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Apocalypse – Not in Finland. Millenarianism and Expectations on the Eve of the Year 2000

LEENA MALKKI

Purely from the Finnish perspective, it seems silly that someone should write an article on what was expected to happen in Finland at the turn of the millennium in terms of radical religious or political activities. Yes, there was anxiety in the air at the time, but it was mainly due to the possible implications of the Y2K problem with the computers. It was known that there existed some groups who believed in some kind of conspiracy theory or the imminence of doomsday, but for most they seemed very distant, something that could only happen in America – or in Jerusalem for that matter.

Without claiming that Finland is the only or even foremost place where not much was expected to happen at the turn of the millennium in terms of radical actions, it is, however, a good case study to look at as a balance to the concerns and threats perceived in some other countries. Finland exemplifies a country where millenarianism is quite alien to the mainstream culture and radical groups holding millenarian beliefs are practically non-existent.

In this article, the perceptions related to millenarianism and the turn of the millennium in Finland are approached from two different angles. In the first part, a historical look will be taken at the manifestations and role of millenarian themes in Finland. The main focus will be on the religious movements holding millenarian or apocalyptic beliefs. In addition to this, the state of the radical right and the New World Order (NWO) conspiracy theories is briefly discussed, since the latter has been identified as the second driving force of millennial violence (e.g. in the *Project Megiddo*

Report). To put these phenomena into context, readers will be introduced to key traits of the Finnish religious and political scene.

The second part of the article concentrates on the fears and expectations related to the turn of the millennium in Finland. In this part, the focus will be on the expectations and fears of the public at large and the preparations and assumptions of security officials. Public opinion and discussion is analyzed by examining two opinion polls on the fears and expectations related to the approaching year 2000 and newspaper articles published in the last three months of the year 1999. After that, views and preparations of the security officials are discussed, relying mainly on interviews conducted by the author. Along the way, suggestions are made on why millenarian excitement and anti-state political extremism have not found resonance in Finland.

Millenarianism in the Religious and Political Scene in Finland

In the *Project Megiddo* report it is stated that 'religious motivation and the NWO conspiracy theory are the two driving forces behind the potential for millennial violence'. These are the areas which will be examined below to get a view on the situation in Finland with regard to those ideas commonly linked to millenarianism. Before turning to that, however, a brief introduction to the key traits of the Finnish religious scene is necessary.

Religion in Finland

The religious scene in Finland is characterized by the dominance of the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church, even though the percentage of the population belonging to it has been slowly declining for decades. At the end of 1999, 85.3 per cent of the population belonged to the Evangelical Lutheran Church, while only 2.1 per cent were members of other registered communities, and 12.6 per cent of the population remained outside registered communities. However, the biggest group among these non-registered communities is the Pentecostal congregations, which have roughly 50,000 members which represent approximately one per cent of the population, making it almost equal in size with the second largest registered community, the Orthodox Church, which has about 55,000 members.¹

The dominance of the Evangelical Lutheran Church can be understood in the light of its role in the past. In the sixteenth century, the

Lutheran church was declared the state church of Sweden and thus also of Finland, which was at that time part of Sweden. When Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia in 1809, the old Swedish laws were retained and thus the Evangelical Lutheran Church maintained its position as the state church. By allowing this, the tsar of Russia hoped to win the loyalty of his new subjects (especially the aristocracy and the clergy). The Lutheran priests were seen as key figures in maintaining order and building loyalty towards the new rulers.

In 1889, the Non-Conformity Act was passed, which meant that other Protestant churches were given an official position. Until that date, everyone had to belong to either the Lutheran or the Orthodox Church. After Finland got its independence in 1917, the state assumed a neutral attitude toward religion. The Constitution of the new republic passed in 1919 and the Law on Freedom of Religion which came into force in 1923, granted the right to found and belong to religious denominations or to remain outside of any religious affiliation. However, freedom of religion did not lead instantly to any massive withdrawal from the Church.

Even though the Evangelical Lutheran Church no longer has the position it used to – especially after the numerous changes that took place in the church–state relationship during the 1990s – it is still not just ‘any other church’. To give a few examples, the opening and closing ceremonies of the Parliament still include Evangelical Lutheran church services, religion remains part of the curriculum in the public schools for the members of the church and the state recognizes the marriage solemnized by the church.

However, this is just one side of the story. According to a survey conducted by the Research Institute of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland in 1999,² only 8 per cent of the population attend church services at least once a month and some 47 per cent of those interviewed said that they believe in God as taught by Christianity.³ Beside the strong institutional position of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, two other tendencies must be noted: a strong tradition of secularization and an increasing individualization of religiosity. For many Finns, being a Christian or Lutheran is more a cultural than religious identity, and means primarily that they have been baptized and belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church.⁴ Moreover, the Evangelical Lutheran Church cannot be considered very coherent since it includes various religious streams and movements. Partly as a legacy of nationalist ideas and a response to criticism in the nineteenth century, the church prefers

to be seen as a 'folk church'⁵ open to every Finn, and has a tolerant and open-minded attitude towards various kinds of views. This can be seen clearly in what has happened with revivalist movements that appeared in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (the most crucial of them being Pietism, Laestadianism, Evangelicalism and Supplicationism). While they originally arose as a protest against the official church and secularization, most of them stayed within the church and nowadays, in the Church's view, form an integral and enriching part of parish life.⁶

In the shadow of the Evangelical Lutheran Church there is an increasing number of other religious communities in Finland, ranging from Jehovah's Witnesses, Theosophy and the Salvation Army, which found their way to Finland around the turn of the twentieth century, to more recent phenomena such as Scientology, Wicca, Devil Worship and various kinds of New Age movements. These other religious movements are typically marginal, with few followers. They cannot be considered oppositional in any meaningful sense of the word since they are not directly opposed to the Evangelical Lutheran Church or the state. Instead, it is more apt to describe themselves as alternative religious movements.⁷

Millenarian Religiosity

Millenarian religiosity has always been a relatively marginal phenomenon in Finland. Millenarian thoughts are not among the core elements of Finnish religiosity and culture since they are quite alien to the mainstream Evangelical Lutheranism. This is not to say that we are dealing with a phenomenon which is totally unfamiliar to Finnish culture. With the concise history of Finnish millenarianism and apocalypticism still waiting to be written, I will limit myself to a few examples of Finnish religious movements colored with the belief in the imminence of the end times.⁸

