THE PRODUCTION OF VALUES: THE CONCEPT OF MODALITY IN TEXTUAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

by

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INTRODUCTION

The analysis of values in textual structures is relevant in three overlapping areas. First, representations of social reality in discourse (and in sociological interpretations of discourse) are always value-related. Whether we talk about sex, gender, ethnicity, war or public health, our conceptual systems are invested with values, albeit often tacitly and in an invisible way. This is one of the most important mechanisms of persuasion, not only in political texts but also in scientific discourse (Atkinson 1990). Secondly, the definition of positive identities of the speaker - for example as someone who knows and can be trusted - involves values that must be generated not only inter- or extratextually but also in the structures of the text itself. And thirdly, the arousal of emotions or even passion is based on values that are present but often hidden in textual structures.

In traditional content analysis values are usually conceived as an element of what Fairclough (1992a) calls the contextual dimension of discourse. Texts are seen to represent values embedded in ideology, attitudes or power relationships outside the text. Fairclough's appeal to combine contextual analysis of the content to intratextual form is particularly relevant in the analysis of values. Understanding how social reality is produced in discourse obviously requires a reflection of how existing power constellations and dominating value systems are articulated in its structures (van Dijk 1993). This article suggests that the semiotic concept of modality is a useful tool for analyzing how this happens.

We shall first briefly look at the concept of modality in formal logic and linguistics. Secondly we discuss the norm-theoretical notion of value to contrast it with a semiotic approach. Thirdly we address the problem of theoretical organization of modalities and
their application to the theory of emotions. Finally we use the theory of modalities in a rhetorical analysis of an influential article on public health that appeared in Le Monde, to show how modal structures are employed in persuasive discourse.

Modalities in formal logic and linguistics

In Antiquity and in the middle ages, modality was understood as the truth value of a proposition: it can be necessarily, actually or possibly true. This is today called "alethic modality" (Sebeok 1986). Since the 1950s, logicians have worked particularly on epistemic and deontic modalities. Epistemic modality is relative to the speaker's knowledge of the world. It can be formulated as a series of two kinds of propositions, one concerning the epistemic state of the speaker, the other the state of the world. The statement "It can be raining in Budapest" can be expressed as: "In view of what I know, it is not excluded that it is raining in Budapest" (Kiefer 1987: 69).

Epistemic modalities are logically related like alethic modalities given what the speaker knows. The set of propositions that describe this knowledge constitutes what is called a "possible world". In formal logic, possible world semantics is the area of inquiry where the validity of propositions is investigated under various possible world conditions that are related to propositional attitudes. For example, the possibility and necessity of a proposition may depend on the speaker's desires, as in "Bill may be our leader" or "Bill should be our leader" (bouлomaic modality). Kiefer (1987) has proposed that the semantics of possible worlds can be used to formalize most phenomena that linguists usually include in the domain of modality, including sentence types and speakers' emotive, cognitive or volitional qualifications of the state of affairs.

Cevroni (1987) has argued that modal logic offers a solid basis to define "the hard core of modality", by which he refers to alethic, deontic and epistemic modalities. However, for linguists the logical treatment of modalities is too narrow, because it is centred on truth values of propositions. Linguistic analysis of modalities presents much more diversity in its problematics and its approaches.

Two basic orientations may be distinguished, the semantic and the morphological. The morphological approach views modality as an independent grammatical category, similar to aspect, tense, number, gender etc. (Palmer 1986). The semantic approach defines modality in terms of content and investigates how lexical forms, modus, illocutionary functions and different forms of negation can be used to express different modalities (Nakulinen & Karlsson 1979: 261).

Cevroni (1987) represents the semantic approach. For him, the "hard core modalities" are expressed in different ways in different languages by propositional structures and modal verbs. Propositional modalities are of the form "It is necessary/probable/desirable/permissible etc. that P/an infinitive". Modal (auxiliary) verbs appear in more diverse contexts and are more ambiguous. The most unambiguous in French are "can/may" (pouvoir) and "must" (devoir), but even they cover vast semantic fields. "Pouvoir" in French may refer to a physical, mental, moral etc. capacity but also a permission (as in "you may enter") or a possibility (as in "he may come later") (81-89).

Outside the "hard core of modalities" Cevroni discusses a series of "impure" modalities that are expressed in a number of principal verbs such as "confirm", "hope", "pronounce", "deny" etc. A large number of lexical categories such as modal and non-modal adjectives ("useful", "serious", "certain"), morphological structures (the subjunctive, several temporal forms of the indicative) and illocutionary acts may express modalities (89-98).

The problem of categorizing linguistic manifestations of modalities indicates a central issue in this area.
We are dealing with a phenomenon that is situated in the Hjelmslevian "form of content" level or as Halliday would say, in "the semantic system" (1976: 39). A theory of modalities that could be useful from the discourse analytic point of view cannot take the inductive road from manifestation (or realization) to content but must proceed in the reverse direction. We must first consider what we mean by modalities or modal structures, and then look for their linguistic and paralinguistic expressions or realizations (Halliday 1976: 198).

Norms, modalities and values

Both in logic and in linguistics modalities are understood as structures that in one way or another evaluate the state of affairs. This is why they are relevant also in discourse analysis.

Very often sociology operates with an interpretative scheme which imputes values to social phenomena from the outside: they orient action and regulate as norms of acceptability, but values rarely constitute the meaning of action itself. In norm-theoretical sociology "...value standards are involved in the evaluative mode of the motivational orientation as rules and recipes for guiding selections ...These standards guide selection (a) by narrowing the range of alternatives open and (b) by amplifying consequences of the various alternatives. These [are] standards of acceptability and they (i) narrow the range of cognitions, (ii) narrow the range of objects wanted and (iii) narrow the number of alternatives." (Parsons and Shils 1951: 72).

