


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Killing it Softly? Explaining the Early Demise of Left-Wing Terrorism in the Netherlands

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This article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the early demise of Rode Jeugd's initiatives towards a terrorist campaign in the Netherlands. It is concluded that three contextual factors played a crucial role in the process: the openness of the political culture, the setbacks experienced by similar organizations elsewhere (RAF in particular), and the lack of overt repression, combined with effective covert operations carried out by the security forces against the Rode Jeugd. Overall, the case of Rode Jeugd is a prime example of a demonstration of state power not always being the most efficient or even suitable method to combat terrorism.

Keywords counterterrorism, disengagement, intelligence, left-wing terrorism, Netherlands

Introduction

The fate of the Dutch left-wing grouping *Rode Jeugd* (RJ, Red Youth) seems in many ways a counterterrorist's dream: The group was starting up an urban guerrilla campaign in the early 1970s, but its actions were halted before they caused any serious consequences. There was hardly a political trial to speak of and the media paid only modest attention to the issue. Throughout the whole period, the public perception prevailed that the Netherlands did not have a terrorism problem. Few now remember that Rode Jeugd even existed and all of its former members have

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re-integrated well into society. A famous explanation for the demise of Rode Jeugd was provided by a former member, Luciën van Hoesel, in an interview in 1985:

If you situated my case in Germany, I would have been dead, received a life sentence, or I would still have been a fugitive. It is actually too crazy, once you realize this. In the Netherlands, you get so much leeway that the motivation to act falls apart. [. . .] The liberal climate in the Netherlands put a stop to terrorism, whereas in Germany, reactionary forces artificially sustained terrorism for ten years [. . .].¹

What makes this explanation particularly attractive is that it implicitly suggests that by reacting in a certain way, the authorities can create or at least contribute to an environment that is hostile to terrorism. Indeed, at first glance, it seems as if Rode Jeugd was crushed by skilful intelligence operations. A closer look reveals, however, that the process leading to its demise was more complicated than that and that the “success” of countermeasures resulted not only from wise decisions and their skilful implementation, but partly from failures to take action.

This article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the process leading to Rode Jeugd’s demise. As framework for our analysis, we will use the model for decline of radical groups on a collective level that F. Demant, M. Sloodman, F. Buijs, and J. Tillie developed.² They argue that to understand the decline and dissolution of radical organizations, the emphasis should be put on the interaction between potential radicals, on the one hand, and the radical organization or movement on the other.³ This interaction can be perceived as an exchange between *demand* and *supply*. In a given society, a considerable number of disgruntled citizens can strive after radical changes. This “demand” for action can, however, remain latent if it does not find an appropriate “supply” of radical repertoires. On the other hand, this supply of initiatives for radical change will remain untouched if there are no disenfranchised citizens. When demand and supply meet, a radical movement can blossom. When the interaction between demand and supply becomes unbalanced, the organization will, however, decline or even disappear.

Several factors can be identified on both sides that can cause a movement to decline. For example, the ideology of the movement can lose its appeal or the movement can fail on an organizational level. This decline can furthermore be enhanced by specific *contextual factors* that provide the radical movement with changing opportunities and restrictions that influence its dynamics (for example other—probably radical—competing organizations). When asked for explanations for the demise of Rode Jeugd and its successors, the former members put much of the blame on themselves, especially on deficits in “supply side” factors such as strategy, internal discipline, and organization. They also point to three more contextual factors as explanations: Dutch political culture (the “liberal climate”), international context, and counterterrorist measures. We examine how these three contextual factors influenced the demand (that is, the sympathizers, members, and popularity of the movement) and the supply side (that is, the organization) of the Rode Jeugd’s activities.

Our analysis is based on in-depth historical research relying on primary sources and oral history methods. Leena Malkki conducted several interviews with former Rode Jeugd members and studied their internal writings.⁴ Beatrice de Graaf carried out research in government archives, interviewed some security officials, and was

able to reconstruct (intelligence) operations that were waged against this radical group.⁵ We will start with a short, factual overview of the rise and decline of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands, focusing on its strategy and organization, before we deal with the three factors mentioned above.

Rode Jeugd: Strategy and Organization

Rode Jeugd had its origins in the turbulent Amsterdam of 1966. Initially, it was a loose network of young workers who were active within the context of the larger protest movement of the time. Its members took part in demonstrations against the Vietnam War, distributed pamphlets on several issues and tried to educate the protesting youths about the principles of Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary action.

What set Rode Jeugd apart from other youthful protesters, however, was its militant attitude and method of action—the factor that Demant et al. denote as “the supply side” of the movement (they stress the importance of ideology, strategy, organization, and leadership). The supporters of the group were proud to be the most radical and violent ones in the streets. The Mao placards were carried in the demonstrations not only for their message but also for the attached stout poles that could be used as weapons if needed. It was not uncommon for the Rode Jeugd supporters to act provocatively, and this confrontational attitude severed Rode Jeugd’s relations with most other groups involved in the protests. The following comment by another demonstrator from October 1968 is typical:

Because the [...] organizations had not dared to ask Rode Jeugd to participate (apparently because of the prior experiences!), they [Rode Jeugd] found it necessary to suddenly show up with slogans that had nothing to do with defending the Vietnamese people. The police got a reason to intervene when other demonstrators who wanted to remove these slogans got into a fight with Rode Jeugd.⁶

Rode Jeugd’s clashes with the authorities were particularly fierce in the conservative city of Eindhoven in the southern part of the Netherlands. Rode Jeugd was practically the only youth protest movement that was marching in its streets. In addition to battles with the police, Rode Jeugd supporters frequently clashed with Philips security personnel and American soldiers stationed in the bases across the border in Germany who visited the city during their furloughs. Rode Jeugd had picked the biggest company and pride of the city, Philips, as its target and as a symbol of capitalism and imperialism.⁷

Towards the end of the 1960s, the character of Rode Jeugd started to change. In 1973, the developments were described in the internal paper of Rode Jeugd:

The year 1970 was important for RJ, and it found its expression in 1971. After 4 years of disturbances, during which Rode Jeugd got and kept going well, the movement began to ebb. This happened in 1969 and 1970. With this, also the potential of RJ slowly washed away. What was left were the motivated adherents, a few key members and the leaders. Whereas in 1966–1970 violence was used only in the form of stones, smoke bombs, cudgels and a few Molotov cocktails, in 1970 there

began a discussion about more serious violence, the development of the “urban guerrilla” struggle of which little was known at that time.⁸

With the spontaneous masses of the protest movement gone, Rode Jeugd needed to reorient its actions—a development characterized by Demant et al. as a decrease of “members’ needs” on the demand side of the radical movement. Another development that suggested that they needed to change their approach was the ever-escalating conflict between Rode Jeugd and the authorities, the Eindhoven establishment in particular.

