TOWARDS SEMIOTIC SOCIOLOGY - THE CONSTRUCTION OF VALUES AND SPEAKER IMAGES IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE.¹

by

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ABSTRACT

All constructivist approaches to social analysis face a common problem, here called the reflexivity paradox, whatever their particular view of society is otherwise. If sociology avers to analyze how social reality is constituted in knowledge it must include itself in its object. The problem is accentuated in approaches such as Pierre Bourdieu’s or C. Wright Mills’ that see society as fields of struggle and power. On what basis does sociology have the right to speak, if it is itself dependent on social power relations and is therefore bound to a point of view laden with interests and values? The problem has long been recognized and different solutions have been heralded, but the way the point of view and interest-related values are constructed in sociological writing has been inadequately analysed. This paper develops the semiotic theory of modalities and enunciation to analyze two paradigmatic cases, Bourdieu and Mills, through their writing. Mills appears to represent a solution that is rationalist and utopian, Bourdieu’s emphasis is on institutional and intellectual autonomy rather than engagement. These positions are visible in the speaker images that the authors construct of themselves.

WHO IS SPEAKING? THE REFLEXIVITY PARADOX AND SPEAKER IMAGES IN MILLS AND BOURDIEU.

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INTRODUCTION

This article addresses a general problem that is common to any constructivist or a sociology-of-knowledge approach to social analysis. If knowledge (in a wide sense) "matters" in society, so that it constitutes at least one relevant part of social reality, and if on the other hand knowledge depends on the social conditions of its production, what kind of autonomy - and right to speak - does sociology have? I call this the reflexivity paradox: if social science is expected to analyze how social reality is constituted in knowledge it should include itself in its object. The problem is accentuated in sociological approaches such as Pierre Bourdieu's or C. Wright Mills' that see society as a composition of struggle fields with symbolic power as their medium and object. But it is a relevant problem for any social scientist who does not believe that neutral objective positions, detached from all interests and values, are possible. There is no single answer to the paradox - many different ways of constructing the point of view of the author, or as I prefer to call it, the speaker image, and juxtaposing it with other points of view or speaker/recipient images, are possible.

Social theory that takes seriously the challenge of the reflexivity paradox can be called semiotic properly speaking, because it investigates not only the mechanisms of semiosis in social processes but inevitably also its own role in it. In this sense, the notion of semiotic sociology covers a wide range of constructivist or discourse analytic approaches. However, what most semiotic, constructivist, discourse analytic or sociologies-of-knowledge approaches neglect is a methodology of identifying the speaker images and the values and interests attached to them.
This article will introduce a set of conceptual tools for a reflexive analysis of the many different ways of constructing speaker images in social scientific texts. The analysis implies the view that, excluding the extremes of pure objectivism and blunt relativism (both of which I take to be illusions), any position taken to the reflexivity paradox necessitates an identification of the point of view and values embedded in speech, text or discourse, including social analysis itself. However, it does not in itself constitute a solution to the reflexivity problem. Many different kinds of reflexivities are possible, but they are inscribed in social scientists' textual strategies as they claim the right to speak and attempt to arouse the interest to be heard.

THE REFLEXIVITY PARADOX

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann formulated the reflexivity paradox thus: "To include epistemological questions concerning the validity of sociological knowledge in the sociology of knowledge is somewhat like trying to push a bus in which one is riding. To be sure, the sociology of knowledge, like all empirical disciplines that accumulate evidence concerning the relativity and determination of human thought, leads towards epistemological questions concerning sociology itself as well as any other scientific body of knowledge. (Berger and Luckmann 1987 [1966]).

Excluding objectivism, or the "standard view of science", as Mulkay (1979) still called it in the 1970s, which is of little interest here because it simply avoids the question at both of its ends - the impact of science on society and the impact of society on the structure of scientific knowledge - there are four major positions that have been taken to the problem,

Relativism is a position that few defend but many are accused of. If scientific as well as other forms of knowledge is in some way contingent upon social circumstances in which the knowledge is produced, then supposedly also the validity of knowledge is contingent in the same way. This is the pitfall that the York-Edinburgh school of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge has been concerned to avoid, while maintaining the fundamental objection to the standard view of science that knowledge production is a social as well as a cognitive process and dependent on language. The standard defense of the sociology of knowledge against the accusation of relativism is that "causation does not imply error", as Michel Mulkay condensed it. More generally, there is no reason to suppose that whatever the social determinations of knowledge production may be, they would necessarily lead to irrelevance of the validity requirement that we normally place upon science; but no more so in the case of any other discourse. For example, a political statement about class interest in a particular issue may be true, given the premises, although it might be redeemed irrelevant given other premises.

