Mikael Carleheden (University of Copenhagen)
How to Criticize? On Honneth’s Method

I will examine Honneth’s method in Recht der Freiheit in contrast to both genealogy and French pragmatism. In spite of Honneth’s attempt to connect his critical theory with an institutionally differentiated history of modernity and freedom, he is from the start highly dependent on Hegel’s Rechtphilosophie. From the perspective of both genealogy and French pragmatism, Honneth’s method might thus be criticized as theoretical apriorism. Honneth seems to run the risk of using a “frozen” and “ready-made” Hegelian model that determines the outcome of his historic and sociological investigations from the very start. History and sociology become then just means of illustration. I will also make use of Habermas’ distinction between developmental logic and developmental dynamic to formulate the main problem: Does Honneth’s dependence on Hegel lead him to reduce developmental dynamics to developmental logic? If that would be the case, his criticism of Habermas’ formalism also might be misguided. An obvious line of defense of Honneth’s method would be to claim that his emphasis on social pathologies and misdevelopments give developmental dynamics a crucial role in his history of modernity. However, a genealogist or a French pragmatist might still insist that this critique of modern society is predetermined by an Hegelian theoretical apriorism.

Antje Gimmler (Aalborg University)
Recognition – Intersubjectivity and Self-Respect

In the current academic and intellectual landscape, recognition theory is well established and used. It seems that there is not much unexamined in recognition theory. One of its major protagonists, Axel Honneth, developed his theory even further and whether this is a continuation of or a break with recognition theory is also discussed. In this paper I shall examine the theoretical construction of the concept of recognition of Honneth and I shall argue that albeit there are serious theoretical problems, a heuristic use of the concept of recognition will help us to see more clearly where recognition theory is useful for the understanding of human relations. In the first part I shall concentrate on the presentation of Honneth’s theory of recognition, emphasizing the construction of the concept and its explanatory power. In a second part I will discuss Honneth’s concept in relation to the critique that has been raised, e.g. the question of the normative or empirical fundament of recognition theory. As we know, Honneth takes his inspiration from the early Hegel of the Jenaer writings to conceptualize recognition as mutual and symmetrical. Hegel, though, later in the Phenomenology of Spirit introduces a second relation beyond the intersubjective relation; that is the relation the slave entertains to products in form of labor. I shall argue that this is an important dimension that is underrated in Honneth’s theory. I shall therefore show in the last part how using recognition theory for understanding human relations and identity building gets us to understand that individual’s self respect can have different sources. I will use the German 18th century novel “Anton Reiser” by Karl Phillip Moritz, which is a kind of negative ‘Bildungsroman’, to come closer to an understanding of the dimensions that are at stake when ‘doing recognition’.
Jaana Hallamaa (University of Helsinki)

Creating Non-Relations: Non-, Ir- and Misrecognition as Loci of Agency

My aim is to analyze different types of failed recognition highlighting their effect on the social and individual levels of human interaction. I will set the scene by exploring such failures – or misdeeds – on the axiological, deontological, and contributive levels of recognition. Next, I will explicate the attitudes that such failings display and their bearings for action towards other agents. My main focus is to analyze the relationships based on non-, ir-, and misrecognition between humans. I will do this by concentrating on the social “space of action” that such nonrelations create between the non/ir/misrecognizer and the object as well as the impact such relationships have on the agent. The approach will enable to deepen our view of the nature of reciprocity in relationships based on non/ir/misrecognition.

Carl-Göran Heidegren (Lund University)

Varieties of Non-Person Treatment

The recognitive attitude has been explicated in terms of ”taking someone as a person”. In my paper I will discuss the opposite attitude, which translated into action can be characterized as ”non-person treatment”. First I will take a look at the work of Erving Goffman, in which the phenomenon of non-person treatment is thematized on several occasions. After that I will move on to discuss the phenomenon of ”social invisibility” and contrast it with overt respect. ”To be overlooked, and to be disapproved, are things entirely different.” (Adam Smith) Overt disrespect can eventually even be seen as a kind of negative recognition, and a struggle for recognition may begin as a struggle for becoming socially visible. Furthermore, the prejudiced look will be discussed as being a form of non-person treatment. Finally, I will reflect on the much discussed phenomenon of bullying, and elaborate on non-person treatment as one major form of bullying.