Besides staying in tune with the developments in the Netherlands, the activists had kept a close eye on what had been going on elsewhere. They seemed to expect that with things going the way they were, the group would soon be confronted with the same kind of choices and circumstances as the radical left had faced in West Germany, France, and other European countries. In the activists’ eyes, the situation was developing much along the same lines as in neighboring West Germany or France. For them, this suggested that if Rode Jeugd wanted to survive, it was time to change the tactics and organization, to move from protest to resistance, just as, for example, the German Red Army Faction had.⁹ In this sense, by customizing and adjusting its strategy and ideology on the supply side of the movement, they hoped they could increase the “demand” for radical and revolutionary action by mobilizing new generations.

The idea of moving from protest to offensive resistance and the use of violence was not welcomed by all Rode Jeugd members. After a fierce dispute, the moderate wing of Rode Jeugd, which claimed that the organization should focus its efforts on organizing the masses and move toward violent revolution only later, split from Rode Jeugd.¹⁰

From the radicals’ point of view,¹¹ it would have been a waste of time to try to gather the Dutch workers into a mass organization at that moment, because the workers had so hopelessly lost their class consciousness that they no longer realized that they were being exploited. The radicals preferred to direct their activities into supporting struggles in the Third World. Based on the encirclement theory of the prominent Chinese military leader Lin Biao, they predicted that revolution would first succeed in Third World countries and then spread to the heartlands of capitalism.¹² By disrupting capitalism at home by all possible means—including intimidation, sabotage, and the annihilation of lives—they could best help the progression of the revolutionary struggle and at the same time demonstrate to the Dutch workers how the capitalist system could be effectively attacked. They favored a two-tier strategy. On the one hand, Rode Jeugd kept in touch with other leftist action groups in order to radicalize them and recruit members for their own struggle. This was called the “legal” side of the urban guerrilla movement. In addition, there would be preparations for the “illegal” attacks against capitalist targets.¹³ Plans were made for some of its members to go underground. However, it was immediately recognized that such a division between the legal and illegal branches was not possible at that moment. Almost all who were involved in the illegal actions continued their normal existence and were involved also on the legal front.

In the coming months, plans and preparations were made for building up an urban guerrilla organization in the Netherlands. Weapons were bought and plans were made for renting safe houses and obtaining money through bank robberies.

Philips and American companies became the targets of several small scale bomb attacks, responsibility for which was claimed under two action names, *Philips Griekenland Aktiegroep* (Philips Greece Action group) and *Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland* (Revolutionary People's Resistance Netherlands).¹⁴

However, the preparations and attacks were soon almost totally halted by a combination of discouraging developments abroad and setbacks faced at home. In West Germany, the majority of the activists who later became known as the first generation of the RAF were arrested and some of the members got killed by the police. Even though the members of Rode Jeugd had serious reservations about the strategy of the RAF, they also felt strong solidarity with it. German left-wing activists and the key members of Rode Jeugd had been in contact at least from 1968 on.¹⁵ The bloody arrests of the RAF members made the chances of a much smaller and less sophisticated Rode Jeugd look grim. Escalating or even continuing the urban guerrilla struggle proved very difficult, especially because the whole concept was so new in the European context.

In December 1972 and June 1973, two Rode Jeugd members were arrested with bomb materials in their possession. In both cases, it was evident that the arrests were made possible by the actions of at least one informant. Even though it was a well-known fact that there were informants inside the group, these arrests caused serious upheaval among its core members. The arrests raised questions about whether Rode Jeugd was suited for urban guerrilla warfare if it was so easily penetrated by the intelligence agencies. The members clearly recognized that the urban guerrilla struggle necessitated a different kind of organization—a more disciplined one—but they did not manage to transform the organization accordingly.

Furthermore, rumors about informants and betrayals led to disagreements between the key members. Their relations had been somewhat strained even before the arrests. Each of them had their own visions about revolutionary struggle. Even though the core members did not explicitly suspect each other of being informants, trust became an issue and paranoia set in. Someone clearly could not keep critical information as secret as it needed to be.¹⁶

By the end of 1973, the key members had reached the conclusion that:

Rode Jeugd is organizationally not up to a long-lasting struggle in the metropolises, not well adjusted to the reality of waging armed anti-imperialist struggle and class struggle. It is therefore unavoidable that we have to remodel our organization. The image of Rode Jeugd that has been formed through several years' practice does not match the level in which we need to start working.¹⁷

In March 1974, the organization was officially disbanded. However, this did not bring any big changes to many of its key members' activities. In the resistance phase of Rode Jeugd, the key members had already functioned in many ways rather autonomously and hardly anyone had a concise overview of everything that was going on. Many of them just went on as before.

The next couple of years were characterized by a search for ways to contribute to the revolutionary struggle. Starting up another urban guerrilla struggle in the Netherlands was still on the agenda. However, due to increasingly unpromising perspectives at home, many former Rode Jeugd activists leaned more and more towards supporting other armed struggles. Their eyes and activities were directed

especially towards the German Red Army Faction which at that time had an important base in the Netherlands.

In these new attempts, the activists confronted similar kinds of difficulties as the Rode Jeugd had confronted earlier, including weak organization, a small number of activists, and vulnerability in face of the countermeasures taken by the authorities. This time, they did not tackle these challenges any more successfully; in fact, the results were even worse. One by one, all of them dropped out. Most of them abandoned the idea of armed struggle in late 1976 after the last attempt for regrouping had failed and the larger left-wing movement had faded away.