Perhaps the most dramatic case of millenarianism in the area of Finland was that of the Old Believers (also called Raskolniks) in the late seventeenth century. The Old Believers were in fact mainly concentrated in Russia, but they had also spread to the Swedish part of Karelia. They came into conflict with the authorities because they refused to accept the reforms to liturgical texts ordered by the patriarch of Moscow (Nikon). When pursued by the military, thousands of Old Believers committed suicide by locking themselves up in their hiding places in the forest and setting themselves on fire.⁹

Among the revivalist movements that arose in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under, e.g., Pietist influences, one can find some apocalyptic and millenarian traits. These movements were mostly quite moderate, but there were also a few more radical groups. As far as the early twentieth century is concerned, the 1920s and 1930s witnessed the high period of Finnish millenarianism. Following the bloody and traumatic civil war in 1918 and the economic hardships of the time, many millenarian movements appeared in Finland and in the Finnish-speaking areas in Sweden. They were characteristically small and local. The Secret Police (established in 1919) followed up religious activities that might endanger the social peace, especially looking at religious persons and movements holding communist or anti-state opinions.¹⁰ Even though most of the movements did not pose any significant danger to internal security, there were some groups which caused problems to authorities. The most notable movements of that time were those formed around Ida Maria Åkerblom, Toivo Korpela, Adam Härkönen and Alma Maria Kartano.

The Åkerblom movement came into existence when a young woman named Ida Maria Åkerblom assumed a role of a preacher and prophet in 1917.¹¹ Her personality, together with the abovementioned external conditions, attracted a lot of people to the meetings in western Finland, and in the early years, in southern Finland. Åkerblom was believed to communicate direct revelations from God; through her activities God was said to be collecting a group to work on His behalf against the forces of evil. In fulfilling Åkerblom's mission it was thought to be justified to use any means necessary. The main task of the group's members was to win other people for God before the return of Jesus, which they believed was likely to happen soon. Despite many confrontations with the Church, the movement remained loyal to it, for example never questioning the importance of the sacraments.

The heartland of the movement was the area around Kokkola and Teerijärvi in western Finland, where it gained ground in the early 1920s in particular. Rumours about suspicious activities by the movement spread and caused irritation and concern among the local clergy and non-religious people. This resulted in a growing determination to remove the movement from the area. Efforts to do this led to riots and a series of trials where the leaders of the Åkerblom movement were charged first with various incidents of disturbance and later with using false witnesses to rehabilitate the leaders. Åkerblom and her followers

were defeated in the trials which, combined with constant persecution and economic difficulties, led the whole group of about 200 people to sell all their belongings and leave for an obscure destination (hinted to be Palestine). The journey stopped, however, at Helsinki where the movement was caught up in a further litigation. When it became clear that even more court cases awaited them in Kokkola, the leaders saw it necessary to eliminate the local governor. The unsuccessful murder attempt led to yet new trials where the leaders were sentenced to long periods of imprisonment in 1927. This did not, contrary to what was expected, lead to the instant dissolution of the movement. In 1932, just before Åkerblom was released from prison, another sleeping preacher appeared and the movement split into two groups. After being released, Åkerblom never managed to assume her role as preacher again. However, the dissolution of her group happened very slowly. This has been explained in part by strict internal control and the fear of new disclosures.

Another revival movement that gave concern for the authorities was the Korpela movement in the Finnish-speaking areas of Sweden. The movement was initially formed around Toivo Korpela, a self-proclaimed Laestadian preacher from central Finland. After being rejected by his own community he travelled to northern Finland to preach in the late 1920s. He found supporters mostly in the Tornio River valley. When Korpela stopped making preaching journeys in the mid-1930s, the movement survived and its content was shaped by its other leading figures. They preached that the new Finnish Old Testament translation brought to use in 1934 was 'the abomination that maketh desolation' predicted in the book of Daniel. It was also told that the last 1,335 days of the world had begun and that there would be an Ark that would take 666 true believers to Palestine, which would appear a year after the two leading figures who had claimed to be the prophets had been taken into heaven. The dogma kept on changing and it was later proclaimed that the Ark would not be an actual vessel, but referred to the spirit of Christ that had been granted to the Korpelians. One of the leading figures began to see himself as the representative of Christ, and thus able to forgive people their sins. He exonerated the Korpelians from sins such as drinking and lewd sexuality. The movement saw its decline in the late 1930s with the Korpela trials, during which 60 Korpelians were given prison sentences on account of immoral behaviour. The leading figures ended up in a mental hospital or prison.¹²

Two other famous movements at that time formed around Adam Härkönen and Alma Maria Kartano. Härkönen was a trance preacher in the years 1919–29. Later, during the Interim Peace between the Winter War of 1939–40 and the Continuation War (1941–44), he preached in March 1941 that there would shortly be a new war and that 9,000 of the soldiers who died during the Winter War were in heaven, while the rest of them were in hell. He also saw several visions of the end times. As result of his activities, a movement carrying his name (in Finnish *härkösläisyys*) emerged in Kainuu in northern Finland. Härkönen attracted thousands of followers. However, the movement began to fade in the late 1940s when Härkönen was revealed to be a false prophet. Nowadays the movement has a couple of hundred members around Kainuu.¹³

Alma Maria Kartano was one of the trance preachers initiated by Härkönen, but they argued and she went her own way. She began to preach actively in the mid-1920s. The central theme of her teachings was the imminence of the end times and the importance of keeping a distance from the ‘carefree’ world. At its high point, the movement (*kartanolaisuus*) had about 100 members, but many more people gathered at the meetings, which were held in different parts of Finland. The movement attracted a fair amount of attention – curiosity because of its child preachers and, in the 1930s and 1950s, a lot of negative publicity due to court cases over the rough treatment of these child preachers. Nowadays there are few people following the teachings of Kartano and they are integrated into local congregations.¹⁴

If millenarianism has always been a marginal phenomenon in Finland, after the Second World War it almost ceased to exist. The movements that appeared in the decades prior to the war have lost almost all of their vigour. According to one of the leading scholars of religiosity in Finland, Harri Heino, people are now, with the individualization of religion, concerned mainly about their personal ends in the world, for example, their own or their neighbour’s death.¹⁵

There are still some local groups which hold apocalyptic beliefs, but they are tiny and attract little attention. One of them is a small movement known by the names *Lasarus-veljet* (the Lazarus Brothers) and *Kristus-kirkko* (Christ Church). The movement has its origins in the spiritual revival among the Finns in Israel in 1972. A couple of years later, after returning home, a small group of them began to publish magazines and books, and established their own unregistered church.

