to be aware of the limits of its own thinking, the existence in which it was situated. Each time and place had its distinct way of perceiving justice; the set of communal values directed the cultural mentalities and distinct ways of thinking which grew out of the material conditions of life in their different societies.

“Conscientious” legal thinking had to be aware of and understand its relation to the prevailing mentality of the present age. Cultivating conscientious legal thinking – a form of meta-level reasoning, which acknowledged the historicity of mentalities – was the most important task of legal education. The historical understanding of law was the means which would enable students – future lawyers – to interpret and apply law in a productive and proper way. The cultivation of such skills in education would raise a community of legally learned individuals within the national community, who, in placing their knowledge at political leaders to utilize, would ensure that society in general followed its ‘destiny.’ Here one can see an emerging conceptual distinction between the Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen, between legal consciousness and legal conscience, which came to be the characteristic feature of Wieacker’s later classics.

In ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ Franz Wieacker defined a novel way to approach the complicated legal phenomenon of land law. The text was in most parts based on his book ‘Bodenrecht’ (1938), but in ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ Wieacker derived from ‘Bodenrecht’s’ argument the possible effects his ‘conscientious’ view on law would have on education and legal practice. The purpose of the text was to combine the new legal scientific ethos of the ‘New legal science’ with the actual work of the courts; to combine theory and practice in a way which would produce just decisions from the point of view of the national community:

It encompasses three essential subjects: the question about the possibility and necessity of a methodical, uniform land law discipline, the question about the relationship of this science to legislation, legal practice and education, and finally the question about the inner structure of land law.

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211 Wieacker, ‘Der Standort’ 1942, 49.
213 “Sie umschliesst drei wesentliche Gegenstände: die Frage nach Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit einer methodisch einheitlichen Bodenrechtsdisziplin, die Frage nach dem Verhält-
Like in the case of property law, the contemporary relevance of Wieacker’s text was based on the one hand on the incapability of the BGB to respond to the new kind of challenges the developing society brought about, and on the other hand ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ was an attempt to shape the existing legal conventions and customs to meet the demands of the National Socialist state. With respect to the first premise, Wieacker saw the complexity and disjointedness of land law as the result of the “bourgeois world-view” and the shortcomings of positivist legal science. Although the “stockpile of concepts” created by the legal positivists had not extended drastically to the field of land law, according to Wieacker coping with recent developments demanded the introduction of new legal tools from the linguistic and conceptual point of view. Wieacker’s ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ was connected to this ‘legal renewal’, not only in his way of referring (solely) to the scholars of the ‘New legal science’, but through combining the Studienordnung of 1935 with his construction of the future gestalt of land law. Yet, the text is also in line with Wieacker’s other texts. Wieacker sought to overcome the incoherence of legislation concerning ‘things,’ and not only define a unified theory that could be easily applied and learned, but also prove that legislation and a judicature of ‘assets’ bore a sphere of values within it, and that sphere should be acknowledged when making decisions on and about legal matters.

Wieacker considered that the reconstruction of law as a discipline was a matter of current urgency, and himself able to accomplish that redefinition because of the developments that had occurred “during recent years,” that is, due to the implementations of the National Socialist ideology in legislation and the theoretical work conducted by the ‘New legal science’. Wieacker was firm that the legal science formulated by him and his circle of colleagues would be a perfect means to adjust legislation to meet the requirements of ongoing social change, since the methods and legal thinking that the circle had cultivated had been developed from and within that social change. Translating Wieacker’s implicit conviction


214 Wieacker, ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ 1942, 432, 433. Wieacker presented that then (1942) the distinction between the State and community, private and public “did not anymore bind the legal scholars”/“für uns nicht mehr verbindlich sind” (441).


of the distinct model of thinking of his circle to the terminology of the ‘New legal science’, we could say that Wieacker’s ‘creative’ usage of law and that of the Kieler Schule as well as Ernst Forsthoff’s enabled them to give “conscientious” legal advice which was ‘close to reality’ and just, for the particular reason that in being ‘close to reality’ they were ‘conscientious’ and ‘creative.’

‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ is an example of a text where Wieacker attempted to put his existentialist understanding of the essence of law into practice. In concrete terms, Wieacker’s suggestion to reformulate Bodenrecht combines the existing legislation and conventions into an idea of Raumrecht as defined by Ernst Forsthoff. The material conditions of a given time, and the underlying ethos that emerged from it, should direct the legal thinking of that time. In other words the existence and preconditions of being (Daseinvorsorge) of a legal scholar were the starting point of his scholarship:

[W]e consider “Raumrecht” [land law] is determined by the thinking in administrative tasks and of the daily public services of general interest, to take up Forsthoff’s felicitous coinage with a slightly modified meaning.

Wieacker’s personal emphasis in his argument in ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ is evident in the way he stresses that the meaning and purpose of the new theoretical openings of the ‘New legal science’ – and the adjustments brought about by Studienordnung – should not overrule the practical value of the previous legal conventions concerning land law. New theoretical openings such as Wieacker’s should instead sharpen and underline the pedagogical value and practical wisdom of the existing – and historical – legal praxis.

The connection between theoretical information and practical knowledge was emblematic of Wieacker’s legal scientific stance. The foundational significance of legal practice always overrode the temporal demands for adjustments in statutes and norms. The shifts in administrative or scientific styles merely supported the development of praxis, which to Wieacker meant a tested and evolved...
knowledge, used for generations, and which resembled more a skill than an accumulated body of information. In other words ‘praxis’ in the context of ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ had its reference point in the assimilation of the tradition which had appeared in the legal culture of Late Republican Rome. In ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ Wieacker’s continues to utilize the concept of experience as a distinguished mode and tool of legal scholarship. The ‘experience of law’ was a feature which connected the practical work of the courts, sound theoretical contributions and the presentations of past generations of scholars. It was a device used in conceptualizing jurisprudential questions, but it was also a foundation on which legal education should be based. In ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’, while writing on the difficulty of combining theoretical presentations and a practical understanding of the subject matter, Wieacker suggests that experience should be used as a guiding principle. Experience did not merely signify accumulated knowledge or a by-product of ageing; The “experience of law” was a horizon which grew out of an understanding of the essence of law, and as such it provided a common ground on which attempts to combine legal praxis and legal theories could be built.

Nonetheless in ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ experience as a timeless cognitive asset, a conceptual tool of legal scholars, and a pedagogical medium, was explicitly combined to the demands and ethos of his contemporary world. Since Wieacker assumed that he, as a representative of the ‘New legal science,’ was perfectly aware of the demands of the Dasein – the existence where the current law was situated – he was able to give suggestions on the reformulation of the legal conventions. Thus, Wieacker’s own experience of social change – shared by other young legal scholars – was a medium which allowed him to combine theory and existing legal practice in a ‘conscientious’ manner. To him, the synthesis where he interpreted the current law and customs from the point of view of the ‘New

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222 Thus, with respect to Volksgesetzbuch, Wieacker objected to the attempts to include land law under a new unifying codification. His stance was probably due to a general ideological resistance to any codifications, but also because the codification could not take into account the “distinct nature of land law” and its relation to “practice.” See Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 6.5.1941. NL Carl Schmitt, RW 0265, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.


IV. Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history and in legal science

legal science’ was a last phase in the historical continuation of true legal scholarship. Like skillful scholars before him, he was applying the craft of legal thinking, only now in very particular circumstances. Thus in ‘Vielfalt und Einheit’ he considered himself to be applying Gewissen, practical legal wisdom, to the field of German land law:

[...] it is our opinion that it [land law] requires a uniform science that, as a quasi conscience, unites and balances the differences with the communal function of the land. This applies to the relationship with administrative practice as well as to the relationship with the administration of justice in the area of land law.225

The way in which Wieacker used the concept of Gewissen in 1942 contained the idea of totally unprecedented and progressive social change. The relation between the people, the state and law had taken a novel direction which the legal theories of the bourgeois world could not understand or control. On one hand, and in comparison to most other theorists of the ‘New legal science,’ Wieacker constantly reflected on his ideas of legal history, and carried with him the insurmountable ideal of Late Republican Roman law. This separated him from scholars like Karl Larenz or Ernst Forsthoff, with whom he shared many ontological premises about legal science. On the other hand, Wieacker’s idea of the significance and essence of Roman law diverged drastically from the arguments of for example Ernst Schoenbauer, who rather one-dimensionally compared the past and present societies, seeking for historical justifications for the National Socialist regime.226 Wieacker was interested in the mentality, the experience, of the past lawyers. The ‘art’ in which Roman lawyers transferred their knowledge, horizon and perception – their existence – to legal language represented an example of just judgments, legal education and theories in his contemporary reality. Thus, Wieacker’s thought was more or less situated in between or outside of most legal scientific presentations prevailing in the Third Reich. It was firmly constituted on the ethos of young conservative lawyers of the war generation, but mostly interested in the cultural, spiritual sphere of the law.

Built on legal historical paragons and established concepts, Wieacker considered Gewissen to be the ability to read and direct the constantly evolving legal culture. As opposed to previous theories of Roman law, his idea of legal conscience was connected to the experience of violent revolution in legal education and abrupt metamorphoses in civil society. As such it comprised the core of


226 Cf. Schönbauer 1935.
Wieacker’s historical vision, and his later works on legal history and hermeneutics have to be read in the light of this ontological principle. In 1942 the idea of Gewissen is not a mere synonym for the concept of Rechtsgewissen, which Wieacker used in Privatrechtsgeschichte de Neuzeit, since the ‘legal conscience,’ as elaborated in Wieacker’s classic book, had to deal with the inescapable precondition of guilt.


The Second World War proposed an ungraspable dilemma to German Society. A dilemma which, explicitly or implicitly, overshadowed the public debate on the meaning of the national past, present and future. Unlike the discussion which emerged after the First World War, this time the War had been a criminal one; it had been launched against civilians and fought against the helpless. There was no “Symmetry of Death” in the Second World War or in the race war of the National Socialism.227 The war, and along with it the warriors, were unconditionally marked with the “stigma of [one-sided] violence”.228 The abstract guilt experienced was comparable to the vastness of the crime. Karl Jaspers formulated that the Schuldfrage, question of guilt, should be divided into four categories in order to be understandable. The categories of criminal, political, moral and metaphysical guilt meant that almost all Germans were responsible with respect to the sins conducted in and by the Third Reich.229 Obviously the existence of such a ‘stigma’ demanded treatment in order to make it manageable for both to the national community and for individual citizens.

The means adopted to make the guilt bearable can be seen in three ways. First there were demands for the “general amnesty” of implicitly accused Germans.230 According to this view, the acts of ordinary people should be disregarded when litigating the crimes of the Third Reich. After all, the Second World War was a war, and in wars people attempt to kill each other. If misconduct on the German side was under scrutiny, then one should also consider the justness of, for example, the firebombings of German cities or Russian mass rapes on the eastern frontier. International justice could be seen as a political invention used for inter-

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227 Kühne 2005 229.
governmental purposes, and thus it should not be a starting point in weighing the justice or injustice of a particular behavior in particular circumstances. The accusations of the Allied countries generated a strong and acute counter-reaction; A vast majority of the German people rejected the idea of “collective guilt” after the Second World War equating the attempts to cast the blame for the Holocaust on the Germans as a people to Fascism.\footnote{According to Habbo Knoch, in 1947 95 percent of Germans rejected the idea of ‘collective guilt.’ Knoch, \textit{Die Tat als Bild: Fotografien des Holocaust in der deutschen Erinnerungskultur}. Hamburg, Hamburger edition 2001, 170, also 152–153, 212.}

In the second common view the retrospective narratives about the era of the Third Reich splintered the guilt, sentencing some agents to total guilt while releasing some from responsibility. For example, the SS, the SA and the \textit{Einsatzgruppen} were perceived as fundamentally and spiritually evil. These groups were led and participated in by corrupt and malevolent people, who managed to seize just enough power in society to fulfill their murderous fantasies.\footnote{Gudrun Brockhaus, ‘The Emotional Legacy of the National-Socialist Past in Post-War Germany,’ in Aleida Assmann & Linda Short (ed.), \textit{Memory and Political Change}. New York, Palgrave Macmillan 2012, 36; Kühne 2005, 230, 245.} These organizations were perceived ambiguously as both undemocratic and political in nature. In the common narrative, these groups had stolen legislative and parliamentary power for themselves by deception, and afterwords became affiliated with the political sphere where bureaucratic decisions on criminal acts were made, leaving common people as passive witnesses to their crimes.

The third part comprised the \textit{redemptive republican} discourse, which Dirk Moses attaches especially to the character of Jürgen Habermas.\footnote{Moses 2007.} This stream of thought was mostly upheld by a younger generation of scholars, writers and public figures, or communists. Although redemptive republicans were not unconditional supporters of Allied austerity and “purge” politics in German administration and education, they called for radical and decisive actions, even at the expense of sliding into social turmoil. Redemptive republicans wanted to detach themselves from the \textit{German tradition} (which after a few decades was named the \textit{Sonderweg}) and in more concrete terms wished to get rid of people who were complicit with the Third Reich, and to abolish the nationalistic sentiments from German culture.

At the same time, the institutional form of the new Republic was under serious and bitter discussion. Konrad Adenauer’s time as the chancellor of West Germany cannot be seen as a model achievement of liberal public engagement or as a sign of flourishing and pluralistic exchange of opinions, although rebuilding the spiritual structures of society was nevertheless a discursive one. To intellectual
historians this period nowadays appears to have been a discussion on the meaning of the German past in relation to the present and future of the Republic. In this discussion several competing intellectual communities could be distinguished. However, in the discursive reconstruction process significant aspects were not only the past of the nation as a whole or the respective intellectual constellations, but the personal past and the memory of those who contributed to the discussion. As such, rebuilding the legal, cultural and social essence of the Federal Republic was a “struggle with one’s conscience” both at the public and personal level. There were no easy or quick solutions in dealing with abstract guilt. “Working through” the national and personal past was a process in which healing and productive results seemed to occur only with time. In addition, remembering the past and further assimilating it into a coherent narrative through which one could interpret the present and anticipate the future, was either overshadowed or backed up by numerous psychological mechanisms.