Dutch Political Climate and Its Effect on Rode Jeugd

In Rode Jeugd members' publications directed at their sympathizers and supporters, the prevalent explanation for the demise of Rode Jeugd was the alleged stagnation in theory forming. Rode Jeugd members were clearly disappointed about the absence of a viable Marxist-Leninist movement in the Netherlands and about the lack of solidarity from other Marxist activists. Other organizations did show support when someone from Rode Jeugd was arrested and criticized the authorities for the way they attacked the left,¹⁸ but that was as far as their solidarity went. The problem with most Marxist-Leninists was, in Rode Jeugd activists' view, that they did not have an understanding of the structure and development of imperialism on a global level and only focused on parochial interests. At the same time, the Rode Jeugd was disappointed about the lack of courage and ambition with these "salon socialists": in their view, no movement without an illegal branch could effectively challenge and undermine the capitalist and imperialist system from within.¹⁹

To put it simply, Rode Jeugd lacked supporters (the "demand side"). In the eyes of most members of the protest movement that emerged in the latter part of the 1960s, the idea of starting up (or even preparing for) armed struggle in the Netherlands was just absurd. Towards the end of the 1960s, the Dutch protest movement started to disintegrate into small parties or single-issue movements which directed their activities towards influencing decision-making within the political institutions.²⁰ To be sure, the same fragmentation and rupturing of the radical movement also happened in Italy and Germany, producing increasingly militant groupings in the wake of this process. There, however, these factions were not able (or willing) to find access to the political parties and were not absorbed by the political system as was the case in the Netherlands.²¹

This quick entrance into parliamentary politics by the Dutch social activists and protesters was to an important degree made possible by the reactions of the Dutch elite to these challengers. Criticism of the "old" governing style had already emerged within the traditional parties themselves in the 1950s. By the mid 1960s, a significant part of the elite was convinced that the world around them was changing rapidly and unavoidably. They found solace in this development by convincing themselves that the only sensible thing to do was to try to adapt to these changes as much as possible. They had seen the backlash of repressive policing measures, applied during the first demonstrations in Amsterdam in 1965–1966, during the visit of the Shah of Iran to Berlin (1967) and during the May revolt in Paris (1968). This was not how the social-democratic and progressive Christian-democratic politicians wanted to enter the history books.²²

The tendency to avoid conflict can be viewed as a recurrent feature of Dutch political culture. According to historian James Kennedy, such behavior was typical of Dutch political life, which was based on pluralism and consensus, including an aversion to high levels of social or political tension. The authorities, therefore, went to much greater lengths to avoid confrontation than in many other European countries. The political leaders of the traditional parties were particularly uneasy with the use of violence (for example, by using repressive police methods) and tried to avoid it at almost any cost. As in many other countries at that time, the Dutch authorities overestimated the power of student radicals, but instead of coming down hard on them, they decided to give in to this perceived “force of history.”²³ This was possible, because they were not confronted with such a polarized society or moral panic vis-à-vis this rise of the left, as that facing the West German government during the same period. Unlike in Germany or Italy, the Dutch political system was not structured along a left-versus-right-wing divide, but segmented along confessional or ideological lines. Furthermore, unlike in the Federal Republic of Germany with its history of aborted democracy, national security (Innere Sicherheit) was not a field in which the Dutch ruling classes (from 1973–1977 principally the social-democrats) had to demonstrate state power.²⁴

This left Rode Jeugd as the only Dutch organization within the gamut of revolutionary movements in Western Europe calling for immediate armed struggle at that time.²⁵ Initially, this lack of a sound support base was actually one of the reasons why Rode Jeugd adopted the tactics of terrorism. It was partly an attempt to find new tactics of militancy, presence, and efficiency that would suit their diminishing ranks and compensate for the loss of supporters. While the liberal climate did not provide total immunity against the emergence of terrorism, in the long run, it heavily eroded the “demand side” factor needed to keep terrorist organizations floating. The inclusive and consensual political culture thus weakened the “breeding conditions” of new generations of Rode Jeugd members and affected the movement’s longevity: the Rode Jeugd lasted only a single generation, and even that generation did not grow old in the battle but abandoned it well short of victory.

Rode Jeugd and the International Context

Another important external factor contributing to the decline of the radical organization was—the admittedly somewhat vague notion of—the international context. This factor mainly influenced the “supply side” of the organization: its ideological, tactical, and technical resources, as well as the motivations of the radical members involved.

When looking for direction and signs of things to come, Rode Jeugd members were not solely or even primarily looking at the national context. Their worldview was thoroughly internationalist and they perceived themselves as part of a world-wide community of revolutionary movements fighting imperialism and capitalism, including national liberation movements in the Third World and groups such as *Rote Armee Fraktion*, *Brigate Rosse*, and the Weather Underground in the Western countries. In this sense, their whole ideology, as an organization resource, was drawn from the paradigms and theories that international social revolutionary thinking could offer them in the 1960s and 1970s. It could be argued that they were even more internationally oriented than their comrades elsewhere in Europe, who had to deal with much more repression at home. For the Rode Jeugd, the international enemy image

of imperialism and capitalism had to make up for the absence of a national enemy of state repression.

The least understood aspect of Rode Jeugd's campaign is how this international inspiration affected its course. Most of those involved in Rode Jeugd point to the Vietnam War as a major catalyst for their radicalization. However, during the late 1960s, the Rode Jeugd members kept a closer eye on the development of protest movements in other European countries—in West Germany, France, and Italy in particular. These developments provided them with a reference point in terms of how their future might look, both in terms of how to escalate their own tactics and what kind of countermeasures might be taken against it.

This focus on foreign protest movements was only logical, since the Rode Jeugd did not find enough “repression” at home. The international context partly served as a substitute for any real conflicts at home. Unlike their German and Italian comrades, they could not present a fascist parent generation or a particularly conservative, repressive, or corrupt government to stand up against. The Dutch militants, even more than their comrades elsewhere, therefore needed to conceive their own actions as part of a broader, world-wide revolutionary struggle in order to find legitimacy for their campaigns.

In this struggle, the Rode Jeugd saw its role primarily as a supporting force to those fighting closer to the frontlines. From 1968 on, Rode Jeugd members for example cooperated with West German activists in helping American defectors escape from military bases in West Germany and travel to Scandinavian countries.²⁶ They had also been active in providing logistical assistance to resistance movements opposing the military juntas in Greece and Portugal.²⁷ The importance of struggles in other countries, and in West Germany in particular, became even more obvious as the campaign of Rode Jeugd reached a dead end in 1974. Without much to fight for in the Netherlands, helping out comrades in other countries, again RAF in particular, provided them with possibilities to continue their involvement in revolutionary action.

However, around the same time, these international contacts and the developments abroad also served as an important external factor that chipped away at their ideological and motivational resources. In this way, both the “supply side elements” were reduced (ideology, strategy) and the “demand side” was undermined (the members' motivation crumbled and the group failed to attract new generations).