Existential reflexivity is another possibility, best represented by Alvin Gouldner's (1970) critical sociology. It says, to put it very simply, that since our (scientific) conceptions of the world will always be applied to serve some interests (if at all relevant), we should be aware of those interests and their counter-interests. Sociologists are a privileged social group, but dependent on power elites that slip their preferences and intentions to our explanations unless we are astute in identifying them and our role in the service of whoever we are. Gouldner's reflexivity thus places emphasis on the uses of knowledge rather than its production or form, and is thus quite close to the Mertonian normative approach to the sociology of knowledge that remains within the "standard view".

The third response could be called utopian rationalism, and it is best represented by C. Wright Mills. He believes that there is a utopian state of society where freedom is achieved under the reign of reason. Committed to promote that ideal, the reflexive sociologist places a high moral value on social analysis that purports to reveal and gain victory over forces that stand in the way of freedom and reason, such as powerful interests and the blind forces of the market. Even this sociological knowledge is socially determined, but it is justified by moral reasons.

The fourth approach to the reflexivity problem arises from totalising cultural critique of modernity, such as represented by Adorno and Horkheimer earlier but incarnated in many contemporary criticisms of mass society, media society, patriarchalism or whatever. Any totalising critique will remain within what Noro (1994) has called the performative contradiction of the self. It is unable to explain itself and its own position, if it understands all cultural forms as being infected by whatever malaise of the Zeitgeist it is pointing to.
Whatever position one takes towards the reflexivity paradox, including its complete denial as in the Standard view of science, the image of the speaker and its point of view is inevitably inscribed in the text that constitutes the scientific representation of reality. The identification of that image and that point of view, does not imply “deconstructing” or ironising our own creations, but is necessary to make relevant interventions to social processes. As Alain Touraine (1974, 21) said long ago, “Sociological research can never reach its object as pure objectivity - it will always reflect the relationship of itself with the object in its interpretations.” The identification of speaker images and their points of view requires an analysis of two kinds of textual structures, modalities and structures of enunciation. Before applying the analysis to two of the most influential critical - and reflexive - sociologists of the twentieth century, C. Wright Mills and Pierre Bourdieu, I shall briefly present its tools.

MODALITIES

Semiotic, logical and linguistic approaches to modalities

Any meaningful representation of reality is invested with values and a point of view from which values are constructed. This obvious, almost innocuous observation was the basis of what A.J. Greimas called the modal revolution in semiotic theory. Admittedly, a statement like “It is raining” does not imply any value or any point of view or a subject. But neither does it have much of a meaning. We do know, of course, what kinds of states of nature the word “raining” refers to, but that does not help us to interpret the statement unless we know something more of its context. In contrast, the statement “It may be raining again today” already suggests some avenues of interpretation. There is someone who evaluates the possibility or rain, and the temporal reference “again today” even suggests an evaluation of the desirability or non-desirability of continued rain.

Evaluations of possibility and desirability are called modalities in semiotic theory. The term may be confusing, because it is used differently in different fields of research, but since it widely accepted in semiotics it will be retained here, with certain specifications concerning its reference. In formal logic modalities are connected to the analysis of truth values of propositions (on what conditions a modal proposition such as “It must/may (not) be the case that...” is true). For sociological as well as linguistic (Cervoni 1987) purposes this approach is obviously too narrow. Modal logic certainly contributes to a semiotic analysis of modalities, but it would be confusing to go into details here.

In linguistics two basic orientations in the study of modality may be distinguished, the semantic and the morphological. The morphological approach views modality as an independent grammatical category, similar to aspect, tense, number, gender etc. (Palmer 1986). The semantic approach defines modality in terms of content and investigates how lexical forms, modus, illocutionary functions and different forms of negation can be used to express different modalities (Hakulinen & Karlsson 1979, 261).

Cervoni (1987) represents the semantic approach. For him, the “hard core modalities” are expressed in different ways in different languages by propositional structures and modal verbs. Propositional modalities are of the form “It is necessary/probable/desirable/ permissible etc. that P/an infinitive”. Modal (auxiliary) verbs appear in more diverse contexts and are more ambiguous. The most unambiguous in French are "can/may" (pouvoir) and "must" (devoir), but even they cover vast semantic fields. "Pouvoir" in French may refer to a physical, mental, moral etc. capacity but also a permission (as in "you may enter") or a possibility (as in "he may come later") (81-89).

Outside the “hard core of modalities” Cervoni discusses a series of "impure" modalities that are expressed in a number of principal verbs such as "confirm", "hope", "pronounce", "deny" etc. A large number of lexical categories such as modal and non-modal adjectives ("useful", "serious", "certain"), morphological structures (the subjunctive, several temporal forms of the indicative) and illocutionary acts may express modalities (89-96).