For the most part coming to terms with the past on both the public and the personal level was impossible. People wanted to keep some concrete part of the past untainted, no matter what the official judgment on the past was. Around or on this memory one could construct continuity and an atemporal meaning in one’s life. Thus, public memory and private (or family) memory are never synonymous. A positive memory of an event, acquaintance, achievement or response usually remains significant, even though it might be devalued by the official stance. In this task of remembering, an individual usually needs positive appraisal from people he or she feels close to. Such a mechanism also applied to post-war German society. Again, like after the First World War, the idealized

234 Moses 2007, 10.
235 Dirk Moses (2007, 40) defines the situation which he calls the “dilemma of republican democracy in a post-totalitarian, post-genocidal society”: “On the one hand, such societies must distance themselves in all respects from the evil regime that they replaced in order to establish their moral credibility. On the other, they must usually integrate a substantial number of persons who were implicated in the crimes of that regime if the new republic is to be a stable entity. West Germany institutionalized this ambivalence. It was the successor regime of the Nazis, liable for its political crimes, while regarding itself as the legitimate representative of the German cultural nation (Kulturation).”
239 Cf. p. 32–34.
social constellation of togetherness became a tool to understand and interpret the common past, present and future in a way that it could bring meaning both to public and personal life.

An illuminating case is the afterlife of the concept and form of Kameradschaft in the Federal Republic. Although militant organizations were prohibited by law, and all kind of militant rhetoric was often treated with silence, disinterest, and even hostility, people continued to need symbols which carried along the positive meanings one had experienced in a bygone world.\textsuperscript{240} The changed social content to which the concept referred, no longer being equated with the militant concept of Männerbund, was related to the larger and shifting orientation in the policies, mentalities and values with respect to such questions as the family, masculinity, career, politics and nationality in the new Federal Republic.

After 1945 Kameradschaft no longer referred to the organizations and hierarchies of Übermenschen, as had been the case in the repressive rhetoric of the Third Reich. In the fall of 1945 German troops were made up of individuals dependent on the help and mercy of others; Kameradschaft was a community of prisoners of war. In the prison camps many men lost their physical and mental health, dignity or future prospects. Nevertheless, many soldiers survived the harsh conditions with, and even because of their fellow men.\textsuperscript{241} In addition to the concrete, life-saving help men offered to each other in the prison camps, the hope and expectations they had imposed on the Heimat which allegedly waited for them after imprisonment, were cherished and constituted within these male circles.\textsuperscript{242} In all these the symbolic value of Kameradschaft was not lost; quite the opposite, it was redefined to explain the spiritual essence of the circle of men who now possessed a shared history as POWs, as members in a peacetime democratic society and as members of the modern family. The heritage of this common experience of unity and of a common past circled around and often involved references to an ideal, geistig cause, and the theme of Kameradschaft continued to surface frequently in the public discourse of the new republic.\textsuperscript{243}

The redefined concept of Kameradschaft, however, carried within it meanings of suffering and sacrifice. When this concept was deployed in post-war discus-

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{240} Kühne 2005, 229–270.
\bibitem{241} Kühne 2005, 211–212.
\bibitem{242} See D. Cartellieri, \textit{Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjetunion: Die Lagergesellschaft}. München 1967 167–169, 272; Kühne 2005, 213.; The “visits of normalcy,” in which men, when a rare chance for it occurred, let themselves enjoy a memory or a touch of civil society, took place within the framework of the all-male camps. These “visits” were often “coffee-breaks,” or like in the case of Franz Wieacker’s imprisonment, lectures like in university. On camp academias, see Liebs 2010; Avenarius 2010.
\end{thebibliography}
In the shared mental sphere of Kameradschaft, the optimal society had been different from the one prisoners of war faced on homecoming. Thus, talking about the mentality of Kameradschaft, or the kameradschaftliche world, usually connotated a negative claim in the social reality of post-war Germany. Whereas in the rhetoric of the 1930s, Kameradschaft had referred to the quest for national unity and dignity after the humiliating Treaty of Versailles, in the post-war discussions the notion was an important part of the terminology which implied to coming to terms with the twisted and criminal past. This was especially due to the problematic nature of individual deeds as part of a national entity, Volksgemeinschaft, which was now proved to be a criminal one. Thus, talking about the spiritual heritage of the old days, of which Kameradschaft clearly represented, was an important level in both private discussions and in public discourse.

For academics, talking and writing about the distinct social purpose and position of the scholarly sphere was for their part a means to resolve the ‘dilemma of the post-totalitarian society.’ They had to both distance themselves from the illegal acts, agents and thoughts of the previous years, but also defend their personal motives during the days of totalitarianism, and the continuing significance of their “learned world” in a drastically changing society. While doing so they, and especially the conservative scholars of the war generation, constantly experienced a frustrating incompatibility between their own understanding of correct communality and the official direction of Germany amidst the modernizing process. After the Second World War the legal scholars of the war generation felt doubly dislocated. The concrete communities of researchers that existed in pre-War universities were no more. The denazification policy and the dividing up of Germany questioned and partly destroyed the notion of Heimat which the learned had constructed during the preceding centuries. In addition, conservative scholars witnessed the eradication of values which they had found fundamental, and were forced to give up some of their traditional prestige, especially with respect to the administration of universities and the independence of jurisprudence.

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245 Thomas Kühne (Kühne 2005, 223–225, 228) writes how the Federal Republic became the “society of men’s grief,” where the war experience was the maxim around which the gendered roles in families and civil society were supposed to be arranged. In the gatherings of male circles, such as veteran assemblies in the 1950s, the participants tried to re-enact the shared positive memory of the past, as opposed to everything which was wrong in the present.


Due to the compelling economic and political circumstances these social structures had no other choice but to adapt, leaving the academics with no other role than that of protesters against the contemporary “social state” and “mass-university.”

The academic culture of social sciences in post-war Germany was characterized by the importance of semi-official study circles arranged outside the formal structures of the university. In these meetings scholars attempted to understand and analyze contemporary social changes and connect the old theories to the novel circumstances as well as redefine established views to better match the challenges of the modern day. This phenomenon went beyond official academic culture, and historical research has acknowledged the need to apply anthropological and social psychological models to understand the form of “doing science” that was typical of this time. Joachim Ritter spoke for many when he wrote that to him, these meetings of “small personal circles, like islands of personal continuity, are important for the further existence of the Geist.” So the existence of regular meetings where scholars could experience a kameradschaftliche mentality were important for the future and for the vitality of the scholarly culture (as remembered and cultivated by the learned), but also for the participants themselves in their individual task to fit their sometimes contradictory experiences of totalitarianism, war and imprisonment to the larger narrative of the national community.

This way to dichotomizing social reality between the opposite ideals of the ‘guilds of the learned’ and ‘barbarism’ as way to make sense of the ‘anarchy’ of the first years of the Federal Republic, was typical of academics, but it did not necessarily reflect reality. As Peter Lambert has presented, after the First World War the guilds of academics were not unattached ‘spiritual islands,’ for they interacted with the political and social spheres of society like any other community within the nation. For the most part, the “unworldly” atmosphere which was commonly associated with the original “imagined communities” of the professoriat, was projected from informal gatherings between a mentor and his “school.”

In short, the ideal of the guild very much represents the overall mentality of Bildungsbürgertum: the “lost world” to which Bildungsbürgertum wanted to return

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248 Meinel 2012, 3.
250 van Laak 1987, 11.
251 Joachim Ritter to Carl Schmitt, quoted in Müller 2003, 117.
never had existed in reality. Cultivating the ideal of a bygone absolute social premise to express one’s learnedness and conduct an inner journey towards perfection, nevertheless served as a powerful metaphor and helped historically oriented scholars in their task to rediscover meaningful phases in the course of both national and European history in the years following the end of the war.253

More recent historiography has underlined the moral problematic of these ‘spiritual circles’ since little seemed to have changed in the mentality of these communities.254 Especially the influence and importance of Carl Schmitt behind the Kameradschaft of the legal scholars of the Federal Republic presents a paradox to a history of historiography which wants to see a drastic breach between National Socialist Germany and the post-war West German intellectual atmosphere. Schmitt refused to go through the denazification program, was excluded from the institutions of higher education, and rejected any possibility of remorse or personal apologies with regard to his actions and writings during the Third Reich.255 Schmitt’s intellectual legacy was of course a multifaceted and even fruitful point of departure for social scientific theoretizations in a permanently altered world, but one could not ignore the anti-parliamentary and racist worldview behind his scientific constructions. Both the war-generation scholars and even the younger generation of 1945ers continued to be intrigued by the powerful writings and charismatic personality of this now self-proclaimed prophet and “Grand Inquisitor” of German social science.256 It is not accurate to claim that they shared Schmitt’s morals or all of his jurisprudential conclusions, rather they eclectically picked out some of his remarks or remained in awe of the scholarly superiority which surrounded the “hermit of San Casciano.”257 In other words, Schmitt was both a symbol which scholars were reluctant to give up and an intellectual provocateur, whose ideological premises many startled, but contendingly witnessed the challenge he posed on the disliked ‘social state’ of the Federal Republic. Thus, the ‘scientific Kameradschafts’, and Schmitt’s position within them, represents the wider process of coming to terms with the past which legal scholars had to undergo.

Since the scholarly task of post-war German reparation was both official and personal, the key-themes of legal science were ambiguously social scientific but

254 Meinel 2012, 2–4, 444; Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1985, 90–93.
257 Müller 2003, 54.
partly intimate or confessional. The “call of conscience” and the search for sustaining “values” were paradigms to which the reflective and interpretative methods were most applicable and the influence of (Catholic) religion natural.258 Such a quest to analyze and fortify the “collective conscience” of West German society marked the legal scientific discourse of post-war academia.259 All paradigms, whether one leaned heavily on the Christian and Catholic tradition, classic natural law theories or insisted on the necessity of a commonly acknowledged system of values guiding the practical work conducted in the courts of law, agreed in blaming legal positivism for the destruction of the legal order.260 The fact that legal positivism was commonly perceived as the root of all evil, like in the 1930s theories of ‘legal renewal,’ enabled legal scientists to hold on to the ontological premises of their constructions of justice. Hans Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’ was buried, and not until the reinvention of analytical philosophy in the late 1960s did his thoughts undergo rehabilitation. Likewise Heinrich Mitteis suggested a return to the “living values of legal history,” which in practice were situated in the times before the emergence of positivistic streams in legal science and in German history.261 Gustav Radbruch when drafting the foundations of post-war German jurisprudence explained the “aberration” of the Third Reich legal sphere as deriving from the corrupting effect of legal positivism.262 The first president of the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Hermann Weinkauff, further applied Radbruch’s theses (from even more religious foundations than Radbruch) while blaming the legal positivistic idea of “law is law” on the jurisdictional havoc of the Third Reich.263 Although most acknowledged the need to find again the core values of actual jurisprudence, legal scientists defended their view of essential values against other philosophical or political worldviews.

But coming to terms with the past involved more personal aspects. When the shocking reality of the National Socialist rule and its legacy reached conservative academics, the experience of the catastrophe of the 1930s had to be explained in terms of a general historical narrative of the national community, but also on a more personal level. The contribution of scholars as a group to the “suppression of the truth” was a dilemma whose solving was far more difficult than to make sense of the historical narrative leading to the totalitarian regime.264 Very often

258 Foljanty 2013.
259 Müller 2003, 70.
260 Cf. p. 73–74.
262 Radbruch 1946.
264 Conrad 1999, 146–149.
the questioning of one’s personal narrative about the twelve years of the Third Reich had to wait until the more material structures of life were repaired. When the immediate conditions affecting on one’s everyday reality – with respect to for example nutrition, housing and employment – had been secured, people were able to rethink their life from a wider perspective. The war years brought about traumas, disabilities and disturbing memories, which prevented any self-reflection. With regard to academics, immediate self-reflections mostly remained inside their own networks and group of friends.

There was no immediate Damascus or revelation in the self-understanding of legal scholars if one considers public statements and texts dealing with their relation to the Nazi regime and ideology. The personal and vocational coming to terms with the past of legal scholars, at least in the ranks of the more conservative part of the Stand, included clinging very strongly to the abstract and more distant past when things had seemed brighter and the virtuous foundations of society were in their place. Thus, scholars hung on to the sphere which still belonged to them, in other words they concentrated on teaching and “spiritual rebuilding,” like their predecessors had done before them within the Humboldtian tradition.

In the early years of the 1960s the memory of recent years resurfaced when the legal process against Adolf Eichmann was broadcast all over the world. In 1963 the Auschwitz trials began in Frankfurt. Along with increased media attention, public interest turned towards the years of Third Reich years, and when questions of guilt were given practical definition in the courts, in more informal settings discussions on individual responsibility within a criminal nation (re-) appeared. The fragile continuity in German universities was interrupted by a generational revolt, which again constituted an inescapable objective for the consensual culture of German academia. The smoldering discontent among the young in the Federal Republic flared into violent protest in 1968. Throughout West Germany students demonstrated against the conservative government, the conditions of studying and political leaders whose Nazi-past did not seem to disturb their involvement in the political life of the Republic. Much of the protest was targeted against politicians and publishers, but the most dramatic action often took place in universities. Students demanded that those university staff who had connections with totalitarian past should immediately be dismissed. During the late years of the Adenauer regime and the student riots of the late 1960s many academics were forced to rethink their personal histories, the premises of their scholarship and the relation which their work had with the mentality of the nation.

265 See e.g. Fritz Pringsheim to Arthur Schiller 3.3.1946. Columbia University archives, Arthur Schiller papers, Uncatalogued correspondence, Box 5, Columbia University, New York.
Franz Wieacker perceived that everyday reality of the immediate years following the “collapse” was marked by both “resentment” and practical difficulties, which made scholarly work almost impossible.\textsuperscript{266} Although Wieacker himself found an academic safe haven, first in Göttingen and then in Freiburg, he felt far from happy. Living conditions were marked by scarcity and many previously important landmarks and symbolic landscapes had been destroyed or contaminated in the events following the 1930s Machtergreifung. Some of his friends were not as lucky as him, and were ousted from the academia. Wieacker, like many others, tried to construct a meaningful new life in a world where previous common appreciations no longer mattered. To Wieacker the physical ruins were a symbol of the inner spiritual wreckage of the nation.\textsuperscript{267} It was the duty of scholars to rebuild the spiritual structures of Germany in order that the nation could again rise from its sad demise. Again, and increasingly after the war, Wieacker connected the physical environment to the spiritual work of a scholar:\textsuperscript{268}

I feel more apt to intellectual work than ever, since the decades of impending threat have changed to a clear, sober suffering above the ruins.\textsuperscript{269}

The process of reconstructing legal science’s core and direction was as necessary (and demanding) as was the rebuilding of the physical structures of society. In their response to the fundamental dilemma regarding the necessity of a sound new base for legal science, many scholars leaned on theories of natural law. Wieacker reacted to these accounts with relative understanding. Especially in
Erik Wolf’s texts he found familiar aspects. After all, the natural legal search for suprapositive principles beyond positive law was an orientation in which Wieacker had distinguished himself and continued to engage himself in the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, Wieacker was reluctant in linking his view of legal history to fashionable theories of natural law. There were many theoretical obstacles, which will be dealt with in detail in section IV.8, but on the ideological level the main reason was the original contradiction between casuistic Roman law and Greek theories of social justice. Wieacker’s historical ideal, the jurisprudence of the Late Republic, presumably had been free from any influence of systemization and theory building. According to the same legal historical stance, the later “corruption” of Roman law was due to the excessive emphasis and assimilation of the theories which assumed the existence of some kind of perennial natural justice.