In particular, the contacts with the German RAF-activists—contacts the Rode Jeugd had so proudly established—contributed to this decline. The West-German militants unwittingly gave their Dutch counterparts some highly unattractive glimpses into life underground. Rode Jeugd-leader Willem Oskam stated in an interview in 1985:

In Amsterdam I drove once with someone from the RAF through the city. Then you saw how paranoid someone like that person was; at every traffic light the person thought that detectives would cut you off and policemen with pistols would surround our car! I can understand that, but it is not a good thing if you have to go that far.²⁸

If the developments in West Germany radicalized Rode Jeugd members, they also played an important role in the decline of the Rode Jeugd and its successor organizations.

Beginning in 1972, the first generation of the RAF was arrested, and many of the second generation were rounded up as well—some of them after heavy shootouts with the police, involving killings on both sides. If even the German radicals, who from the Rode Jeugd's point of view were so much more professional and better trained, were defeated so quickly, how could the Dutch organization stand any chance? Would it not be better to stop right away and find other ways to serve the revolution? Although one may question whether their expectations regarding similar repressive police responses in the Netherlands were well founded, seeing comrades next door getting killed and arrested was very disheartening for many Rode Jeugd members indeed. Even if the deaths of Holger Meins (1974) and Ulrike Meinhof (1976) did motivate some of the RJ members to carry on, the showdown of the "German Autumn" in 1977 most certainly discouraged most of the remaining Dutch radicals.²⁹

Countermeasures

As has been stated above, the Rode Jeugd itself paid much attention to finding explanations (or justifications) for their demise in the third external factor we address here: the role of the Dutch security forces and its countermeasures. In its press release from 1974 the Rode Jeugd gave the following explanation for their disbandment in that year:

The national command of Rode Jeugd has decided to disband Rode Jeugd as a legal political organization. The formation of sharpshooter brigades whose task is to kill, the establishment of the National Criminal Investigation Service for so-called ideological criminality and increasingly stronger calls of the police corps from big cities to widen the repression apparatus are seriously threatening Rode Jeugd's normal way of functioning. [...] As Rode Jeugd refuses to be voluntarily experimented on or to serve as a target for the rising fascism any longer, the national command has decided to disband its legal status.³⁰

This statement rings more like a justification of the decision directed towards their members and supporters than as an accurate description of what actually happened in the field of countermeasures against the Rode Jeugd.

To be sure, many of the Rode Jeugd activists made an escorted visit to the police station at some point during their radical careers. In Eindhoven, between 1969 and 1972, the police treated Rode Jeugd members more harshly than elsewhere, even unleashing police dogs against them and letting American soldiers (who were on furlough from their bases in West-Germany) attack Rode Jeugd members in the streets. This police brutality was one of the reasons why the Eindhoven branch of the Rode Jeugd became the most militant, being the first to advocate a transformation from protest to offensive resistance in 1969.³¹

In October 1972, when public opinion was already sensitized after the hostage drama in Munich in September 1972, the Rode Jeugd carried out several bombings throughout the country. Most of the bombs did not go off, but their detection electrified the authorities and the public nevertheless. Only then were the local forces in Eindhoven reinforced with nationwide security operations against Rode Jeugd cells.³² Justice Minister Dries van Agt went on television to announce an antiterrorist

campaign against them and promised to undertake some steps against “the worrisome increase of terror in the Netherlands.”³³

In January 1973, Prime Minister Barend Biesheuvel presented his “terror letter” to the House of Representatives, in which the government described what it intended to do in response to acts of terror.³⁴ Apart from the Rode Jeugd, Moluccan activists (who were responsible for some incidents involving the occupation of the Indonesian ambassador’s residence and the killing of a police officer in 1970) and Palestinian militants (responsible for several bombings, without any casualties involved) were mentioned as possible targets. The government furthermore announced the establishment of new antiterrorism units.

However, terrorism was not defined as a new legal category. Government officials did not deem it necessary to make provisions for a state of emergency or introduce offensive antiterrorism laws. In the first place, many influential writers had already pointed out how such measures could backfire against society.³⁵ Prime Minister Biesheuvel therefore explicitly stated that “an open society should not be afflicted” by counterterrorism measures.³⁶ This restraint was moreover inspired by the wish to keep counterterrorism “low profile” and out of the public eye. Counterterrorist measures were a matter of traditional law enforcement and intelligence, deployed by the existing security and police forces, who had a great say in the matter and did not favor new centralizing or coordinating agencies put above them.

This meant that the population was not mobilized and the tone remained pragmatic. The government even persuaded the editors of the national newspapers and other media representatives to issue as little information as possible on the context of terrorist actions and not to give terrorists or politically violent activists a platform to tell their story in the media. Partly due to these decisions, no broadly employed, all-embracing terrorism discourse came into being. For the average newspaper reader, it even remained unclear who was behind the bombings.³⁷

Furthermore, without new laws, it was difficult to get the arrested Rode Jeugd members convicted. Indeed, only a handful of them ever got sentenced—to relatively short sentences as well (two years at the most). The lack of spectacular court cases and downright repression also meant that Rode Jeugd had only few agitation points that it could use to draw support. There would probably have been more support for the radicals had the repression been more heavy handed. The arrests and subsequent trials of three fugitive RAF members in the Netherlands in 1977 proved this point: their trial mobilized several radical supporters, who became involved because they protested against the way the West German state handled the imprisoned RAF members and against the fact that the Dutch government now effectively was assisting their German colleagues in doing so.³⁸ Even the Rode Jeugd members themselves agreed that being arrested had more value than walking free. Luciën van Hoesel, who got a sentence of two years, recalled:

You accepted the repercussions as a kind of role play that went with it. Or more strongly, if public prosecutor Peijnenburg had said, you are a fool, we let you go, that would have been worse than his claiming that I represented a revolutionary danger to the society.³⁹

The principal instrument deployed against the Rode Jeugd was therefore not criminal law, but consisted of disruptive intelligence efforts. The BVD and its local branches within the police forces, the Police Intelligence Services, initiated several

infiltration operations from 1971 onwards.⁴⁰ The services planted agents or recruited informers with the aim of collecting information on upcoming attacks and carrying out “active measures.”⁴¹ Rode Jeugd activists of course knew that they were under close scrutiny by the security service, but they were unable to close their ranks against infiltrators and informers—mainly because they did not develop adequate security awareness, did not discipline their followers as the RAF or the Weather Underground did, and kept an open flank because they refused to go completely underground.