From the point of view of sociological discourse analysis there are three problems with the norm-theoretical framework.

First, values have more dimensions than just acceptance or rejection. An art critic, for example, mobilizes a wide range of values not only to approve or disapprove an object of art but to evaluate the artist's ability, talent and devotion. The critic may impose on the readers a duty to know and enjoy the work. By comparing it with other pieces of art the critic may extol his or her own competence. These are all articulations of values and there are others but only some of them have to do with norms of selection.

The second problem, closely related to the first, is that norm theory does not account for the meaning of the objects of action or forms of behaviour. The same behaviour, visiting art museums for example, may have entirely different meanings for different people or at different times. Correspondingly, very different objects and forms of action can have similar symbolic functions.

A third criticism of the norm-theoretical conception of value and meaning is associated with American phenomenology and ethnomethodology. This criticism has attempted to replace the externality of values to action by an emphasis on contextuality and interactivity of meanings (Heritage 1984: 7-36, 103-134; Garfinkel 1984: 11). Social phenomena are negotiated constructs of reality, and we agree with ethnomethodologists that the function of social science is to identify such constructs and to analyze how they are created in discourse (Pollner 1987).

The actantial model and the semiotic concept of action

Norms of acceptability certainly are expressions of values, but they represent only one dimension of a rich and complex web of discursive phenomena. Values are relations not only between subjects and objects but also between several subjects. The actantial model that A.J. Greimas (1966) developed from the Proprian narrative scheme is a helpful heuristic device in understanding the pluridimensionality of values in simple stories. This model distinguishes several logical positions - subject, object, sender, receiver, anti-subject, opponent and helper - that actors may occupy in a story. These positions are important in
articulating why an action is valuable and from whose point of view. We could therefore call this the semiotic concept of action.

FIGURE 1: THE ACTANTIAL MODEL

sender → object → receiver
    ↑   anti-subject
helper → subject ← opponent

For example, in a Western film (such as Shane, Dodge City or Duel in the Sun), the hero arrives on a scene where the villagers are troubled by bandits. The hero may be requested to rescue the village by the people, but he may also get at the bandits for a personal reason. It could for example be a revenge for killed parents as in Nevada Smith (Wright 1975: 64). In the former case the villagers occupy the sender's position: they set the hero's action in motion. The object of value is peace or justice. The villagers are also the receivers in the sense that they are the beneficiaries of the victorious heroism. In the latter case, the hero himself sets the action in motion and is sometimes also the receiver or beneficiary because his honour (the object of value) will be restored. The function of the anti-subject and its helper, the opponent, is to articulate the hero's exceptional skills, and the function of the helper is to articulate the nature of these skills (for example loyalty to a friend as in Rio Bravo).

The model should not be understood too rigidly. The actantial positions are usually not each occupied by different actors; they are positions between which actors may move in the course of the narrative; and some may remain empty throughout the story.

The actantial model helps to see that norms are only one kind of value-relationship that defines action: that of obligation (or interdiction). To be meaningful, social action requires a valuable object, but its value can be defined in different ways, including difficulties in attaining it. Such values are articulated in discourse as modalities. However, this is not how modality is today most commonly understood in (critical) discourse analysis.

Functional grammar, critical linguistics and sociosemiotics

The functional approach to language developed by M.A.K. Halliday has been influential in a diversity of discourse analytic approaches to modality. The best known of these is the "critical linguistics" group who have developed Halliday's theory of modalities in a sociologically relevant direction. (Powier et al. 1979; Krans and Hodge 1979). Hodge and Kress (1988) have applied Halliday's theory to media studies in a methodology that they call social semiotics. Fairclough (1992b), also indebted to Halliday, has developed a "critical discourse analysis" which focuses on relational and identity functions of discourse. Agnes Weihun He (1993) has employed the concept of modality in the sense of Halliday in a conversational analysis.

Halliday looks at language from the point of view of the functions it serves and he explains its structure on this basis. The three functional components he has distinguished early on in the development of his theory are ideational, interpersonal and textual (Halliday 1978: 112-113). Two of these are relevant for our purposes. The ideational function describes the logical and experiential structure of "reality", i.e. that which is talked about. This corresponds closely to what is often called the referential or mimetic plane or dimension of discourse, and it is not very far from what we will call the dimension of utterance. The interpersonal function concerns the traces of interpersonal context that appear in texts, such as mother speaking to a child, professor giving a university lecture etc. This is what we will call the enunciative dimension.
For Halliday, modality operates within the interpersonal function (1976). Speaker and hearer roles are created and maintained in speech by evaluating the certainty of what is being said in the thesis (or clause). Thus modalities only concern expressions like "John must be very worried" but not expressions such as the following: "You must build a gazebo", "I can't build gazebos, I would if I could" or "Well, you ought to be able to". The latter are called "modulations" by Halliday, and they operate on the ideational rather than the interpersonal level of discourse: "These have nothing to do with the speaker's assessment of probabilities. In these examples the auxiliaries must, can etc. express various types of modulation of the process expressed in the clause; modulation in terms of permission, obligation and the like. They are part of the thesis - part of the ideational meaning of the clause". (Halliday 1976: 199)

This distinction reflects the fact that auxiliaries can be used to signify two different things: "You must be very careful" and "You must be very careless", where the first renders either "you are requested to..." or "it is obvious that you are..." while only the latter interpretation is meaningful for the second. Because of this duality, ambiguities occur and it is interesting to see how such ambiguities are resolved (Halliday 1976: 200-201).