Moreover, modern natural law theories came too close to the religious worldview. In the end ‘conscience’ and the religious vocation represented two distinct ways of perceiving the world, and whereas the former had subsumed the superstitious human nature, the latter had not. On the other hand, many natural law theories leaned too much on “calculative” reasoning and were as such (according to Wieacker) closer to legal positivism than sound jurisprudence.

The stance adopted by Wieacker can be elaborated by comparing it to two other major lines of “existentialist” legal science, namely to Carl Schmitt’s and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s post-war production.

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271 Cf. p. 166–168, 216–228.


274 To label Schmitt and Gadamer as “existentialists” is highly tentative, but that was nevertheless the category in which Wieacker himself situated them. Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 469 fn. 13.
tance towards Schmitt. He rarely refers to Schmitt in *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit* nor does he mention him in his letters. In the Federal Republic it was possible to work on Schmitt’s ideas, actually quite a few distinguished scholars did, but in doing so, the author had to be prepared for vocal resistance and public resentment.\footnote{Cf. Jürgen Habermas’ critique of Reinhard Koselleck’s *Kritik und Krise* (1959), which Habermas saw as an heir to Carl Schmitt’s thinking. Jürgen Habermas: ‘Zur Kritik an der Geschichtsphilosophie,’ in Jürgen Habermas, *Kultur und Kritik*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1977, 355–364.} In the 1950s Schmitt altered his previous “institutional turn,” which had intrigued Wieacker, to an orientation which dealt mostly with international law.\footnote{Mika Ojakangas, ‘A terrifying world without an exterior: Carl Schmitt and the metaphysics of international (dis)order,’ in Louiza Odysseos & Fabio Petito, *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt*. London, Taylor & Francis 2007.} He also retreated into a kind of adapted isolation outside academia—mostly because he was not allowed to return, although he himself preferred the story in which his retreat was a deliberate personal choice—bitterly commenting on the political life of the Federal Republic and maintaining his own shadow academy for young scholars.\footnote{Cf. Müller 2003, 51–62, 91.} In his works Schmitt combined older themes with contemporary circumstances in order to give a presentation of the (allegedly unjust) ontology of his current reality. Thus, he chose the metaphor of the Grand Inquisitor from *Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form* (1923), by which he illustrated the ambiguous relation of the Catholic Church and the common awareness of justice. In short, the Catholic Church as an institution representing justice, had the right to act against what was commonly held as just or against individual ethical purposes: it was the Grand Inquisitor.\footnote{Cf. Alfons Motschenbacher, *Katechon oder Grossinquisitor?: Eine Studie zu Inhalt und Struktur der Politischen Theologie Carl Schmitts*. Marburg, Tectum Verlag 2000, 314, 330–333.} After the war the metaphor slightly altered. Now it was Schmitt himself who is equated with the Grand Inquisitor. Schmitt was neither willing to reconsider his ideas nor question their moral superiority with respect to the scientific paradigms prevailing in the Federal Republic.

Wieacker used the same Grand Inquisitor metaphor when giving a presentation in 1949.\footnote{The presentation was later turned into a book. Franz Wieacker, *Vom römischen Staat als Rechtsordnung*. Freiburg, Zähringer 1949. The Grand Inquisitor metaphor is on page 6.} To Wieacker, Roman law in European history was like the Grand Inquisitor. Even when contrary to public opinion in any given historical moment, Roman law had managed to retain the connection to atemporal justice. The tradition of Roman law had gone through different phases during European legal history, but nevertheless continued to provide a source for correct and moral le-
7. Affections in Rechtsgewissen 1945–1968

legal decisions, even though they might have appeared unjust to the general public. Here the conceptual distinction between *Rechtsbewusstsein* and *Rechtsgewissen*, based on Wieacker’s war time experience, is evident. On closer scrutiny, it is clear that Wieacker emphasizes the meaning of tradition more than Schmitt.

Wieacker held on to the principles that Roman lawyers had managed to combine the necessities of their social being with their legal method, to relate their *Rechtsgewissen* to the prevailing *Rechtsbewusstsein*. Their jurisprudence had been ‘conscientious,’ a form of legal wisdom, and thus their texts provided priceless examples for modern legal scholarship. In addition, the correct understanding of the tradition had to be derived from and was situated in the community of legal scholars. Although in historical comparison society as a whole was constantly evolving, the common culture of the learned provided a premise from which these changes could be evaluated, coordinated, and analyzed. To Wieacker the question was whether the methods deployed in the research process were appropriate and solid, for not only was the truth reachable only through certain, correct methods, but the question of methodology extended to the notion of the morality of science.280

From the mid 1950s onwards Wieacker engaged himself ever more determinedly in discussions on legal hermeneutics, and was fascinated by the thoughts of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Wieacker’s idea of legal conscience, although there were several points of connection, was difficult to translate into Gadamer’s hermeneutical model. To Gadamer true interpretation existed in dialogue. When scholars engaged themselves in a discussion or reading, the quest for understanding was a dialectic one. Both the understanding of the phenomenon at hand, and the scholars’ own prejudices changed. The core of Wieacker’s historical view was that a distinguished model of just interpretation had existed in European history, and should be studied and applied to contemporary society in order to correct “the crisis of justice.”281 Gadamer was ready to abandon historical knowledge as überzeitlich; it had no pregiven direction. Written history was a series of acts of interpretation where people tried to understand their past and present. Clearly there were some consistent elements in human beings that had stayed the

280 Cf. Wolf 2007, 78.
281 Wieacker, *A History of Private Law* 1995, 482; Wieacker to a degree accepted Gadamer’s view, but held on to the assumption that Roman law as practiced by the ancient lawyers themselves represented the truth. Their virtuous judgments presented a model to modern legal theorists in their quest for just legal decision: “[D]en alten römischen Texten (für die dogmatische Auslegung) mit zunehmenden Zeitenabstand wirklich ein neurer, gerechterer Sinn sich entfalten kann; (wie im Abstand Hochgipfel hinter den vorgrelagerten Hügelketten aufsteigen).” Wieacker to Hans–Georg Gadamer 14.7.1965, Nachlass Hans–Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar.
same through time, but to Gadamer, historical narrative was more about the present than the past. Wieacker’s idea of history was, on the other hand, and as Reinhard Zimmerman rightly asserts, distinctly constructive in nature. According to Wieacker, and in distinction to Gadamer, the post-war ‘crisis of justice’ was a result of actual historical events and development. A side-effect of this historical development was the incorrect interpretation of the law, which legal science (or more precisely, legal positivism) had disoriented in its methods. He wrote to Gadamer:

[…] for the modern law does not seem to make such an experience for today’s lawyer. I cannot think of any other reason for this very peculiar phenomenon at the moment, than particular disrespect of today’s interpretation teaching [Auslegungslehre] against the authority which appears in the words of law. This [crisis] could be related to the generally accepted discrediting and “unmasking” conducted by legal positivism. These things [methodology] are now so in disarray that the old fundamental relations of law and dogma today appear only in turbidity.

Wieacker linked his idea of Rechtsgewissen to the European tradition of law, but it was ‘experience,’ which enabled the lawyer or scholar to make a sound interpretation of law. So in Wieacker’s theory there was a connection between feeling and interpretation, or to be more precise, a just understanding could not be reached by means of pure reason. Justice involved such emotions as respect, modesty and dignity, and law had to be authoritative in the eyes of those whose actions it sought to guide and regulate. This dimension had a correlative in the actual premises of academia. The community of legal scholars was also affected by the values of law, and, in Wieacker’s conviction, law was supposed to reflect this distinct, virtuous being in its reality.

a) The guild of scholars

During the War, while serving on the frontline, Wieacker had pondered about the possibility of scientific work after the war was over. In his letter to Ernst Rudolf

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285 Wolf 2007, 78.
Huber on 6. January 1945, he referred to the constant and pervasive public demands to “keep on trying and stay together.” Wieacker’s view on the wellbeing of the nation was not congruent with the public stance. As always, in his thoughts the national destiny was tied to the structures of academic work, and from that viewpoint a return to normalcy was no longer possible. In Italy he heard news about the destruction of German universities and the relocation of his former colleagues. Thus, he confessed to Huber:

[T]hat in an intellectual and dispositional connection an exterior organization [the university] is not necessary, and that one ideed must stay in touch with regard to a national godsend of an immediate lasting restoration, [we must], although it would be sad, to keep a constant local connection and thus to withheld the best personnel from the other already dreadfully depleted universities.\footnote{Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 6.1.1944[1945]. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.}

The future of the ‘spiritual well-being’ of the nation was not dependent on the concrete structures or bureaucracy, but on the ‘togetherness’ of the learned. Indeed, the cultural core of Germany, the tradition of Bildung, would do even better without the ‘weakened’ universities. In his letter Wieacker is explicit about the importance of learned ‘togetherness’ in the ‘recovery’ of the national community, but implicitly his claim also presents the personal need to keep in contact with the common culture of his circle of friends. After the war Wieacker indeed had to start from scratch, without the structures and premises which had previously defined the routines and everyday reality of the scholar. His 1945 anticipation of the indispensability of the close communities of scholars proved to be right, both on the general level, since many scholars shared Wieacker’s opinion, but also personally when he had to face the physical relocation and the changed political climate of the Federal Republic. While starting “afresh” he tried to both visit spaces and companies which still carried a positive significance and was afraid that the experiences he had gathered would become obsolete. In his letter to Ernst Rudolf Huber he expressed his fear that the “catastrophic decomposition of memory”\footnote{Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.10.46. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.} would slowly eradicate the meaningful emotional bond between him and his friend. On the other hand, the circle of close comrades was a mental
space in which he among others was able to deal with difficult memories and disturbing experiences.\textsuperscript{288}

In his need for scholarly togetherness Wieacker was not alone. Many scholars, which before the war would have mostly been categorized as representing the war generation and conservative revolutionary thoughts, acknowledged the necessity to cultivate their common culture beyond the walls of the university. A good example of the semi-private discussion circles of conservative legal scholars, and an attempt to retain the memory and experience of the past \textit{Kameradschaft}, were the seminars arranged by Ernst Forsthoff. Forsthoff organized regular “summer academies” in the town of Ebrach, which were attended by Franz Wieacker, but also many other distinguished scholars of the Federal Republic, ranging from Carl Schmitt and Arnold Gehlen to Niklas Luhmann.\textsuperscript{289} At the same time, the Ebrach seminars were an “intimation experience” into the worldview of the conservative mentors for many students participating in the annual gatherings.\textsuperscript{290} Depending on the view of the given contemporary historian, the Ebrach seminars either presented a latent academic threat to the parliamentary establishment, or acted as an essential premise for conservative legal scholars in their scientific endeavors, since many of them still felt themselves to be outsiders within the academic community of post-war Germany.\textsuperscript{291} The seminars did result in some noteworthy academic outcomes. For example, Carl Schmitt first introduced his theory of the “tyranny of values” in Ebrach, and later dedicated his book on the subject to “the Ebrachers.”\textsuperscript{292} Like the \textit{Dozentenlager} of the 1930s, the ‘spiritual \textit{Kameradschafts}’ of the Federal Republic served many purposes, and were not merely a kind of academic holiday. However, to the contributors, the togetherness and experience of belonging to the same-minded group of scholars descending from an abruptly ended world of bourgeois learnedness and virtues, which the regular reunions offered, were more important than the possible scholarly significance of the seminars. In 1960 Joachim Ritter wrote to Ernst Forsthoff about his experience of the Ebrach seminar:

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[288] Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.10.46: Wieacker describes how he had traveled to the coast with Hellmut Becker, (who used to be Huber’s assistant) and “mich in meiner seit mehreren Jahren sich verdichtenden Überzeugung bestätigt sah, dass er […] Richtung und »Substanz« (um dieses Schlagwort zu brauchen) gut seinen Kriegserfahrungen beständig gewinnt. […]die angesammelten Beschaulichkeit zu kommen.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
\item[289] Meinel 2012, 3–4; Müller 2003, 73.
\item[292] Müller 2003, 73.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The circle of young, open-minded and bright, thinking people that you gathered there around yourself quite encouraged me and gave me hope that that which we have to do will not be lost in the current mass universities and will eventually find those who will pass it on. Maybe it is always the fate of the reasonable intellect in the historical world to be limited in its esoteric influence on the small group, and we let ourselves be deceived about what is normal by the education of the 19th-century middle classes.  

To the participants the image of the bourgeois order of bygone Germany represented a golden age, whose absence they bitterly acknowledged in the Federal Republic. The learnedness, social order and virtues that the past world seemed to them to possess, were absent in their contemporary world, but nonetheless offered a mental position from which they were able to analyze the post-war society. Although in the Federal Republic Bildungsbürgertum had turned into Bürgertum without the social respect which its monopoly in higher education had previously provided it, the conservative scholars desperately clung to the Bildung part of the word in order to achieve some understanding and sense of significance in a world they no longer felt to be their own. Franz Wieacker, who naturally also participated the Erbrach seminars, shared this nostalgic yearning for the past, which he tried to regularly re-enact in the reunions of the scientific Kameradschafts. Moreover, the standpoint that the experience within these communities offered provided a mental tool to “know right” and evaluate different values in a blurry modern world.  

In a complex modern world, Wieacker prioritized the loyalty between the Kameraden of these ‘spiritual circles.’ The importance of togetherness between scholars and the loyalty between circles of friends in scholarly practices became evident when Wieacker arranged Ernst Rudolf Huber’s return to academia. After the Second World War Huber was not allowed to teach nor was he able to obtain a position in institutions of higher education. Wieacker felt that the treatment of his friend was part of the

293 “Der Kreis junger, weltoffener und kluger, denkender Menschen, den Sie dort um sich gesammelt haben, hat mich recht ermutigt und mir Hoffnung gegeben, dass das, was wir zu tun haben, nicht ganz in der gegenwärtigen Massenuniversität untergehen und schliesslich diejenigen finden wird, die es weitergeben. Vielleicht ist es ja immer in der geschichtlichen Welt die Bestimmung des vernünftigen Geistes, in esoterischer Wirkung auf den kleinen Kreis beschränkt zu sein, und wir lassen uns nur durch die bürgerliche Bildung des 19. Jahrhunderts über das täuschen, was an sich normal ist.”, Quoted in Meinel 2012, 3.

