Anthropological Theory



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Who's afraid of violent language?

Honour, sovereignty and claims-making in the League of Nations

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Abstract

The peace treaties following the Great War dictated that certain nation-states accept, as the price of international recognition, agreements to protect the rights of their minority populations. Responsibility to 'guarantee' and 'supervise' the minority treaties fell to a novel and untried international institution, the League of Nations. It established the 'minority petition procedure', an unprecedented innovation within international relations that initiated transnational claims-making. Focusing on the supervision of agreements pertaining to the Macedonian region, I examine how the Minorities Section of the League of Nations Secretariat handled 'minority petitions' alleging state infractions of minority treaties. I consider, in particular, a preoccupation among both bureaucrats and states with 'violent language' in petitions. I argue that this preoccupation signalled anxieties about honour, sovereignty and legitimacy, about the ambiguous position of 'minority states' and about the potentially explosive effects of popular energies in the post-war international order.

Key Words

bureaucracy • claims-making • international institutions • League of Nations • minorities • minority treaties • petitions • rights • sovereignty • violent language

The redrawing of European state boundaries at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1918–1919 had dramatic consequences for the inhabitants of the now disintegrated Ottoman, Hapsburg and Romanov empires. If the peace settlement gave 60 million 'their own' national state, more than half that number, who saw themselves, or were seen by others, as distinct from the majority population, confronted a different fate. Many, though by no means all, of these people were ultimately designated as 'minorities'.[1]

Members of the Committee on New States, charged with determining the new boundaries, were all too aware of the potentially explosive character of minority conflicts for inter-state relations. Consequently, they stipulated that certain states, as the price of

recognition, agree to be bound by minority treaties or agreements. The treaty-bound or 'minority states', as they are tellingly labelled by some analysts (e.g. Claude, 1955; Fink, 1995), comprised certain states associated with the losing side, as well as several newly created or expanded states, mostly in eastern and south-eastern Europe.[2] Minority treaties bestowed full political and civil rights to 'individuals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities', and in addition, specified certain group-specific rights with respect to language, education and local autonomy. The peacemakers in Paris dictated that minority treaties were to be 'guaranteed' by the League of Nations, a novel and as yet vaguely conceived international institution that, for the first time, was to be supported by a corps of international civil servants and a complex administrative apparatus. The guarantee entailed that the League establish, in a phrase pregnant with Foucauldian overtones, a mechanism of treaty 'supervision'. The 'minority procedure' was intended to allow the League to receive information about alleged infractions of the minority treaties, enabling the highest chamber, the League Council, to examine and, if necessary, discipline a treaty-bound state.

The minority procedure that evolved through the 1920s and 1930s has been the subject of numerous studies in the fields of international relations, politics, history and law (see, e.g. Azcárate, 1945; Bagley, 1950; Claude, 1955; Jackson Preece, 1998; Janowsky, 1945; Macartney, 1934; Mair, 1928; Mazower, 1997; Robinson et al., 1943). With few exceptions, these studies have taken 'states', 'nations' and 'minorities' as unexamined categories. In attempting to analyse the minority procedure, their authors have focused heavily on the actions and interactions of states. They have devoted surprisingly little attention to examining the role of the Secretariat. Even less have they attempted to theorize the imbrication of minority supervision in a novel and evolving set of bureaucratic practices at the international level. Nor, finally, have they explored the cultural dimensions of this new mechanism of governance, and the ways minority protection was contextualized within, and informed by, discourses of progress, civilization and empire.[3]

Rather than broaching these vast and complex issues through an overview of the minority procedure, I start from the ground of the routine bureaucratic practices of the League Secretariat's Minorities Section. My analysis is based on an ongoing ethnography of the Minorities Section via, primarily, its files in relation to minority supervision of the contested region of Macedonia. My concern in this article is to consider bureaucrats' engagement with petitions alleging state infractions of minority agreements. Specifically, I try to make sense of a pattern that emerges in the ways this particular set of petitions is treated: a bureaucratic preoccupation – echoing that of states – with the alleged presence of '*violent language*' in petitions. I explore what 'violent language' meant to those who discerned it, and consider the effects of judgements of language as 'violent' upon the career of petitions that articulated allegations of state or state-sponsored violence. And I look at the ways bureaucrats negotiated such judgements among themselves as well as with state delegates.

THE MINORITY PETITION PROCEDURE

Although earlier international agreements had included provisions for minority protection, the Paris peace treaties were the first to identify minorities as *a matter of international concern*, and to vest responsibility for ensuring compliance in the international community, rather than a specific Great Power or 'kin state'. The League of Nations,

charged to 'guarantee' the treaties, had to invent a mechanism by means of which they could be supervised. A committee of the League's Council, led by the Italian delegate, Mr Tittoni, formulated the basic elements of what became known as the minority procedure. The *Tittoni Report* was presented to the Council in October 1920. Its essential principle was that although only another (state) member of the Council had the right to 'raise an infraction' (Mair, 1928: 61) or 'seize the Council' (Claude, 1955: 24) against an accused state, anyone – a state, an individual or group speaking as or on behalf of a minority – could communicate such information to members of the Council through a letter, known in League parlance as a 'petition'.

Minority supervision at the League involved an unprecedented innovation within the domain of international relations that, I would argue, initiated and made possible transnational claims-making. The Council evolved a procedure whereupon petitions from, or on behalf of, aggrieved minorities could be submitted to the League Secretary General. If found to be 'receivable', petitions could then be communicated to the accused government and to members of the League Council. Writing in the late 1920s, the anthropologist Lucy Mair noted the enormous implications of such an innovation:

> This means that in certain countries a section of the population has a right of appeal – though this appeal is not invariably heard – not possessed of the majority of subjects of that State, to an authority outside and above its own government. This is the greatest abdication of sovereignty which has been made by an independent State; and since it has not been made universally, those States which have made it are in an inferior position compared to the rest. They cannot but resent this discrimination . . . (Mair, 1928: 29)

The League petition procedure represented a challenge to past practices of statecraft, in which only states were legal subjects with agency, including the authority to 'speak', within inter-state relations. In the first decade of the procedure, this challenge was deeply contested. The nature and reasons for the conflicting views on the degree to which non-state actors ought to be allowed agency within the League can be grasped by considering two different senses of the word 'claim'. The first involves simple assertion; the second involves an assertion rooted in a sense of *entitlement* that expects a response. Following a conservative state-centric approach, Mr Tittoni's committee limited the space and weight given to petitioners' voices. They defined the procedure as 'political' rather than 'judicial', and argued that the petition should be treated 'purely as information' rather than as an accusation requiring a reply. They held, therefore, that petitioners were not party to a dialogue, a negotiation or arbitration. They limited petitions to the first sense of 'claim'. This restrictive approach was attractive to the treaty-bound states that wished to limit the derogation to their sovereignty. Members of minority organizations and their allies, by contrast, saw the procedure in terms of direct appeal to a supreme international guarantor of justice, or alternatively, as a means of establishing a dialogue in which they were acknowledged parties. They tried as much as possible to widen this new space for agency.