Modality and power

Modality in the Hallidayan sense is often associated with power. In her application of this concept in conversational analysis, WeiHyun He (1993) observed that in university counseling discussions counsellors were using both "high" modalities indicating that they are certain about what they said, and "low" or "weak" modalities for uncertainty (Halliday 1985: 75), whereas students were mostly using only the latter.

Fowler et al. (1979) have elevated the concept of modality to one of the focal points in their theory. They call themselves "critical linguists", referring to their interest in unveiling power structures and ideology in the use of language. Modality reflects for them power differentials between the participants in communication. For example parents may use very direct forms of speech acts addressing their children ("You must come") while children between themselves tend to use indirect forms like declaring the source of authority ("Mummy says you must come") (Fowler et al. 1979: 205; Kress and Hodge 1979: 123).

Power relations may be articulated not only by modal structures in the linguistic sense. Also forms of politeness, spatial and temporal determinations among other things indicate interpersonal relationships between the speaker, the hearer and the object of speaking. For example, the use of the present tense indicates affinity and thus certainty in the sentence: "It is raining now". In another formulation by Kress and Hodge (1979: 122-128), modality is understood in a more limited sense as a duality of certainty (as we would say, epistemic modalities) and power (we would say deontic modalities). Both vary in degrees and get realized in almost any kind of ways, both linguistic and paralinguistic. However, even certainty or uncertainty of utterances is interpreted to be an indication of power relations.

Hodge and Kress (1988) have developed this approach further, calling it "social semiotics". The dimension of affinity expresses the status of knowledge or the facticity of the mimetic system. An impersonal editorial, for example, which makes unchanging claims about the world, expresses high affinity. It asserts categorizations, social persons, places and sets of relations as true. In contrast, low affinity, expressed for example by hesitations and using the first person singular I for the narrator ("I think..."), represents the mimetic content as more or less uncertain. Modal analysis is an integral part of their interest in a critical countersemiosis to media ideology (c.f. Fowler 1991: 85-93). Control of modalities and modality strategies are keys to such ideology critique (Hodge and Kress 1988: 159).
Towards a conceptual organization of modalities

For a general theory of modalities the dual meaning of auxiliaries may not be the optimal starting point. The distinction between modality and modulation is not clear. As Halliday comments himself, even modulations especially of the "obligation" or "ability" type typically involve the speaker's judgment, as in "Jones must swing" or "Smith can swim", either as a source of the obligation or as an evaluator of the fact. We would add that all such "intrusions" of the speaker into the ideational plane invest a value in what is spoken of, albeit in very different ways depending on what specific modal structures are employed.

As a general principle we endorse the distinction between modalities that evaluate the truth or certainty of an utterance and other kinds of modalities such as obligation, desire etc. We also agree that the former are characteristic of the interpersonal or enunciative dimension and they are theorizable only in that context. However, also the other modality types reflect (often implicit) attitudes of a speaker and construct values in discourse.

In our view the "social semiotics" or "critical linguistics" conception of modalities is both too narrow and too wide. It is too narrow in limiting the semantic functions of modality to the relationship between the author and the receiver. It is true that in so far as values appear in text or speech, they are always values from the standpoint of a speaker/author image. However, it is important to distinguish two different cases: those in which the subject issuing an utterance is explicit, and those in which this is not the case. From the point of view of analyzing values, the Hallidayan definition, where modalities operate only within the interpersonal function of language, is too restricted even if understood very widely in terms of power relations. Values are constructed modally in the most transparent narratives, classifications or other kinds of utterances, which have almost no explicit interpersonal (or in our terms, enunciative) structure.

On the other hand, the scope of modality is too large if it includes all possible structures that express the position, attitude or point of view of the speaker to what is being said. We agree that semantic categories of modalities cannot be unambiguously operationalized at the level of language use, let alone inductively reconstructed from natural language(s). Nevertheless, modalities are only one among several layers of meaning indicating the speaker's or author's relationship to what is being said or written and to whom.

The dimensions of utterance and enunciation

The most interesting perspective in critical linguistics and sociosemiotics is the distinction between what is said about the world on one hand, and the structures that articulate the relationship between the speaker/author and addressee/reader on the other hand.

No text functions without an uttering subject. Even the most "transparent" literary romance or news report that may pretend to report "objectively" events that have happened in an imaginary or real world, implies a narrator who tells a story, and also someone who could be reading it. These narrators and readers are textual constructs and therefore we call them speaker/receiver images (Sulkunen 1992). In most texts the structures of authorship are quite complex, and there is considerable conceptual diversity in their analysis (Chatman 1990: 74-108; Rimmon-Kenan 1983: 86-89; Goffman 1981; Genette 1988: 135-154). We do not want to go into details here; simply we call the structures of authorship and reception as the enunciative dimension of texts while the "facts", "stories" etc. reported are called the dimension of utterance (Greimas & Courtés 1989: 563-566). The distinction between these dimensions is abstract but indispensable for the production of values and for the conceptual organization of modal structures.

Values are produced through modal structures in both dimensions, but in different ways. Let us first clarify...
how these dimensions differ. In Greimasian terminology, the formation of discourse develops from simple deep structures to rich and complex discursive structures in what is called the generative trajectory (parcours). The deep semiotic level consists of simple utterances of being and doing. Utterances of being state that the subject is or has something, utterances of doing state that the subject transforms one state of being to another one. These will be chained to form rich and complex expressive structures (Greimas & Courtés 1979: 124). This is the level we call "utterance".