294 In his 1945 letter Wieacker wished a “prosperous academic stay” to Ernst Rudolf Huber, who had to flee from Strasbourg to Heidelberg. In this respect the most important factor was to find a suitable community of scholars: (“Hoffentlich hast du in Heidelberg vernünftige Verhältnisse vorgefunden”). Such an assembly was in contrast to the “spiritually ill statesmen and military leaders” whom “history will judge” (“geistige Erkrankung der verantwortlichen feindlichen Staatsmänner und Militär erscheint und über der die Geschichte richten wird”). Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 6.1.1944[1945]. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
IV. Rechtsgewissen: Conscience in history and in legal science

political theater of post-war Germany and was fundamentally unjust.\(^{295}\) Thus, Wieacker was the initiator and central figure in arranging an official teaching post for, and at the same time rehabilitation of, Huber at the Albert Ludwig University in Freiburg im Breisgau, where Huber was accepted as an honorary professor in 1952.\(^{296}\) Wieacker was not alone in promoting Huber’s rehabilitation, but the opposition was also marked. Fritz Pringsheim, who had now returned from exile to Freiburg, found it unacceptable that a scholar who had been “one of the leading figures in perverting the law” could be granted acceptance at Freiburg University.\(^{297}\) He wrote to Erich Weniger:

Contented looking back and turning around is not allowed. Germany is preparing itself to play a meaningful role, and I very much doubt if it is really ready to do that or even has the will to mature [...] When I take a look at the people here, the very real fear comes upon me that they do not know at all and do not wish to know what they still do not recognize.\(^{298}\)

In the personal sphere Wieacker missed the togetherness, friendship and common culture of the circles in which he had been a member. Thus, writing to Ernst Rudolf Huber in 1947, he referred to Kiel University as “our earlier [and] common academic homeland.”\(^{299}\) To Wieacker the memory of the “good old days” comprised friendship, scholarly culture and the fatherland, Heimat, which to him meant national places of symbolic value. In one way or another, the war had displaced all of these elements. The occasions when he could briefly enjoy the company of his friends thus appeared in stark contrast to the prevailing mentality and circumstances of the Federal Republic. Or conversely, the marked loss of values in the post-war time and society was compared to the experience of Kameraschaft and togetherness. Writing to Huber in 1946, Wieacker grieved over the pitiful nature of the post-war academic culture and the witch-hunt of denazi-

\(^{295}\) Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 25.10.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

\(^{296}\) Grothe 2005, 320–322; cf. Wieacker’s letter to Erik Wolf 9.5.1952, where he forwards Huber’s request to Wolf. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\(^{297}\) Grothe 2005, 322.

\(^{298}\) “Das behagliche Züruckschauen und Zurückdrehen ist nicht erlaubt. Deutschland schickt sich an, eine bedeutende Rolle zu spielen, und ich zweifle sehr, ob es dazu innerlich schon reif ist oder auch nur den Willen zur Reife hat [...] Mir kommt manchmal, wenn ich mir die Leute hier ansehe, die Furcht sehr nahe, dass sie gar nicht wissen und nicht wissen wollen, was von ihnen verkannt wird.”, Fritz Pringsheim to Erich Weniger 21.9.1952. NL Erich Weniger, Cod. Ms. E Weniger, 1:676, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Göttingen.

\(^{299}\) Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.8.1947: “Unserer gemeinsamen frühere akademische Heimat.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
He contrasted the contemporary turbidity to his and Huber’s stay at the University of Leipzig in the late 1930s:

It is safe to say that what most pains me is that I cannot be in the old circle in Leipzig. Here in Göttingen one learns to appreciate the inner freedom and sovereignty of one’s group doubly. In Göttingen we have countless stimulating people with whom I am completely of one mind: Grewe, Raiser, Scheuner (who lives here in a transitory state), Aubin, even Smend, and of course Felgentraeger, and I don’t have anything to say against any of the others, but we’re not (yet?) forming a republic of letters.

In the post-war conditions the previous ideal of virtuous academic work conducted within a group of fellows, united by their common mentality and shared destiny, was felt as a twofold loss. The ‘inner freedom’ and ‘sovereignty’ of the guild no longer existed. The idea of the ‘Republic of the learned,’ combining academic learnedness with the ethos of the restructured German society, was to Wieacker both strange and very distant. To Franz Wieacker the ideal of the guild nevertheless had a very concrete realization. The ‘old circle’ in Leipzig was a constellation which he dearly missed. His own experiences of the Dozentenakademie at the University of Frankfurt and the communality of the Kieler Schule and the “scientific community” of Leipzig, were times when he had participated in scholarly circles which had enabled him to conduct insightful and fruitful academic work. Although the colleagues with whom he worked in Göttingen were by no means unworthy scientists, the sense of togetherness which he had experienced before was lacking. The community of scholars, or guild, represented a material context for just legal reasoning. Thus in 1956 Wieacker wrote to Erik Wolf, who had extended his research on ancient legal history: “And so, I send you my most sincere thanks and best wishes for the present you have given to me, or rather our, guild.”

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300 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber (beantwort 21.2.1946): “Noch einiges Faktische aus Göttingen: man liest dort bis Mitte Februar; vorige Woche wurden wieder mehrere Ordinarien und viele andere Lehrkräfte aus unbekannten, doch manngfachen Gründen entlassen; Einspruchsverfahren laufen jedoch; monströse Denunziationen eines leider aus dem Gleichgewicht geworfenen (Schnorr v. Carolsfeld) erstaunen und setzen nicht nur die davon Betroffenen ausser Fassung.” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.


302 “Also noch einmal meinen aufrichtigstesten Dank und Glückwunsch für das Geschenk, das
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b) The Damascus of 1968 and the conscience of a scholar

The organic relation between tradition, and those deriving decisions from that tradition as the root of ethical jurisprudence, provided a simple explanation for the ‘collapse’ of 1930s German legal culture. Legal positivism had distorted the core of law, allowing political forces to take over the legal system. On the other hand, the retrospectively suspicious actions one had conducted in collaboration with the National Socialist administration, could be reasoned away with the help of the fundamental historicity of both law and legal scholars. This did not mean that the process of explaining and narrating the recent past was an easy one. Self-examination was, to most, a difficult task. Likewise, Franz Wieacker also acknowledged the vastness of National Socialist crime and understood that the projects which he had participated in were now highly suspect and should be subjected to serious reconsideration. The situation caused him emotional distress. He wrote to Ernst Rudolf Huber:

I am, as you probably are, somewhat tired of torturing myself over how it came to this. I have (as you and every respectable and more or less informed person) completely had my fill since 1933 of the inner torment that one, because of the abomination of the brown shirts [the Nazis], belately wishes the Germans to suffer in presumption of them being hardened, to the point that I am somewhat weak.

It was, however, difficult to admit that the views one had believed in and the actions one had sincerely participated in, had proved to be twisted. In his letters to Ernst Rudolf Huber from 1946, Wieacker argued against collective guilt. How should one have taught, written and lectured about law in a totalitarian country where public opinion was undoubtedly unanimous on the justness of the national cause? Wieacker had a deep emotional tie with Huber, and had experienced nothing but loyalty and good intentions from him. It was impossible to think...
that Huber, as a person, would have been a representative and an archetype of a scholar who had participated in National Socialist crimes. In his letters to Huber, Wieacker comforted his friend (who did regret his involvement in the ‘legal renewal’ of Germany), pointing out that Huber’s public exclusion was due to the resentment that plagued post-war German academia.\textsuperscript{307} Wieacker explained Huber’s (and his own) actions with the help of the same existential concepts he had used in his post-war works to illuminate the historicity of law. Huber’s collaboration was the result of “requirements of the time” \textit{[Daseinsnöte]} and the deeds he had done then could not be judged retrospectively.\textsuperscript{308}

And where I encounter such [accusations of collaboration]- which, after all happens frequently, I remember with horror, how little I knew – in 1933 – how to pass over the crowd. But, these [the accusations] litters of muted vanity and suppressed self-esteem seem to me so human, that I can leave them be.\textsuperscript{309}

Wieacker saw his and the \textit{Kieler Schule} members’ acts from the generational point of view. The 1930s fight against legal positivism and the university elite was just one stage in the longer disagreement between the commonly held and contemporary false prejudices, and Wieacker’s scholarly devotion which he shared with his in-group. Wieacker resented those who, in hindsight, easily judged the \textit{Kieler Schule}’s complicity during the Nazi era. Wieacker insisted that the primary target of these young scientists had been the dethronement of the educational elite, and to judge someone for trying to do that was doubly hypocritical if it came from those who did not have to do anything and had not done anything. Those who accused Huber (and himself) of amorality represented the original anonymous nemesis of the \textit{Kieler Schule}, the “old generation” of legal science:

Certainly we had it essentially just as difficult as the others, whether those who where left in their positions or those who have been retired in peacetime; but to them it always appeared, as we fought against them in the shadows of power, viz. fought unfairly; it was such a rooted preconception, that I was almost never able to overcome it, although I during the later years condemned much more explicitly and radically than the wilhelmlan generation.\textsuperscript{310}

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\textsuperscript{307} Cf. Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
\textsuperscript{308} Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 14.6.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
\textsuperscript{309} Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. “Und wo ich solches begegne – was immerhin häufig vorkommt, denke ich mit Schrecken danach, wie wenig ich gewusst habe, wie den damals – 1933 – beiseite Gedrängten zu überzugehen; aber diese Würfen der gedeckten Eitelkeit und des unterdrückten Selbstgefühls scheinen mir doch zu menschlich als dass ich darüber ausser mir geraten könnte.”
\textsuperscript{310} “Gewiss hatten wir es im Grunde ebensoschwer wie die anderen, sei es ganz in ihren
\end{flushright}
Moreover, the post-War Spruchkammeries were not “authoritative” or “conscientious” enough to judge Huber (or Wieacker) according to his 1930s and 40s activity. Admittedly, one can see here a blind spot in Wieacker’s reasoning. Wieacker had devoted his career to searching for the timeless bases of social justice around which the legal foundations of European history had been arranged. According to his correspondence in the 1940s he believed he had at least a hunch what such an idea would look like and of what it might be constituted. Yet with respect to his own writings (and his friend’s representations) he was inclined to compromise due to their temporal context. To Wieacker, the biased legal reasoning of the 1930s was in general valid, and the “flaws” should be excused on account of the contemporary circumstances.

When the temporal distance towards the totalitarian era and the Second World War grew, Wieacker had to rethink his narrative. After the chaotic immediate years following the end of the war, life in the Federal Republic entered a relatively peaceful era. Everyday life was no longer characterized by continuing crises and turbulence. One’s view of law and legality was not overshadowed by a constantly looming catastrophe. Although the legal system of the Federal Republic did not seem to be based on a correct understanding of law, nor founded on common values – it was ungebildet – it produced social harmony and was in general respected by people. Moreover, when going ever deeper into the realms of legal hermeneutics and theories of interpretation, Wieacker had to set his historical vision against more far-reaching and contesting thoughts of historicity. If law was fundamentally historical, and its understanding was due to the necessities brought about by one’s historical situation and temporal perception, how could one suggest that there was only one correct point of reference from which an individual view of justice could be derived? And even if there was a true tradition, how could one be certain that one’s personal interpretation was comprehensible within the true meaning of that tradition?

Ämtern Belassenen, sei es im Frieden Emeritierten; aber für die sah es immer so aus, als ob wir im Schatten der Macht gegen sie kämpften, also unfair kämpften; das war ein so eingewurzeltes Vorurteil, dass ich es, obwohl ich in den letzten Jahren weit klarer und radikaler verurteilt als die wilhelminische Generation, fast nie habe brechen können.” Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

311 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber (beantwortet 21.2.1946): “Zum gewissenhaften Nachrichtenorgan bin ich aber zu unordentlich, und zum Erteilen guter Ratschläge eine gar winzige Autorität […] In Dein und der Deinen Ergehen mich mit naiven Fragen oder Ratschlägen mit dem ersten Wort zu mengen liegt mir nicht […]” NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

312 Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 22.4.1961. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
In 1964 Wieacker received the new edition of Erik Wolf’s *Große Rechtsdenker*. Again the book stimulated Wieacker to reflect not only on the essence of legal scientific research in general, but also on the premises of his personal scholarly identity. In 1964 Wieacker was a renowned legal scholar in the Federal Republic who had contributed to and further developed the theoretical understanding of many subfields of legal science. *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit* was widely held to be a foundational work in the legal history of modern times. Among Romanists and in the field of Roman law his “third way,” which emphasized the intellectual history of Roman law as well as its sustaining ideas, types and mentalities which explained its relation to the general historical development, was a strong theoretical stream between the “neo-pandectists” (Paul Koschaker) and the “neo-classicists” (Max Kaser). He had experimented with Hegelian theories and published important works dealing with the problem of hermeneutics and interpretation. He worked as a respected professor with his friends Ernst Rudolf Huber, Karl Michaelis and Friedrich Schaffstein at the University of Göttingen. To sum up, Wieacker had established his status in the Federal Republic and workwise things could have not been better. At the same time, however, the Auschwitz trials had began in Frankfurt, and earlier Adolf Eichmann had been sentenced to death in Jerusalem.