There are some 100 members, and the core group lives in a community in Säkylä in south-western Finland. However, their publications reach a considerably larger audience. As for their dogma, they emphasize the importance of conversion and sanctification, and consider the Lutheran and other traditional churches to be secularized and heretical. They believe that the second coming of Christ and the thousand-year kingdom are near and fear that with the End of Days approaching, a bigger and more solid 'world church' will emerge.¹⁶ This group seems to concentrate mostly on preaching and shows no signs of radical action.

Another direction where one might look for millenarian traits in present-day Finland is the Satanist scene. The reason for this is that there was one suicide attempt and one successful suicide around the turn of the millennium by persons known to hold Satanist beliefs. However, it remains unclear if they were related to any kind of millenarian beliefs at all.¹⁷

Satanists and devil worshippers attracted much attention in Finland during the late 1990s, mostly due to a brutal murder in southern Finland in 1998 and several disturbances of graves. The Satanist scene is quite heterogeneous, ranging from adolescent Satanism to Laveyan Satanists and devil worshippers.¹⁸

There is no study exploring millenarianism among Finnish Satanists in detail. However, some remarks can be made based on the interviews that Merja Hermonen conducted with the Satanists in Finland during the 1990s. In her interviews it came out that the theme of the end times is perceived as interesting by many Satanists, especially in iconographical terms. However, millenarian thoughts do not characterize the Satanist scene as a whole. Instead, to the extent that millenarian beliefs can be found among the Satanists, it is mostly in the thoughts of single individuals, especially among the Black Metal Satanists and some criminal Satanists who were imprisoned at the time of the interview. Some of those holding millenarian beliefs saw the year 2000 as somehow special in this context, while others did not link their beliefs related to the end times with this particular date. When it comes to Satanists who do not hold any explicit millenarian thoughts, the turn of the millennium did provoke some nervousness because it was felt that one can never be sure what could happen. All in all, the role of millenarian thoughts cannot be considered central to the Finnish Satanist scene.¹⁹

Around the turn of the millennium, there were few signs of any kind of millenarian excitement in any religious group in the country let alone

any group that would fit to the characterization of a cult prone to violence suggested in the *Project Megiddo* report.²⁰ In this light, the possibility of radical action committed by religious believers at the turn of the millennium was minimal at best.

In the following, the state of the other idea mentioned as a driving force behind the potential for radical millenarian action in *Project Megiddo* – the New World Order conspiracy theory – will be considered.

Millenarianism in Politics

In a newspaper article dealing with the preparations for the possible acts by the doomsday cults in the US and Israel, it was stated that 'In the US it is also possible that people believe that the UN will seize power at the turn of the millennium and take away the civil rights of Americans.'²¹ Between the lines one can read that the author of the article considered these kinds of conspiracy theories to be alien to Finnish culture – and the implication is quite correct. While White Power ideology, together with the idea of the Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG), has found its way to Finland,²² conspiracy theories do not play a notable role in the ideology and action of any group.

There are clearly numerous differences between American and Finnish society and thus to explain adequately why conspiracy theories like the New World Order have found ground in the US but not in Finland is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, the discussion will be limited to bringing to the fore some features of nationalism, the radical right and attitudes towards the state in Finland which may explain in part why fierce opposition towards the power of the state and intermixing religious and political themes are quite foreign to Finnish political culture.

In the 1990s, the most important items on the agenda of the radical right, radical nationalist and racist organizations were relations with Russia, immigrants and membership of the European Union. Many of these organizations hold a critical attitude towards the old relationship with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union aroused many traditional anti-Russian feelings and themes, one of them being the Karelian question, that is, demands for returning the areas in Karelia that were ceded to the Soviet Union in the Peace of Moscow after the Second World War. The question of immigration rose to prominence especially following the arrival of Somali refugees in the early 1990s which, together with increasing immigration from other countries, multiplied

the number of foreigners living in Finland. To put this into the context, it must be added that the foreign citizens still represent less than two per cent of the Finnish population. Opposition to membership of the European Union has also been quite common in nationalist circles.²³ Fear of sacrificing Finland's sovereignty, as well as Finnish national identity and culture, is clearly present in the nationalist and rightist discussion, especially in the anti-EU arguments.

The new radical right is an almost negligible phenomenon in Finland. This is somewhat surprising given that the situation in Finland in the 1990s – deep recession combined with an increasing number of foreigners moving to the country – had many characteristics commonly identified as factors helping the radical right movements to gain ground.

A look at the country's history makes the minuscule scale of the new radical right both more understandable and more surprising. The extreme right has not always been a marginal phenomenon. Fascist ideology had a relatively strong foothold in the 1920s and 1930s.²⁴ In theory, this tradition could give a good and solid ground for new radical right movements. However, things have not turned out that way in Finland. The story of fascist organizations came to an end after the Second World War, when they were forbidden following the peace treaties of Moscow and Paris. This ban was in force until 1991. In the postwar era, the political right has had a very negative connotation. Being labelled right-wing was not desired by any political organization because it implied opposition to President Urho Kekkonen, good relations with the Soviet Union, and the basic interests of the Finnish state. Even with Kekkonen and the Soviet Union gone, the negative attitude towards the extreme right is still largely in place. On the other hand, the 'supply side' of the radical right ideologists has also so far been quite negligible, and no leader comparable to such personalities as Le Pen or Haider has appeared in Finland.²⁵

All in all, the radical right scene in Finland is very fragmented and consists mostly of very small local groups.²⁶ There is no extreme right-wing party that has gained any success worth mentioning, be it in electoral support, number of members or even publicity, even though the Finnish multi-party system provides a proportional vote and strongly personalized electoral campaigns, which make it relatively easy for newcomers to gain parliamentary seats. In fact, some attempts to form a party have stalled due to the difficulty of getting the required 5,000

signatures for party registration.²⁷ The extra-parliamentary activities of the radical right have been very small-scale, too. The organizations and individuals on the scene have not gained much following or public attention.²⁸ Some of them have managed to build relations with foreign rightist organizations, which has resulted in an increasing amount of foreign influence.²⁹

The ideas and fears of the nationalist and radical right groups have not been linked to any particular idea of conspiracy, nor do they contain any references to apocalyptic beliefs. There is no notable intermingling of millenarian beliefs and political issues, which is hardly surprising given the weak tradition of millenarianism in the country.