This vulnerability to intelligence penetrations could however also partly be attributed to the fact that the Netherlands was not a very convenient place for armed struggle in terms of geography. As a former Rode Jeugd member explained:

Everybody lives close to each other and therefore there are few places to hide. In the United States there were whole neighborhoods the police did not dare to enter. Those are perfect hiding places for urban guerrilleros. Such places do not exist in the Netherlands. You saw also what happened in Germany. Germany is many times bigger than the Netherlands, but it did not work out there either, because the social control and the technical level of the police and intelligence services were so high.⁴²

In the end, the BVD gained access to almost every Rode Jeugd cell and contributed to betrayal and paranoia within the organization. Former BVD employee Frits Hoekstra argues that his service was a major proponent of the “repressive tolerance” approach: the approach aimed at paralyzing the movement, on the one hand, by internal security measures, but keeping this repression as low-key as possible, while at the same time convincing politicians and journalists that their concerns about an RAF-style violent group being on the verge of emerging in the Netherlands were unnecessary and that no additional attention should be paid to the activists, not even negative attention.⁴³

It must be added that the policy against Rode Jeugd was not as uniform and concerted as the above suggests—although this was the basic tone. Furthermore, the “success” was not simply the result of good policies and their skilful implementation. It was also a product of failures. Police forces and public prosecutors would have liked to have seen more arrests being made and more Rode Jeugd members convicted and put behind bars. Their attempts, however, failed due to the lack of evidence and adequate legal provisions in place (such as conspiracy laws, organization offenses, or glorification bans—measures that were adopted in Germany, for example, but not in the Netherlands).⁴⁴ In many instances, prosecuting individual members was attempted, but failed in the absence of evidence.⁴⁵ But even some police officials concluded in retrospect that these failures were not necessarily unfortunate. The director of *Landelijk Bijstandsteam Terreurbestrijding* (LBT, National Support Group for Combatting Terrorism) estimated in 1981:

Even though the LBT has had many successes, the penal wrapping up of terror cases [through convictions] has been one of the exceptions. But we are not very sad because of that. The experiences in the last years have taught that terror can be combated very well by “disturbing” it. That way, more than one act has been prevented. That is perhaps not very spectacular, but effective.⁴⁶

In sum, be it consciously or as a result of some positive contingencies, the countermeasures applied by the intelligence services, the lack of overt repression by police or antiterrorism units, and the absence of new laws effectively undermined the morale of the members and the standing of the leadership (Van Hoesel was arrested) and rendered the organization incapable of setting up new campaigns—thus undermining both the supply and the demand sides of the radical group.

Individual Exits

In addition to these factors contributing to the decline of the Rode Jeugd on a collective (group) level, there remains to be addressed one essential factor promoting disengagement on an individual level: The smooth demise of Rode Jeugd was partly made possible by the fact that its members always had another way out. The organization could disband, because its members were able to slide back into “normal life” again. Individual exit was never a problem.

First of all, this was due to the fact that the Rode Jeugd members were not pursued by the judicial system. They were not haunted by arrest warrants or driven underground out of fear of heavy sentences. It was good luck that the clashes with the police and the violent attacks carried out by Rode Jeugd members had no deadly consequences. Fatalities would have lifted the confrontation to a totally different level and could have antagonized the forces of law and order and the left-wing movement to a similar unbridgeable extent as happened in Germany or Italy.⁴⁷ As things were, there was no need to hide from the authorities, and no one was dependent on Rode Jeugd for survival. This absence of fugitive stress probably also explained why no peer group pressure or even retaliation threats were issued against activists who wanted to quit—unlike with the RAF, for example.

In the second place, unlike the German case, in the Netherlands, the Rode Jeugd members could easily find other, non-militant outlets for their political energy. Radical parties were not banned or blocked from participation in the political system. Significantly enough, several former Rode Jeugd members and their associates stepped from the armed struggle directly to a political party, *Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij* (PSP, Pacifist Socialist Party), and many of them ran as its candidates in municipal elections. Mirjam Lucassen, who was one of them, explained this choice in an interview:

We had always been in the same lines with PSP with regard to how economy should be organized, how the society should be organized, you name it. Only the armed struggle was somewhat contradictory, because PSP was pacifist and we were just the opposite. But if you come to the point that you decide to stop with the armed struggle, then that last difference is [...] gone. That was then the only party that came into question. [...] I think what has also played a role is that we thought that if we joined a political party, then we would be safer, then you were part of something. You can of course start up something yourself, but nobody will believe you and you continue to be placed in that same corner.⁴⁸

In the third place, the political system and public opinion as such also went along with this change of track: the former Rode Jeugd members were accepted in community councils (even in Eindhoven, where they formerly had fought bitter

battles against the same municipal representation, even involving smoke bombs and fake bomb alerts). The group was not demonized by other political actors or by the media. In the interviews that Leena Malkki conducted with former Rode Jeugd members, no-one indicated that their past had influenced their lives negatively afterwards, although some of them have refrained from political activity in order to avoid a situation where the “terrorist” past might be brought up to discredit the movement in which the person is participating.

In sum, when most of the Dutch activists lost faith in the idea of the urban guerrilla around 1977, the whole affair was able to just fall into oblivion. It took the remaining revolutionaries a few years more to abandon the struggle. But the BVD kept a close eye on former Rode Jeugd members for several years anyway, and finally carried the concept of the urban guerrilla in the Netherlands to its grave.⁴⁹

Conclusion

To conclude this analysis, the question remains to be answered whether the demise of Rode Jeugd resulted from clever counterintelligence operations. As we have explained, three contextual factors chipped away at both the supply side of the radical movement and the demand side of its members: (1) the openness of the political culture, (2) the setbacks experienced by the RAF in West Germany and other similar organizations elsewhere, and (3) the lack of overt repression, combined with effective covert operations carried out by the security forces against the Rode Jeugd. The first and third contextual factors indeed point to a positive net effect of countermeasures undertaken against the Dutch radicals.

There are two comments to make on this point. First of all, some might argue that this “Dutch approach” of tolerance, caution, and shrewd measures which was developed over the course of the 1970s was easily applied in a country where no real terrorist threat existed at the time. We think, however, that this is an anachronistic and a-historical way of thinking. There were quite a few terrorism-related incidents during the decade: around 15 people died because of terrorist attacks in the 1970s (including six terrorists). Several terrorist groups, such as Black September and Japanese Red Army, carried out attacks, not to mention the terrorist attacks by Moluccan youths, which included two train hijackings, sieges of diplomatic buildings, and even the occupation of a primary school (involving 105 school children). In this climate, the government could have responded to the bombings and threats made by the Rode Jeugd in a much more repressive way. It therefore was a conscious, deliberate, and not at all self-evident step for the government not to introduce new laws, announce a state of emergency, and unleash an antiterrorist campaign.