In his correspondence with Erik Wolf, Wieacker does not state why in January 1964 he started to rethink the meaning which legal science had in shaping the ‘consciousness’ of society, and his own position as a scholar with respect to common public values. Probably the rethinking was due to the above-mentioned historical events and development, but in any case Wieacker again processed his scholarly identity by comparing himself to the legal scholars of the past. He wrote to Wolf about the feelings which reading the new edition of Wolf’s book had evoked in him:

I have endeavored late to acquire the inner maturity that one needs to fully dignify the biographical reference to life and the ancestry of a great person tardily; to this extent the relevance of books for my personal life and research increased. We have all gotten too used to the sorting in the great drawers of the humanistic categories due to an overbred and surely promotional and deepening historicism; today I sometimes feel uncomfortable when I contemplate the swift classification, the Hegelian everything-matched-just-perfectly-to-the-Weltgeist of the founders: Dilthey, Troelsch, M. Weber, let alone their epigones. In contrast to that the task, that your book has rightly taken up: how “legal thinkers” have interacted with the moral culture of their time and further continue to have an effect, has become increasingly important to me.314

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313 Winkler 2014, 173.
314 "Die innere Reife, die dazu gehört, auch den biographischen Lebensbezug und die Herkunft eines großen Menschen aus einem sittlichen Klima ganz zu würdigen, habe ich erst spät zu erwerben mich bemüht; in diesem Masse wuchs auch das Gewicht des Buches für mein
First, Wieacker admitted that he had lately ‘matured’ in his thinking and awareness, meaning that to a certain extent he had found his previous explanation of the relation between ‘great men’ (scholars) and their ‘moral climate’ not entirely accurate. Thus, this suggests that his historical vision had undergone a shift; historical events and developments were now being measured in the light of ‘mature experience.’ He continues by expressing his tiredness at the theoretical constructions which were now being used to illuminate different aspects of law. They were useful, but in the end they might well conceal what was really important, namely how a given scholar ‘has interacted with the moral culture of his time and further continues to rework it.’ So although Wieacker himself discussed contemporary methods, and in one way Wolf’s book was about different perceptions of legal matters, to Wieacker reading *Große Rechtsdenker* raised questions about the *morality* and *meaning* of scholarly work. He continued:

I know of no book that takes this question more seriously and answers it from the calm, mature perception of the inner values of the person. What gives this effort flesh and blood, however, is the [...] gift of connecting the biographical with the well-being and sorrow, the ups and downs of the living cultures of the smaller and larger centers; also the luckiest twist of pointing attention, which we sometimes encounter in the shape of a serene medisance, to the personal movement of a person within the community – I mean, the luckiest twist of this gift in the educational manner.  

The metalevel understanding of a personal path within a set of cultural meanings, where ‘personal values’ were in constant interaction with cultural ‘centres’ both ‘large and small,’ was at the core of the scholarly activity of a historian. This was the key to understanding past people (as in *Große Rechtsdenker*), and to ac-


knowledge this intertwinement was the purpose of scholarly maturation. To Wieackecker, reading *Große Rechtsdenker* was like ‘no other book’ a path towards a moral approach to scientific work. Furthermore, while Wolf’s book sparked an inquiry into the morals of legal science, it also clarified the meaning of scholarly work. A metalevel understanding of constantly evolving personal values within a cultural frame, could ‘educate’ one towards ‘virtues’ (*Pädeutische*). The historical worth of ‘examining’ the ‘personal examples’ of the past scientist was shown in the manner in which the examination offered insights into the ‘correct and wrong ways for the nation.’ The idea that a scholar’s devotion would bring harm to the national community and in the end prove to be unethical, was not a new idea in Wieackecker’s thoughts. To him the worldview (and along with it the texts) of legal positivists was a consistent example of the wrong way. A new dimension was nevertheless evident in the attempt Wieackecker made to understand the reasons which had led to such a situation. In this sense he wrote about Gustav Radbruch:

You have done well not to predate Radbruch’s “conversion” to adventist backwards in time, but rather accepted him in his earlier phase as himself. There is a level on which relativism and even positivism are strict requirements for the decision for the good side; Savigny’s words always remain dear to me, that it is not the function of the law to cause morality, but instead it has to guarantee the conditions of moral action (he says it with very different words). On the other hand, your acknowledgement counteracts the always a bit painful feeling of uncertainty [...] in the ambiguous political experience: as if he [Radbruch] himself had to endure the terrible consequences of relativistic positivism and experience a natural-law Damascus. Again, the correct understanding of the nature of things goes hand in hand with your habit of seeing personalities fully as lived, concrete and moral entities.316

This excerpt reveals both the continuities and the discontinuities of Wieackecker’s view. The principle that legal positivism was to blame for the legal havoc of Germany was an explanation which he saw no reason to rethink, but he was nonetheless ready to soften his former view: to some scholars and in some situations even legal positivism was an approach that could decide what was ‘good.’

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The law was not in itself moral but it did guarantee the conditions that enabled moral deeds. But as a legal scientist, how was one supposed to measure the sustaining ethicalness of one’s claim on the nature of justice? The evaluation of jurisprudential ideas, which might have been drafted amidst an ‘ambiguous political experience,’ seemed to be possible only in retrospect, in experiencing the consequences of one’s former view. To Wieacker, that had been the sad fate of Radbruch. Moreover, Wieacker was impressed how the ‘consequences of [Radbruch’s] relativistic positivism,’ which Radbruch himself had to ‘experience,’ resulted in a ‘natural law Damascus.’ In Radbruch’s later perception of justice, which was deeply influenced by his trust in in natural law, his previous conviction conflicted with the actual social experience. This gave Radbruch’s character a ‘lived, concrete and moral’ dimension. One’s historical vision could be one in which different perspectives, which had all been correct at one time, although some later proved to be incorrect, coexisted. This was not indecisiveness, but maturation. Wieacker concluded that Wolf’s book would clearly have an effect on the second, revised version (1967) of Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit:

Your book comes just in time for the revision of my Privatrechtsgeschichte [der Neuzeit]. I will still need to consult your book at every turn (I have to thoroughly revise some parts, e.g. Savigny).  

What had begun as a self-reflective historical reading of autobiographies, developed into existential doubt during the student riots of 1968. One of the most notable victims of the accusatory campaign was Ernst Forsthoff, who decided to resign after considerable pressure as early as 1967. To Wieacker accusations and a violent atmosphere was a shock. He wrote to Wolf of the “horror” when “our most illustrious colleagues” where attacked and stripped of their “dignity.” The “swarms grasped” even those who showed some understanding of their cause. To Wieacker, these developments were heartbreaking. He hoped for a harmonious society and the authority of law, but a return to such times was not possible before leading politicians and administrators started to make a genuine

317 “Ihr Buch kommt sehr zur guten Stunde für die Neuaufage meiner Privatrechtsgeschichte; ich werde es dort noch auf Schritt und Tritt zu Rate ziehen müssen (so wie ich auch, z. B. bei Savigny, ohnedies gründlich neuern muss).”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 12.1.1964. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
318 Meinel 2012, 478.
320 Liebs 2010.
attempt to understand the student revolts. However, there was nothing from the government but “a lot of [blaming others for] bad conscience, but little perception, that it would be human and dignified even for the students, to show some attitude against them and set an example.”

Most importantly the protesting students reminded Wieacker of his own youth. Their accusations against the scholars of the war generation, although not directly pointed at Wieacker, compelled him to reevaluate his life history in a “mature autobiographical manner.” Amidst the “chaos” of 1968, and in an attempt to understand what was happening, Wieacker recollected how he as student had talked about *Große Rechtsdenker*, at that point still an idea, with Wolf:

The best […] memories have persisted since the winter semester (29/30 or 30/31), since I heard your “Große Rechtsdenker.” I see and hear them still even today, as they were guests, and I have always followed their longer, inner path and could thankfully benefit from it. Being reassured in such ways of consistencies in these times belongs to the best gifts that one can receive. It is unearned, like all that is truly good, as I have found with surprise a kind of a certain religiousness (if the word is permitted) developing while thinking about my life.

The time when Wieacker had first discussed about the ‘inner path’ of the great legal thinkers with Wolf was also a turbulent time, and the society as well as the public moral discourse seemed be at odds with what young scholars thought of as just. Wieacker and Wolf had chosen their path and revolted against the old generation. Their revolution had felt justified in the light of legal tradition, and the fight was accompanied by an unquestionable sense of an unprecedented remediation of the moral structures of society. But, although their intentions were sincere, was the fight which Wieacker and Wolf had engaged themselves in any more justified than that of the students of 1968? Was there something good in the generational revolution itself which would provide a covering ethical entitlement

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for the revolution and excuse the unintended effects? On this Wieacker had no clear answer. He tried once again to understand the moral and historical paradox with the help of Gustav Radbruch’s experience. Expressing his “own poetic-moral feeling,” he wrote to Wolf:

I agree with the better part of “the whirl to save as fixed, what must be maintained and passed on,” as you write.  

The ‘whirl’ which Wieacker and Wolf discussed was a concept which Radbruch used in *Biographische Schriften*. In a section named *Innere Weg* (the inner path), Radbruch characterized his experience of the time following the German Revolution of 1919 as a “romping whirl.” Radbruch’s experience of the revolution was one which Wieacker could identify with, and reading about it awoke recollections of the years of ‘legal renewal.’ Radbruch wrote about his experience thus:

It was truly the time of political unrest [...] It was the time when multifarious political ideas fought amongst one another passionately and demanded response. For the first time my dislike reached its end to give up the wealth of possibilities for a bounded reality, to give up the richness of contradiction for a solid conviction [...] From then on I won a series of friendships of a new kind in which one person did not reveal himself to the other, but both found to each other through a common thing, conviction or task. Idem velle adque idem nolle ea demum firma amicitia. (Agreement in likes and dislikes—this, and this only, is what constitutes true friendship. Lucius Sergius Catilina quoted by Gaius Sallustius Crispus).  

To Radbruch, out of the revolt had emerged lasting and noble experiences, friendships, the questioning of social injustices, and passionate scholarly presentations. But to Wieacker and Wolf – still conservative enough not to identify with the socialist revolution – it was obvious that the insight of a rebel was not reality *per se*. Wieacker could understand the emotions that emerged from the

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324 “Ich willige mit dem besseren Teil darin ein, in “den Wirbeln festzustehend zu retten, was bewahrt und tradiert werden muss,” wie Sie schreiben.”, Wieacker to Erik Wolf 21.8.1968. NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.
revolt, but the ‘whirl of revolution’ as such was not desirable to him. Even a sincere interpretation of social justice, constructed in a battle against a stagnant and unjust social system, might in practice lead to disastrous results. This had happened in 1919, in 1933 and now in 1968. The intoxicating movement of revolution had to be halted, scrutinized for what was worth saving, and the noble elements handed over to subsequent generations.

In hindsight, this should have been the case with ‘legal renewal.’ Wieacker acknowledged that the “fight against the Wilhelminian generation” was mostly a call to action of him and his peers, rather than a definite feature of 1930s legal science.\textsuperscript{327} The conviction which he had had on the relation between the timeless principles of justice and the legal science produced during the Nazi regime now seemed inadequate. What in concrete terms was left from those days were the crimes, whereas the good intentions and learned theoretical constructions had not stood the test of time.


*Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit* is a masterpiece of European legal history, which perhaps more than any other text written by Franz Wieacker continues to bring praise to its author. There Wieacker connected his decades-long learnedness of law to a coherent representation of the essence and state of European legal science. On one hand, the book mirrors the larger tendency in post-war German legal science, where scholars attempted both to explain the immediate past of the Nazi regime and reconstruct new solid foundations for jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{328} On the other hand, *Privatrechtsgeschichte* was the end result of a project which Wieacker had started in the last years of the 1930s, and which aimed at representing European legal history from the point of view of the modern world, *Neuzeit*. As such it belonged to a scientific paradigm which explicitly took history as a tool to define the confusing social (and legal) development of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{329} In what follows I concentrate on a substantial aspect of the book: the manner in which Wieacker explained the concurrent ‘crisis of justice’ with the help of the concept *Rechtsgewissen*. In this task I build on the analysis of the previous pages of this study, and seek to show how Wieacker used this concept,

\textsuperscript{327} Cf. Wieacker to Ernst Rudolf Huber 29.3.1946. NL Ernst Rudolf Huber, Bestand 1529, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.

\textsuperscript{328} Foljanty 2013.

\textsuperscript{329} Rückert 2010.
which signified an ability to achieve just legal reasoning, a notion he had developed for years, to make sense of the legal reality of post-war Germany and Europe.

Privatrechtsgeschichte was published in two editions; the first appeared in 1952 and the second in 1967. Wieacker made significant revisions to the second edition, but in this section I will look at the editions side by side in support of my argument that Wieacker’s thoughts on the relation between justice and society in principle remained the same. Later developments, as discussed in the second edition of Privatrechtsgeschichte, lie more in the domain of legal interpretation, and the passages concerning the concept of Rechtsgewissen are more or less identical in the two editions. However, the 1967 edition is far more reflective in one important sense: there Wieacker, for the first time in a public text, commented on his involvement with the “legal renewal” of the 1930s and his relation with National Socialist legal science. Since this feature is of great importance in my work, it is reasonable to start the analysis from that theme.

It is possible to treat Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit as a whole as a kind of indirect apologia. Wieacker did not provide a very thorough or explicit report of his personal participation in the Rechtserneuerung, or give much space to that phenomenon in Privatrechtsgeschichte. However, where he does touch upon these times, his tone is humble. Wieacker writes in the second edition:

It is difficult enough for the distant observer, let alone those who were involved in it at the time, to reach a balanced judgement on private law scholarship between 1933 and 1945. Sensible reforms which had been thought out long before had to defer to a government completely contemptuous of all principles of the rule of law. Sometimes the alliance was superficial and tactical, sometimes corrupt. In the prevailing atmosphere of the utter contempt of law, ideological prejudice, and abuse of power for political ends, private law scholarship, which perhaps could in any case not have stood firm in that decade, proved unable to remain in critical control of its method and social role. Racism in statutory form engendered dreadful injustices in the law of persons and marriage; and if other parts of the private law were less affected this was perhaps more because of the nature of the material than because the specialists were any more resistant to the warped fallacy and brutal perversion of legal ideas. Nevertheless, one can perhaps say that thanks to the professionalism of the practitioners and professors involved in the ‘Academy for German Law’, much of the reform work done by its committees in the area of private and commercial law was, on sober appraisal by those better qualified than the author, both well thought out and appropriate. This is true despite the painful tactical or naïve accommodations to Nazi terminology and ideology which readers today must find offensive.[…] They [Wieacker and his generation] had some of the false assurance of the graduate in Faust Part II ((6770 ‘Admit that what was ever known/is not the knowing worth’ or at 6794: ‘The world until I made it, wasn’t there.’ Compare also 6807: ‘You may be hurt by what I say, /But nothing stupid,
nothing smart,/ Can be imagined that has not/Already been conceived’) and were insufficiently respectful and mindful of their predecessors’ scholarship under the rule of law.331

Although Wieacker was in the above excerpt open about the “failings” of the lawyers of his generation and himself, he maintains that the era of National Socialist ‘legal renewal’ itself was not a reason or source for the contemporary ‘crisis of justice,’ which is the coherent theme in Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit.332 Rather, the writings of his generation of scholars were attempts to resolve the more general dilemma in legal science: the incompatibility between social reality and legislation, and the latent possibility of legislation being unjust from the point of view of society as a whole.333 The injustices embedded in legislation, legal decisions and applying the law was the result of centuries old developments in European legal history, where the law was no longer in accordance with what people considered to be just, and the methods of legal science were no longer able to overcome that breach. Modern legal science theories further widened the gap and enabled the legislator to make laws which oppressed some for the benefit of the powerful. Wieacker posited the work of the ‘New legal science’ within this larger narrative as follows:

The criticism directed at the traditional constructions of Pandectism and private law by the younger generation of private law scholars [of the war generation] is another matter, in which the author was also involved. Although their reasons were predominantly sound in substance, they were at fault, especially in the early years, in embracing the tendentious terminology and ideology of the time. […] For a period after 1945 these faults or failings naturally but regrettably cast a blight over their perfectly legitimate criticism of doctrine or system, matters which had nothing at all to do with Nazi ideology but had been discussed by the great Pandectists of the nineteenth century or by jurists in other legal systems.334

The perennial incompatibility was partly due to the fact that lawyers were no longer in charge of the legislative process. Modern democracy prevented lawyers from being in charge of legislation. Wieacker asserts that the massive crimes against humanity of the twentieth century would have not been possible in an era when jurisdiction was in the hands of the “representatives of this legal culture, scholars and jurists with scholarly training.”335 In the modern world the process of legislation was dictated by the “general will” of the people, which as a concept

332 See e.g. Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 482.
333 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 481–482: “All the main problems of private law today, namely the conditions of private autonomy, substantive contractual justice, the restriction of private rights and powers by social law, and above all the extent of judges’ freedom to develop the law, all of these lead back to the central question of the relationship between justice and reality.”
and concrete entity was a vague constellation, vulnerable to outer influence and the pursuits of corrupt politicians and “demagogues.”\textsuperscript{336} As senators had no understanding of the law, and since such an understanding could only be obtained through “jurist-experience,” even at its best parliamentary legislation did not achieve a proper approach to the relations between law and justice, and one could not trust its ability to provide just laws.\textsuperscript{337} This double-bind formed a permanent ‘crisis of justice’ whose resolution seemed impossible.