The radical right in Finland has not, however, been completely devoid of religious overtones. Mythical belief system colours one group in particular: the Patriotic Right (*Isänmaallinen Oikeisto*, IO) with Väinö Kuisma as its central figure. He first founded the Aryan German Brotherhood (*Arjalainen Germaaniveljeskunta*, AGV) which was inspired by German neo-Nazism. Later Nazi symbols were abandoned and replaced by the symbols of ancient Finnish mythology, and the name was changed to the Patriotic Right. The mythology of the Finnish national epic *Kalevala* plays a central role in Kuisma's ideology. In the rhetoric of the Patriotic Right, history is a great narrative, its sense being the struggle over the perseverance of Finnishness and finding the hidden secret essence of the Finnish people. This is combined with the struggle for the preservation of the white race. The movement is really tiny, having just 50 members, and is unknown to most Finns. It claims to have parliamentary political goals and wants to distance itself from Nazism and the violent and anarchistic skinhead groups.³⁰

The activities of the radical right groupings have been relatively harmless. As a whole, the personalities and groups of the new radical right have not been particularly extreme in their actions when compared to other countries, even though they have crossed the limits of legality from time to time. The typical act has, so far, comprised an insult, harassment or campaign involving threatening letters. The targets have been politicians, officials, the media and 'political' enemies.³¹ There have also been incidents in which strained relations between immigrants and Finns have produced mostly spontaneous and accidental outbursts of intercommunal violence. Compared to other countries, the level of racist violence in Finland is still low, even though it seems to have increased in recent years.³²

Besides the fact that radical right ideology and millenarian beliefs are largely rejected by the mainstream, there is also something about Finnish attitudes towards the state that makes fierce opposition against state power and the formation of secular millenarianism, such as that linked to the NWO conspiracy theories, quite unlikely.

As a reason for the relatively positive attitude towards the state, one might point to the fact that Finland is quite a new state. The independence gained in 1917 liberated Finland from the power of Russia and attempts at Russification. Seen in the light of history, the state is thus more likely to be perceived as a guarantor of freedom than as a threat to it. Moreover, as legislation conferring freedom of speech and religion is in place, there are few grounds for alternative political and religious movements to accuse the state of discrimination. Seen from this perspective, the idea that the state would function as an arm of evil forces or as part of some kind of conspiracy seems rather outlandish.

The second thing that might be mentioned in this context is that, to borrow the words of Kyösti Pekonen, the welfare state has so far functioned well enough to 'buy' political tranquillity.³³ Still, even with the privatization of state-owned companies, the role of the state is strong in every sector of society and the welfare state model enjoys wide support among the citizens. Despite the financial problems during the recession of the early 1990s that forced the state into cutbacks in subsidies, the welfare state has so far functioned relatively well and managed to prevent any large-scale displacement. This might also be one of the main reasons for the weakness of millenarian religiosity today.

Beside the fact that the legitimacy of the state is largely unquestioned, there are other factors that would make it difficult and unproductive to form 'militia-type' organizations opposing the state. Even though Finland is a sparsely populated country, the administrative bureaucracy is extensive and systematized so that it is almost impossible to turn one's back completely on society. Conscription creates a further bond between the male population (and female volunteers) and the state.

This is not to say that critics of the political system and the welfare state are non-existent. In fact, according to surveys, attitudes towards party politics are quite negative. Moreover, Finns are relatively uninterested in politics and do not feel that any party is speaking for them. One sign of the diminishing interest in party politics is the voting turnout, which declined from 84 per cent in 1966 to 68 per cent in 1999.

The level is still high when compared to many other countries, but in the context of Finland the decline is truly significant. Some scholars have also talked about growing alienation from party politics, especially among the youth and in the new working-class urban areas. However, this anti-party sentiment has so far manifested as social apathy and apolitical indifference.³⁴

One factor that can be viewed both as the reason for and consequence of the relatively modest forms of political protest activity is the attitude towards the police. Respect towards the police in Finland is high. According to the Security Barometer of the Police in 1999, 91 per cent of Finns had an above-average trust in the police. In another study, 55 per cent of the respondents thought that the police had too little power and only four per cent of the interviewed thought that they had too much power. The citizens see the police as impartial, understanding, realistic and professional, and believe they succeed well in the tasks assigned to them.³⁵ The police have so far not needed to use harsh measures to maintain public order and security, which has in turn helped prevent the polarization of attitudes towards state power.

Following from all of these factors, there are hardly any groups in Finland that openly hold millenarian beliefs. One can quite safely assume that the turn of the millennium did not have any significant religious or political meaning for large majority of Finns. This is not surprising, given that extreme millenarian beliefs are fairly alien to Evangelical Lutheranism, which is one of the key elements of the Finnish culture.

Waiting for the Millennium Party and Bugs – Expecting the Year 2000 in Finland

Despite the weak tradition of millenarianism, the approaching turn of the millennium provoked a fair amount of discussion, anxiety and fears in Finland, just as it did in many other countries. These fears will be approached using three different sources. First, the results of public opinion polls related to the year 2000 will be discussed. After that, the discussion in the newspapers in the last months of 1999 will be analysed and finally, the security officials' views and preparations will be discussed.

The Opinion Polls

The fears and expectations related to the approaching year 2000 were the topic of two (multiple choice) opinion polls conducted by Suomen

Gallup Oy for the Research Institute of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. The first opinion poll called 'Vuosi 2000' (Year 2000) was conducted in May 1997 and the second one, 'Pelot ja uhkakuvat' (Fears and threat scenarios) in September 1999.³⁶

The results of the surveys suggest that on average the Finns were not very concerned about the turn of the millennium. Moreover, their anxiety seemed to decline over time. In the 1997 survey, 20 per cent of those interviewed said that they were somewhat or very nervous, while in 1999 only 15 per cent gave that answer. Most interviewees did not believe that fear and mass hysteria would spread widely at the turn of the millennium. Only some 12 per cent agreed somewhat or totally that fear and mass hysteria were possible. In a news magazine article, it was suggested that the peak of millennium excitement was probably in the winter 1998–99, and thus fell between these two surveys.³⁷

It also emerged from the surveys that most Finns did not give any specific religious meaning to the turn of the millennium, at least in terms of the return of Jesus or religious revivalist movements. In 1997 for example, only five per cent and in 1999 only three per cent agreed somewhat or totally with the argument that Jesus would return to the earth around the year 2000. About one-tenth (12 per cent in 1997 and seven per cent in 1999) of those interviewed agreed with the suggestion that a new revivalist movement would spread around the world at the turn of the millennium. However, a considerably larger proportion thought it was possible that religious extremists groups would spread prophecies of the end times and excite people around the world. This was asked in the 1999 survey, and 68 per cent of the interviewed found it at least possible. About the same proportion (69 per cent) found it possible or probable that there would be great catastrophes around the world caused by the collapse of information technology systems.