Onni Hirvonen (University of Jyväskylä)

Institutionally Mediated Recognition Practices – A Vicious Circle?

It is largely agreed that institutions only exist if they are accepted or recognized by those who participate in them. However, according to the Hegelian theories of recognition, any practical form of recognition is always mediated by institutions. Thus, it seems that the collective acceptance of institutions is always already mediated by institutions.

This paper aims to solve the apparent contradiction by, firstly, specifying how recognition is precisely mediated through social roles and institutions. It is clear that institutions come in different shapes, sizes, and forms. They are all normative systems but it is equally clear that all-pervasive institutions like language and money are not the same kind of entities like more rigidly structured state institutions or corporations. Though all institutions might require collective acknowledgement and recognition to exist, it is not as clear that all institutions are about our practical forms of recognition or that all forms of practical recognition are completely restricted to stay within certain institutional borders.

Secondly, as the institutions are also dependent on our collective recognition of them, the forms that recognitive attitudes take towards institutions need to be specified. In the literature, vertical recognition of institutions has been distinguished from horizontal recognition between individual agents, but it is unclear how exactly these attitudes differ from each other.
This paper aims to show how the Hegelian theories of recognition face a potentially severe problem of circularity between institutions and recognitive attitudes. It is argued that we need to distinguish different senses of recognition and different kinds of relevant institutions to sidestep the problem. This also clarifies the role of recognition in formation of institutions and the extent of institutional determination of recognition practices.

► Veronika Hoffmann (University of Siegen)
**The Gift Model of Recognition**

Recently, the issue has been raised whether the concepts „gift“ and „recognition“ are more than superficially linked. It seems obvious that, on a practical level, giving gifts can be an expression of recognition. In this paper, it is argued that the notion of gift also serves as a model for certain kinds of recognition on a more theoretical level. As both concepts are not only used for a broad range of social practices, but also defined and explicated in very different ways, this depends in part on the understanding of „gift“ and „recognition“. A possible „gift model of recognition“ will be explored based upon related theories by Marcel Hénaff and Paul Ricœur.

► Heikki Ikäheimo (University of New South Wales)
**Recognition and the Human Life-Form**

What exactly in recognition is universal and what in it is variable from one culture and epoch to the next? This article distinguishes, first, between different phenomena often identified with ‘recognition’ and argues that while many of them are obviously historically and culturally variable, not all of them are. Secondly, the article discusses three universally constitutive facts about human co-existence and their connection to three dimensions of recognition, and suggests that on each of the three dimensions there is a fundamental difference between ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ modes of recognition. This difference, it is suggested, ‘makes a difference’ that is independent of variability between particular forms of life, and stands a chance of functioning as an immanent ethical yardstick for any variation of the human life-form in general.

► Maijastina Kahlos (University of Helsinki)
**Citizens, Aliens, and Recognition**

According to one of the foundational myths of the ancient Romans, Romulus made the city of Rome an asylum for refugees and welcomed all sorts of newcomers inside its walls. In the 2nd century CE, as the Romans had already held the entire Mediterranean area in their iron embrace for centuries, a Greek orator Aelius Aristides celebrated the Roman power with a similar ethos: “Rome has never rejected anyone; on the contrary, this city receives men from all countries just as the soil of the earth welcomes all men”. This ethos of asylum is even more remarkable when it is compared with the foundational myths of many Greek poleis, for instance, the myth of autochthonous origin of Athenians.

Despite the ethos of asylum and eloquent orators who cherished the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship, not all the inhabitants of the Roman Empire had the status of citizen. Who were recognized as Roman citizens? What were the criteria for becoming a Roman citizen? How did these criteria change in the course of centuries? During the expansion of the Empire in the Republican period, to gain citizenship as a mark of membership of the Roman community meant abandoning one’s former lifestyle and
embracing a new one. As the Roman power in the Mediterranean was consolidated during the Early Imperial period (1st–2nd centuries CE), the strong conception of citizenship based on cultural criteria could not hold. The Roman power had to gain backing from the elite key groups in the conquered areas. Cultural criteria (such as the Latin language) became less emphasised, and the citizenship became to be more built around the display of loyalty to the ruling power.

