A Seminar on Human Freedom

Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

Friday 24 March 2017, 10:15–14:00
Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki
Room 524, Fabianinkatu 24, 5th floor

10:15–10:30 Risto Saarinen & Sami Pihlström (Helsinki): Opening Words
10:30–11:15 Aku Visala (Helsinki): “Is the Problem of Free Will a Scientific Problem?”
11:15–12:00 Hanne Appelqvist (Turku): “Kant on Freedom and Rules”
12:00–13:00 Lunch Break
13:00–14:00 Thomas Buchheim (LMU Munich): “The Concept of “Human Freedom” according to Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom”

    The seminar is free for all. Welcome!

For more information, please contact Lassi Jakola / lassi.jakola@helsinki.fi

Abstract Buchheim:
According to Schelling, human freedom is, as a combination of formal freedom (= self-determination of the will) and its real concept (= ability to side with either the morally good or the evil), the capacity of a naturally and historically situated subject to consider itself as either entitled to utilize the universal for the purpose of its particular interests or as being called to the commitment of the own vigor for the purpose of the universal, however in each case in the light of historically available suggestions of good or evil by virtue of one’s own decision, and although the reverse decision remains possible in the same capacity. For the contemporary debate as well, it seems to be the case that the following requirements ought not be waived: that man in his freedom should be understood as on the one hand a naturally and, on the other hand, a historically existing being, and that, in that way, human freedom ought to be understood as being in accordance with a generally (although not in any of its details and alleged consequences) affirmative attitude towards modern sciences. Both, reductions of freedom and the principal disempowerment of our scientific knowledge and its truth claim are to be rejected. The free decision of man must neither be a naturalistically explainable event, nor a lucky or unlucky coincidence for the subject. It has to be imputable to it both in terms of its reason and its consequences.