When compared to the other threat scenarios in the surveys, these two ranked seventh and eighth. The five threat scenarios that were found possible or even probable by most of the interviewed were the same in both years. These were a flood of refugees caused by hunger, the collapse of the Russian economy followed by a flood of refugees to Western Europe, the use of drugs slipping totally out of the authorities' hands, a major series of floods and earthquakes, and the death of tens of millions of persons from diseases similar to AIDS. The proportion of the respondents who found these threat scenarios possible or even probable to materialize at the turn of the millennium varied from 70 to 85 per cent.

As can be seen from these surveys, the top fears and threat scenarios were of a very general nature. As it is noted by the Research Institute of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, these threats and fears would probably have been among the top ones even if the turn of the millennium was not in sight.³⁸ The respondents were asked to evaluate the statements specifically in the light of the turn of the millennium. How strictly they actually did that can be questioned. Considering that only some 15 to 20 per cent of the respondents said they felt at least somewhat nervous about the turn of the millennium, even though the majority of them found various threat scenarios possible or probable, it seems that the date was not a very significant reason behind the fears.

Since the opinion polls consist of multiple-choice questions, it is possible that there were some fears and threat scenarios that the surveys did not highlight. To obtain more insight on the public discussion and atmosphere, a look will be taken at newspaper articles published in late 1999.

Discussion in the Newspapers

Reading through the main newspaper, two tabloid papers and two weekly papers published between October and December 1999,³⁹ one notices that the word 'millennium' comes up fairly often. The newspapers featured 117 articles on issues directly related to the turn of the millennium. The most popular topic is how to celebrate the New Year's Eve, as 50 articles deal mainly with this theme. The majority of the articles (77) was published in December and almost half of those (37) in the last week of that month, whereas in October there were only 12 articles on the topic.

Some kind of threat related to the turn of the millennium is discussed in 42 articles. The most common threat scenarios brought out in the articles are Y2K problems with computers and their possible consequences in general and specifically in Finland, the threat posed by millenarian or other kinds of extremists to the US (or that the US authorities were monitoring such groups and individuals), any kind of Y2K problems in Russia, and disturbances in Jerusalem or elsewhere in the Middle East.

The threat taken most seriously was what would happen if Russia had not resolved its Y2K problems properly. Whereas such threats as problems with the supply of energy and water are mentioned, the most critical issue is considered to be what might happen in Russian nuclear

power plants.⁴⁰ That this threat was taken fairly seriously by the public is shown by the fact that, as the newspapers report, the demand for iodine tablets increased considerably towards the end of the year 1999.⁴¹

The possibility of action by extremists, and the authorities' actions to prevent them, were discussed in 15 articles. The majority of them (11) were published in December and almost half of the total (7) in the last week of the month. The individual countries that got most attention in this context were the USA and Israel. When discussing the threats faced by the USA, the main focus was usually on the efforts of the authorities to prevent acts by the extremists. In this context, the security measures in Time Square, the arrest of Ahmed Ressam and the search for Abdelmajed Dahoumane, and the cancellation of New Year's celebrations in Seattle, were dealt with. When it came to Israel, attention was drawn to the existence and deportation of groups which were alleged to have planned to act around the turn of the millennium and the measures taken by the authorities to ensure that nothing would happen. Another common theme was the Jerusalem syndrome, a temporary mental disorder (most typical among the pilgrims) under which the person believes himself to be a biblical character.

What is notable is that in these articles dealing with possible disturbance caused by extremists, Finland is mentioned no more than once, and then only to announce that this kind of threat does not exist in Finland. It was reported that, according to the research work by the EU police work group, Europol, and Interpol, that there was no threat of terrorism in Finland (or in many other European countries).⁴² No explanation was provided for this, probably because when it comes to Finland, the finding was hardly surprising in any way. All of the other 15 articles that dealt with threats to Finland were related to the Y2K problem. A few critical voices notwithstanding, in almost all of these articles it was confirmed that the preparations had been sufficient and everything should go on without any major problems. This is especially true about the articles describing how the state authorities and different companies had prepared for the year 2000 which were published on the last days of 1999.⁴³ The citizens were assured that, thanks to good planning and preparation plus extra staff in place on New Year's Eve, everything would go smoothly. When it comes to people's behaviour, the authorities and journalists seem to have been worried primarily about how people would make it to home in one piece after hard

celebrations without getting stuck in traffic or lost in the cold winter night.

Security Officials' Point of View and Preparations

What about the security officials? Did they also regard the approaching turn of the millennium as calmly as everyone else? From the perspective of this article the answer is yes and no – officials prepared carefully for New Year's Eve, but for completely different reasons than the threat of radical actions.

The preparations for the turn of the millennium were extensive. As in many other countries, the state and private companies had spent considerable amounts of money to ensure that their systems were Y2K compatible. To give some examples, the rescue services had more people at work on New Year's Eve than ever before, except during major disasters or accidents. Most companies had staff standing by to make sure that there were no problems. Helsinki Energy, for example, had five times more employees at work than normal. The supply of water was ensured by filling water towers to maximum.⁴⁴

Maintaining public order and internal security is the responsibility of the police in Finland. The organization is tripartite, consisting of organs at national, provincial and local level. The police organization is led by the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior. The Provincial Police Command reports directly to the Supreme Police Command. These organs are responsible for developing and leading the work of the police on their own area of operations. Securing public order and security is the responsibility of the local district police. For this task it receives guidelines from the Supreme and Provincial Police Command, but normally fulfils the task fairly independently at the operational level. In addition to these, there are some national units directly under the Supreme Police Command. These are the National Bureau of Investigation, the Security Police, the National Traffic Police, the Police Technical Centre, the Police School and the Police College of Finland. The Helsinki District Police also report directly to the Supreme Police Command.⁴⁵ The police organization ultimately reports to the Minister of the Interior.

From the perspective of internal security and public order, the key organizations in the preparations for the turn of the millennium were the Security Police, the Supreme and Provincial Police Command and the District Police.⁴⁶

As part of its task to monitor and prevent actions that might pose a risk to internal security and international relations, during the years 1998–99 the Security Police investigated the possibility of action that would threaten public security around the turn of the millennium. The investigation focused on the movements that, according to the international experience, might potentially pose a threat. There was no specific incident, report or piece of information that gave an impulse to this investigation. Instead, these kinds of movements are constantly being monitored at some level. The investigation on the risks related to the turn of the millennium was not a major project in the Security Police; the issue was not even mentioned in their annual report for 1999. Instead, the attention of the Security Police was directed mainly to the tasks related to the first EU Chairmanship by Finland (1 July–31 December 1999).