The petition procedure was thus a source of contention and debate. The minorities had their champions, some of whom lobbied hard for the system to become universal, both for the benefit of minorities of all states and to lessen the grievances of current

treaty-bound states at their iniquitous treatment.[4] Treaty-bound states, and their allies among the Western Powers (especially France), were able, none the less, to retain in large measure the original conservative approach. From 1920 to 1929, six resolutions for modifications to the procedure were presented by states and negotiated in the Council. For the most part, the modifications served to limit treaty-bound states' exposure – to accusations of infractions, and to criticism – within the wider League community, as well as in relation to the outside world, illustrating 'the primacy of sovereign rights and interests in the inter-war nation-states system' (Jackson Preece, 1998: 83). But in 1929, several League delegates (led by Dr Stresemann of Germany and Mr Dandurand of Canada) demanded that more public information be made available on a regular basis about the League's work on minority issues and the fate of petitions. The acceptance of this sixth resolution inaugurated a new era of bureaucratic accountability. From 1929 the Secretary General was required to publish annual statistics regarding the number of petitions received, the number declared receivable and irreceivable, the number of petitions under examination by committees of the Council (the so-called 'Committees of Three'), and other details, in the *Official Journal of the League of Nations*.

For petitioners (including minorities), the critical moment in the procedure was the petition's reception. In response to a complaint by the Czechoslovak government that, 'so long as all petitions were received indiscriminately by the League, there was no protection against factious petitions manufactured expressly to embarrass the authorities' (Mair, 1928: 69), the Council in 1923 endorsed a resolution setting out five conditions of receivability. These conditions were as follows (all but the last had been in use already since 1921):

> Petitions
> 1. must have in view the protection of minorities in accordance with the Treaties;
> 2. in particular, they must not be submitted in the form of a request for a severance of political relations between the minority in question and the State of which it forms a part;
> 3. must not emanate from an anonymous or unauthenticated source;
> 4. must abstain from violent language;
> 5. must contain information or refer to facts which have not recently been the subject of a petition submitted to the ordinary procedure.

In principle, members of Council (i.e. official delegates of member states) examined petitions. In practice, the Minorities Section 'officials' (as the bureaucrats were called) handled most of the work, including the crucial preliminary examination. They decided upon 'the delicate matter of "receivability" ', although the Secretary General had the last word (Azcárate, 1945: 124). Through these preliminary examinations, the Minorities Section determined whether petitions complied with the required form (i.e. fulfilled the five conditions of receivability). In principle (if not always in practice), no judgement was made at this stage on the petition's substance.

In light of this significant responsibility, the original Director of the Minorities Section, Erik Colban, a Norwegian diplomat, gave his staff detailed instructions on how to examine a petition. They were to devise a memorandum that set out systematically whether and to what degree a petition fulfilled each condition of receivability. They were to consult with colleagues within the Section, and where necessary, with colleagues in

other sections, such as the Political or Legal Sections, and all opinions were to be recorded on the memorandum. They were to conclude with a recommendation on the petition's receivability, and pass this to the Director of the Minorities Section for comment. He would then forward the file to the Secretary General for a final decision.[5]

Once put into practice, the preliminary examination for receivability constituted a collective exercise. Any given petition might generate 10–15 pages of handwritten and typewritten commentaries, shifting between French and English, depending on the bureaucrat's language of greatest ease. By means of this circulating file, individuals communicated their judgements up and down the hierarchy, negotiating a final conclusion regarding a petition's receivability.[6] With respect not only to petitions concerning the southern Balkan region, but in general, Minorities Section officials acted as gatekeepers, and largely determined a petition's fate. While the immense responsibility handed over to an administrative unit of the League exemplifies the burgeoning power of bureaucracies in this era, the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Minorities Section was exceptional.[7]

THE PUZZLE OF 'VIOLENT LANGUAGE'

The League maintained files on the so-called 'Bulgarian'[8] populations living in the Macedonian and Thracian regions that at the time formed parts of Greek, Yugoslav and Turkish territories. These populations were, in principle, protected by the minority treaties of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. 'Bulgarian' minorities living in northern Greece were also affected by a Convention on Greco-Bulgarian Voluntary and Reciprocal Emigration, agreed between Greece and Bulgaria in 1919 at Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, that was intended to encourage minorities to migrate to their 'kin state' (Finney, 1995; Ladas, 1932).

Within the League files pertaining to this population are a number of petitions that make claims or allege mistreatment by state or state-sponsored authorities. Reading through the bureaucratic examinations of petitions for receivability, I was perplexed at how frequently the Minorities Section officials discerned 'violent language' within these petitions.[9] Indeed, petitions were more often deemed 'irreceivable' on the basis of this 4th condition than on any other condition. And though, given that the petition procedure was heavily used by groups favouring Macedonian autonomy, I expected more to be turned down on the basis of the 2nd condition, I also found the very broad interpretation of 'violent language' puzzling. I gradually became convinced that this phrase was a key to numerous implicit social and political assumptions framing not simply the minority procedure, but the League of Nations more broadly.

'Violent language' operated as a 'local' concept within the world of international statecraft. Minorities Section files on 'the procedure', sub-committee reports and minutes of Council meetings provide evidence of discussions that shed light on the concept. In turn, the files containing the petitions and the memoranda they generated in the course of the petition evaluation process reveal patterns in the ways the concept was *used* – asserted, denied, treated as significant or insignificant – by Minorities Section officials, and representatives of states, in examinations of petitions concerning Macedonia over a number of years. They bear witness to a dramatic contestation emerging in 1927 over the interpretation of petitions, which leads me, in conclusion, to speculate on the nature of the *problem* that 'violent language' presented to states and to international bureaucrats.