Utterances are always connected to the speaker-now, to the here and now of the context in which the utterance is issued. This connection is regulated by so-called shifters, a term borrowed from Roman Jakobson (1971), which are of three kinds: actorial (what is the relationship between the speaker and the persons or things that appear in the utterance), spatial and temporal. All of these may or may not be deictic, and they fulfill the double operation of disengaging and (re)engaging the speaking subject to the utterance (see also Fludernik 1991).

Shifters define the relationship between the (image of) the speaking subject to the content of the utterance; therefore they are part of the process that Greimas and Courtés call "aspectualization": they define the aspect from which the speaker image speaks.

Modalities in the Greimasian sense are another part of aspectualization (Greimas 1983c: 67; 1987: 121). However, in difference to the functional grammar of Halliday and its socio-semiotic applications, modalities operate independently of explicit enunciative structures also in the dimension of utterance (Greimas & Courtés 1986: 141).

Shifters and modalities have overlapping functions. Both timing, for example, and modality may enhance the value of doing in a simple series of utterances:

(1) John writes

Ability to do something is positive in itself, and the more unexpected the skill appears to be, the more positive the doing. Even a simple utterance such as (1) includes an actorial shifter (John) to imply that the utterance is about somebody else than its enunciator; in (2) the doing is modalized as ability, and in (3) the enunciator places it in a deictic time frame to describe it as unexpected. Although the functions of shifters and modalities overlap, they are distinct categories and have completely different logics.

Modal groups

Once this much is agreed, another problem arises: on what basis should different modalities be distinguished and what are their semantic relationships?

Like Halliday, Greimas and Courtés find inadequate any linguistic or other inductive method of organizing modalities (Greimas and Courtés 1979: 230-231). In an early paper Greimas (1983c) has suggested that modalities could be classified as statements of being (description of a state) and of doing (description of action) modalizing each other. This extremely abstract formulation reflects the narrative starting point of greimasian semiotics. Meanings are analyzed as if every meaning unit were part of a "story". The propnarrative narrative scheme with a qualifying test, the principal performative test and the sanctioning test serves as a model of relationships between objects and subjects. Modalities can be mapped onto this model.

In the qualifying test the hero is given the motivation to perform a task. This motivation defines the object valuable (desire, will) and the hero responsible for achieving it (obligation). These are "virtual" modalities, properties of the subject and the object ("being"), and they render meaningful what the subject does ("doing") (being regulates doing). Ability and knowing how to do, on the other hand, are "actual"
In the second case the text depicts the speaker image in the role of an addressee. An utterance appears to the speaker as a belief, and the speaker assesses its truth against her or his true knowledge. This is called interpretative doing (Greimas 1983a: 118-119; 1987b: 168). The utterance may express a belief that is (knowing) or is not knowledge (assumption), or it may express a non-belief in what is (doubt) or is not known (imagination), as in Figure 3.

**Figure 3: Epistemic Modalities**

- certainty
  - knowledge
  - belief

- doubt
  - not-belief
  - not-knowledge

- assumption

- imagination

Which of these sets of enunciative modalities are employed depends on the communicative position in which the speaker image is placed. The depicted speaker, addressing us as hypothetical auditors, may either interpret knowledge that has already been transmitted to her or him and evaluate it for us. Or the speaker (image) may persuade us of something that may or may not appear to be true to us.

In scientific texts, for example, it is usual that the author first takes the position of an addressee to other scientists, to judge their knowledge as partly correct and partly incorrect. This functions like the qualifying test in a story; it formulates a lack and sets a task for the present author. After having acquired legitimacy in this way, the "present author" moves on to the veridictory or persuasive square to convince the reader of a truth about the world which may or may not be apparent.

In other types of texts, such as popular novels, the enunciative modalities may remain at or close to degree zero. The speaker image reports unquestionable knowledge of the world and of beliefs with the competence of an omnipotent and omniscient subject. What is told in the utterance is not in any way questioned, and for this reason the speaker image remains invisible although present. We therefore call this kind of speaker image transparent. There is no gap between knowledge and the events of the story. The reverse is the case in literary texts, where the story itself may be fragmented, while the reflexive narrator occupies the dominant role vis-a-vis the subjects he or she is telling about.

**Pragmatic modalities**

The other major group of modalities operate in utterances where the communicative relations between speaker and addressee are not necessarily explicit. These are modalities that qualify the value of doing or being something but not the certainty of knowledge. Such modalities are familiar from stories about heroes who feel the duty and recognize the value of achieving a goal, and then demonstrate their ability and skill in performing difficult tasks. Since the communicative structures are not necessarily explicit, and knowledge of a speaker or an addressee is not inevitably put into play when these modalities are employed we call them pragmatic: they regulate relationships between subjects, objects and events rather than knowledge of what is told about them.

Even pragmatic modalities raise conceptual problems but only one remark is worth making here. In order to make a story interesting, some relations of obligation (having-to), willing (wanting) and ability (being-able) must be constructed in its course. French semioticians usually distinguish ability (pouvoir) from knowing how to do/be (savoir). This may reflect the semantic
structure of the French lexicon, but there might be more interesting reasons to retain the distinction. "Knowing how" is a property of a subject ("I know how to swim"), as compared to ability that is related to a situation ("I could swim across the river"). We call the former competence and the latter ability (see also Table 1 above).

It is important not to confuse competence with the enunciative modalities related to knowing, such as certainty, truth and the variants in the respective groups of veridictory and epistemic modalities.