Wieacker did not suggest that the essence of democratic society should be reversed and the lawyers again be given the dominant position in creating the law, but strongly emphasizes the latent dangers of the contemporary system. Like other conservative legal scientists, such as Ernst Forstho\textsuperscript{338}ff,\textsuperscript{338} Wieacker was suspicious of the idea that the state, meaning the people, decided and regulated in a parliamentary process on social justice and the realization of individual rights in society.\textsuperscript{339} In practice, the ‘crisis of justice’ was a symptom of the havoc of the common and shared values on which laws had previously rested, and from which they had been derived:

Indeed the legitimacy of enacted law depends in the long run on such integration [of law and a shared value-base], and such legitimacy is lost if the continuous reassertion of the general will is frustrated by the disappearance of any common sense of values [.]\textsuperscript{340}

In Wieacker’s view the modernization process, in practice, had occurred in two distinct, but similarly challenging, tendencies. First, the modern state had turned into a social state (Sozialstaat) which regulated the actions of its citizens with the help of statutory system. This system for its part was legislated from the point of

\textsuperscript{336} Wieacker, \textit{A History of Private Law} 1995, 444–445: “The crisis of positivism is in truth the crisis of the legitimating power of the general will in a democracy.”

\textsuperscript{337} Wieacker, \textit{A History of Private Law} 1995, “[S]tatutes could be passed which were no longer in harmony, or were indeed grossly out of harmony, with the principles of law which had long been founded in religion, philosophy, or history.”

\textsuperscript{338} Cf. Meinel 2012, 318–352.

\textsuperscript{339} Wieacker, \textit{A History of Private Law} 1995, 443: “This risk is inherent in modern democracies.” Embedded in Wieacker’s argument is a strange twist, given that the conservative “war generation” had not succeeded very well in defending human rights during an era when they perceived that jurisprudence, “the jurists’ law,” was being given the status it was entitled to. Nevertheless, Wieacker’s, as well as Ernst Forsthoff’s and even Carl Schmitt’s, claim about the antinomy within the democratic theory and legislation is not without significance in the light of recent developments in Western democracies. One need only take a look at the difficulties which European countries are facing in dealing with populism and anti-democratic movements, or the enthusiasm which scholars, politicians and writers show in explaining the global order and Western democracies using Schmittian concepts and theories in a “post-truth world.”

\textsuperscript{340} Wieacker, \textit{A History of Private Law} 1995, 443. See also 443: “[The] moral quality [of law] [...] was true only so long as the legislative organs, government and parliament continued to respect the traditional axioms of law.”
view of purposes. That is, laws were drafted in order to produce desirable economic, social or political effects in society.\footnote{Wieacker, \textit{A History of Private Law} 1995, 427–428, 432–434.} Even if one supposed that parliamentary legislation worked unattached to economic influence and political ideologies, of which Wieacker was highly suspicious, the chances of such a system bringing justice were negligible. Wieacker was confident that a sound legal system had to work from its own inner dynamic. With respect to his previous works and to his scientific context, he coherently maintained that an autonomous judiciary within a democratic nation meant not only independent judgments made in courts of law, but judges’ privilege to \textit{create} the law:

The strongest and most durable legal systems have always claimed such autonomy, as in ancient Rome, in England, in the Middle Ages, and in general in well ordered societies with pre-scientific legal systems. They all presume the immanent justice of the actual law and rely on producing just results by applying their own standards, such as the maintenance of tradition, of authority, of logical argument and concepts.\footnote{Wieacker, \textit{A History of Private Law} 1995, 348; On the resentment which the old students of Carl Schmitt had on \textit{Sozialstaat}, see Müller 2003, 86.}

Second, although the legal system of the Federal Republic acknowledged the need for a “law above laws,” a “transcendental” basis for jurisprudence, such beyond-legal principle(s) had not been thoroughly reasoned and explicated. The constitution of the Federal Republic, the courts in their practical work as explicated in their verdicts, and recent theories of legal science, all adhered to and strove to apply some kind of “call to conscience.”\footnote{Wieacker, \textit{A History of Private Law} 1995, 440, 470–472.} It was not, however, irrelevant which kind of conscience one turned to, and on which bases it was built. Referring to a religious vocation while conducting operations in the basically secular spheres of law and administration did produce space for critical questions and comments.\footnote{Wieacker, \textit{A History of Private Law} 1995, 473.} Likewise, a mere remark that one should follow one’s conscience in deciding issues regarding the whole population, did not result in any ethical commitment or general guideline. Again, Wieacker called for an autonomous, mental tool for ruling and deciding justly, which would derive its legitimacy from ethical principles beyond individual experience, but nonetheless would be applicable in a wide range of practical and moral dilemmas brought about by the rapidly developing modern society:

Basic law, […] lays down that Members of Parliament are bound only by their own conscience, though this is hard to reconcile with the reality of political parties such as we have. When voting on laws, the conscience of the member should include \textit{legal conscience}, a less subjective matter.\footnote{Wieacker, \textit{A History of Private Law} 1995, 444 fn.2, emphasis original.}
Hence the mental tool Wieacker suggested for creating and upholding justice in society was one situated in the sphere and tradition of legal reasoning. Such a tool could even be used in a society like the Federal Republic, where the scope of the legal system, in comparison to the preceding legal cultures, was somewhat restricted. In 1967 Wieacker was more at ease with the social state and gave credit to its durability from the point of view of the rule of law, and acknowledged that in the legal consciousness, Rechtsbewusstsein, of the German people the contemporary form of administration and jurisdiction were accepted. In 1952, however, in the first edition of Privatrechtsgeschichte, he still struggled to welcome the post-war order with all the changes in its relations between law, politics and legal science. At that time he perceived the legal system of the Federal Republic to be an heir to the intellectual streams which achieved their notorious high point in the mindset which he so much despised, namely legal positivism:

This pre-clarification of reality has become as indispensable as ever since the will to power of modern consciousness has brought to awareness, discussed and finally destroyed the old, inviolable conditions of the order of human life that were once pre-given in the subconscious, just as it occurred after the destruction of the old western Hellenistic-Christian-reason-oriented value system by the scientific positivism.

The old European value system was being destroyed by scientific positivism, and that value system was being destroyed through bringing it under public discussion and subjecting it to twisted (positivist) theoretical conceptualizations. In the 1952 edition Wieacker saw “recent answers” in legal science to be particles in a long line of causal explanation theories. In the end, causal theories had achieved the status of a “layman religion” and an authoritative position in “the public consciousness”. Thus, positivist reasoning had not merely remained within the intellectual circles of the legal theorists, for its concepts had been assimilated as axioms which guided administrative decisions leading to a “conscienceless disdain” for justice in the legal reality.

347 Cf. p. 145–162.
349 Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte 1952, 335: “Laienreligion”, “öffentliche Bewusstsein”; see also 333.
The roots of this decline go a long way back. The scientific positivism of the 19th century had for the first time fulfilled not only the demands of the Cartesian concept of science and the law of reason for the jurisprudential method with the development of a closed system of civil law and a general civil law theory, but at the same time it scientifically expressed and intellectually legitimized the legal picture of the civil society of its time.\(^{351}\)

Both editions of *Privatrechtsgeschichte* are built on the same “degradation narrative” of European legal culture. Wieacker’s book is quite unusual since the preceding works on the same subject had mostly concentrated on legal institutions and the history of statutes. He narrates the phases and development in the European way of perceiving legal phenomena side by side with the more general changes in the intellectual history of the continent. The text proceeds from the Glossators to natural law theories and to the Age of Reason, which are succeeded by legal positivism, textual formalism, and finally legal naturalism. Each of the epochs carry within it the seed of the subsequent paradigm, and the legal culture evolves like an “organism,”\(^{352}\) but the story as a whole can be reduced to a dichotomy between two views on social phenomena: causal theories and practical wisdom. Wieacker is not hesitant to equate the juridical naturalism of the twentieth century with the scholasticism of the ancient world, which in contemporary Romanist discourse was seen as the nemesis of Roman legal thinking.\(^{353}\) His vehement opposition to forms of causal explanations in humanities and legal science was not only a consistent element in his texts, but also a feature which irreversibly connected him to thinkers like Hans-Georg Gadamer and Martin Heidegger.

Since it was juridical naturalism which seemed to dominate the public consciousness in post-war Germany, it is understandable that Wieacker’s narrative turned out to be a history of spiritual degradation and its subsequent effects on modern society. *Privatrechtsgeschichte* is far from being a one-sided declaration, but its underlying message is clear: causal theories rip the law from its substantive moral binding force, and open up possibilities for modes of apparently legitimate injustice in society. Ultimately, causal theories treat people as “species” not as “free men,” and laws as “vehicles for gaining certain purposes” rather than “expressions of values.”\(^{354}\) Thus, scholars who were prejudiced by the principles

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\(^{353}\) Cf. p. 227.

of legal naturalism were unable to define ‘the conscience’ in a balanced way, where it would be bound by law, in connection with tradition as well as with reality, and usable in a multitude of legal cases. Thus, Rudolf von Jhering, the Freirechtsschule and the jurisprudence of interest did enrich the field of legal science with their contributions on the essence of legal reality and interpretation, but with respect to the question of ‘legal conscience’ their works deepened the ‘crisis of justice’ rather than offered any solutions in reconnecting the spheres of social reality and justice.\(^{355}\)

Inquiry into causes and analysis of motives of individuals or groups are perfectly good ways of apprehending the reality to which the norms are to be applied, but they do not of themselves provide us with the standards we need in order to apply law properly, to legislate rightly, or to adopt apt legal policies: the values of justice are related to social reality but they are not inferable from it.\(^{356}\)

In the second edition of *Privatrechtsgeschichte* Wieacker’s tone was not as cynical and disenchanted as in his first edition, and succeeding research on legal and intellectual history has in general focused not on comparing his idea of Rechtsgewissen to his previous texts, but on other streams of legal theory current in the first decades of the Federal Republic.\(^{357}\) It is obvious that Wieacker’s Rechtsgewissen, the “supralegislative legitimation” as he represented it in the second edition of *Privatrechtsgeschichte*,\(^{358}\) has been constructed both in relation to theories of natural law and to substantive legal values. As such it mirrors the larger tendency in post-war German legal science, where scholars attempted to both explain the immediate past of the Nazi regime and reconstruct new solid foundations for jurisprudence. The extent to which scholars admitted or realized these arguments as part of the post-war Vergangenheitspolitik varied. Nevertheless the “turn to natural law” was being acknowledged, and most understood this as a counter-reaction to the injustices of the previous decades. As a result, the attempt to go beyond positive law and find a transcendent justification for law was a defining feature of post-war German legal science.\(^{359}\)

\(^{355}\) As a whole, juridical naturalism “knowing no justice but the purposes of the party in power, is perhaps the greatest threat to the idea of law in Europe in recent centuries.” (Wieacker, *A History of Private Law* 1995, 458). On the other hand, Wieacker, *A History of Private Law* 1995, 458 fn. 20 states: the jurisprudence of interests “rates the demands of individual conscience above the requirements of any objective and binding rule” and further, 455: “the rift is due to the fact that the jurisprudence of interests can offer no suprapositive reason for preferring one competing interest over another, and therefore like every related form of naturalism must make a leap from what is in fact to what should be in law.”


\(^{357}\) See Avenarius 2010; Foljanty 2013.


\(^{359}\) Foljanty 2013, 327–329.
In *Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit* Franz Wieacker also contributed to discussion on natural law, though opinions vary as to what extent Wieacker’s texts can be situated under this label. As Lena Foljanty shows, however, Wieacker’s argument in *Privatrechtsgeschichte* certainly comes very close to natural law theories.\(^{360}\) Wieacker’s friendship with Erik Wolf, one of the most notable friendships in natural law discourse, and the extent to which he was influenced by Wolf’s view on legal theology, makes it easy to take Wieacker as a proponent of natural law. In addition, especially in the second edition of *Privatrechtsgeschichte*, Wieacker frequently discusses *Rechtsgewissen* in light of the arguments of renowned natural lawyer Hans Welzel.\(^{361}\) But having said that, Wieacker himself never agreed to be a “natural law man.” Quite the contrary. He stuck with his original idea that in the end natural law theories were not “practical,” as jurisprudence was supposed to be, and had been for example in ancient Rome.\(^{362}\) Wieacker upheld his own view on the “route to justice,” and although he was impressed by the works of Leo Strauss and Hans Welzel, they did not alter his vision of the relation between reality and justice in the decades following the end of the Second World War.\(^{363}\) Wieacker concludes:

> [W]e shall avoid the hasty impression […] that no transcendental justification of law is possible, while realizing that any absolutist and doctrinaire natural law with authoritarian ‘conclusions’ is unacceptable.\(^{364}\)

A more difficult task is to distinguish Wieacker’s view from Nicolai Hartmann’s and Max Scheler’s theories on the substantive ethical values of law, Theodor

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\(^{360}\) Foljanty 2013, 188–190. Nevertheless, the theme can be read through the dispute between the “Smend school” and the “Schmitt school.” Wieacker does not seem to be interested in taking part in this dispute. He gives credit to both “Protestant” and “Catholic” readings of the law and its substantive value. Furthermore, in his review on contemporary trends in searching for the “superlegislative” basis for law within democratic society, he treats different tendencies in a sober manner, not preaching about the “tyranny of values.” What is emblematic, however, is the long-standing dislike of natural law theories and his personal emphasis on the synthesis of tradition and experience as a means to read and apply law. Cf. Müller 2003, 70 fn. 27.