I will discuss the criteria for the recognition as a Roman citizen and maintaining the privileges connected to the citizenship during the later Roman Empire (200–400 CE). I will focus on, first, the return of the cultural criteria, and second, the impact of immigration in Late Antiquity. 1) I will argue that defining Romanness in religious terms became more and more emphasized from the early 3rd century CE onwards. Recognition was connected with the correct performance of religion. Defining a good and loyal Roman in terms of religion continued in the course of the Christianization of the Empire. 2) In regard to the Gothic immigration into the Empire in the 4th and 5th centuries, I will discuss the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in Roman ‘migration and accommodation policies’.

► Matthias Kettner (Witten/Herdecke University)
Integrating Recognition Theory and Realistic Discourse Ethics

Normative Discourse Theory in the line of Apel and Habermas rely heavily on a notion of argumentative discourse but fail to sufficiently clarify this basic notion. Once clarified, argumentative discourse is an informal social practice, open to all persons in their capacity as reasonable evaluators, which has as its aim the communicatively rational revision of conflicting reasons with (apparently less conflicting) reasons. First, I will explore the recognitional infrastructure of the practice of fixing the true value of reasons by argumentative discourse. Second, I want to strengthen a post-Apelian, post-Habermasian conception of realist discourse ethics by showing how its key concepts (normative consent, rational validity, discourse-power) involve conceptual distinctions elaborated within recognition theory. Thirdly, perspectives of realist discourse ethics concerning problems of robustly asymmetric recognition and fundamentalist identities will be sketched.

► Heikki J. Koskinen (University of Helsinki)
Rationality, Dignity, and Respect-Recognition

According to a standard conception in contemporary recognition theory, what makes respect an adequate response to us human beings is our dignity, or our normative status as rational agents. In this paper, my aim is to articulate some interesting and important questions related to such a rationality-centered conceptualization of respect-recognition. I will take a look at the functional role of a semantic criterion of rationality whose purpose is to distinguish between adequate and non-adequate responses of respect. I will then move on to consider a distinction between responsive and constitutive forms of recognition, and to say something about the distinction’s relevance for the semantic criterion of rationality. This leads to a discussion of varying degrees of rationality and the problematic notions of actual and potential rationality. A central theme to be considered then has to do with the morally crucial question of how we should understand the boundaries of rationality and the consequent limits of respect. If our intuitions and practices of recognition do not correspond with our theoretical understanding of interpersonal recognition-relations, then something needs to be revised. The conclusion of my systematic analysis and argumentation is that we have to carefully reconsider and re-evaluate a rationality-centered conceptualization of respect-recognition that focuses on the qualitative features or identities of individuals.
Arto Laitinen (University of Tampere)
Is Recognition Constitutive of Well-Being?

Empirical studies suggest that being loved is very central to well-being or happiness. There is no reason to think that being respected or being esteemed would be insignificant either. And there is no reason to think that giving recognition in turn is much less significant than receiving recognition – what matters may well be (networks of) relations in which each party both gives and gets recognition. This paper asks how dominant theories of well-being can address these insights (e.g. as preference satisfaction, experienced happiness, or as items on objective lists), and then suggests a new, multidimensional conceptualization of well-being where well-being partly consists of standing in relations. This builds on already existing views which have proposed multidimensional conceptualizations (e.g. Kauppinen: both agency and subjectivity matter; Ricoeur: agentic, interpersonal and institutional aspects of “the ethical aim”), but adds an irreducibly relational or social dimension (drawing on debates on the relational self).

It thus contributes to debates on recognition (why is recognition important?) and on well-being and on relational self.

Cillian McBride (Queen’s University Belfast)
Authenticity and Recognition

Taylor argued that a historical transformation in the recognition order is responsible for contemporary concerns about authenticity. But how is recognition related to authenticity? If anything, it looks like a concern with social recognition is actually one of the hallmarks of inauthenticity. This is evident in the two opposed modern traditions of thought about the authentic life: the collectivist, and subjectivist models. One insists that an authentic life involves unreflective immersion in the life of the community, while the other insists on active, deliberate, self-making. I argue that these are mistaken. The problem of authenticity is a problem of self-knowledge: over and above questions about whether we can freely endorse our lives, and whether they embody genuine values, we want to know whether the life we lead is truly our own. Social recognition functions as a mirror to the self, making self-knowledge possible: it is essential to the pursuit of authenticity.