The semiotics of emotions

An interesting recent development in modal theory is the semiotics of emotions or passions. Modal structures are often combinations of different modalities in a narrative trajectory of a subject. In a seminal article "On anger" (1983b; 1987c) Greimas proposed that certain passions or emotions such as anger or jealousy may be articulated somewhat like modal chains in a story. In a story the hero first has the will and obligation to act, then demonstrates ability and competence, and is finally recognized as having performed the task. In contrast to a story the modal chain that develops into an emotion, anger for example, requires a "fiduciary expectation" between two subjects (which can be separate or syncretized) where Subject 1 believes that Subject 2 will realize his or her will and has assumed this as an obligation. If these expectations "break", Subject 1 is disappointed or dissatisfied and this "leads to the explosion of anger" (Greimas 1987c: 154) which can, in turn, give rise to a "program of compensation": vengeance.

"Passion" is an ambiguous word because it refers both to an emotion and to a state of mind, even personality at times. Nevertheless, "the semiotics of passions" has brought attention to a number of important points in modal analysis. First, modal structures can host a system of values independently of what action or state of the world is being modalized: avarice, for example, is an obsessive (devoir) will (vouloir) to possess regardless of the value, purpose or function of the possessions.

Secondly, passions are modal dispositions or states of mind ("états d'âme") rather than actions or actual states of things ("états de choses"). The fiduciary expectation that leads to anger need not be a real contract actually made between two subjects. It is a simulation of such a contract in the subject's mind and can be completely imaginary; the emotional effect of its breaking is the same. As a result, modal chains that characterize emotions or passions are not distinct and linear as they would be in a narrative. Instead, they are simultaneous, non-discreet and not chained in the logical order that rational action would require.

Thirdly, emotions or passions often imply excess, because they are insatiable states of mind rather than series of events. Avarice is an excessive and overwhelming (obligation) will to employ competence and ability to acquire wealth; economic rationality on the other hand is realized in plans and in appropriate action from want to accumulation. (Greimas & Fontanille 1991: 135-145)

The Greimas-Fontanille approach offers an interesting perspective for the analysis of the rhetorics of passion in persuasive discourse, as we will show in the following example.

"Non au ministère de la maladie" - the passion of modernity

As a sample text we have selected an article on public health policy in France (Le Monde 15 November 1989). This article, authored by five professors of medicine Gérard Dubois, Claude Gout, François Grémév, Albert Hirsch and Maurice Tubiana, started a spectacular public campaign which helped France to adopt an anti-publicity legislation on alcohol and tobacco. The professors first submitted a commissioned white paper to the minister of health, Claude Evin, and then forced
the political apparatus into action through a classic French model of independent intellectuals' public appeals. The legislation was adopted in 1990 and now is one of the most restrictive on alcohol and tobacco advertising in Western Europe.

The article (Appendix) was selected not only for its importance as a starting point of the "Bvin affair" but also because it represents a remarkable sociological analysis of the public health issue. Furthermore we consider it to be an exemplary case of persuasive rhetoric.

The argument of the paper, summarized in paragraph 11, can easily be fitted to the actantial model. The anti-subject, particular interest groups, threaten the health of the French population while the Subject, the State, fails to act. The Receiver is the French population (including the readers as well as enterprises). The weakness of the political system, captive of particular interest groups, exposes to misery and death particularly the frailest persons caught by their incapacity to master the society of consumption. This "story" is centred around the modality of ability, less of willing or the lack of it. The article simply assumes, i.e. creates the "fiduciary expectation", that the objectives or ideals promoted by the authors are shared and desired by all. These ideals can be called object values (Sulkunen 1992): optimal use of scientific knowledge (2), leading a rich and healthy life (4), justice and equal chances with respect to illness and death (1, 3), transparency, respect of the majority opinion and morality (11).

It is the lack of ability to realize these ideals that regulates their value and gives this article its extraordinary strength and character. Citizens are mutilated by addiction and manipulation in a way that is "comparable to excision" and are "deprived of their liberty". The stakes are high: lost ability to realize the common social ideals puts at peril the human rights society in which we all want to live, sacrificing it to natural society "where the first victims are the weakest and the most destitute" (3).

The rhetorical strength of the article is based on a particular way of combining the enunciative dimension with the dimension of utterance. The Sender of the utterance is occupied by the speaker-observer, who makes demands (obligation) on the Government (13): "The government must not hesitate in implementing a public health policy and not delay measures that have a general interest and the support of the majority of the population", and on politicians (8). This way of mixing the two dimensions is typical in political or ideological texts.

In this case the speaker will convince the addressee by undergoing a series of transformations in enunciative modalities. These transformations generate a trustworthy and knowledgeable image of the Speaker who can use this image as a resource to issue obligations for the subject.

The first part of the article is regulated by veridictory modalities, in other words it consists of persuasive discourses. In the beginning the speaker is invisible, stating in a neutral way the true opposition between an independent social policy and one that is dominated by economic interests (1). Thereafter follows a series of statements where the speaker claims to possess correct knowledge against certain illusions: the falsity of advertisement (2), the illusion that therapy could save and protect from noxious practices and their consequences (5), the deception of parallel medicine (7). Instead, it is a fact, known to experts, that prolonged life and expensive medical technology will soon make rationing and choice indispensable (5). Next a contrast between common knowledge and expertise is made. In (6) the Speaker first identifies with everybody: "We know that life has a cost of some tens of francs per week of nourishment in certain countries and of hundreds of thousands of francs worth of medical technology in others. A not very demanding ethic allows us to accept that in numerous countries death is the consequence of these disparities." Then the Speaker reveals a "secret", a fact about us that is not apparent: "We still have some difficulties to recognize that in our own country some die because of our
inability to master these risk factors and to ensure equality of access to prevention and treatment. It would be realistic to recognise our limits."