It must be added, however, that this restrained approach was also inspired by the fact that the Dutch political and administrative landscape was just too fragmented to carry out effective national counterterrorist campaigns. The regional police forces and security services fought hard to keep their autonomy in the field—and the government let them, because counterterrorism was not seen as an issue that could be capitalized upon politically at that time.⁵⁰

Secondly, it is true that this approach of restraint and infiltration would probably not have worked against a group that was already more radicalized or organized (like the RAF or the Red Brigades).⁵¹ The fact that no-one had been killed because of Rode Jeugd’s actions made it morally easier to think pragmatically. However, one of the main reasons for the Rode Jeugd’s poor organizational,

strategic, and motivational rigor, was exactly the good information position of the security service and its many successful infiltration operations in the first stages of the Rode Jeugd's radicalization process. When the Rode Jeugd members tried to improve their security situation in 1972 as they decided to move towards armed struggle (and again after 1974, when they extended their international contacts and even endeavored on a trip to South Yemen in 1976 to obtain terrorist training from the PFLP, together with German RAF-members) it was too late—the core members had already been identified years before, and new recruits were monitored almost as soon as they entered the radical orbit.

What implications does this have in terms of counterterrorism? Firstly, the case of Rode Jeugd highlights that a demonstration of state power—for example by staging national counterterrorist campaigns, mobilizing the public and deploying massive counterterrorist instruments—is not always the most efficient way—or a suitable method at all—to combat terrorism. In theory, Rode Jeugd could have been easily crushed with force because they were so few, they did not have many supporters, and the police was very well aware of their whereabouts. This would however almost certainly have elevated their status as political combatants. It would have fuelled their militant strategy (the supply side of the movement) and would have radicalized new generations (the demand side) as well.

The case of Rode Jeugd also demonstrates that terrorists do walk away and voluntarily abandon the tactic—when supply and demand are no longer in tune. Rode Jeugd is not the only group to have done so. The Weather Underground de-escalated its tactics considerably after three of its members got killed while assembling a bomb. Later, the organization made an attempt to start operating aboveground again. The organization was a target of severe countermeasures, but very few of its key members were arrested at that time.⁵² Moreover, it could be argued that these countermeasures even kept the WUO alive for a little bit longer: some of the WUO-members remained underground only to demonstrate that they could outplay the authorities.

The second evident implication therefore is that it certainly does not hurt to make abandoning terrorism easy. Like any other decision that a person makes, the choice of continuing or abandoning terrorism is influenced by both push and pull factors: things that make one reconsider the commitment to terrorism and how the other options look. In the Italian case, offers of sentence reduction (based on the “*pentiti* laws” of the early 1980s) ignited whole waves of repentant terrorists betraying their comrades and confessing to the prosecutors.⁵³

Thirdly, the case of Rode Jeugd suggests that counterterrorist policies are likely to be more successful if they utilize the weaknesses of the group that they are targeted on—provided they play their part subtly, without capitalizing too much on this weakness in public. The open character of Rode Jeugd made it relatively easy to recruit informants from the crowd of supporters and friends surrounding the core members. The policy of controlling the movement through infiltration made it possible to aggravate already existing internal problems by sowing discord and distrust, effectively paralyzing the Rode Jeugd's leadership. In doing this, the authorities made use of—and were themselves part of—the Dutch political culture, which was characterized by its openness towards radical parties, restraint in using overt violence, and a fragmented administrative landscape. It may be very difficult to deliberately create a political climate free of fear and demonization, but it makes a lot of sense to try not to destroy it where it prevails.

Notes

1. As quoted in: Luuk Ottens, Piet Hein Scheltens, and Rob Siebelink, "Rode Jeugd revisited," *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 13 February 1985, 4.

2. Froukje Demant, Marieke Sloomman, Frank Buijs, and Jean Tillie: *Teruggang en uit-treding. Processen van deradicalisering ontleed* (Amsterdam: IMES, 2008); English translation: *Decline and Disengagement. An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation*. Amsterdam: IMES, <http://www.imes.uva.nl/about/documents/IMESReportDeclineandDisengagement-layoutKKenFD.pdf>. See also Froukje Demant and Beatrice de Graaf, "How to counter radical narratives: Dutch deradicalization policy in the case of Moluccan and Islamic radicals," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, no. 5 (2010), 408–428.

3. The analytical framework of Demant et al. to study deradicalization of radical groups is based on insights from literature on social movements, sects, and gangs. Among others: Bert Kländermans, *The Social Psychology of Protest* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Stuart A. Wright, *Leaving cults: The Dynamics of Defection* (Washington, D.C.: Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1987); Scott H. Decker and Barrick Van Winkle, *Life in the gang: Family, friends, and violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Cf. the introduction and conclusion in: Tore Bjørgo & John Horgan, *Leaving Terrorism Behind. Individual and collective disengagement* (Oxon/New York: Routledge, 2008); John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2005), especially chapter 6.

4. See Leena Malkki, *How Terrorist Campaigns End: The Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States* (PhD Dissertation). Acta Politica 41 (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department Economic and Political Studies, 2010). An early partial draft of this article is published in "Liberal climate as antidote for terrorism: The case of Rode Jeugd (1966–1974) in the Netherlands," in Anna Mikkonen, ed., *Threats and Prospects in Combating Terrorism. A Challenge for Domestic or Transnational Cooperation?* Series 2: Research Reports no. 41 (Helsinki: National Defence University/Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, 2009).

5. See Beatrice de Graaf, *Theater van de angst. De strijd tegen terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, Italië en Amerika* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2010). An English adaptation will follow in 2010/early 2011: *Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance. A Comparative Study of the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and the United States in the 1970s*.

6. Chris Bischoff, "Provotariaat of Proletariaat," *Rode Vlag* 5, no. 1 (November 1968).

7. Dick van de Pol, "De Rode Jeugd van Eindhoven kondigt de stadsguerrilla aan. 'Iemand om zeep helpen is in onze ideologie volkomen vanzelfsprekend,'" *Vrij Nederland* 7 August 1971; Rode Jeugd, "rj 7: Amerikanen in Eindhoven" (Rode Jeugd pamphlet [October 1968]); Frans Dekkers and Daan Dijkman, *'n Hollandse Stadsguerrilla. Terugblik op de Rode Jeugd* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 1988), 30–32; Interview with Henk Wubben by Leena Malkki on 3 April 2003.