The results of the investigation confirmed the presumption that there were no significant threats caused by the behaviour of some groups or individuals holding beliefs related to the turn of the millennium. The Security Police did not identify any individual or group in Finland as posing a possible threat. When it comes to acts committed by international or foreign groups in Finland, they were, and still are, in general considered to be improbable, and as to the turn of the millennium, this possibility was not specifically discussed within the Security Police. The Security Police were somewhat concerned about the possibility that someone might take advantage of the special occasion and issue a threat directed at information technology systems. However, there were no signs that someone was planning this kind of act. At a more general level, the Security Police had devoted quite a lot of effort to dealing with threats related to the vulnerability of the information system. The Security Police had been concerned with issues like the organized sabotage, destruction, theft or spoiling of information systems. As many of the critical key systems maintained by private companies, the Security Police felt it necessary to expand its guidance and instruction activities in this sphere by, for example, establishing contacts with high-tech companies in the country.⁴⁷

The low probability of radical action around the turn of the millennium was confirmed by the report of the EU police work group discussed in *Helsingin Sanomat* on 24 December 1999. In addition to this, according to Deputy National Police Commissioner Jorma Toivanen, who was interviewed in the same article, Europol and Interpol

had no contact with Finland to warn about any specific threat scenarios.⁴⁸

Following from this, the possibility of religiously or politically motivated unrest at the turn of the millennium was not the focal point of the preparations in the police organization. Based on the risk analyses gathered by the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior, the preparations were directed at risks related to the possible consequences either of the Y2K problem or of the unusual scale of celebrations. To give an example, the Police Department was in contact with the banks to ensure that should there be any problems with the electricity, the security of the banks would be guaranteed. It was also made sure that the police and rescue organizations could operate even if Y2K-related problems occurred.

The Police Department estimated that it should be possible to ensure public order and security without making any exceptional arrangements. Work shifts were planned to ensure that there would be sufficient police officers on duty on New Year's Eve. Should the police forces have needed assistance, there was a mechanism under law to obtain extra manpower and equipment from the defence forces. However, this possibility was not part of the plan – the Police Department had merely checked with the defence forces that everything was working as usual should something come up.

On the local level, the main concern seemed to be the scale of celebrations. For example, in Helsinki it was expected that tens of thousands of people would gather in the city centre to see the fireworks. Planning and preparing for the New Year's Eve in the Southern Police District of Helsinki – comprising the city centre where most of the crucial governmental buildings are located and where most celebrations and demonstrations usually take place – started in July 1999. The police did not expect this particular New Year's Eve to differ from the other ones in quality, only in the scale of celebration. Thus the plan was based on the normal New Year's Eve scheme, but everything was multiplied by three or four. The arrangements were of equal size to those taken around a big state visit, but on the other hand, the readiness of the police was considerably lower than during the Helsinki EU Summit in December 1999.

In practice this meant that there were around 100 policemen around the city centre on the New Year's Eve. Besides the district's own police forces, extra help was obtained from the other police districts of

Helsinki. This is normal practice during special events. There were also some organizations and associations taking part in the arrangements (again as usual on New Year's Eve) and some 60 or 70 stewards assisting during the celebration.

The turn of the millennium went smoothly in Finland. There were almost no Y2K problems at all, which in fact exceeded the expectations of the Ministry of the Interior which had assumed that there would have been at least some difficulties. Moreover, according to the police reports, the celebrations went peacefully and no severe disturbances of public order took place. In the Helsinki city centre about 100,000 persons gathered to see the fireworks. Despite this incredible number of people, everything went almost as on any other New Year's Eve except for the traffic jams.⁴⁹

With regard to actions motivated by millenarian beliefs, there is not much to say. The two suicide cases of Satanists have already been mentioned. It is possible that there were people waiting for doomsday, but none of them did anything that would have made the news or given anyone a reason to file a police report. The Chief Inspector who led the police operation in the Helsinki city centre recalled that he got a couple of announcements about individuals holding some kind of banners and talking about the end of the world. These persons were considered harmless and were left alone, and no written report of these incidents was made.⁵⁰

There are many reasons why everything went so well at the turn of the millennium. In the Y2K matters, the police credit companies and organizations for solving the problems before the year's end. As for the outdoor celebrations, they are actually always relatively modest on New Year's Eve. In addition to this, judging from the newspapers, it seems that by the autumn of 1999 many people were already fed up with the millennium excitement. Many tickets to millennium parties went unsold as many people decided to celebrate the occasion with their family at home.⁵¹ The night of the millennium, anticipated with fear and excitement, turned out to be like any other New Year's Eve. In the end, the turn of the millennium went even more smoothly than expected and there were few signs of anyone waiting for the Apocalypse in Finland.

NOTES

I would like to thank Prof. Jeffrey Kaplan, Prof. Kyösti Pekonen, Dr Tomas Ries and various other scholars and security officials mentioned later in the notes for their assistance and insight.