From now on, the Speaker is identified as the group of authors who have demonstrated their competence as possessors of expert knowledge. The authors are ready to start making demands (deontic modality) on the state, first on behalf of fair and sufficient evaluation of medical knowledge (7), and then in favour of widening the scope of health policy (8). In (9) they request that "we" (the French) reveal what is false progress and set "our" priorities with respect to real progress that is leading to a cost crisis.

Next the authors adopt temporarily a position of an addressee to employ the epistemic modality of doubt: "We are not convinced of the ability of our system of decision-making to make these choices" (10). Again a distinction between the reader and the author is effected, but this time the authors appear as co-citizens who all have been led to believe (fiduciary expectation) that the political system is there for making reasonable choices. Their experience justifies the author-citizens to question its ability to do this.

The rest of the article resorts to the two competencies of knowledge possessed by the authors: that of experts and that of experienced citizens, and uses these as a resource to convince the reader that their programme is both well-informed and in the readers' interest.

The values produced in this article emerge from modal structures both in the dimension of utterance and in its dimension of enunciation. On the level of the utterance the article is about lost ability: ability of citizens to lead a valuable life, ability of society to realize its ideals, and ability of the political system to police private interests on behalf of citizens and "the society of human rights". It resembles the classic narrative structure of Western films where the hero steps in to defend the people against bandits because the sheriff is unable to do this, at least within the limits of his official mandate. The objectives of citizens are taken for granted, and their frustration by the inability of the political system arouses anger and appeals to the reader to support anyone who would undertake the task of recuperating the loss.

However, unlike Westerns, this story does not unfold to a victorious (or tragic) end. Although the expected authors' demands on the state are legitimated through a number of apparently factual statements, the force for the demands comes from the logic of passionate discourse. Few actions are outlined to "eliminate a lack", the loss of ability is a continuing state of frustration. Anger is aroused by asserting that an imaginary contract (the political system is there to make reasonable choices) has been broken. The skilful, often almost unnoticed alterations in the referent of "us" (experts, experienced citizens, the French), create an alliance between the reader and the authors. This kind of alliance could be termed a political contract, because it is grounded in legitimacy claims of the authors as experts but places both the addressee and the authors at equal footing in opposition with an enemy.

The passion of the article is very modern. The object values themselves (solidarity and justice, science, health, majority rule) are part of the modern welfare state ideology; the value invested in them by the modal regime of (lost) ability is even more so. Self-determination through reason, in individual life as well as in the society as a whole is one of the most cherished values of modernity. That this value remains a passion instead of being transformed into action is typical of traditional political activity of French intellectuals (Ory and Sirininell 1986; Charle 1990). There is no subject-hero in the story, such as a political party, and the authors do not place themselves in this position either. Their knowledge does not appear as a competence in the technical sense of the term used above: it is not a means to accomplish the task of recuperating the lost ability. Rather, as experts and as experienced citizens they claim the authority to make requests on behalf of the French people. Their role is to articulate values; it is for
others to act on them.

NOTES

1. In his pioneering work von Wright (1951) distinguishes four 'modes' (modalities): the alethic modes (modes of truth), the epistemic modes (modes of knowing), the deontic modes (modes of obligation) and the existential modes (modes of existence) (1-2). Later more extended systems have been proposed. Rescher (1968), for example, has proposed that in addition to alethic, epistemic and deontic modalities one should consider temporal, boulomaic, evaluative, causal and conditional modalities as distinct categories.

2. This way of understanding rests on the Parsonsian concept of action as a combination of means and ends in the external conditions of values and the situation. Values do not constitute the meaning of, for example, alcohol use; they only regulate it as a condition of subjective choice. This is why the Parsonsian scheme is sometimes called the voluntaristic concept of action (Adriaansens 1980).

3. In his works on taste Bourdieu introduces the social dimension of class as a basis for interpreting preferences for different kinds of art and cultural products. However, he, too, only rarely pays attention to what values are attached to objects of taste and how these are expressed.

4. Slightly different versions of the model have been developed since the original appeared (Greimas 1966). This version has been used by Silvo (1988: 45-47) and Salossari (1989: 15).

5. This speaker-addressee pair corresponds to narrator-narratee pair in narratology. They refer to communicative positions rather than to verbal acts. Speakers and addressees may thus appear also in written texts. They do not of course always involve other than degree zero enunciative modalities, as in direct and indirect quotations like "He told me he was sick" or "Jane thought: 'That man must be crazy'."

6. The analysis stems from a discourse analytical study of public health policy in Western European countries.

7. The enunciative structure of the article performs quite properly the essential features of Aristotle's political oratory which is exhortatory and dissuasive by nature, oriented to the future and "urges us either to do or not to do something" (1946: book I, c3).

8. The reader whom the speaker of this article tries to convince can be seen in Perelman's words as 'universal audience'. Speaker 'searches for facts, truths and universal values...presuming that each member of the universal audience is part of the community to which he [she] alludes, sharing the same intuitions and self-evident truths' (Perelman 1982: 17).
Point de vue
NON AU MINISTÈRE DE LA MALADIE!
par les professeurs Gérard Dubois, Claude Got, François Grémy, Albert Hirsch, Maurice Tubiana

Dans un texte sur la politique de santé remis à M. Claude Bvin, ministre de la Santé (le Monde du 14 novembre), cinq experts avancent des propositions. Ils développent ici leur argumentation contre les drogues licites.