THE 4TH CONDITION

The first and most striking feature of the phrase 'violent language' is simply the silence that surrounds it. Nowhere is it explicitly defined; its meaning is apparently taken to be self-evident. In the very large secondary literature on the minority petition procedure, the condition requiring petitions to 'abstain from violent language' (the 4th condition) is mentioned, yet the phrase is never commented upon. My own search through the primary material in the files – minutes of committees, committee papers, Council debates and discussions on procedure – has so far yielded no record of discussions around this phrase, either in the lead-up to the 1923 amendment or prior to its adoption as a practice before 1921.

Debates around the 1923 amendment, sponsored by two treaty-bound states, Poland and Czechoslovakia, do, none the less, provide indirect evidence. The key objective of the amendment was to restrict the circulation of petitions to the Council rather than the whole Assembly, thus reducing the public exposure of accused governments.[10] The Polish representative asserted that although the minority treaties were 'considered as tending to stabilise and to fortify this new order', the question of minorities, 'if treated in a clumsy manner [could] . . . exercise a destructive and dissociating influence' (League of Nations, 1929: 16). Mr Beneš, for the Czech government, justified the amendment as aimed 'to prevent the use of petitions, not for promoting peaceful conditions, but rather – as had too often been the case – for purposes of propaganda'. The Director of the Minorities Section, Erik Colban, summarizing various arguments, insisted that 'any possibility of malicious propaganda must be avoided', and that

> . . . whatever the care taken by the Secretariat, there would always be a possibility that Members of the Council would receive petitions, accompanied by the observations of the Government concerned, which were *not in all respects in conformity with the rules* laid down, or which advanced an opinion which was *not expressed in clear terms*, or which *might throw discredit on some State* if the document in question were published or commented on by the Press. (League of Nations, 1929: 17, my emphasis)

These exchanges in the Council index a larger struggle over legitimacy and control of the means of violence. Treaty-bound states, anxious to consolidate their sovereignty, were in conflict with groups and individuals who wished to see the new borders revised. The latter category often included revolutionary organizations, so-called 'kin states' and some members of the new minorities.

In Macedonia, for instance, since the 1890s, armed bands promoting the nationalisms of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and a 'Macedonia for Macedonians' had been locked in violent conflict with each other, as well as with Ottoman troops. By the teens of the new century, the states of the region had fought, or allied, with each other in two Balkan Wars, then in the First World War. At the Paris Peace Conference, the Committee on New States refused to sanction an autonomous Macedonia; its territory remained divided between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,[11] Greece and Bulgaria. The first two, partially as reward for having allied with the eventual victors, were awarded additional territories; between them, they received the lion's share of Macedonia, at the expense of the vanquished Bulgaria. Like those agitating for an autonomous Macedonia,

Bulgaria profoundly resented and vigorously contested the new borders. In the parts of the Macedonian region under 'Serbian' and Greek authority, the contest over territory created a relentless cycle of violence and tens of thousands of refugees. Armed revolutionaries sought to destabilize the new states through bombings and assassinations of state officials (in pursuit of a more 'just' recognition of Bulgarian, or Bulgaro-Macedonian, national claims). Fragile states responded with repressive measures towards whole populations.

Revisionist movements pursued legal avenues as well. The heaviest users of the minority petition procedure in regard to this region were persons affiliated with Macedonian revolutionary organizations. The 'Supremacist' wing, which sought Macedonia's 'union' with Bulgaria and which was supported and financed by the Bulgarian state, was especially active and well organized. The Macedonian case was not unique; a similar pattern emerged in relation to Hungarians in Romania, and Germans in Czechoslovakia, among others.

DISDAINFUL PASSION AND PROPAGANDA

Certain organizations using the minority petition mechanism clearly presented a threat to new states. The threat, however, was not exercised primarily through the petition mechanism as such, but through direct acts of sabotage and insurrection committed by members of these organizations. Moreover, as a means of propaganda, newspapers were always a much more effective means of publicizing claims and grievances than the League's minority procedure. Bureaucrats' preoccupation with 'violent language' in petitions thus cannot be fully explained with reference to fears on the part of the architects of the new political order about the potential 'violence' that disloyal elements might wreak upon a state. That perceived link points, rather, to deeper anxieties about the disorder, and ultimately, the transformative potential of popular (here, coalesced as nationalist) energies.

In the early 20th century, in both of the League's official languages, English and French, the semantic valency of the adjective 'violent' was much wider than today. While the term currently signifies a *physically forceful and destructive* act, it previously indicated *intensity or passion*, as in the phrase 'violent emotions'. In Britain, France and beyond, violence of language was implicated in and understood through a pervasive, fundamental and hierarchical Enlightenment antinomy between passion and reason, body and spirit, the vulgar and the refined, the barbaric and the civilized. In a study of the English case, Olivia Smith explored how theories of language promulgated by the 'universal grammarians' in the late 18th century were used to justify and maintain rigid class divisions and political disenfranchisement of the poor:

> To speak the vulgar language demonstrated that one belonged to the vulgar class; that is, that one was morally and intellectually unfit to participate in the culture. Only the refined language was capable of expressing intellectual ideas and worthy sentiments, while the vulgar language was limited to the expression of the sensations and the passions. (Smith, 1984: 2)

The French notion of 'cultivated language' (*la langue cultivée)* similarly contrasted with vulgar or popular speech. Grillo (1989: 188–93) demonstrates that this language

was associated with reason, logic, universality, order, clarity; those adopting it strived for elegance and *politesse*, and avoided unpleasant words or phrases. Grillo notes, as well, the concern for 'disciplining' language in this era: he cites the administrator, Richelieu, who believed that 'the language needed to be shaped and regulated, "cleaned up" (Brunot, 1930: 34) to suit the needs of a centralising bureaucracy' (Grillo, 1989: 191).