8. "Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970–1970/1973," *Voorwaarts*, 15 November 1973.

9. This argument is put forward for the first time in "REBO," *Publikatie aktiegroep Rode Jeugd*, no. 3 (1969).

10. Those supporting the moderate wing consequently established a short-lived organization called *Rode Jeugd (ML)*.

11. The description is based on Rode Jeugd's internal paper *Voorwaarts* 1, no. 4 and its partly re-written version published in the following issue no. 5.

12. Willem Oskam, "De volksoorlog of de parlementaire weg," *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-leninistisch jongerenblad*, no. 10 (20 October 1967) *Voorwaarts* 1, no. 5, *Voorwaarts* 2, no. 2, *Rode Jeugd Stadsguerrilla Cahier*, no. 1.

13. *Voorwaarts* 1, no. 5, *Voorwaarts* 2, no. 2.

14. Interview with Aat van Wijk by Leena Malkki on 24 March 2003. Some other former members of Rode Jeugd have been more reluctant in admitting Rode Jeugd members' responsibility for the attacks (e.g., interview with Henk Wubben by Leena Malkki 3 April 2003, interview with Evert van den Berg by Leena Malkki on 29 June 2005 & 15 April 2007). See also *Rode Jeugd Stadsguerrilla Cahier*, no. 1; John Ubbink & Hans Polak, "Rode-Jeugd-secretaris Willem Oskam: 'Niet alleen zaak van bommen,'" *Het Parool* 14 December 1972; "Voorwoord," *Over gewapende strijd. Aanzetten tot de stadsguerrilla in Nederland. 1966–1974 Rode Jeugd* (Marxisties Scholings Kollektief, 1975).

15. Interview with Aat van Wijk by Leena Malkki on 30 June 2003; Interview with Henk Wubben by Leena Malkki on 15 July 2003; Interview with Annie Westebring by Leena Malkki on 18 April 2007; Dekkers and Dijksman (see note 7 above), 122–125; Antoine Verbij, *Tien rode jaren. Links radicalisme in Nederland 1970–1980* (Amsterdam: Ambo, 2005), 152–156.

16. “Arrestatie week geheim gehouden. Politie Eindhoven pakt man met bomonderdelen,” *Eindhovens Dagblad*, 24 June 1973; “Politie pakt man met materiaal voor bomproductie,” *Trouw*, 22 June 1973; interview with Aat van Wijk by Leena Malkki on 24 March 2003; interview with Henk Wubben by Leena Malkki on 3 April 2003; interview with Evert van den Berg by Leena Malkki on 29 June 2005.

17. “Bijdrage V: Enige opmerkingen over de legale organisatie,” *Voorwaarts*, 15 November 1973.

18. E.g. “Onmiddellijke vrijlating van Lucien v. Hoesel,” *Rode Tribune* no. 14 (January 1973); “Klassejustitie!” *Rode Tribune* no. 17 (April 1973); “Onmiddellijke vrijlating van Lucien van Hoesel,” *Rode Tribune* no. 23 (October 1973); *Rode Tribune bulletin: Extra uitgave* (1973); “Het volgende artikel is . . .,” *De Rode Vlag* 7 no. 1 (January 1971); “Politie en justitie terreur,” *De Rode Vlag* 11 no. 8 (November 1974).

19. See especially “Bijdrage IV: De illegale organisatie,” *Voorwaarts* 15 November 1973; “Bijdrage V: Enige opmerkingen over de legale organisatie,” *Voorwaarts* 15 November 1973; “Voorwoord” and “Inleiding,” *Over gewapende strijd. Aanzetten tot de stadsguerilla in Nederland. 1966–1974 Rode Jeugd* (Marxisties Scholings Kollektief, 1975).

20. E.g. Verbij (see note 15 above); Ruud Koopmans, “Van provo tot RARA. Golfbewegingen in het politieke protest in Nederland,” in Jan Willem Duyvendak, Hein-Anton van der Heijden, Ruud Koopmans, and Luuk Wijmans, eds., *Tussen verbeelding en macht. 25 jaar nieuwe sociale bewegingen in Nederland* (Amsterdam: Sua, 1992).

21. See for example Butz Peters, *Tödlicher Irrtum. Die Geschichte der RAF* (Berlijn: Argon, 2004); Gerd Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt. Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution, 1967–1977* (Frankfurt a. M. 2004); Dorothea Hauser, “Deutschland, Italien und Japan. Die ehemaligen Achsenmächte und der Terrorismus der 1970er Jahre,” in Wolfgang Kraushaar (red.), *Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus*. Band 2 (Hamburg, 2006), 1272–1298; Donatella Della Porta, “Left-wing terrorism in Italy,” in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 105–159; Germana Tapperro Merlo, “Italy. Part I,” in Yonah Alexander, ed., *Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations* (Washington, D.C., 2006), 99–114.

22. James Kennedy, *Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw. Nederland in de jaren zestig* (Amsterdam: Boom, 1995/1999), 146–173. A similar kind of argument on the development of the policing and political response to protests has been put forward also by Alex P. Schmid, “Countering Terrorism in the Netherlands,” in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten, eds., *Western Responses to Terrorism* (London: Frank Cass, 1993).

23. Kennedy (see note 22 above), 149, 172–173.

24. Pieter Bootsma and Willem Breedveld, *De verbeelding aan de macht. Het Kabinet-Den Uyl 1973–1977* (Den Haag: Sdu, 1999), 226–227; On West Germany cf. Stephan Scheiper, “Der Wandel staatlicher Herrschaft in den 1960er/1970er Jahren,” in K. Weinbauer, J. Requate, H.-G. Haupt, eds., *Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik. Medien, Staat und Subkulturen in den 1970er Jahren* (Frankfurt, New York: Campus Verlag, 2006), 188–216.

25. Koopmans (see note 20 above), 66–67.

26. Interview with Aat van Wijk by Leena Malkki on 24 March 2003 and 30 June 2003, Verbij (see note 15 above).

27. Interview with Henk Wubben by Leena Malkki on 3 April 2003; interview with Aat van Wijk by Leena Malkki on 24 March 2003 and 14 April 2003. Henk Wubben has later come to the conclusion that these movements may have been false flag organizations set up by intelligence agencies.