DANS une société dominée par l'économie, le débat sur la politique sociale se limite à la répartition des moyens financiers, au lieu de définir les objectifs et d'analyser les échecs, en particulier l'aggravation de l'inégalité des Français face à la maladie et à la mort. Les responsables politiques sont inhibés par les groupes de pression économiques et sociaux ainsi que par la crainte de dépôts aux médias et aux publicitaires qui assurent leur promotion personnelle. Cette dérive est dans la logique d'une société où la fausse communication publique tient lieu de présentation objective de la réalité et où le téléspectateur remplace l'instituteur.

Quand la médecine était inefficace, l'inégalité acquise devant la mort provenait de l'alimentation du comportement individuel. A la vision naïve du bon vivant insouciant et heureux, qui meurt un peu plus tôt que les autres mais après avoir "profité de la vie", se substitue l'image moins acceptable d'une société qui développe les risques et réduit les chances de survie d'une partie de la population qui ne bénéficiera pas de l'utilisation optimale des connaissances.

Notre société de sélection applique à la santé les mêmes méthodes qu'à l'économie. Elle sauve les plus aptes et abandonne les autres. Ce retour à la sélection naturelle indique l'abandon des idéaux de solidarité et de justice qui différencient une société des droits de l'homme d'une société de nature où les premières victimes sont les plus faibles et les plus démunis.

Quand une adolescente de douze ans allume sa première cigarette pour marquer son appartenance à un groupe et s'identifier à un conformisme, elle entre dans un processus d'intégration culturelle mutilant comparable à l'exclusion. Elle ampute à terme des possibilités fonctionnelles essentielles comme sentir un parfum, respirer et finalement vivre. Le conditionnement au tabac et au malheur est le résultat d'un conformisme manipulé par un marketing publicitaire disposant de 1 milliard de francs par an en France pour promouvoir des intérêts commerciaux. Comme tous les conditionnements à une drogue, c'est une privation de liberté.

Empêcher que l'association des progrès thérapeutiques aux modifications de comportement réduira les dépenses de santé en raréifiant certaines pathologies risque d'être une illusion. Des économies peuvent être réalisées par des traitements efficaces et une meilleure utilisation des moyens, mais l'augmentation de la durée de la vie conduira une proportion plus grande de notre population à un âge où la dépendance augmente, engendrant des dépenses incompressibles car il s'agit de services et non de techniques ou de médicaments.

L'apparition de médicaments d'un coût élevé fait prévoir les difficultés à venir. Les techniques coûteuses seront rationnées, malgré l'accroissement des moyens financiers dont nous disposerons pour les mettre en oeuvre, comme l'a été l'implantation des scanners ou de l'imagerie par résonance magnétique nucléaire.

Nous savons que la vie a un coût de quelques dizaines de francs par seconde de nourriture dans certains pays et de centaines de milliers de francs de technologie médicale dans d'autres. Une morale peu exigeante nous permet d'accepter que dans de nombreux pays la mort soit la conséquence de ces disparités. Nous avons encore quelques difficultés à reconnaître que dans notre propre pays certains meurent du fait de notre incapacité à maîtriser le développement des facteurs de risque et à assurer l'égalité de l'accès à la prévention et aux soins. Le réalisme serait de reconnaître nos limites.

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Les moyens consacrés à l'évaluation de notre système de soins sont insuffisants. Le développement de médecines parallèles met le charlatanisme diplômé sur le même plan que les démarches évaluées objectivement.

L'abus de l'effet placebo s'apparente à une machine à sous associée au mépris de l'individu. Le doute scientifique et la tolérance ne doivent pas conduire au refus de l'objectivité et l'exploitation de la crédulité.

Une politique de santé publique ne doit pas se contenter d'optimiser le fonctionnement du système de

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soins, elle doit élargir sa réflexion et coordonner son action avec d'autres aspects de la politique sociale. Il peut être plus intéressant pour une personne âgée de bénéficier d'une aide ménagère pendant quelques années ou d'un poste de télévision couleur que de séjourner une semaine en réanimation à la fin de sa vie.

La principale difficulté de la période à venir sera de savoir définir nos priorités. Il faudra non seulement refuser les faux progrès, mais surtout contrôler les progrès réels dont le coût dépasse nos possibilités de financement. Nous ne sommes pas convaincus de l'aptitude de notre système décisionnel à faire ces choix.

L'Etat "rationnel" est remplacé par un groupe de pression supplémentaire qui, au nom de l'efficacité et du développement économique, met en péril la société par son inaptitude à préserver ses qualités fondamentales : la transparence, le respect de l'avis majoritaire et tout simplement une morale.

Face à un rationnement des soins qui est inévitables, les actions de l'Etat devront être cohérentes dans tous les domaines ayant une relation directe avec la santé. La limitation des soins serait insupportable si, dans le même temps, nous continuions à organiser des actions contraires à l'intérêt de santé publique.

Nous nous réjouissons que le président de la République encourage son homologue colombien à lutter contre le narcotraficants, que le premier ministre dénonce le caractère insupportable de la mort de plus de dix mille Français sur les routes ou que le ministre de la santé sorte de son placard pour la dépoussiérer la loi de 1938 sur l'internement. Il ne faudrait pas que ces gestes sans grand intérêt pratique remplacent l'action dans les domaines où le pouvoir de l'argent et le clientélisme inhibent l'action de l'Etat.