Viehweg’s work on “topoi” of legal arguments, and existentialists like Werner Maihofer (who was both a student of Erik Wolf and a friend of Wieacker).\(^{365}\) Scheler’s work was highly appreciated in the Federal Republic. He seemed to offer a philosophically solid system, detached from Catholic theories of natural law, in weighing the necessary values guiding legislation and the judicature.\(^{366}\) Thus, Wieacker in an apparently explicit statement, though on closer inspection it is somewhat ambiguous, conceded: “For Scheler justice is a personal virtue, the individual’s insight into competing values, that is, *legal conscience.*”\(^{367}\) Wieacker did not propose a similar system and hierarchy of values as a foundation for legal reasoning as Scheler. Scheler’s and the existentialists’ scrutiny of the way people had tried to find the basis for the absolute transcendental principles of law were to Wieacker the different approaches to “legal anthropology”.\(^{368}\) Thus, Wieacker shared with them a common task in revealing the forms of thinking, and the mentalities of different legal cultures and jurisprudential practices, in order to comment on the “superstatutory means” of European legal culture: “A knowledge of the legal imperative of a person without knowledge of the human reality, that is, without a legal anthropology, is not possible.”\(^{369}\)

Wieacker’s *Rechtsgewissen* necessitated knowing the society in which the law was situated, and, contrary to the legal positivists, from the material conditions of that given society derive the form of legal thinking which marked the particularity of this society or community. To Wieacker, legal communities had their distinctive virtues, customs, beliefs and norms, which were not merely institutional or “materialistic” in a way that they could be reduced to symptoms of a battle for some resource or social psychological purpose.\(^{370}\) *Privatrechts-

\(^{365}\) Cf. Wieacker to Erik Wolf 4.11.1953. NL NL Erik Wolf, Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau.

\(^{366}\) Foljanty 2013, 178.


\(^{368}\) Cf. Wieacker, *A History of Private Law* 1995, 451, 468, 469. The turn towards “legal anthropology,” and concurrently the acknowledgment of the necessity of an existentialist view of legal historical study, was emphasized by Wieacker as early as 1941 in ‘Zum System des deutsche Vermögensrechts.’


\(^{370}\) In post-war German legal science it was not uncommon to include Carl Schmitt among the “existentialists” (Wieacker, *A History of Private Law* 1995, 469 fn. 13). Given that Wieacker included many different approaches to his “legal anthropology,” and the way he combined
geschichte der Neuzeit, especially its second edition, shows that in the quarrel on the ‘tyranny of values’ between the Schmitt school and the Smend school, Wieacker cannot be clearly connected to either school. Like the Smend school, Wieacker appreciated Scheler’s and Hartmann’s attempt to define a system of values on which legislation should be based, he even calls Scheler’s result Rechtsgewissen. Nevertheless, a hierarchy of values which does not grow out of the practice of legal thinking, or of the domain of understanding the law per se, cannot truly reflect justice. It lacked the connection between Rechtbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen, the people’s consciousness of law and the experts understanding of it, thus it embeds the possibility of eradicating the authority of the law, something which had plagued natural law theories, legal positivism and juridical naturalism. Scheler’s and Hartmann’s system of values had not been built on the correct kind of (legal expert’s) experience of law. Here Wieacker was closer to the opinions of the Schmitt school (though maybe not Schmitt himself). A system of values in itself was arbitrary if it was not preceded and backed up by a homogenous common sense notion of legal values.

With respect to Viehweg’s work on the basic principles of judicial decision-making, Wieacker appreciates Viehweg’s attempt to develop “open systems consistent with the factual structures” in legal doctrines. In other words, Viehweg invoked the sphere of scholarly dialogue within the legal culture one was studying, and emphasized the importance of learned practical wisdom in legal reasoning. According to Wieacker, Viehweg “transmitted the understanding of sensus communis” to modern legal science.

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372 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 477 fn. 31: “When Max Scheler placed justice before aesthetics and intellectual values but after the ‘values’ of mercy and love of God, he was speaking from personal experience; we might well agree with him, but that is no basis for inference.” Emphasis mine.
375 Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 469. To Wieacker, Viehweg’s work dealt with past legal thinking and saw theories as “‘sensible drafts’ […][which] constitute topics for discussion of what solution would be just, for a debate in which we would gradually learn what justice requires.” Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 481. The fundamental significance of the concept of “sensus communis,” and its meaning to Wieacker’s legal hermeneutics, is a theme which unfortunately does not fit within the scope of this work.
Within his contemporary scholarship on the history of European private law, Wieacker’s search for ‘supralegislative legitimation’ was comparable to other theories, though it was nevertheless highly original. He acknowledged other works in analyzing the “call of conscience,” but perceived *Rechtsgewissen* as fundamentally different from individual vocation, since it occurred within the sphere of legal tradition.\(^{376}\) It belonged to a specific world of thinking, arguing, learning and presenting, which could only be achieved through its own methods:

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\text{Law is a social phenomenon which has its own way of developing through time, like ‘species’ in biology or humanity in positivist sociology. If law is a manifestation of life then the subjective aspects of its validity which outlast the individual, such as consciousness of law, sense of justice, and conviction of legitimacy, are the results or superstructure of secondary effects in consciousness of a causally determined development of psychological qualities in Homo sapiens[.]}^{377}
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In *Rechtsgewissen*, and with its help, it was possible to connect the spheres of values, tradition, and personal experience in jurisprudence. As a ‘subjective aspect’ of the ‘validity’ of the normative system, and as an exclusive human attribute, *Rechtsgewissen* was traceable throughout the European legal tradition, only sometimes being more hindered in one era than another. Legal conscience emerged from the mentality, *Dasein*, of a given legal community. The distinctive awareness of a group of people sharing virtues, values, ways of life, social practices and understanding their culture as successors of previous generations, nevertheless positing their own questions with regard to the boundaries of their knowledge, formed a mental community which created its own conscience.\(^{378}\)

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\(^{376}\) Wieacker, *A History of Private Law* 1995, 477: “Legal conscience differs from other instances of ethical insight in that it has consciousness of what is required in one’s conduct towards other men. This distinctiveness of the experience of law is the foundation of the autonomy of justice: if we see the question of what is legally due in this light, there is no higher value into which justice can be absorbed (such as ‘cultural norm’, ‘public benefit’ or love) and there is no priority of ranking among such values. A person thinking about law as it really is must accept that justice does not directly serve any other absolute good (such as religious ardour, enjoyment of God, pity, truth, beauty, or the general welfare)[.]”


\(^{378}\) Wieacker, *A History of Private Law* 1995, 348: “These methods of finding law [relying on the standards of one’s own legal culture] […] certainly depend on shared beliefs about the existence of some law superior to all positive law, beliefs of the kind that existed in Rome and in the High Middle Ages[…], guaranteed principles endorsed by the legal conscience of the community.”
To be conscious of and appreciate this mentality of the communal bond, whether in one’s own time, or while studying other cultures or eras, was to “experience” law.

It follows that by justice we must understand the superior mandate of which a person becomes aware when he experiences a sense of the obligatoriness of law. It is not some general obligation severable from individual experience, but a distinctive and spontaneous behest to every individual in every decision he has to make.\textsuperscript{379}

The legal thinking of the past provided a ‘stock’ of ‘experiences of law,’ thus it provided the modern world with both a vehicle in cultivating one’s legal conscience, and a treasury to further learn from past experience.\textsuperscript{380} Since, from Wieacker’s point of view, the modern world suffered from the ‘crisis of justice’ it was crucial to understand and utilize legal conscience. In conducting peaceful co-existence in a modern society mere application of norms or subjecting the rules of communal being solely to parliamentary procedure, was not enough. The ‘authority’ of the law needed to be reinstalled, and such a task had to be carried out by making people aware of the value-based nature of law: “The art of living together calls for longer and deeper experience than the application of the laws of nature.”\textsuperscript{381} Such ‘longer and deeper experience’ was provided by assimilating the past legal thinking, the tradition of understanding the law.

The Rechtsgewissen as elaborated in Privatrechtsgeschichte signified all the aspects Wieacker held fundamental after the ‘point Zero’ of post-war Germany, but in reference to the contemporary discourse of searching for ‘metajuristic moral values’, and it was constructed on his previous scholarly works. It meant that a legal scholar had to be like the learned ones in history – who had guarded and applied the European legal tradition – asserting that the experiences and understanding of the learned ones were vital and necessary in order to steer the modern legal system, indeed the whole society, in a healthy direction.

\textsuperscript{380} Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 481.
\textsuperscript{381} Wieacker, A History of Private Law 1995, 482.
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Franz Wieacker’s scholarly production offers an invaluable case study concerning the history of historiography. During his life he personally experienced two world wars, served as a soldier in battle, witnessed three abrupt changes of social systems, lived under a totalitarian rule, saw his home country divided and united again, was accused of supporting fascist crimes and celebrated as the reinventor and highest authority of European legal history. These different phases all surfaced in his scholarly texts. Thus, to study the intertwinement of his personal experiences in the historiography he produced, brings forth results, not only from a biographical point of view, but for the history of ideas in general. These results show the dynamic relationship between personal vision, scientific tradition and social circumstances in historical writing.

My attempt has not been to study the extent to which Wieacker’s texts were embodiments of any political ideology. It is important to analyze the “politics of history” and reveal the function historiography in general had, and has, in supporting and legitimizing political ideologies. In this study, however, I intended to go beyond such questions as whether Wieacker’s 1930s texts can be seen as an extension of National Socialist ideology. I consider, in fact, that historiography is always political in the sense that it is produced within a political framework set by the society of the time, and the historian’s aim is to have an effect on the prevailing common opinion. The actual audience might just occasionally be more restricted and comprised of other scientists. I have also wanted to refrain from analyzing Wieacker’s texts solely in relation to other texts and only within scientific discourse. While analyzing the meaning of a given text, one should not forget the agency of a scholar, and the continuous interpreting and reinterpreting of both the social context and the scientific tradition in which authors are more or less always engaged. Thus, the relevant question in the context of this book and of Franz Wieacker’s texts is why does a scholar choose a particular message in any given moment, which he/she then further presents to the audience in a political act of writing history.

I consider this approach to be a fruitful way of making sense of historiographical texts, at the same time avoiding the caveats of overemphasizing either the influence of the prevailing ideology on the text or the text’s descent from the
preceding tradition. This is also a natural stance towards Franz Wieacker’s works, since his intentions to have an impact with his writings are explicit, but he just was not interested in political ideologies. His writings took part in politically oriented disputes over the fate of the nation, and especially in the 1930s clearly supported some sides of the National Socialist ‘legal renewal.’ But to explain Wieacker’s intentions through the ideological principles upheld by the National Socialist party, or after the Second World War, by Konrad Adenauer’s CDU, would be very artificial. Wieacker mastered the field of Roman law, and was quick to pick up and adapt new theoretical openings from another fields of science. Nevertheless, and despite his political ambiguity and scientific eclecticism, Wieacker had a strong personal understanding of the essence of social justice, which was the prior point of departure for his writings.

This further underlines the ambiguity of his texts. Although they reveal an exceptional knowledge of previous and contemporary legal scientific contributions, and some of them seem to be steeped in a political ideology, they nevertheless always speak of the commitment to consistent, atemporal values. In addition, Wieacker was among the few legal historians who explicitly admitted the effect of political discourse on his historiography, but at the same time insisted that this was not opportunism. Franz Wieacker was a charismatic teacher and a loyal friend. His colleagues remember him as a kind and polite man, with impeccable manners, but as a researcher he never ceased to be interested in new things and fresh approaches. Although an active and social member in the scientific community, his personal world was virtually impermeable to others.¹

Above all Franz Wieacker was a scholar. Like any historian of the modern world, Wieacker saw political changes and new scientific ideas in the light of his own moral standpoints about society, his personal understanding of historical development, and his idea of the role of scholarship in relation to the national and public good. From the viewpoint of the twenty-first century, Wieacker was exceptional in his unquestionable belief in the value and social relevance of scientific work and higher education, and in the significance which he gave to historical examples in the construction of his contemporary world. His scholarly identity was molded by a conviction of the uncorrupted essence of Bildung. This conviction gave added weight to the concepts which he used in his attempt to transmit the lessons of history to the present day. In this work I have analyzed the concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein (legal consciousness) and Rechtsgewissen (legal conscience).

¹ I am deeply grateful to Detlef Liebs, Michael Stolleis, Laurens Winkel, and Geoffrey MacCormack for sharing their personal recollections of Franz Wieacker with me.
In the early texts of Franz Wieacker which I have analyzed in the book, there is no distinction between Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen. Indeed, in these texts Wieacker did not use precisely these concepts to elaborate the features of a common understanding of the rule of law and justice. However, it is evident that these two major entities were often seen by Wieacker as synonyms. If we reflect on the textual devices which Wieacker later deployed to his 1930s texts, the result is obvious. The concepts of Rechtsgewissen and Rechtsbewusstsein overlapped, and with respect to the larger claim which Wieacker intended to make with his writings, their separate existence was not a matter of importance to him. This was still evident in 1944, when Wieacker for the first time introduced precisely these two concepts in the same article. The hierarchy and differences between them were fuzzy.

During the years following the National Socialist Machtergreifung, the common understanding of the rule of law and justice were often perceived to be the same thing. This was the case with the National Socialist rhetoric – which further subordinated the common understanding to the will of Führer – but also in legal scientific discourse. Rechtsbewusstsein was the source for social justice. Deploying this at the time fashionable idea in a legal scientific text could have been experimental and a scholarly mind-game, but Wieacker went further. The conviction that the ‘New legal science’ had indeed uncovered something scientifically sound and relevant, continued to occupy his texts until the early 1940s.