Ritva Palmén (University of Helsinki)
The Problem of Desire for Esteem within the Community of Equals

Self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem, these three modes of relating to oneself are essential for the possibility of identity formation. They can be acquired and maintained intersubjectively, through recognition by others who one also recognizes (Honneth 1992). These all practical relations to self contain beliefs about oneself, emotional states and experiences of having certain status. As maintained by Axel Honneth, only self-confidence which is supported by love is a universal precondition for self-realization in any community. However, both respect and esteem have gone through a significant historical transformation. My paper builds on this claim, but also critically re-evaluates and adjusts it. By exploring textual material ranging from late Antiquity to twelfth-century spiritual rehearsals and medieval university theology, I will ask how practical relations to self and identity formation have been explained in varying cultural and historical conditions.

In particular, my aim is to analyze the problem of desire for esteem in the context of medieval Christian cloister, which social life and cohesion was basically founded on the idea of compliance
and total submission. In this framework fellow Christians were considered to be equal in a way that there was no qualifying principle based on each person’s individual merits which would distinguish them from one another and thus facilitate comparison with other people. Rising above others and the feeling of pride were considered as the most sinful acts. However, simultaneously religious communities had highly hierarchical social structure, regulated communication between members of different levels and strict command to obey the elders or men of a higher rank. This discrepancy created a difficult question how to react towards often observed desire for esteem and in what way it was still possible to either gain or show esteem within the community. The combination of the chosen textual material and elements of contemporary theory of recognition allows me to examine by what means medieval monks were thought to have a need to be qualified within their own religious assembly and how the closed social group could manager this desire. The testing of qualified historical cases in the light of recognition theory also permits me to amend the contemporary ideas and suggest new modifications of esteem and its role in a human society.

► Sami Pihlström (University of Helsinki)

**Beyond the Theory-Practice Dichotomy: Pragmatism, Antitheodicy, and the Recognition of Suffering**

I have argued in previous work (to a large extent in collaboration with Sari Kivistö; see especially Kivistö and Pihlström 2016) that theodicies, seeking to philosophically justify God’s allowing apparently unnecessary and meaningless evil and suffering – or offering some secular proxy for this traditional theological project – amount to a colossal ethical failure to recognize the suffering other and the utter pointlessness of their suffering. This argument for antitheodicism, focusing on the moral need to appropriately recognize the reality of suffering, or to take evil seriously, can draw from various sources, including William James’s pragmatism, Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, as well as post-Holocaust Jewish moral reflection exemplified by Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics of otherness, all of which can be interpreted as fundamentally Kantian approaches to theodicism and antitheodicism.

A typical response to this kind of moral criticism of theodicies in contemporary mainstream analytic philosophy of religion pursuing theodicies (or “defenses”) starts from a sharp distinction between theory and practice. Theodicists can easily maintain that at the theoretical level their justifications for evil and suffering may fail to recognize the suffering other, or the experience of meaningless suffering, while also maintaining that such a failure does not matter insofar as the theodist exercise is, and remains, merely theoretical. Theodicists can (and arguably should) avoid engaging in their theory-construction when actually faced by suffering human beings and the practical need to comfort them. This practical task of consolation is to be clearly distinguished from the purely theoretical or intellectual task of constructing a theodicy argument or a “defense”. (For a discussion of the purely theoretical nature of the problem of evil along these lines, see, e.g., van Inwagen 2006.) Hence, it could be claimed that no failure of recognition is necessarily committed by the theodist at the practical level of engaging with suffering human beings needing consolation (or, in a theological context, pastoral care).

However, it can be argued – especially from a pragmatist point of view – that the very attempt to defend theodicy by drawing this sharp theory-practice dichotomy is itself (at a meta-level) a failure of recognition. The suffering other ought to be morally recognized precisely by *not* drawing such a dichotomy. This, we may say, is where the metaphilosophical relevance of antitheodicism lies. It can be further argued that antitheodicism (which insists on not explaining away the meaninglessness of suffering) is needed as a necessary condition for the possibility of adequately recognizing the other
person as a (potential or actual) sufferer. Therefore, there is a sense in which theodist attitudes to others should not themselves be (philosophically, ethically) recognized or perhaps even tolerated, and this can be articulated in terms of pragmatism that is generally critical of any principled theory-practice dichotomies. We may say that for pragmatists theory and practice are inevitably entangled, and the failure to recognize this already constitutes a failure to adequately engage in the practical task of recognizing otherness. (For some related discussion regarding pragmatist philosophy of religion, see Pihlström 2013.)