A parallel phenomenon occurred in the language of statecraft and the practices of diplomacy. Whereas Renaissance political philosophy saw emotions at the centre of action, classical accounts distrusted emotion, and emphasized interests. Explicating 'how policy became foreign' in the 17th century, Bartelson (1995: 137–85) argues that the pursuit of state interests required the ambassador to be 'an honourable spy', whose reports and treatises were lucid and 'untainted by passion'. The demands of precise calculation of interest drew states into relations of reciprocity:

> The community of diplomats (and ultimately that of states) is not depicted as a society where interest is pitted against interest in irresolvable oppositions. Rather, it is a disciplined society, at once transparent and predictable to its inhabitants. (Bartelson, 1995: 183)

Classical diplomacy insisted upon honesty, prudence and moderation as guidelines for conduct, since deceit, in the long run, would 'undermine one's reputation, and with it, one's identity as an actor on the diplomatic stage' (Bartelson, 1995: 184).

Similar notions of state sovereignty, diplomacy and control were dominant in the early 20th-century League context. European notions of class and status differentiation also informed diplomatic discourse. As a modern ruling elite drawn from the privileged classes of their respective countries, statesmen, diplomats and bureaucrats usually shared core assumptions about the political world. World affairs were seen to be the business of sovereign nations, acting separately or in concert, as exemplified in the League itself. It was incumbent on the 'civilized nations' of Europe to lead 'immature' nations or regions whose 'primitive' populations were 'not yet ready' for self-rule. States naturally had conflicts of interest, but these were to be settled through civilized negotiation. Diplomatic discourse was premised on opponents' mutual recognition of each other's right and capacity to govern.

In League public arenas, verbal exchanges between states were typically formal, employing something akin to *la langue cultivée* discussed earlier. They were characterized by elaborate politeness, invocations of equality and assurances of friendship and faith in one's colleague's honourable motives. Criticism or lack of agreement was expressed through indirection and with regret; occasionally, one finds a strategic use of humour. These codes enabled political opponents to coexist in the same negotiating arena, and to express conflict, as the following example demonstrates.

ELOQUENCE AND VIOLENCE: SOME EXAMPLES

In a Council session in 1928, the Albanian representative publicly appealed to the Greek government over an issue of intense and long-standing conflict regarding Albanian minorities and Albanian properties within Greek territory. He spoke eloquently of the international community as an 'organism' that requires 'as complete harmony as possible

between the various organs', of justice as not merely a moral ideal but 'indispensable to the interests of the general community' and, quoting Herbert Spencer, of the virtue that is 'indispensable to the interests of all'. Referring to Greece, he continued:

> This dispute between Greece and Albania dates from 1923. Albania, considering Greece as an elder sister, has . . . approached on several occasions the Greek government. It is now the turn of Greece to show its generosity. By acting in this manner, it can rest assured of finding sincere and frank friendship on the part of its neighbour.

The Greek representative, after 'warmly associating himself' with Albania's expression of thanks to the Committee of Three, noted that Albania's report 'makes an appeal to the spirit of conciliation. I shall never remain deaf to such an appeal, and I intend to ask my government to reply as generously as possible to it'. He then set out his government's objections to Albanian claims, identifying those points on which it 'would never agree'. He ended by expressing 'the hope that between these two countries which are neighbours, and which are bound by so many close bonds of race and history, the most friendly relations may be established, not only neighbourly relations but also relations of confident friendship and practical cooperation'.

Contrast this with an exchange that occurred some years earlier in 1923, in which one state accused the other of breaking this implicit code, and employing violent language.[12] In this unusual breach of diplomatic etiquette, and rare instance of explicit reference to 'violent language' in diplomatic exchange, the Bulgarian representative launched a complaint against Greece's treatment of Bulgarians inhabiting the region of Western Thrace, a territory where Greece's jurisdiction had not yet been internationally ratified. Without any conciliatory opening gambits, he began abruptly:

> In contempt of principles loudly proclaimed in all treaties, all the Bulgarian schools and churches have been closed. The persecution of the population of Bulgarian origin in Thrace is increased every day by the addition of new victims. The sufferings of this province are stirring public opinion and the public conscience in Bulgaria, which demand reprisals. The Bulgarian Government, confronted with this painful situation, has been obliged to protest in the name of humanity to the Great Powers, which are still sovereign in Thrace, and to address to the Council of the League of Nations the complaint which is now under examination . . . How does Greece explain these atrocities, for she has not dared to deny them?

Then, expressing scepticism at the explanations the Greek representative had provided, he characterized a temporary policy of deportation as 'a pretext intended to justify a system planned long ago and aiming at the extermination of the Bulgarians inhabiting these districts for centuries past'. He contended that 'we are dealing here with a systematic policy cruelly applied with the object of denationalizing all the provinces under Greek rule with a Bulgarian and Moslem majority'. He proposed that 'the most thorough and just solution would be to withdraw from Greece a mandate the exercise of which has resulted in nothing but evil, and to entrust this mandate to the League of Nations'.

The Greek representative responded that:

> Both the letter of the Bulgarian Government's delegate and his memorandum are conceived in such violent terms that the inaccuracy and exaggeration of the facts reported, whether intentional or involuntary, are apparent, and the object of these violent statements becomes clear to every reader.

Explaining that the Greek government had not yet enough time to reply to the Council 'in respect of informations obviously unconfirmed, irresponsible and tendentious', he none the less was able to provide explanations regarding Greek government measures.

In a later exchange, the Bulgarian delegate commenced with an apology that, in fact, acted as a pretext to a further accusation:

> In conclusion, I beg you, Gentlemen, to excuse the warmth of feeling which characterised my first request. The violence of language for which the Greek representative reproached me was no more than a feeble echo of violent deeds of which I have received an account from the victims of the Greek regime in Thrace themselves, and I am sure that when everything taking place in Thrace is known and verified by the sovereign Powers to which you have forwarded my request, their conscience will not fail to prompt them to issue decisions of a nature calculated to ensure the future, the life and the well-being of the original population of Thrace, which it is sought by brutal methods to exterminate or to denationalise.

Whereas the normative diplomatic code required *politesse* and indirection, the Bulgarian delegate's intervention in the Council chamber displayed a very different philosophy of speech. Its idiom drew on a tradition of revolutionary rhetoric, informed by romanticism, valorizing the vernacular, passions, and liberty. Such a rhetoric denounces and makes demands, it dares (i.e. it claims) to 'speak the truth' against a silencing authority, and it claims a moral superiority. Since Tom Paine's *The Rights of Man* and throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, this had been the dominant language of nationalist tracts and of social reform. It was the language of nationalist leaders as they rallied their populations to struggle against imperial rule. It echoed very closely the language of most Bulgarian and Bulgarian Macedonian petitioners. But when articulated by a state delegate in a milieu dedicated to the performance of state sovereignty, this frankly provocative manner of speaking jarred.