The problem of categorizing linguistic manifestations of modalities indicates a central issue in this area. We are dealing with a phenomenon that is situated in the Hjelmslevian “form of content” level or as Halliday would say, in “the semantic system” (1978, 39). A theory of
modalities that could be useful from the discourse analytic point of view cannot take the inductive road from manifestation (or realization) to content but must proceed in the reverse direction. We must first consider what we mean by modalities or modal structures, and then look for their linguistic and paralinguistic expressions or realizations (Halliday 1976, 198).

Modality and power

Modalities have also been given a key position in linguistic and discourse analytic approaches that are directly relevant to sociology and the reflexivity paradox. For example Fowler et al. (1979) have elevated the concept of modality to one of the focal points in their theory. They call themselves "critical linguists", referring to their interest in unveiling power structures and ideology in the use of language. Modality reflects for them power differentials between the participants in communication. For example parents may use very direct forms of speech acts addressing their children ("You must come") while children between themselves tend to use indirect forms like declaring the source of authority ("Mummy says you must come") (Fowler et al. 1979, 205; Kress and Hodge 1979, 123).

Hodge and Kress (1988) have developed this approach further, calling it "social semiotics". The dimension of affinity expresses the status of knowledge or the facticity of what is being said. An impersonal editorial, for example, which makes unquestioning claims about the world, expresses high affinity. It asserts its categorizations, social persons, places and sets of relations as true. In contrast, low affinity, expressed for example by hesitations and using the first person singular I for the narrator ("I think..."), represents the content of the message as more or less uncertain. Modal analysis is an integral part of their interest in a critical countersemiosis to media ideology (c.f. Fowler 1991, 85-93). Control of modalities and modality strategies are keys to such ideology critique (Hodge and Kress 1988, 159).

The dimensions of utterance and enunciation

The most interesting perspective in critical linguistics and sociosemiotics is the distinction between what is said about the world on one hand, and the structures that articulate the relationship between the speaker/author and addressee/reader on the other hand.

No text functions without an uttering subject. Even the most "transparent" literary romance or news report that may pretend to report "objectively" events that have happened in an imaginary or real world, implies a narrator who tells a story, and also someone who could be reading it. These narrators and readers are textual constructs and therefore we call them speaker/addressee images (Sulkunen 1992). In most texts the structures of authorship are quite complex, and there is considerable conceptual diversity in their analysis (Chatman 1990, 74-108; Rimmon-Kenan 1983, 86-89; Goffman 1981; Genette 1988, 135-154). I do not want to go into details here; simply we (Sulkunen and Törnroos 1997a) analyze the structures of authorship and reception as the enunciative dimension of texts while the "facts", "stories" etc. reported are called the dimension of utterance (Greimas & Courthé 1989, 563-566). The distinction between these dimensions is abstract but indispensable for the production of values and for the conceptual organization of modal structures.

Values are produced through modal structures in both dimensions, but in different ways. Modalities in the dimension of utterance attach values to, for example, the actions of a hero in a story or the hero's qualities. The hero may be described as loyal to a duty, capable of surmounting an overwhelming enemy, superior in a number of skills or successful because of unexpected aid etc. These evaluations present the hero in a positive light, often evoking moral judgements as well. The judgements are inevitably made from a point of view, but the speaker adopting it remains invisible.

In contrast, modalities in the enunciative dimension explicitly evoke an image of a speaker, author, or generally enunciator, who evaluates the degree of certainty or verisimilitude of the utterance. This is what is meant by modalities in "critical linguistics" and "sociosemiotics". Whenever someone says "It may be raining" or "Is it raining?" this implies a statement of
uncertainty on behalf of the observer-speaker and thus makes the subject of enunciation visible. In fact all utterances are regulated by such modal qualifications. However, when the qualification is unquestioned certainty ("I know/am sure that it is raining") it is normally left unsaid and the speaker image remains invisible or transparent as an omniscient narrator with full access to perfect and unquestioned knowledge of the world. This kind of "degree zero" epistemic modality (Kiefer 1987, 80, 92) is common in popular novels or in some news material that pretends to be objective reporting.

However, whenever a modal qualification on the certainty of the utterance does appear, the enunciator inevitably enters the scene, and therefore we call this group of modalities *enunciative*. Enunciative modalities define the degree of certainty of an utterance from either one of two positions: that of a speaker-observer and that of an addressee. Speaker and addressee refer here to communicative positions as they appear in the text.

**Pragmatic modalities**

Modalities in the dimension of utterance will be called the *pragmatic* type. The term refers to the narrative origin of semiotic theory. Pragmatic modalities describe the relationships of characters and their actions in a story, but they can be applied more widely in non-narrative contexts as well.

For the sake of this article a detailed discussion of pragmatic modalities is not necessary. Suffice it to say that from the point of social action theory two distinctions are very important (for a more detailed discussion see Sulkunen & Törrönen 1997c; Sulkunen 1998). On the one hand, pragmatic modalities can be either *endotactic*, referring to the subject of action itself, such as competence or will, or *exotactic*, referring to some outside agent imposing an obligation or providing help. On the other hand, modalities can refer to *actual performance*, such as ability to overcome an obstacle, or they can refer to *potentialities* such as will or duty (that motivate action).