That this idea of the identical nature of the common understanding of the rule of law and justice inspired Wieacker is explained by his socialization to the values attached to Bildung and Stand. Wieacker’s personal experience during the early years of the 1930s was that the social appreciation given to the higher, humanistically oriented education and learnedness as well as to the estate of the legally skilled, was becoming violently degraded. In Wieacker’s view, learnedness, and the virtues of responsibility and honor annexed to it, was a way to make sense of the relation between people, the state and law. In an authentic national culture, the Stand of the legally skilled should be acknowledged as a vital “limb” in the body of society.

Paradoxically, the social context of the years following the National Socialist Machtergreifung seemed to rehabilitate this socially conservative ideal. The legal Studienordnung of 1935 – or to be more precise, Wieacker’s interpretation of it – highlighted the importance of a historical, general understanding of law. The working communities in which Wieacker participated, had apparently been assigned the task of redefining the relation between legal education and society, and in their ethos the communities stressed the meaning of a wider, culturally constituted meaning of law. Not only was the ‘aberration’ of the Weimar Republic being fixed, but Wieacker was in the vanguard of the task of novel restoration.
In Wieacker’s texts on the concept of ‘property,’ the idea of Berufstand, ‘vocational estates’ as the foundational structures within society, gave old ideals new social significance. The ‘lawyer estate’ was again, like in Roman times, at the disposal of the political order when refining its own virtuous culture and advising in administrative decisions concerning the national destiny.

During the war years, at the latest, Wieacker along with many other legal scientists and historians realized the vagueness of the legal ideology of new regime. From the point of view of the National Socialist state, the function of legal reasoning was to serve as a respectable façade for the crimes and destructive policies carries out in the totalitarian nation. While finding the racial premises of the National Socialist laws incomprehensible and irrelevant, Wieacker at the same time furthered his existentialist approach to jurisprudence. Concentrating on the history of definitions given to the material “things” which existing laws spoke about enabled the scholar to deal with the non-contemporaneous, abstract level of law, but also to contemplate the more general – and acute – dilemma of the liaison between scholarly ideas and administration.

The war experience brought empirical evidence to Wieacker’s understanding of human affairs and his legal scientific stance. The political domain of society and its rhetoric could no longer be used to describe his personal experiences. Kameradschaft and ‘concrete order’ became mere slogans which existed in a realm detached from Wieacker’s view of the world. Rechtsbewusstsein and Gewissen did nevertheless appear in his writings and personal letters. Wieacker, who as a representative of the ‘New legal science’ had committed himself to redefining the existing legal concepts in order to meet the social “revolution” and to detach legal science from the twisted old theories, returned to the concepts of Friedrich Carl von Savigny in order to explain legal phenomena. The irony of this turn reveals that it was not a mere textual choice, but a more basic shift in the historical vision of Wieacker as a scholar.

The newly-adapted old concepts were, however, precise in explicating the turbulence of the late years of the Second World War as well as the period of scarcity in post-war Germany, a time to which Wieacker struggled to bring historical meaning. It was obvious that the legal scientific equation of legal consciousness and justice had been a mistake. The Rechtsbewusstsein of the people was misinterpreted, mistaken and unable to understand the deeper historical reasons behind current events. During his service on the frontline, Wieacker realized that not only did the people blindly participate in the war effort, but the study of their historically and culturally constituted set of beliefs would help prevent such a destructive illusion from occurring again. The scholar’s duty was to provide information on the origins and development of the awareness with which people explained their existence.
Wieacker maintained that due to one’s social status and education there was a significant difference in how one understood the meaning of time. To ordinary people the tragic play of historical forces was hidden, but Wieacker and the ‘learned’ in general could interpret the larger picture, placing the ‘collapse’ within a historical context. Furthermore, the ‘learned’ could teach future generations to use the law in a proper way. To contextualize himself (and his group of friends) within a rapidly altering society, Wieacker again resorted to historical examples. Consequently, the legal scientist needed to be the ‘Glossators’ of the Federal Republic, to humbly cultivate tradition, educate, and ward off ‘barbarism.’ The constant and continuous historical reflection between the past and the present in order to bring meaning into one’s social context indicates Wieacker’s learnedness, but also the significance which humanistic education along with the virtues of Bildungsbürgertum had in his identity. Bildung was a value in itself, but it also provided means to understand one’s being.

To rebuild meant to write and engage in scholarly activity. Due to the widespread destruction and scarcity brought about by the war, people, according to Wieacker, were separated from their cultural heritage and character and were deprived of their ‘destiny.’ The reconstruction of the nation necessitated an awareness of the historicity and particular nature of the German people, that is, an acknowledgment of legal consciousness. Only after Germany had understood its destiny – which meant a path that respected the social structures and values important to the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie – in relation to historical examples and the European tradition, could it (re)construct a just society. In this process, necessitated by the collapse of the common culture, it was, according to Wieacker, perfectly human to lean on superstitious explanations, ideologies, and religion. Nevertheless, only after a true awareness of the material values, principles and virtues comprising the common legal culture had been achieved was it possible to apply conscience, Gewissen, to jurisprudence, legislation and court decisions. In his works following the end of the Second World War, Wieacker set about reinstating the legal culture in such a way that the law could be used in a ‘conscientious’ manner. In reconstructing the legal foundations of Europe, the scholar’s task was to spread an awareness of the true causes leading to the ‘collapse,’ and to highlight the distortions in common thinking which had enabled legal havoc to take place. Thus, it was necessary to write on the history of the German and European legal consciousness.

In this task of historiographical reconstruction, Wieacker used the methodological stance he had absorbed during his stay at the University of Leipzig. In Vulgarismus und Klassizismus, instead of tracing the concrete reality and structures of past legal culture, he sought to understand the mentality and thinking of the people inhabiting that time. He tried to understand the common experience of the
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post-Roman legal culture. Thus, Wieacker’s approach to the phenomenon of vulgarization was novel, but it also enabled him to construct a solid historical continuation of the particles which he appreciated in Roman culture, outside concrete temporal structures and institutions. Such immaterial assets had survived the collapse of the Roman culture; they would survive another collapse, and secure the continuation of the essence of legal tradition. With his psychological approach to the distortion of the ancient world, Wieacker also explained the more recent “irrational” aberration of the legal culture, and further emphasized the importance of virtuous, historical structures in the material context of the present. In other words, he reminded his audience of the essential value of Stand and Bildung within the legal culture. Vulgarismus und Klassizismus was more than just a historical case study, it was a framework which Wieacker developed further in ‘Ur- sprünge und Elemente’ to explain the wider narrative of European legal history.

In addition, in the years following the end of the Second World War, Wieacker had to adjust his scholarly identity with respect to the abstract guilt brought about by the public attempt to come to terms with the totalitarian past. In the beginning this process was overshadowed by the material obstacles which scholars faced in their everyday lives. It seemed that law academics had lost their previous respected position as the mediating civil servants between the people and the state. During the denazification of the German academia, Wieacker, along with his close colleagues, was charged with supporting the National Socialists in their oppressive restructuring of Germany. To Wieacker, denazification was a manifestation of the lack of a ‘conscientious’ legal culture, and an expression of the takeover of superstition in society. Nevertheless, the compelling need to redefine a sound legal scientific device in order to come to terms with the past as well as finding a solid base for the legal culture of the future, remained. Such conceptualization had to be in touch with tradition, meaning both legal historical examples and modern elaborations on past examples. It also had to address wider questions on the role of scientific work in society and the responsibility of a scholar within historical development. Wieacker’s solution was a more precise definition of the old concept of Rechtsgewissen.

In defining Rechtsgewissen Wieacker again called upon his scholarly knowledge accumulated during the preceding decade. Although he used the same terms as some other scholars, his concept was in essence existential. The resemblance between Wieacker’s Rechtsgewissen and, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s sensus communis is evident. Very important in constructing the concept were, however, Wieacker’s personal experiences during the ‘legal renewal.’ Wieacker was confident that within a community of scholars, sharing the same set of virtues and bound by a common purpose, it was possible to find a ‘basic thought’ from which to derive ‘truthful’ decisions and through which the sustainability of
other claims could be evaluated. That had been his experience from the lecturer academy of Frankfurt and the *Kieler Schule* as well as the faculty of law at the University of Leipzig. Moreover, it was an enduring principle that such communities of the learned could conduct ‘elastic creativity’ in their thinking. It enabled legal scholars to unchain themselves from restrictive dogmatism and shift their thinking towards legal wisdom. By means of these axioms in his historical vision, achieved through personal experience, Wieacker had already elaborated the exceptional legal culture of the Late Roman Republic in ‘Vom römischen Juristen.’ Furthermore, that historical example of Late Republic jurisprudence legitimated the distinct nature of *Rechtsgewissen* as a morally unflinching way of legal thinking in modern society. When I describe here Wieacker’s historical reflection, which took the shape of a circle, my attempt is not to prove his claim inaccurate, nor devaluate the idea of *Rechtsgewissen* as a jurisprudential tool. Rather I intend to elaborate how Wieacker, like all historians, researched the past from the premises of his own context and through writing intended to have an effect on the present day.

To Wieacker, Roman law never lost its place as a superior historical example. The ‘conscientious’ use of law by the ‘great lawyers’ was due to their ‘creative’ ability and awareness of the tradition of law. Tradition both in Rome and in twentieth-century Germany signified both an understanding of the historical development of law, but also of its historicity; every epoch had its distinct manner of applying and conceptualizing legal matters. In his pedagogical articles Wieacker argued that the ‘great jurisprudence’ of Late Republican lawyers was not only the starting point of the European legal science, but that the Roman *Stand* of jurists had mastered and developed the law in a way which could serve as a perfect example for contemporary European legal scholars and lawyers. Being one with their tradition, the Roman lawyers had been able to further develop their legal culture to meet the challenges of a developing society and technological change. Their legal ‘art’ had been ‘creative,’ *schöpferische*, in the true meaning of the concept. Moreover, the legal art of Roman lawyers stemmed from an absolute awareness of their existence. Roman lawyers were not only able to carry out exceptional legal thinking, they were firmly rooted in the mentality of their society, and had assimilated the social values which defined the cultural horizon of the Romans. To translate this into Wieacker’s own concepts, the *Rechtsgewissen* of Roman lawyers was in touch with the Roman *Rechtsbewusstsein*. Thus, Roman law and Roman lawyers represented a consistent paragon for modern lawyers in their task to keep up with the modernization process as well as find again the untainted core of jurisprudence after the ‘collapse.’

In *Privatrechtsgeschichte* Wieacker also defined *Rechtsgewissen* in elaborating what it was not. It was not based on religious conviction or on dogmatic in-
terpretation in the context of previous theoretical constructions. Thus, as a legal form of *Gewissen* (legal conscience), phronesis or atemporal wisdom was constituted on the temporal, common understanding of the rule of law, but it managed to avoid the ideological and psychological caveats which haunted the legal consciousness. Thus in *Privatrechtsgeschichte* the two concepts of *Rechtsgewissen* and *Rechtsbewusstsein* were related, but the distance between them was a feature which defined the moral quality of a given legal culture. Such a conceptual change in Wieacker’s historical vision was a result of decades of scholarly work, learnedness, and dramatic personal experiences.

The most drastic change with respect to Wieacker’s understanding of conscientious scholarship, however, took place after the second edition of *Privatrechtsgeschichte* had been published. Following the student riots of 1968, he had to reevaluate his scholarly identity with respect to the morals and meaning of scholarly work. As a result, he reviewed his old article ‘Wandlungen der Eigentumsverfassung’ and admitted that the original text was not at all in line with what he, and the society in which he lived in 1976, considered to be ethical. One is compelled to ask why did his scholarly identity, and along with it his historical vision, change so slowly? One reason was the wider social context. In general, German legal scholars did not publicly reflect upon their involvement in the legal havoc of the Third Reich. Wieacker was one of the first of the few who did so. The other aspect relates to the sustaining premises through which Wieacker perceived the law, the world and history. Wieacker believed in the distinct and to a degree separate dimension of the academic world, whose culture changed according to its own rules and schedules. Only when the past intruded into the universities in the form of the student revolt, did the principles of scholarly work have to be reevaluated. The third explanation is elaborated in the theoretical framework of this study.² It is fundamentally human to avoid any drastic reevaluation of an explanation one has earlier given about the world and previous experiences. This is one of the reasons why historical writing is so important in modern cultures. The certainty of both a personal life script as well as a culturally upheld “significance” in history, the sense of continuity, are essential in order to gain individual meaningfulness for one’s story, the “I” among others. Thus in some sense to criticize historians for their lack of interest in rewriting their narratives is unfair. That is not how historiography or historical vision works.

To conclude, and to summarize my response to the research questions raised at the beginning of this book: Franz Wieacker was first and foremost a scholar. His view on social change and society was deeply influenced by his belief in the values of learnedness and higher education. He firmly believed in the necessity

² Cf. p. 30–35.
of the distinct social position of the legally skilled, and maintained that the work conducted by that ‘estate’ was vital for achieving social justice in a given society. He shared that conviction with his closest colleagues, whom he met in the lecturer academy of the University of Frankfurt and in the Kieler Schule. In their culture, within a network of colleagues, social changes were evaluated against an ideal type of social order. The network cultivated their culture in practice in the form of working communities, since in 1933 the National Socialist Machtergreifung provided the network with a possibility to enrich their ideas as models for legal education and jurisprudence. The collaborative method and the resulting academic works of the young scholars represented, for a short period of time, a revolutionary stance against the allegedly dogmatic academic culture. The end of the war and the consequent denazification process was a drastic disappointment to both Wieacker and his network of colleagues. Wieacker, however, found a new, reconstructive direction from the ‘collapse’ and by means of his personal experiences – of communality as the context of legal scholarship and elastic creativity as the aim of legal science – and accumulated, multifaceted scientific capital, established himself as a leading Romanist and legal historian in Europe. Wieacker explained the diverse social breaches and recent crises through a vast narrative of European legal culture, which he constructed by means of concepts. After the war the concepts of Rechtsbewusstsein and Rechtsgewissen were of great importance, but they were only one dimension of his production. Nevertheless, and despite the radical changes that the Machtergreifung and 1945 brought about, the core of his scholarly identity remained untouched. So it is not entirely accurate to analyze to what extent Wieacker’s texts in the latter part of the twentieth century are the results of either the National Socialist era or the post-war atmosphere. The continuing aspects in his works lead back to the Weimar Republic.
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