'VIOLENT LANGUAGE' IN PETITIONS

Notwithstanding Colban's precise instructions on how the Minorities Section officials should examine petitions for receivability, the dialogues contained in the memoranda make clear that such examinations only partially determined decisions about the fate of communications arriving at the Minorities Section. In an important sense, the Minorities Section itself *constructed* petitions. This bureaucratic unit was required to make an initial decision as to whether a communication 'constituted a true minorities petition' and whether its author(s) intended it as such. Furthermore, once the bureaucrats designated a communication as a 'petition', other questions had to be resolved. Was the relevant minorities agreement[13] actually in force? Were the complaints specific enough that they might be investigated, and therefore be worth taking forward to the Council? Did they refer to a minority whose existence the state concerned actually recognized?[14]

By introducing summaries of two petitions, and of the assessments they received from officials, I hope to give readers an indication of bureaucrats', and states', preoccupation with so-called violent language and how their judgements affected the career of petitions.

CASE 1

The petition:

In early March 1925 the Minorities Section received a letter addressed to the League of Nations Council from Dr Itanicheff, Président du Comité National, L'Union des Organisations des Emigrés Macédoniens', Section de Bulgarie. The letter includes a resolution, in French, voted by its 14–17 February 1925 Congress, entitled 'Concerning the situation in Macedonia under Greek domination'. The resolution makes three assertions:

(a) that the Greek government is not just tolerating but tacitly encouraging terror carried out by the authorities against the Bulgarian, Koutzovlach and Albanian populations in order to persuade them to emigrate (etc.);
(b) that [the Greek Foreign Minister] Politis has only signed the Greek Minorities Protocol in order to avoid a public discussion about the massacre at Tarlis and other excesses committed against the Bulgarian population in Macedonia; and
(c) that the Greek government's claims that the protocol should be denounced because the protection of national minorities[15] is already envisaged by the Treaty of Lausanne, does not stand up to criticism. The resolution states that it is precisely after signing the treaty that dozens of thousands of Bulgarians of Macedonia were forcibly expelled, innumerable atrocities committed, unjustified arrests and murders of innocents were perpetrated in Greece.

The Congress asks that the Bulgarian community, and other communities which are not Greek, be given back the churches, schools and other institutions of which they have been deprived, and that an international commission ensure that the clauses concerning protection of minorities – of Bulgarians residing in Greece, as of Greeks in Bulgaria – be enforced.

Minorities Section action:

Pablo de Azcárate, a Spanish Minorities Section official, trained in law, examined the petition. He drafted a comment, in French, to the Section's Director, Erik Colban, on 3 March:

> I do not believe that it is indicated, for the moment, to consider this document a petition and to apply the ordinary procedure to it. From a formal point of view the conditions of receivability seem to me to be fulfilled, although one could have some reservations on the matter of its language: I have underlined in the text some expressions which could perhaps be considered as violent.

Azcárate has underlined the following phrases in the Resolution with blue pencil: '*la terreur*' and '*innombrables atrocités*'. He wondered whether it was legitimate to accuse the Greek government of 'innumerable atrocities' without mentioning even one concrete

case, and whether one 'has the right to accuse it of having rejected the protocol and attempting to cover it up through the Parliamentary vote'. He added that as the question of Bulgarian minorities in Greece would be examined in the Council anyway in a few days, he thinks this should not go through as a minority petition, and that it should be sent merely a letter of acknowledgement (i.e. and subsequently be allowed to drop). Replying in English, Colban remarked that the petition 'hardly contains anything sufficiently specified to render it desirable to communicate it to the Council or to the Rapporteur on the Greek protocol question'. Secretary General Drummond penned a final comment: 'I shall remember to mention the matter to the Rapporteur. Please let me have a copy' (Box R1660, File 41/42685/11974).

Though inconsequential in itself, this case enables readers to note some patterns both in the petition texts and in the examination of them. While Azcárate considered that the petition met the other conditions of receivability, he identified 'some expressions which could perhaps be considered as violent', such as '*la terreur*' and '*innombrables atrocités*'. In addition, he queried both the 'lawfulness' of making serious and sweeping accusations, without providing any concrete cases, and the 'right' to accuse the government of bad faith and deviousness. Here, what seems to be at issue is the petition's insolent tone and its generality.

CASE 2

The petition:

In early July 1926, the Minorities Section received a letter from Madame Donca Holiotcheva, Présidente de l'Union des Femmes Macédoniennes, Sofia, to which was attached a resolution voted at the organization's Congress of 31 May to 1 June 1926. Composed in French (as is the letter), the resolution conveys the views of the Congress on the present situation in 'Macedonian territories annexed to Serbia via the peace treaties'.

Minorities Section action:

A.M. Céspedes, a Colombian Minorities Section official, trained in law, wrote a note, in French, to the Acting Secretary General, the Japanese Dr Nitobe. He opined that 'given the violence of its language' the document seems incompatible with the fifth [sic: actually fourth] condition of receivability'. He continued:

> The State concerned here is, in effect, accused of placing a part of its population under "an unbearable regime" of "terror" (*un régime insupportable de terreur*), of attacking "family morals and women's and girls' chastity" (*attenter enfin à la morale familiale et la pudeur de la femme et de la jeune fille*), of "permitting atrocities" of which the signatories of the said document are "terrified and disgusted" (*épouvantés et dégoutés*), and of "excesses committed on the part of persons responsible, or irresponsible, in a country deprived of the most elementary rights" (*excès commis de la part de facteurs responsables ou irresponsables dans un pays privé des droits les plus élémentaires*).

Céspedes has underlined the phrase '*privé des droits les plus élémentaires*' in blue pencil to indicate its particular violence. He concluded:

> Under these conditions, I think the petition can be dismissed, without it being necessary even to examine the cause of non-receivability which could result, equally, from the fact that Macedonia is here considered as a *nation* (underlined) placed under a foreign "domination" and that no allusion is made to the minorities treaties.

The Acting Secretary General (Dr Nitobe) agreed on 9 July; the Section Director, Colban, marked the file as 'Seen' on 9 August (Box R1660, File 41/52504/11974).