Pragmatic modalities can thus be arranged in the following fourfold table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>potential</th>
<th>performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>exotactic</em></td>
<td>obligation</td>
<td>ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>endotactic</em></td>
<td>will</td>
<td>competence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are the basic pragmatic modalities, each of which may be projected on a fourfold table (the "semiotic square") as follows. Obligation or having to (prescription) do A is contrasted with an obligation not to do A (interdiction), and these are complemented with non-obligation to do A (permission) and non-obligation not to do A (optionality). Similar "semiotic squares" can be generated for all of the basic modalities. For example willing or wanting A (where A may be an object or an act) belongs to the same set as refusal (will not-A), acceptance (not-will not-A) and compliance (not-will A).

**ENOUCNICATION**

To come back to our specific problem concerning the reflexivity paradox in social science, it is in the enunciative dimension where we should look for traces of the different solutions of the problem. Obviously, the strategy of enunciation, as well as the gravity of the problem itself, will depend on how society is constructed in the dimension of utterance. Conflict theorists such as Mills or Bourdieu have much more difficulty in establishing and justifying their positions than theorists such as Dahrendorf (Aro 1999) who believe that there is a possibility of a fundamental consensus behind apparent conflicts, and it is the duty of social science to unveil the conditions of a peaceful social contract from the position of a neutral scientific authority. However, the point of view and the interests and values related to it are necessarily constructed in the enunciative dimension.
Veridictory and epistemic modalities

The function of scientific texts is to persuade. They purport to provide new knowledge or understanding, and to do so they need to catch the attention as well as the confidence of the reader. They must build, to use another Greimassian expression, a contract of confidence between the author and addressee. And they must begin with a problem, the solution of which is the task of the "present author" who invites the reader to join the journey of the narrative. For this reason, opening chapters or sections of scientific texts are typically what Törnönen (1997) has called "pending narratives".

Enunciative modalities, evaluating the certainty and verisimilitude of what is stated in the utterance, are among the main instruments in constructing the speaker image and the contract of confidence that are necessary to persuade the reader, and they also are the principal ingredients in constructing the point of view and the interest of the author to the subject matter (Sulkunen and Törnönen 1997b).

In enunciative modality two cases should be distinguished, because they generate different kinds of evaluations of the truth of an utterance. In the first case the speaker evaluates the state of the world comparing its appearance with his or her knowledge of how the world actually is. This generates what Greimas & Courtés (1982, 369) call persuasive modalities or modalities of veridiction. They can be summarized in the semiotic square shown in Figure 2 (see also Greimas & Courtés 1989, 570-572; Bertrand 1989, 116-123). The speaker may persuade the addressee that what appears actually is (truth) or is not the case (deceit, illusion), or what does not appear the case nevertheless is (secret) or is not true (error).

FIGURE 2: VERIDICTORY MODALITIES

In the second case the text depicts the speaker image in the role of an addressee. An utterance appears to the speaker as a belief, and the speaker assesses its truth against her or his true knowledge. This is called interpretative doing (Greimas 1983d, 118-119; 1987b, 168). The utterance may express a belief that is (knowing) or is not knowledge (assumption), or it may express a non-belief in what is (doubt) or is not known (imagination), as in Figure 3.

FIGURE 3: EPISTEMIC MODALITIES

Which of these sets of enunciative modalities are employed depends on the communicative position in which the speaker image is placed. The depicted speaker, addressing "us" as hypothetical auditors, may either interpret knowledge that has already been transmitted to her or him and evaluate it for us. Or the speaker (image)
may persuade us of something that may or may not appear to be true to us.

In scientific texts, for example, it is usual that the author first takes the position of an addressee vis-a-vis other scientists, to judge their knowledge as partly correct and partly incorrect. This functions like the qualifying test in a story: it formulates a lack and sets a task for the present author. After having acquired legitimacy in this way, the "present author" moves on to the verdictory or persuasive square to convince the reader of a truth about the world which may or may not be apparent.²

The promise of the Enlightenment: the \"sociological imagination\"

The "Sociological Imagination" by C. Wright Mills is a brilliant example of how the enunciative dimension can be used to develop a commitment of the reader to a battle on the scientific field for a moral cause higher than the simple advancement of knowledge. As is well known, the book is a eulogy of Enlightenment values: freedom and reason, in the midst of a postmodern mass society that is descending from the overripe "political age", with disastrous consequences for mankind, in the form of massive economic crises and the threat of a nuclear war, and for the individual in the form of lost self-determination and destruction of free intelligence. The first chapter of the book, "The Promise", sets out the programme and defines the respective positions of "men", "the intellectual community", the reader and the "author of this book" in this world.