La situation se résume de la façon suivante : quand des consommations (tabac, alcool) ou des comportements (conduite automobile) potentiellement dangereux pour la santé impliquent des groupes de pression socio-économiques puissants, l'Etat renonce à agir. Il transfère la plus grande part de responsabilité sur l'individu en laissant le champ libre aux acteurs économiques qui assurent la promotion du risque. Il expose ainsi les membres du groupe social les plus vulnérables à ce conditionnement au malheur et à la mort, en particulier les enfants et les personnes les plus fragiles, piégés par leur incapacité à maîtriser la société de consommation. Ce faisant, il met la France dans une situation d'inévitabilité par rapport à ses partenaires européens, la maladie et l'accident réduisant l'efficacité des entreprises.

Evolution rapide des problèmes de santé publique, accroissement des inégalités, inhibition de l'Etat par des intérêts particuliers. Le schéma est banal, mais le mécanisme intime de cette inefficacité n'est pas évident dans un pays dont le personnel politique a des qualités humaines indiscutables.

Au cours des actions de santé publique auxquelles nous avons participé, les obstacles furent les suivants:

- Les grands désastres de la santé publique constituent des catastrophes "en miettes" qui ne mobilisent pas l'opinion.
- Les intellectuels de notre pays ne s'intéressent pas aux problèmes de santé publique.
- Notre système de décision politique a une efficacité décroissante.

Dans l'aimable gageure de la IV République, voire au début de la V, il était encore possible d'obtenir une décision de santé publique en réunissant une majorité d'occasion sur un problème particulier. C'est devenu impossible en raison de la personnalisation du pouvoir et du bipartisme de fait qui réduit la marge de manœuvre des parlementaires.

Quand le Parlement a étudié en juin 1987 les propositions des centristes sur la publicité pour l'alcool, le RPR a supprimé des dispositions essentielles de ce texte et le centre s'est mis au garde à vous pour ne pas passer ce projet avec les socialistes. Comme si une dissociation sur cet amendement mettait en cause la cohésion de l'ancienne majorité.

Il manque à notre pays une structure permanente et représentative capable de préciser les insuffisances de notre système de prévention ou de soins et de proposer des choix cohérents au gouvernement, qui seront mis en œuvre par les organismes les mieux adaptés à chaque problème (service du ministère, Comité français d'éducation pour la santé, INSERM, CNAM...).

Il faut, par ailleurs, ajouter que la personnalisation du pouvoir a transformé la prise de décisions en santé publique. Cet aspect du problème est rarement abordé, comme s'il était indécent de parler de la relation personnelle entre un personnage politique et un problème du santé publique. Nous ne pensons pas que ces faits exigent la même discrétion que la vie sentimentale. Il n'est pas imaginable que les politiques cherchent en permanence à s'imposer sur les écarts de télévision et
exigent dans le même temps que leur attitude personnelle face à un problème de santé soit exclue de la représentation que l'on donne d'eux-mêmes alors qu'elle va déterminer leurs décisions.

Un fumeur "heureux" qui court à la catastrophe sans se poser de questions est un obstacle insurmontable quand il intervient dans une décision politique concernant le tabac.

Les hommes politiques ont un métier dangereux, leur rythme de travail, le climat de fausse urgence permanente dans lequel ils vivent, la concurrence, la soif de paraître pour exister, s'accompagnent fréquemment d'un mépris des facteurs de risque. Ils ont été sélectionnés sur des aptitudes à la lutte, et la fraction réduite qui atteint le véritable pouvoir est aussi représentative du Français moyen qu'Alain Prost du conducteur standard. Leur aptitude à prendre en compte des notions de santé et d'hygiène de vie qui sont aux antipodes de leur propre comportement est limitée.

Paradoxalement, quand ils ont pu, avec l'âge et l'expérience, maîtriser leurs habitudes dangereuses, leur regard se porte alors vers des horizons planétaires, et les préoccupations de santé de leurs concitoyens sortent de leur domaine d'intérêt.

Les politiques sont prisonniers des médias et des publicitaires qui assurent leur promotion. Ce facteur est le plus important et la plus inquiétant de la période actuelle. La politique sous les préaux d'école, soutenue par les militants bénévoles, est morte, remplacée par une promotion tapageuse faite au niveau national. Les campagnes publicitaires, les chapiteaux de cirque et les universités d'été coûtent cher. Le rôle des médias nationaux s'accroît avec la personnalisation du pouvoir. Toutes les conditions sont réunies pour placer les hommes politiques dans une situation de dépendance qui supprime leurs possibilités d'action de santé publique si elle entre en conflit avec les intérêts des médias et de la publicité.

Il est regrettable que les scandales financiers des partis politiques qui témoignent de l'impasse où ils se trouvent pour assurer leur publicité aient simplement provoqué une réaction inadaptée de contrôle et de limitation du financement alors qu'il serait plus efficace d'agir sur les possibilités de dépenses.

Admettre la publicité dans ce domaine, c'est accepter l'ingérence d'une méthode inadaptée par nature à l'adhésion politique, qui doit se fonder sur un raisonnement. La démarche publicitaire est une manipulation destinée à contourner les défenses logiques d'un individu.

Le gouvernement ne doit pas hésiter à mettre en œuvre une politique de santé publique et ne pas différer des mesures qui ont un intérêt général et le soutien de la majorité de la population. Si l'intérêt financier de groupes privés devenait le seul critère de décision, le rôle de l'État se réduirait à celui d'un arbitre qui compte les points et refuse de modifier des règles défavorables à l'un des camps. Le nombre d'exclus de la santé augmenterait. Il ne serait pas utile de maintenir un ministère de la solidarité, le tabac, l'alcool et l'accident pouvant exercer leur sélection sans le soutien de l'État. Un ministère de la maladie suffira.

Ce serait un triste épilogue pour 1989.

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