Céspedes here identified many phrases which, taken together, constituted for him a strong case for unacceptably violent language. He noted the forceful adjectives used to describe the regime ('unbearable', a regime of 'terror', 'permitting atrocities' which are 'terrifying and disgusting', in a country 'deprived of the most elementary rights'). He deemed as overly violent accusations that the Serbian government is attacking family morals and the chastity of women and girls, apparently interpreting this as a slur upon the government's honour. These violent expressions, he thought, were sufficient to cause the petition to be dismissed, making it unnecessary to examine conditions 1 and 2.

Céspedes' explanation, confirmed by other similar admissions in the files, provides the surprising evidence that avoidance of 'violent language' was, in fact, *the pre-eminent condition*, a more important pre-requisite even than the 2nd condition: what I call the anti-separatist condition. When a petition failed on the 4th condition, officials sometimes remarked that they were obliged to 'abstain from approaching the question' as to whether it also failed other conditions, 'which would be of interest theoretically' (de Haller in December 1927, Box 1661, File 41/63381/11974). If contemporary anthropological theories see violence as a form of *communication*, in the League context, violent language infringed the rules of interchange, and sometimes an official decided, as did Céspedes in July 1927, that a petition's language was 'too violent even for an acknowledgement letter' to be sent (Box 1661, File 41/61064/19974).

But what exactly counted as 'violent language' in petitions? In keeping with the distaste for excess in diplomatic and bureaucratic codes, phrases were likely to be deemed 'violent' if they contained nouns or adjectives conveying intensity ('*terrifying and disgusting*', '*the terror*') or extensivity ('*innumerable atrocities*', '*systematic persecution*', '*the iniquitous and atrocious character of the penal sentence*'). More to the point, the blue pencil was likely to be applied to any word or phrase that criticized a state, or that accused it of illegal or immoral acts. '*Atrocities*' as well as '*unspeakable atrocities*' was often underlined, along with '*cruelly maltreated*', '*deprivation of the most elementary rights*', '*state-hired assassins*', '*blood-splattered torturers*'. Phrases expressing derision, disrespect or outrage toward a state were also singled out as violent: including sarcastic expressions like '*the supposedly civilized State*', accusations that the state was attacking women's honour, and assertions that government claims were '*ridiculous*'. What was not at stake were threats to commit violence, which I have not yet encountered in any petition, even though some petitioners belonged to, or represented, organizations involved in armed struggle.

The bureaucrats' extensive application of the prohibition on 'violent language' disciplined through exclusion. It blocked petitions that the Minorities Section believed constituted merely 'propaganda'. Indeed, with its stringent requirements for mild speech,

it made it very difficult for petitioners to name state violence at all. The question of 'correspondence' between events and language used to describe them, such that distressing events could be thought to justify distressed or distressing language, did not arise explicitly in Minorities Section documents for some time.[16] The first instance that I have found within the Macedonian files occurred in a comment by Erik Colban in March 1926 to Secretary General Drummond. It referred to a petition which, League officials agreed, failed to meet as many as three conditions of receivability, but – because of the gravity of the infractions it might point to – the Minorities Section wanted to reach the Belgrade government and a Committee of Three. In his summarizing comments to the Secretary General, Colban wrote '. . . Certainly [the petition's] terms are strong, but I am not at all sure that they can be said to be more violent than necessary if the facts to which they refer are true, or believed to be true by the petitioners.'[17]

A BUREAUCRATIC CONTESTATION

Colban's comments apart, the practices surrounding the judgement of texts as 'violent' were not challenged until 16 March 1927. On that day, a relatively new member of the Minorities Section, Mr A. Hékime of Persia, examined a resolution passed the previous 19–22 February by the congress of 'the Union of Macedonian Emigrant Associations in Bulgaria', sent to the League on 5 March 1927 and already examined by several of his colleagues. Hékime composed a detailed, eight-page typed memorandum, in French, to Colban. He immediately took issue with his colleagues' conclusions that the petition should be deemed non-receivable, insisting that 'there is no reason *not* to consider these two documents as a minority petition'. He disagreed with the view that describing Macedonia as 'under Hellenic domination' implied non-recognition of Greek state sovereignty; he proposed that the authors were merely asking for the treatment of minorities to be in conformity with the treaty signed by Greece. 'This apart', he asked,

> . . . might we not be less strict in relation to certain maladroitly employed expressions? For while we should note that the composition (literally, 'editing') of such letters leaves something to be desired, we also should take into account that these excesses of language are most often only a sign of ignorance of the language in which the petition is composed. I have in front of me the 4th condition of receivability, on 'violence of language', and I would like, in relation to what I have said above, that opinion to be taken into consideration. More than one petition has been rejected on the basis of violence of language. Yet it seems to me it would be appropriate to take in to account, in this material, differences in temperaments and mentalities. An expression considered in Geneva as 'violent', might be merely anodyne in Macedonia. One must also think about the psychological factor. Thus, the injustices and extortions that one cannot, under any circumstances, even imagine in Western Europe are committed on a daily basis in Balkan countries against minorities of every category. As a result, ways of speaking, words, even written texts, correspond to events. For example, terms like 'a shameless endeavour' (*une tentative effrontée*) or 'a provocation against the League of Nations', found in the resolution, may wound the diplomatic sensibility, but for individuals expelled, hunted from their lands or terrorized for unjust motives, the terms cannot seem excessive. There has been, thus, more

> than one extenuating circumstance; in similar cases, one does not reject a petition purely and simply for a slight excess of language . . . (Box R1660, File 41/57889/11974)

Unlike his colleagues, Azcárate and Céspedes, Hékime portrayed these passionate documents as deserving to be heard, despite their questionable language. In fact, Hékime suggested a number of factors affecting how these texts had been phrased, only some of which would have been fully under the control of their authors. He wrote of 'faulty editing' (possibly meaning 'bad translations'), of imperfect knowledge of French leading to 'maladroit phrasings'. He stressed 'differences in temperaments and mentalities' which lend different connotations to a phrase, and local circumstances that affect how it is interpreted, depending on whether it is 'read' in Geneva or in Macedonia. He allowed for the psychological effects of terror and destitution. Then, somewhat contradictorily, he insisted that the petitioners were, in any case, describing a reality that was simply unfathomable to the bureaucrats in Geneva. However fantastic it might seem, petitioners were just speaking plainly. 'Words correspond to facts', Hékime stressed, and this legitimated disturbing language, since it merely described disturbing events. Even accusations by the minorities against a state, charging it with 'shameless endeavours' against its own people and 'provocations' against the League to which it belonged – accusations that might 'wound the diplomatic sensibility' that requires refinement and circumlocution as a mark of respect – could be recognized as reasonable, given the extreme circumstances.