1. Statistics on the membership of registered communities are provided by Statistics Finland (www.stat.fi/tk/tp/tasku/taskue_vaesto.html). Information on the membership of Pentecostal communities is from Harri Heino, 'Religion and Churches in Finland' (virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/uskoeng.html). Heino's article is one of the best introductions in English to the Finnish religious scene.
2. The survey is called Gallup Ecclesiastica and it is conducted every fourth year. The results are presented e.g. in Kari Salonen, Kimmo Kääriäinen and Kati Niemelä, *The Church at the Turn of the Millennium. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland from 1996 to 1999* (The Research Institute of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland 2001), pp.17–20. The publication is available on the Internet at www.evl.fi/kkh/ktk/publication96-99/publ51.pdf.
3. Interestingly enough, the percentage of the interviewees who said that they believe in God as taught by Christianity has risen since 1991 when only 33 per cent gave that answer. One explanation given for this is that the importance of shared communal values increased because of the uncertainty induced by the economic recession (Salonen *et al.* (note 2), pp.17–18).
4. See for example Jouko Sihvo, 'Suomalaisten uskonnollisuus [Finnish religiosity]', in Pertti Suhonen (ed.), *Yleinen mielipide 1997* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi, 1997), pp.33–53.
5. The concept of the 'folk church' has different meanings. It can be understood to refer to a church which, because a significant majority of people belonging to it, has a special relationship with the state. The folk church can also be seen as an institution providing services, and as such, an analogous institution to the state and the municipalities. In contrast to this functional view referring to the prevailing situation, the folk church has been used to refer to an ideal or theological programme. From this perspective, the folk church can be understood as a missionary concept, for example. For more see Hannu T. Kämpuri, 'The "Folk Church" as an Ecclesiological Concept', in Pirjo Työrinoja (ed.), *The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finnish Society. Documents of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland 6* (Helsinki: Church Council for Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp.20–25. While both views have been present in the Finnish discussion, it is the functional view referring to the prevailing situation that seems to be dominant.
6. Salonen *et al.* (note 2), pp.71–4, Heino, 'Religion and Churches in Finland' (note 1).
7. The argument about the alternative rather than oppositional nature of the religious movements was clearly brought up in the conference 'Oppositional Religions in Finland', which took place in Helsinki in 1999. For the papers presented in the conference see Jeffrey Kaplan (ed.), *Beyond the Mainstream: The Emergence of Religious Pluralism in Finland, Estonia, and Russia*. *Studia Historica* 63 (Helsinki: SKS, 2000).
8. I am greatly indebted to Ilpo Pursiainen for his insights on this topic.
9. Kimmo Katajala, 'Savuna taivasten valtakuntaan. Vanhauskoisten polttoitsemurhat Ruotsin-Karjalassa 1600-luvun lopulla [In smoke to the kingdom of heaven. The self-immolations of Raskolniks in the late seventeenth century in Swedish Karelia]', in Kimmo Katajala (ed.), *Manaajista maalaisaateliin. Tulkintoja toisesta historian, antropologian ja maantieteen välimaastossa. Tietolipas 140* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1995), pp.181–207.
10. Ilpo Pursiainen, 'Salaiset kansiot: Suomalainen millenarismi 1918–1939 Etsivän Keskuspoliisin asiakirjoissa [Secret files: Finnish millenarianism 1918–1939 in the documents of the Secret Police]', in Sulevi Riukulehto (ed.), *Perinnettä vai bisnestä? Kulttuurin paikalliset ulottuvuudet* (Jyväskylä: Atena Kustannus Oy 2001), pp.204–16;

- Interview with Ilpo Pursiainen on 18 June 2001.
11. The information on the Åkerblom movement is based on the dissertation of Gustav Björkstrand (Gustav Björkstrand, *Åkerblom-rörelsen. En finlandssvensk profetörelsens uppkomst, utveckling och sönderfall* [Åkerblom movement. The birth, development and dissolution of a Finnish–Swedish prophet movement]. *Meddelanden från stiftelsens för Åbo Akademi Forskningsinstitut, nr 11* (Åbo 1976)). For those interested, there is an English summary available in the end of the book. Almost the same text is published also in Harald Biezeis (ed.), *New Religions. Based on Papers Read at the Symposium on New Religions Held at Åbo on the 1st–3rd of September 1974. Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis VII* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1975) under title ‘Formative Factors of the Maria Åkerblom Movement’.
 12. Ilpo Pursiainen, ‘Passion and Apocalypticism Under the Midnight Sun: The Apocalyptic Korpela-Movement in North Sweden in the 1930s’, in Jeffrey Kaplan (ed.), *Beyond the Mainstream* (note 7), pp.145–56.
 13. Ilpo Pursiainen, ‘Salaiset kansiot’ (note 10), pp. 208–10, 219.
 14. Harri Heino, *Mihin Suomi tänään uskoo* [What Finland believes in today] (Porvoo/Helsinki/Juva: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö 1997), pp.170–71; Saara Beckman, *Tiesivätkö he mitä tekivät?* [Did they know what they were doing] (Beckman & Norström AB, 1999).
 15. Harri Heino’s interview in *Helsingin Sanomat*, Monthly Supplement December 1999, p.67.
 16. Heino, *Mihin Suomi tänään uskoo* (note 14), pp.154–7.
 17. Interview with Arto Heiska and Teemu Isoaho (the Security Police) on 5 June 2001.
 18. Merja Hermonen, ‘Aspects of Youth Satanism in Finland’, in Jeffrey Kaplan (ed.), *Beyond the Mainstream* (note 7), pp.273–88.
 19. Interview with Merja Hermonen on 9 Aug. 2001.
 20. *Project Megiddo* report, pp.26–9.
 21. *Helsingin Sanomat* (25 Nov. 1999), p.C2.
 22. See for example the annual report of the Security Police 1999.
 23. Kyösti Pekonen, Pertti Hynynen and Mari Kalliala, ‘The New Radical Right Taking Shape in Finland’, in Kyösti Pekonen (ed.), *The New Radical Right in Finland* (Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association, 1999), pp.38–9.
 24. For more about this see Lauri Karvonen, ‘From White to Blue-and-Black: Finnish Fascism in the Inter-War Era’, *Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium* 36 (Helsinki: The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters 1988); and Risto Alapuro, ‘Mass Support for Fascism in Finland’, in Stein Ulgevik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (eds.), *Who Were the Fascists. Social Roots of European Fascism* (Universitetsförlaget: Bergen/Oslo/Tromsø 1980), pp.678–86.
 25. Mari Kalliala, ‘Traditions of the Radical Right in Finnish Political Culture’ (pp.75–7); Kyösti Pekonen, ‘Introduction to the Essays’ (pp.24–5), and Jeffrey Kaplan, ‘The Finnish New Radical Right in Comparative Perspective’ (pp.209–13), all in Kyösti Pekonen (ed.), *The New Radical Right in Finland* (note 23).
 26. The number of studies on the Finnish new radical right is very limited. The most notable effort has been the research project ‘Criticism of politics, political detachment and the possibilities of new right-wing populism or radicalism?’, which started in 1995. One of the aims of the project was to map out the situation and the ideas of Finnish radical rightwing populist and extremist movements. This is covered in Kyösti Pekonen (ed.), *The New Radical Right in Finland* (note 23), which is an excellent (and so far the only) introduction to the radical right scene in the country.
 27. Pekonen *et al.* (note 23), pp. 31–41, 46–51. The most notable of the radical right parties in the 1990s have been The True Finns (*Perussuomalaiset*), The League for a Free Finland (*Vapaan Suomen Liitto*), and The Reform Group (*Remonttiryhmä*). The first one, the True Finns, was earlier known as The Finnish Rural Party (*Suomen Maaseudun Puolue*, SMP), which occasionally got some electoral support in the preceding decades, having even 18 MPs at its high in 1970. Nowadays the party represents just 1.3 per cent