"The Promise" is a typical polemical text in that it is arranged in the form of a qualifying test in a narrative scheme, in Jukka Törrönen's terms a "pending narrative" (1997). It is an actantial structure that does not "move". The subject and its helpers, object, counter-subject and its helpers (opponents to the subject) are placed in their positions, the task is defined and motivated, but the subject never sets out to encountering the counter-subject or to completing the task. The readers remain in a state of suspension, waiting and hoping to see the hero's victory, and willing to lend him their support.

The hero is the sociologist equipped with "the Sociological Imagination", helped by the classical sociological tradition. The object is true knowledge of structural social factors that underlie peoples' private troubles. The adversary is false sociology, represented by three "tendencies" that distort the classical sociological tradition. To the first belong the historical prophetic views by Arnold Toynbee or Edward Spengler. The second is Parsonsian systematic theory of "the nature of man and society"; the third, the empiricist research technology that has developed into a bureaucratic ethos with no insight to the structural realities of American mass society.

"Nowadays men often feel that their private lives are a series of traps. They sense that within their everyday worlds, they cannot overcome their troubles, and in this feeling, they are often quite correct: what ordinary men are directly aware of and what they try to do are bounded by the private orbits in which they live; their visions and their powers are limited to the close-up scenes of job, family, neighbourhood; in other milieus, they move vicariously and remain spectators. And the more aware they become, however vaguely, of ambitions and of threats which transcend their immediate locales, the more trapped they seem to feel."

In the famous opening paragraph of "The Sociological Imagination" a neutral narrator observes what appears to be the sense of being trapped to ordinary men and confirms that they indeed are. The veridictory statement builds an alliance from the very start between the narrator and the people who "need, and feel they need ... a quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves". That quality of mind, the Sociological Imagination, is offered to them in this book by the narrator.

Its task is to solve a problem: to reveal a secret that is but does not appear to be the reality in peoples lives. The secret is the way private troubles - unemployment, urban life, broken marriages and a general psychological malaise - depend on historical social structures, and the promise is that awareness of this dependency helps people to turn
their private troubles into public issues and political action. The secret that is most particularly troubling in contemporary society is the unawareness of values and threats to them, which produces indifference as a mental reaction. Another is anxiety, resulting from awareness of a threat but unclarity of the values that are being threatened.

The clarity of this narrative structure is further enhanced by a list of false heroes and their false solutions: psychologism (p. 19-20) and natural science (20-23) as well as substitute heroes and their substitute solutions: art and fiction (24-25) that for their best efforts have "not the intellectual clarity required for their understanding and relief today". The real hero is adequate social science called the "sociological imagination" and offered to the people by the narrator.

"The Promise" employs only weak epistemic modalities of belief and knowledge in renouncing the false solutions.

It is true, as psychoanalysts continually point out [=believe], that people do often have 'the increasing sense of being moved by obscure forces within themselves which they are unable to define'. But it is not true [=knowledge], as Ernest Jones asserted, that 'man's chief enemy and danger is his own unruly nature... On the contrary: 'man's chief danger today lies in the unruly forces of contemporary society itself... (p. 19-20).

The contract of confidence is not very strongly based on the narrator's scientific competence; it rests much more strongly on the loyalty of the narrator to a higher cause that is understood to be shared with the wide majority of "the American people".

Projections

The construction of the speaker image often takes the form of a more or less richly detailed story. In popular scientific writing "the story of a discovery" is often more dominant than the discovery itself. Also in academic scientific writing, however, the narrative about the subject of the research is often important, at least in prefaces and introductions to books and articles.

From the point of view of the reflexivity paradox, the important thing about the narrative of the subject is its relationship to what the subject writes or is going to write about. These relationships will be called projections and they may be of several kinds. Sometimes projections take the form of insertion: some of the characters in the story of enunciation are inserted in the story of utterance. Journalists often tell a story about how they found the information they are releasing to the public, and in that story the "enemy" of the journalist who conceals true knowledge is the same villain as the anti-subject of the story they are telling. This creates what Seymour Chatman (1990) calls a slant in the report, which otherwise seems as neutral and objective as can be, but the common enemy puts the journalists on the same side with the hero of the news story.

Often, however, the insertion of characters is simply achieved by identifying the narrator as one of "us", the readers and the wider public. Mills uses this device in "The Promise" to fix the narration to the point of view of ordinary people and to incite them emotionally to support the author's mission. First, the narrator is identified as one of the people who need the sociological imagination: "We have come to know that every individual lives... in some society... The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two..." (Mills 1970 [1979], 12, emphasis added) and "What we experience in various and specific milieux... is often caused by structural changes." (p. 17, emphasis added). The task of formulating the sociological imagination is felt to be necessary and beneficial not only for the intellectual reasons of science, but has an emancipatory mission that is common to the reader, to other people and to the author of this text alike. Mills is a "populist" in the precise sense that he writes in the name of the people, not only of experts.