Hékime's passionate stance impressed Colban, who had earlier wagered that violent words might be appropriate for describing violent deeds. Appending his own note to the Secretary General within the circulating file, Colban wrote:

> unless we wish to render access to the minorities protection of the League extremely difficult for the minorities of the Balkan states, we must not be too exigent with regard to the terms of their petitions. We cannot expect that they should use the same careful language as citizens of the Central and Western countries of Europe.

Did the 'violent words' in this petition merely 'correspond to events'? Did they express a different 'temperament' or 'mentality' from those found in Geneva? Hékime's and Colban's interpretations could be read as 'Balkanizing' gestures (Todorova, 1997). They drew upon and reinforced the conviction of a civilized/primitive divide: ironically, the argument was used here for petitioners' benefit, but remained double-edged. At the same time, the two bureaucrats clearly felt obliged to acknowledge what they saw as the petitioners' linguistic and cultural differences from the bourgeois European norm, as well as the material effects of a war-torn environment utterly alien to a League audience. Here, at least, they named the diplomatic sensibility and challenged its appropriateness as a universal standard for determining whether claims might be deemed 'violent'.

Hékime's intervention reverberated in Minorities Section documents for some time, and was cited when someone (frequently Colban) wanted to argue that a petition of borderline acceptability language-wise be forwarded to the Council, given other merits or extenuating circumstances. Hékime's argument also came to inform conversations held with individuals outside the Section. Reporting a conversation on 5 May 1927

with the Greek delegate, Mr Dendramis, about yet another petition from the same organization, Colban told the Secretary General: 'I said that it was a question of appreciation whether the expressions contained in the petition were violent or not'! (Box 1660, File 41/58756/11974). Even the more fastidious members of the League Secretariat sometimes asserted that 'violent language' should not necessarily block a petition which had other strongly redeeming features.

The tale of our second petition has many more twists and turns, but its denouement is especially revealing. Ultimately backed by the Minorities Section as 'receivable', then repudiated by the Greek government as 'irreceivable', it was sent to a Committee of Three to adjudicate on its 'receivability' (which, in the end, the Committee declined to do). Azcárate, now won round to a more tolerant position on violent language, cited in his 'progress report' (9 June 1927) to Colban the advice of Mr Nisot of the Juridical Section:

> As concerns the question of 'violence of language' raised by the Greek government, I met with Mr Nisot concerning the extent to which they must be considered as prompting a declaration of irreceivability of the petition. Mr Nisot is of the opinion, and I agree with him completely, that no doubt is possible with respect to the expressions 'bitter mockery' (*amère raillerie*) and 'provocations'; they could not justify the documents being considered 'irreceivable'. The word 'shameless' (*éffrontée*) is, in Mr Nisot's opinion, an expression which implies a certain violence, but in order to pronounce on the question as to what measure of violence there must be, according to the Council's resolution of 5th September 1923, to warrant irreceivability, one must specify, as much as possible, what idea one had wanted to express when one speaks of violent language. Following from this, and adopting the same point of view that was accepted implicitly by the Greek government, Mr Nisot is of the opinion that one can establish a relationship between violence of language, and insult (*injure)*, that is to say, violent language would render a petition irreceivable when it constituted an insult. Once this criterion is accepted, one must conclude the receivability of the present petition because, in Mr Nisot's opinion, the expression 'shameless attempt', whilst it could be considered violent in certain measure, certainly does not constitute an insult in the juridical sense of the word.
>
> Without presuming to decide on the general question of whether the relationship between violent language and insult could be accepted in a more general way and thus fix in a precise sense 'violent language', in the present case, it constitutes a very practical means for arriving at a solution, given that the Government itself has accepted this in the first place. (Box R1660, File 41/59212/11974)

Rendered in the agitated prose of a palpably righteous, but always meticulous, bureaucrat, we have here an exemplary effort to pin down, for purposes of bureaucratic routinization, the precise meanings of violent language as 'an insult in the juridical sense of the word'.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to the dominant view promulgated both by League insiders and by scholars that the 'conditions of receivability' were simple, reasonable and straightforward, and

therefore of little scholarly interest, I have argued here that their exact meaning and import were often the object of intense negotiation. Sacred tenets about state sovereignty, and the anxieties generated within the institution by the 'threat' to sovereignty that minority treaties constituted for the 'minority states', strongly influenced the reading of petitions and judgements about their receivability. The League procedure concerning receivability structured the field of the sayable within this domain, at least for those who hoped their petitions would reach the ears and eyes of states, and not just of bureaucrats. Over the long term, the procedure established a template for claims and their reception within the international realm; today, petitions submitted to international bodies are similarly scrutinized according to defined sets of 'admissibility' criteria by bureaucrats. Significantly, the League procedure's interdiction against 'violent language' in petitions, in as much as it was interpreted in broad terms, often penalized the articulation of protests against state violence in the very forum where such communications were ostensibly invited.

Recent theoretical work on violence and language has tended to oppose the two concepts. Analysts have emphasized the capacity of violence, through torture or war, to render its victims mute, and conversely, the importance of language in remaking annihilated subjectivities and lifeworlds (Das et al., 2000; Kleinman et al., 2001; Scarry, 1985). I have been grappling with a 'local' formulation that links, rather than opposes, these concepts. This has led me to ask: what does it mean to characterize language as *violent*? What is the preoccupation with violent language *about*? And, *who*, precisely, is afraid of violent language?

As unruly linguistic behaviour, violent language (language that was both passionate and critical) transgressed the codes of diplomacy and of class and racial hierarchy cultivated within the institutional space of the League. It constituted an affront to all who saw themselves mandated to rule. Yet it was treaty-bound states that most vociferously objected to such language. These states' preoccupation with violent language was only partially rooted in fears about propaganda and destabilization. More importantly, it arose from a contradiction around their status within the community of states: putatively equal, they were, in fact, unequal – as the telling appellation 'minority states' signals – compelled to accept limitations to their sovereignty that more powerful states had resisted. Resentment at this structural inequality was displaced 'downwards', as it were, translated into a heightened concern for the honour of the state, a sensitivity to insult from ordinary subjects/citizens (*qua* petitioners) and a demand that they 'show respect'.