- of the electorate.
28. Pekonen *et al.* (note 23), pp.41–6. Extra-parliamentary groups include: the Patriotic National Alliance (*Isänmaallinen Kansallis-Liitto*, IKL) which is an extreme right group with nostalgic orientation, and Great Finland (*Suur-Suomi-yhdistys*), which is known for its strong verbal attacks against Russia and the Somalis in Finland. Perhaps the best-known personality of this scene is Pekka Siitoin. Besides being known as an occultist, he is famous for his overt admiration of Hitler and National Socialism. He got a fair amount of attention (but few followers) in the 1970s and continues his activities on a small scale. For more information on him, see Mari Kalliala, 'Pekka Siitoin – Representative of the Cultic Milieu', in Pekonen (ed.), *The New Radical Right in Finland* (note 23), pp.87–113.
 29. The annual report of the Security Police 1996, p.7.
 30. Kyösti Pekonen, 'The Patriotic Right as a Myth', Pekonen (note 23), pp.114–36; Jeffrey Kaplan, *Encyclopedia of White Power: A Sourcebook on the Radical Right* (Walnut Hills, CA: AltaMira, 2000), pp.160–62.
 31. The annual report of the Security Police 1999, p.10.
 32. The first yearly report on racist crimes in Finland compiled by the Ministry of the Interior is from 1997 (for the latest reports see www.intermin.fi). The number of racist crimes reported annually to the police has been about 200–300, with the number of incidents growing each year. However, due to difficulties with the quality of data and changes in the data collection methods, one should be careful about drawing conclusions from these figures. The increase of intercommunal violence was mentioned in the annual report of the Security Police 2000.
 33. See for example Kyösti Pekonen, 'The Problem of Political Intolerance in "Decaying" Suburbs: A Finnish Case Study', Paper presented at the Stockholm International Forum Combating Intolerance on 30 Jan. 2001 (<http://2001.stockholmforum.se/se/stats/presentpdf/pekonen.pdf>).
 34. See for example Tuomo Martikainen, 'The Urban Voters: Lost Their Empire?', in Pekonen (note 23), pp.147–58. For information on voting turnout in the 1990s see www.tilastokeskus.fi/tk/he/vaalit/vaalit_en.html.
 35. *Poliisin turvallisuusbarometri 1999. Haastattelututkimuksen tuloksia* [Security Barometer of the Police 1999. Results of the interview study] (Sisäasiainministeriö, Poliisiosasto 1999), pp.33–39; EVA, *Mielipiteiden sateenkaari. Raportti suomalaisten asenteista 1999* [The rainbow of opinions. Report on the attitudes of the Finns 1999], www.eva.fi/julkaisut/raportit/asenne99/sisallys.html.
 36. The surveys were conducted by a research system called GallupKanava, which is based on a permanent group of interviewees who answer a set of questions every week via computer. The group of interviewees is selected so that it forms a representative sample of the Finnish population. In the 1997 survey, the number of interviewees was 1,422, and in 1999, 1,031. The surveys consist of two sections of multiple choice questions. In the first section, respondents were asked to evaluate the possibility of different kinds of large-scale catastrophes taking place at the turn of the millennium. The alternatives given are 'impossible', 'possible', 'probable' and 'I don't know.' In the second section, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with different kind of arguments about the turn of the millennium. The choices given were 'fully agree', 'partially agree', 'partially disagree', 'totally disagree' and 'I don't know.'
 37. *Suomen Kuvalehti* (12 Nov. 1999), p.44.
 38. News bulletin of the Research Centre of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 12 Nov. 1999, published on Internet at www.evl.fi/kkh/kt/uutiset/mar99/kthar.htm.
 39. The newspapers included in the study are *Helsingin Sanomat* (the leading morning newspaper in Finland by far; despite its name it is practically a national newspaper), *Ilta-Sanomat* (a tabloid paper published by the same company as *Helsingin Sanomat*) and *Itälehti* (a tabloid paper published by another media group). In addition to these, *Suomen Kuvalehti* (a weekly news magazine) and *Kotimaa* (a weekly newspaper with Christian orientation) were included. The articles included here are those dealing

directly with what would or might happen around the turn of the millennium. Thus, articles using the term 'millennium' in a merely rhetorical sense were not taken into account. Some of these newspapers often divided the articles into several smaller articles under one big heading. In cases where the articles dealt with the same theme, they are counted as one. If the articles are on different topic, they are counted separately.

40. See *Helsingin Sanomat* (4 Nov. 1999), p.C1; *Ilta-lehti* (14 Dec. 1999), pp.18–19; *Ilta-Sanomat* (13 Dec. 1999), pp.A10–11; *Suomen Kuvalehti* (17 Dec. 1999), p.23.
41. *Helsingin Sanomat* (29 Dec. 1999), p.A10.
42. *Helsingin Sanomat* (24 Dec.1999), p.C2.
43. See for example *Ilta-lehti* (23 Dec. 1999), p.A41, (30 Dec.1999), p.A3; *Helsingin Sanomat* (29 Dec. 1999), p.A10.
44. *Helsingin Sanomat* (11 Dec. 1999), p.B5; *Ilta-lehti* (30 Dec. 1999), p.A3.
45. The organizational structure of the Finnish police and the roles and responsibilities are defined in *Poliisilaki* [Police law] 493/1995 and *Asetus poliisin hallinnosta* [Decree on the administration of the police] 158/1996; the organization chart and other information on the topic can be found on the Internet at www.poliisi.fi/english/index.htm and www.intermin.fi.
46. Most documents related to the risk analyses and preparations are still classified and thus have not been used in this study. The following information is based (unless otherwise indicated) on interviews with Chief Superintendent Arto Heiska and Detective Sergeant Teemu Isoaho, the Security Police (5 June 2001), Police Commander Hannu Hannula, the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior (19 June and 31 July 2001) and Chief Superintendent Jussi-Pekka Lämsä, Helsinki Police District (26 June 2001). I would like to thank them warmly for their contribution. The Provincial Supreme Command's contribution to the preparations is not discussed here since the Helsinki District Police, which is taken as an example of the local level, reports directly to the Supreme Police Command.
47. This aspect of the work of the Security Police is discussed especially in their annual report 1999.
48. *Helsingin Sanomat* (24 Dec.1999), p.C2.
49. *Helsingin Sanomat* (2 Jan. 2000), pp.A5, A8–10; interview with Jussi-Pekka Lämsä on 26 June 2001.
50. Interview with Jussi-Pekka Lämsä on 26 June 2001.
51. See for example *Helsingin Sanomat* (8 Dec. 1999), p.D2, 12 Dec, 1999, p.A9; *Ilta-Sanomat* (17 Dec, 1999), pp.30–31.