However, Mills is also a heroic writer. Towards the end of the chapter he switches to first person, projecting the public person, the celebrated sociologist C. Wright Mills, to the position of the narrator: "It is my aim in this book to define the meaning of the
sciences for the cultural tasks of our time. I want to specify the kinds of effort that lie behind the development of the sociological imagination. I want to make clear the nature and the uses of the social sciences today, and to give a limited account of their contemporary condition in the United States (p. 25). The first person singular develops an image of a tragic hero that fights against the corrupted but dominating tendencies in American social science (p. 27) sketched out above. The result is anger. The narrator-hero (Mills) is struggling to arrive at true knowledge but his work is obstructed by forces that are allied with the power elite, the cause of the many private troubles in which the people appear to be trapped, and indeed are.

THE AUTONOMY OF THE OUTSIDER

Mills and Bourdieu

A comparison between Mills and Bourdieu is not motivated by any obvious genealogical or historical link. In my knowledge Bourdieu has seldom referred to Mills’ work. However, the similarity of their social analysis is apparent. Both emphasise power and conflict instead of integration and consensus. In fact, for both of them the mechanisms that appear as spontaneous instruments of social integration are in fact (veridictory modality) operations of invisible power, and they see it as the social scientist’s task to reveal this fact to the public. Both, therefore, insist on social science’s capacity and duty to provide true knowledge, while admitting that it too is inevitably affixed to a point of view and affected by the systems of symbolic domination in society. It is the true knowledge of society, independent of power interests, that makes people free and resistant to the effects of invisible domination. Both insist that social science reflect its role in the production of true knowledge, including itself in its object.

But Mills and Bourdieu differ in their conceptions of how and by what resources this reflection contributes to their capacity to promote knowledge and freedom. Mills believes in the modern ideal of a political society based on the Enlightenment values of truth, reason and universalist morality that are the measure of freedom and emancipation. The objectivity of science rests on the respect of this ideal, unhampered by the interference of invisible power. For Bourdieu, no universal emancipation is conceivable, although he sometimes (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 52) has stressed the new degrees of freedom that democracy provides. His solution to the reflexivity problem lies in what he calls “heterodoxy” - social scientists’ point of view from “outside” of the various fields of symbolic struggle. Heterodoxy is a capacity to critically examine and assess dominant symbolic forms but also to keep a distance to the discourses of resistance. With these resources social science can make interventions to social processes, and it is in the nature of the case that such interventions are always intellectual rather than practical. The sociologist’s true knowledge is always about knowledge, not about the true course of social action.

La leçon sur la leçon

The inaugural lecture as professor of sociology at Collège de France 23 April 1982 is the most prestigious presentation of Bourdieu’s views on the reflexivity problem. However the highly regarded institution is also accessible to the public. Outside of the university system, lectures at the Collège are open to anyone, and often - as when Bourdieu spoke - followed by large numbers of people, filling several lecture halls with video monitors, and even outside in the corridors.

The text, originally 31 pages long, presents Bourdieu’s views at the moment when "Distinction" was 3 years old, and he was working on the somewhat outdated material for Homo Academicus, a statistical study of 405 professors at the University of Paris in 1966. The inaugural lecture is a diligent treatise of the major themes of his sociology of knowledge up to that date, and to my understanding the key positions have remained the same at least in his methodological writing.
The text is interesting in this context for the additional reason that it addresses the problem of reflexivity in sociology very directly and reflexively, using his own lecture as one example of his analysis. The text has later been published under the title "Leçon sur la leçon", lecture on the lecture (1982), but of course the lecture itself is in a minor role, the main problem being the inevitably reflexive nature of sociological research as represented by Pierre Bourdieu. It is thus a programmatic text in the same way as The Promise by Mills, and develops a different answer to the same problem. If Mills’ critical sociology can be called utopian rationalist, Bourdieu’s could perhaps be characterised as a rationalist outsider’s autonomy: its solution to the reflexivity problem rests on the possibility of maintaining an intellectual as well as institutional distance to other fields of symbolic power.

Bourdieu’s text is complex in structure, although less so in argumentation. I shall concentrate on some observations on the speaker image that are related in a relevant way to Bourdieu’s solution of the reflexivity problem.