Unruly language also fell foul of bureaucratic imperatives for rationality and moderation. Yet League Minorities Section officials' preoccupation with violent language is probably better explained through reference to their structural position as mediators between states and petitioners. On the one hand, they were scrupulously attentive to language in order to maintain the trust of states and to anticipate their potential – and, in terms of the established rules, legitimate – objections. On the other, these officials acknowledged their 'sacred duty' to protect minorities' well-being in often hostile circumstances. As a result, the bureaucrats were adept at playing a double game. Although legalistic in their perusal of petitions, they were pragmatic in their handling of them. They often found ingenious means to circumvent the formal conditions of receivability and forward a petition to the relevant parties if the situation it addressed seemed important enough.

Through the League's minority petition procedure, the community of states widened, though ambivalently, the space for non-state actors to articulate claims and appeal for rights and justice. Processes of negotiation around the procedure existed, and must be acknowledged. Yet then, as now, the international institution set the terms by which such claims and appeals had to be formulated if they were to be heard.

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Notes

1 Mazower reckons that the new borders created 25 million minorities (1998: 41). Robinson et al. claim that 'the new order detached *almost one hundred million people* from the three great pre-war empires of Central and Eastern Europe' (italics in original) and that 'minority groups totalled from twenty to twenty-five million people' (1943: 35).

2 By 1924, 15 states had accepted minority obligations: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland (in respect of the Aaland Islands), Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Germany (in respect of Upper Silesia).

3 Nathaniel Berman's fascinating and innovative work (1993, 1995) constitutes a distinguished exception.

4 The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), for instance, consistently supported the demand that minority agreements apply to all states. Another notable supporter was Professor Gilbert Murray, an Australian-born but Oxford-based classicist and social reformer actively involved in League issues, especially minorities' questions, who also served for a time as the League's delegate for South Africa. Murray was assisted by Lucy Mair, before the latter commenced her anthropological career.

5 Secretary General Drummond tended to make more conservative judgements on minority petitions than did the Minorities Section staff; that is, he tended to privilege states' prerogatives over those of minorities. Though Minorities Section staff did not hesitate to state their views frankly, in the end they virtually always deferred to the Secretary General's decision.

6 This bureaucratic volubility, completely invisible to anyone outside the organization,

contrasted starkly with the terse if impeccably polite response to the petitioner(s). Typically, petitioners received a formal acknowledgement of the petition's receipt, and nothing more ever again, and sometimes not even that. This undoubtedly contributed to the public's perception that petitions were not treated or acted upon with sufficient seriousness. After 1927, however, at the Section's discretion, petitioners were occasionally invited to revise and resubmit petitions.

7 The tendency to rely on the Minorities Section's expertise was intensified by other procedural decisions and practical constraints. For example, a new 'Committee of Three' (i.e. of three Council members) was convened for each receivable petition, such that up to a dozen such committees might be functioning simultaneously. Committee members were given only the documentation relevant to that specific petition and they did not necessarily have a good sense of the larger context giving rise to it. The decision not to circulate written records or produce official minutes of the committees' meetings further thwarted members from learning from their colleagues' previous experiences. Serving on a Committee of Three was, as well, only one of a panoply of League duties carried by any particular member. In such circumstances, these committees relied heavily on the Minorities Section Director's knowledge and advice. Meetings were normally held in his office, and he initiated them by summarizing the petition, offering background information and suggesting some possible solutions (see Azcárate, 1945: 93–136).

8 I place 'Bulgarian' in quotation marks because there was intense contestation over the national belonging of this population. The Bulgarian government, as well as most petitioners claiming to seek 'Macedonia for Macedonians', saw them as 'Bulgarians'. The Yugoslav government dubbed them 'South Serbians'. The Greek government's position shifted over the inter-war period, in relation to changing political factors. It called this population, variously, 'Slavophones', 'Bulgarians', 'Bulgarophones' and 'Bulgarophone Greeks'.

9 As I have not systematically studied the files of other minorities, especially those outside the Balkan region, I cannot judge whether the Minorities Section officials' propensity to find 'violent language' in petitions pertaining to the 'Bulgarians' of Macedonia is typical. My impression is that their recourse to such judgements is unusually frequent in this case. This may be a response to the extreme sensitivity of the states concerned, the assertive rhetoric of the petitioners and (in some cases) the latter's political aims.

10 In 1928, for instance, there were 56 state members with rights to sit in the Assembly; of these only 14 sat on the Council.

11 This entity was formally renamed 'Yugoslavia' in 1929. The term 'Yugoslavia', as well as the adjective 'Yugoslav', was none the less in use from the early 1920s. Sometimes, though, papers refer to the 'Serbian government' as a form of shorthand, an indication of the hegemony of the Serbs within this federation.

12 The exchanges between the representatives of Albania and Greece are recorded in the July 1928 *League of Nations Official Journal* 9(7): 942–3. Those between the representatives of Bulgaria and Greece appear in the June 1923 *League of Nations Official Journal* 4(6): 561–79.

13 The issue arose primarily with respect to the Greek Protocol on 'the protection of minorities'. Although signed at Sèvres in August 1920, due to unresolved territorial

issues in Thrace the protocol did not come into force until three years later when signed, along with the treaty between Greece and Turkey, at Lausanne, Switzerland in July 1923. Strictly speaking, petitions regarding the 'Bulgarian minorities' in Greek territories could not be dealt with as 'minority petitions' until that time. In practice, they were often passed on to the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Commission, which was organizing the voluntary emigration, and dealt with by them.

14 For instance, since the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes did not recognize the existence of a 'Bulgarian minority', it often refused to consider petitions by those claiming this designation.

15 In the original, '*minorités ethniques*'.

16 This 'correspondence' was also referred to in the Bulgarian delegate's speech, see earlier in the article.

17 For complicated reasons, primarily concerning the anticipated reaction of the Belgrade government (that the petition's language was 'violent' and that no Bulgarian minority existed, anyway) but also possible 'irredentist' readings, the Secretary General and the Minorities Section decided not to forward the petition to the Council President for examination by a Committee of Three (Box R1660, File 41/49662/11974).

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