The paper concludes by suggesting a way of investigating the relations between attitudes such as recognition and toleration by allowing iterations of the attitudinal “operators” representing these or related attitudes. For example, we may say that a certain kind of recognition or non-recognition is (or should be) tolerated (by someone in a certain context), or that it is not or should not be tolerated. Conversely, we may say that certain attitudes of tolerance or intolerance ought to be recognized (or non-recognized), and so forth. It is easy to see that indefinitely complex cases of “nested” attitudes can be constructed in this manner. This is relevant to the case discussed in the paper – antitheodicism and the recognition failure of theodicism – precisely because a certain kind of failure to recognize others’ suffering, a failure ultimately based on the theory-practice dichotomy, is criticized as a morally problematic attitude that in a certain sense should not be tolerated.

References

► Risto Saarinen *(University of Helsinki)*

**Recognition and Trust in Theology**

Trust and recognition display some structural similarities as two moderated versions of non-economic, gift-like exchange. We do not normally trust others in all possible respects. I may trust you as a good team member and a good politician, although I do not trust your health advice. There is thus a Tdef, the content or domain of trust between A and B.

Given this, the elements of bilateral trust look as follows, T1 being the core element:

- **T0**: B appears as trustworthy in the eyes of A (and vice versa)
- **T1**: A trusts B
- **T2**: B trusts A (in return)
- **Tdef**: the content or domain of trust between A and B

These elements are similar to the so-called “parts of recognition” (R0, R1, R2, Rdef) discussed in my *Recognition and Religion* (2016). This paper investigates the similarities and differences between the concepts of trust and recognition.

► Simon Thompson *(University of the West of England)*

**The Environment of Recognition**
Theories of recognition tend to assume that the archetypal form of recognition is a relationship between two individual subjects. This is because they also assume that only individuals can express recognitive attitudes such as care, respect and esteem. At the same time, these theories often proceed as if other types of entities can engage in recognition. They may, for instance, claim that a state's laws give appropriate acknowledgement to some people but not to others. Or they may argue that a social institution – such as a police force or welfare system – may recognize some people but not others. However, there is often a failure to ask who or what is doing the recognition in these cases and others like them. Is it the state, police force or welfare system which is itself the active agent of recognition? Or is it a group of individuals who are doing the recognition by means of the laws and institutions in question?

In this paper, I want to consider whether another kind of entity can be regarded as playing a similar role in relationships of recognition. Could it be argued that a social environment plays a part in relationship of recognition? Could such an environment itself recognize some of the subjects who are located in it? Or is such an environment only the means by which one group of individuals recognizes another? I shall explore these questions by considering whether a concept of collective or accumulative harm can be used to understand how an environment may play a part in a network of recognition relationships. And, in order to see how these questions play out in practice, I shall consider three specific environments of recognition: Swiss public space affected as it is by a ban on the building of minarets, Quebec’s visage linguistique in which the French language enjoys a certain priority, and the public space of US states which continue to fly the confederate flag.

Christopher F. Zurn (University of Massachusetts Boston)
The Political Pathologies of Misperceived Misrecognition

Well-established and prosperous constitutional democracies on both sides of the Atlantic have recently begun to show signs of serious political pathologies. Among numerous institutional, fiscal and societal challenges, this paper focuses on the prevalence and political impact of two cultural phenomena: increases in partisan polarization and in anti-pluralistic populism. The hypotheses of the paper are that 1) polarization and populism have common roots in the increasing salience of political identity; 2) political identities are linked to political pathologies, since they can undercut reasoned attention to and debate about politically-relevant facts, policy impacts, and ideological coherence; 3) the development and salience of political identities is best analyzed in a recognition-theoretic framework; 4) partisan polarization and anti-pluralistic populism can both specifically be tied to experiences of misperceived misrecognition; and, 5) recognition theory may be explanatorily powerful and normatively problematic when analyzing such culturally-rooted political pathologies.
● Conference website: https://blogs.helsinki.fi/recognition/
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