The lecture is framed - in the beginning and end - within a comment on giving an inaugural lecture at Collège de France, a comment that could almost be discarded as rhetorical snobbery. It does, however, contain an important element of Bourdieu’s vision on sociological autonomy. Although membership in the academic elite institution should not lead to any indulgence of the temptation to consider oneself an impartial and objective judge of social affairs, its critique should not be understood as a devaluation of the scientific institution either: "...cette interrogation critique ne doit pas être comprise comme une concession à l’humeur anti-institutionnelle qui est dans l’air du temps." (p.8) In fact, it is the merit of academic institutions "to make possible the sociology as I understand it" (…telle que je la conçois, p. 5). It detaches the sociologist from all his affiliations and gives distance to society that is a necessary resource for an autonomous intellectual practice. A sociologist [such as P.B. -PS] with origins in what is called the "people" and gained access to what is called the "elit" can only attain the lucidity of those removed from their origins by denouncing populist representations of the people, as well as elitist representation of the elite (p. 6).¹ The academic institution is an essential resource in this detachment.

The first 11 pages of the text is in cold and distant style. The narrator, who remains almost invisible with the exception of a couple of sentences in first person singular, makes almost no effort to build a contract of confidence with the reader. The "sociologist" of whom the narrator speaks moves on the scene, the audience is situated in the lecture hall, passive.

However, the almost invisible narrator, the "me" ("je") has an enormous power to place duties to "the sociologist", distinguishing him from those who - in the guise of the profession - "give reason to those who see [in sociology] a terrorist inquisitor, available for any action of the symbolic police force", because they are not competent to comply with these obligations [of reflexivity] in their work. Sociology of sociology is deemed "indispensable", the sociology of education and the intellectuals "seems to me primordial" (p. 7), sociology "must" not simply classify people but take as its object the struggle of classification itself (p.9). The obligations amount to an existential solution to the reflexivity paradox: sociology must include itself in its object in a very concrete way, not only epistemologically but also as a social phenomenon and an academic institution with a history. "...all the propositions that this science issues can and must apply to the subject who is making that science" (p. 6).²

The existential sociology of sociology does not, however, bind the sociologist to relativism (p. 10). Reflexivity itself reveals the structure of classificatory struggles, opens up "modifying elements" to social laws, as Auguste Comte said. Knowledge of the mechanisms of classification contributes to the creation of political conditions in which emancipatory movements may successfully refuse to accept the operations of symbolic violence (p. 13). "Through the sociologist, who is an historical agent situated in history and socially determined, history turns upon itself, reflects itself; and through him all social agents may know a little better what they are and what they do." (p. 18-19)
Thus, Bourdieu combines existential reflexivity with rationalism. For him, like for Mills, the enemies of the sociologist and the forces of emancipation are above all those with the power of naturalising the legitimate discourses on society, thus obscuring their true nature as the result of symbolic violence and struggle. They who need the obscurity of ignorance will deprive sociology of its status of science (p. 14), but sociology should perhaps be even more aware of those who expect too much of it (as an instrument of maintaining their own power) than of those who expect it to destroy itself (p. 17). There are false heroes at the side of the real one, who either participate in the "terrorism of resentment" (p. 18) (usurp their position to represent themselves as spokesmen of the people) or exceed the boundaries of their scientific field, pretending to be experts in any social question.

The adversaries of sociology may have the right to question the right of existence of a reflexive critical social science that threatens their position; but they have no basis for judging sociology unscientific. Bourdieu's sociologist is a rationalist, like Mills'. Unlike in Mills, however, the correct hero does not believe in total knowledge of the social world.

"And only the relative autonomy of scientific production and its specific interests may authorise and privilege the emergent offer of scientific products, which are in most cases ahead of the demand, that is critical. ...the side of sociology is more than ever that of the Aufklärung..." (p. 20)

The rest of the text is a summary of Bourdieu's core notions of habitus and field (champ). It proceeds to present, again in the name of an almost invisible narrator, a series of false debates, (the epistemic modalities of false beliefs and true knowledge) between action and structure (that can be combined in the notion of a struggle field) as well as between meaning and objective circumstance (that can be combined in the notion of habitus (Sulkunen 1984).

From the point of view of the speaker image and the reflexivity problem, the rhetoric of Bourdieu's inaugural lecture reflects quite accurately his sociological position. The erudition of the lecture, with references to a large number of French (and one American unnamed) intellectuals and social scientists, either approves or contests knowledge received from them, thus operating with the epistemic modalities of belief and knowledge. He emphasises the autonomy and exterior role of the sociology, within the confines of the academic community that provides a minimum necessary immunity towards the blinding effects of symbolic domination. However, the autonomy is only local and partial, itself subject to symbolic struggles.

Only twice in the lecture a faint attempt at building a contract of confidence with the "ordinary reader" appears. First, the veridictory modality of "truth" is evoked when he says that it both appears (to everyone) and is the case that "It is only too obvious that one must not expect a reflection of limits to give access to a reflection without limits - which would only reinstate the illusion formulated by Mannheim, of the [freischwebende] intellektuals without ties nor roots." But again, the appeal is to a specialised public where everyone knows what this erroneous illusion of Mannheim's is. The second time a contract of confidence is established by projection, when Bourdieu places himself as the narrator as well as the sociologist Bourdieu of whom the narrator speaks, in the same category as the audience: "us". Here again the veridictory modality of appearance versus being is made to work: "Because we are always more or less involved in the social games provided by different fields, it does not even occur to us why there should be action... Everyone knows by experience that what makes a high civil servant run may leave a researcher indifferent..." (p. 30) This comes towards the end of the exposition of the theory of fields, and has relatively weak rhetorical power in either motivating the reader to follow the argument, or to make familiar what the theorist has worked on with his elaborate conceptual resources in the preceding part of the text.