28. Ottens et al. (see note 1 above), 5.

29. Interview with Aat van Wijk by Leena Malkki on 24 March 2003; interview with Mirjam Lucassen by Leena Malkki on 6 February 2006; interview with Annie Westebring by Leena Malkki on 18 April 2007. On the other hand, not everyone recalled that the situation in West Germany had had a particularly important impact, e.g., interview with Evert van den Berg by Leena Malkki on 15 April 2007.

30. Cited in “Actiegroep Rode Jeugd opgeheven,” *Eindhovens Dagblad*, 15 March 1974.

31. "REBO," *Publikatie aktiegroep Rode Jeugd*, no. 3 (1969). This same call was made in Rode Jeugd's national paper in the summer of 1970 ("RJ van protest naar verzet," *Rode Jeugd-Marxistisch-leninistisch jongerenblad*, no. 1 [1970]).

32. "Onderzoek bomaanslagen krijgt centrale leiding," *De Volkskrant*, 19 October 1972; "Bombrigade direct in actie bij aanslag in Leiden," *De Volkskrant*, 20 October 1972.

33. "Maatregelen tegen de toename van terreur," *Eindhovens Dagblad*, 20 October 1972.

34. Handelingen der Tweede Kamer (Acts of the Second Chamber), 'Brief van de Minister-President, Minister van Algemene Zaken,' 22 February 1973. 'Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1973,' 12.000, no. 11.

35. Cf. for this Dutch antipathy against alleged police state tendencies in West-Germany: Jacco Pekelder, *Sympathie voor de RAF* (Amsterdam: Mets & Schild, 2007).

36. Handelingen der Tweede Kamer (Acts of the Second Chamber), 'Brief van de Minister-President, Minister van Algemene Zaken,' 22 February 1973. 'Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1973,' 12.000, no. 11.

37. See for example Ministry of General Affairs, "Conclusies van de tweede bespreking over overheidsmaatregelen tegen terreuracties," 6 November 1972. RA 1972/001. Archive MinJus, The Hague; Peter Klerks, *Terreurbestrijding in Nederland, 1970-1988* (Amsterdam: Ravijn, 1989), 50-53; cf. also Frits Hoekstra, *In dienst van de BVD. Spionage en contraspionage in Nederland* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2004), 73; Interview with Frits Hoekstra by Beatrice de Graaf on 7 October 2008.

38. See Pekelder (see note 35 above).

39. Dekkers and Dijkman (see note 7 above), 153. See also the upcoming biography on Luciën van Hoesel: Maarten van Riel, *Luciën van Hoesel. Symbool van een revolutionaire generatie* (upcoming, Amsterdam, 2010).

40. "Notulen van de vergadering van de Procureurs-Generaal, fgd. Directeuren van Politie met het Hoofd van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst in het Ministerie van Justitie," 23 September 1971. Archive of the Ministry of Justice, RA 1972/001. Not Rode Jeugd, but the Japanese Red Army, however, conducted such an operation in 1974 and negotiated a free retreat to Yemen; See also "Dubbspionage verraadde Rode Jeugd," *Algemeen Dagblad*, 20 December 1972; and; Klerks (see note 37 above); Schmid (see note 22 above); Hoekstra (see note 37 above); Dick Engelen, *Frontdienst. De BVD in de Koude Oorlog* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007).

41. "Active measures" is the term the BVD (and other intelligence agencies) use to describe more offensive measures to exert influence on the development of a certain extremist group. It may include stalking, "harassment arrests," other "disturbing" activities (phoning, showing up at someone's doorstep), ostentatiously patrolling, but can also comprise more aggressive steps such as inspiring treason or distrust within the organization, or explicitly trying to incriminate members. Cf. Onderzoeksbureau Inlichtingen-en Veiligheidsdiensten (ed.), *Operatie Homerus. Spioneren voor de BVD* (Breda: Papieren Tijger, 1998), 28-38; Rode Jeugd, *Rode Jeugd vogelvrij. Het BVD spel Luciën van Hoesel* (Eindhoven [1973]).

42. Interview with Aat van Wijk by Leena Malkki on 30 June 2003.

43. Hoekstra (see note 37 above), 67-68; interview with Frits Hoekstra by Beatrice de Graaf on 7 October 2008; interview with Paul Abels by Beatrice de Graaf on 18 May 2006; see also Paul Abels, "'Je wilt niet geloven dat zoiets in Nederland kan!' Het Nederlandse contraterroreerbeleid sinds 1973," in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Beatrice de Graaf, eds., *Terroristen en hun bestrijders: Vroeger en nu* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007), 125.

44. See e.g., Klerks (see note 37 above), 95-99.

45. *Ibid.*, 95-99.

46. Cited in *ibid.*, 99.

47. Neither were the authorities confronted by any other full-fledged domestic terrorist organization or high levels of international terrorism. For an overview of terrorism in the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s, see Schmid (see note 22 above). The train hijacking and sieges by Moluccan youths in the mid 1970s, however, resulted in deaths and pushed the policy of avoiding the use of violence to and eventually over its limits. On the authorities' response to the case of the Moluccans, see e.g., Martijn Rasser, "The Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism, 1970-1978," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 6 (2005), 481-492; Fridus Steijlen, "To Talk Them out Is to Talk Them out Is to Shoot Them out Is to ... A Critical Analysis of 'the Dutch Approach' to Moluccan Terrorists," *The Netherlands' Journal of Social Sciences* 37, no. 1 (2001), 38-51.

48. Interview with Mirjam Lucassen by Leena Malkki on 6 February 2006.
49. Rudie van Meurs, "Een observatiepost van de BVD in de Haagse Staatsliedenbuurt," *Vrij Nederland*, 13 March 1982, Dekkers and Dijksman (see note 7 above), 90–92.
50. Schmid (see note 22 above), 89.
51. See also Alex P. Schmid, "Politiek geweld en terreur-bestrijding in Nederland: enkele contouren," *Tijdschrift voor Criminologie* 31, no. 4 (1989), 333–356.
52. On Weather Underground and countermeasures against it, see e.g., Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home. The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 2004); David Cunningham, *There's something happening here. The New Left, the Klan and FBI Counterintelligence* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 2004); Dan Berger, *Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity* (Oakland & Edinburgh: AK Press, 2006).
53. On this and other alternative strategies for deterrence see e.g., Bruno S. Frey and Simon Luechinger, 'How to Fight Terrorism, Alternatives to Deterrence.' Working Paper No. 137, in: *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 14 (2003), no. 4, 237–249.