CONCLUSION
This article has analysed the reflexivity problem in social constructivism, particularly in Mills and Bourdieu, using the semiotic theory of modalities and enunciation as analytical tools. The reflexivity problem arises in any approach that accepts the view that social reality is at least in relevant part constructed on the basis of knowledge, and that knowledge - also sociology - at least partly depends on social reality.

The reflexivity problem is central for both Mills and Bourdieu. They share a similar conflictual and hierarchical view of society, and they both declare themselves as representatives of the Enlightenment values of truth, rationality and freedom. However, their solutions to the reflexivity problem also differ essentially. Mills is quite openly a populist, considering himself a rightful representative of people’s rational interest, while Bourdieu denounces the populist position as an illusion. Mills believes in the possibility of total freedom in democratic society, although this freedom is getting lost in postmodern mass society. For Bourdieu freedom is only ever partial and local, dependent on the degree of relative autonomy that academic institutions and self-reflexion make possible for sociology.

Both the similarities and the differences between the two solutions to the reflexivity problem are reflected in the use of the enunciative modalities, epistemic and veridictory, in the two programmatic texts analysed here, Mills’ “The Promise”, the opening chapter of The Sociological Imagination, and Bourdieu’s inaugural lecture at Collège de France. While Mills concentrates on building the contract of confidence with the audience, the “people”, using the veridictory modalities of appearance versus being, Bourdieu’s narrator remains largely invisible, issuing obligations to “the sociologist” but rarely if at all involving the audience in the discourse. Bourdieu’s sociologist is a man of erudition, aloof, distant and cool, whereas the Millsian hero embraces the audience and calls for their attention and loyalty to his intellectual leadership.

REFERENCES:


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NOTES

1. This speaker-addressee pair corresponds to narrator-narratee pair in narratology. They refer to communicative positions rather than to verbal acts. Speakers and addressees may thus appear also in written texts. They do not of course always involve other than degree zero enunciative modalities.

2. In other types of texts, such as popular novels, the enunciative modalities may remain at or close to degree zero. (The speaker image reports unquestionable knowledge of the world and of beliefs with the competence of an omnipotent and omniscient subject. What is told in the utterance is not in any way questioned, and for this reason the speaker image remains invisible although present. We therefore call this kind of speaker images transparent. There is no gap between knowledge and the events of the story. The reverse is the case in literary texts, where the story itself may be fragmented, while the reflexive narrator occupies the dominant role vis-à-vis the subjects he or she is telling about.

3. Obviously, in this very sketchy outline essential features must be bypassed, including the intellectual development of the two authors. Although both can be considered exceptionally consistent thinkers, at least as far as their sociology of knowledge is concerned, Mills arrived at his analysis and critique of objectivist social science only after his major substantial work on the new middle class, the trade unions and the power elite (Sulkunen 1994). In contrast, Bourdieu's sociology of knowledge has been an essential ingredient in his work at least from 1972 (Essai d'une théorie de la pratique) onwards, and as far as I can see, the fundamental ideas have remained quite stable until at least 1993, when La misère du monde was published.

4. It is therefore somewhat contradictory that Bourdieu has recently taken a very open political role; also his recent work is less true to the ideals of heterodoxy than one might expect on the basis of his earlier work. In this respect also, Bourdieu's career is similar to Mills', who went very political in the latter part of his short life.

5. Ainsi, le sociologue issu de ce que l'on appelle le peuple et parvenu à ce que l'on appelle l'élite ne peut accéder à la lucidité spéciale qui est associée à toute espèce de dépayement social qu'à condition de dénoncer la représentation populiste du peuple, qui ne trompe que ses auteurs, et la représentation élitaire des élites, bien faite pour tromper à la fois ceux qui en sont et ceux qui n'en sont pas.* (p. 6)

6. Sometimes Bourdieu writes very emphatically on his existential reflexivity: "I continually use sociology to try to cleanse my work of the social determinants that necessarily bear on sociologists. Now, of course, I do not for one minute believe or claim that I am fully liberated from them. At every moment, I would like to be able to see what I do not see and I am endlessly, obsessively wondering: 'Now what is the next black box that you have not
opened? What have you forgotten in your parameters that is still manipulating you?". Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 211.

7. Obviously the reference is to Robert Dahl's "Who Governs?"