

Tanja Tamminen¹

Re-Establishing Cross-Border Cooperation Between Montenegro, Kosovo and Albania: The *Balkans Peace Park* and Local Ownership

Introduction

In the Western Balkans the current economic crisis is not only affecting the local economies but raises fears that the pace of European Union enlargement will slow down even further. Croatia's EU membership is due in 2013 and Serbia was given a candidate status in the EU Council meeting of February 2012. Negotiations with Serbia were, however, not opened, and regardless of the Commission's recommendation the decision on Montenegro's accession negotiations was postponed until June 2012.

Despite this set-back, Montenegro is well on its way towards the European Union, unlike its neighbours such as Albania and Kosovo. In Albania, the internal political battles have slowed down the necessary reform policies, and the EU road of Kosovo is blocked by the fact that five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo's independence. Thus Kosovo cannot have any kind of contractual relationship with the EU. The political future of this southern Balkan triangle thus seems quite questionable.

The EU membership is nevertheless underlined by the political elites of all three countries as their main foreign policy goal. All countries have declared they will share 'the common European values' and have engaged themselves in implementing (more or less actively) the reforms required by the European Union. This 'Europeanization' discourse is shared by all and the Commission progress reports and the European partnerships serve as roadmaps for further reforms to 'consolidate stability and raise prosperity' in the Western Balkans (Commission 2006).

¹ Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

The European enlargement and the necessary conditions to be met by the potential candidates are seen as the main argument behind the 'Europeanization' process, but what does this really mean, if anything, on a village level, where a number of more or less technical support projects are being developed?

Border regions have received a special place in the European discourse as active spaces where links and contacts for deeper integration are being established. The EU Commission finances cross-border cooperation projects and regional cooperation, and good neighbourly relations are underlined by the European Council as necessary conditions for joining the EU.

This article proposes a critical look at the cross-border cooperation initiatives and poses the question, why would the international actors involved in these projects expect local people to act in ways that they (foreigners) want them to act? What kind of idealist discourse lies behind cross-border cooperation projects and what kind of resistance to 'subjugated knowledge' (as Michel Foucault would have put it) persists on the local level?

In the Western Balkans, the mountainous and remote border regions may not have been in the focus of the central Governments before, but in order to receive funds from the Commission the political elites of these countries are starting to see the importance of cross-border cooperation projects. At least on the discourse level the border regions are being looked at in a more positive way than for a long time in history. For regions marginalized in Communist times, some consider this to be a time for a new starting point. *Are we, however, just witnessing outside subscribed and elite-driven idealist models being transferred to the border regions without taking into account the interests, customs and habits of the local people, and how may this have an impact upon the final outcome of the process?*

In the field of anthropology (see studies by David Kideckel, Gerald Creed, Katherine Verdery and others) as well as in political sciences many studies exist on how the central planners failed to implement idealist discourses such as 'socialism with a human face' in Southeastern Europe in the 1980s. Today academic critics often target Europeanization discourse (see Tamminen 2011, 254–258). In the field of International Relations research David Chandler has called the EU 'an Empire in Denial'. Chandler notes that the European Commission assistance programmes, for instance, 'tend to bypass mechanisms of democratic accountability entirely. They involve the direct regulation of South-eastern European state governance

mechanisms'. (Chandler 2006, 111.) Highly critical of the outside funded civil society, Chandler sees the financing of the NGO sector merely as a way to buy legitimization for international community programmes (Chandler 2006, 113–115). Chandler's critical approach stresses the lack of social and political legitimacy of these processes. He notes that 'the Empire is not in denial because it is not regulating enough, but because the political power of decision-making elites seeks to clothe itself in non-political, therapeutic or purely technical, administrative and bureaucratic forms' (Chandler 2006, 9–11).

The report of the International Commission on the Balkans makes it clear that 'the real choice the EU is facing in the Balkans is enlargement or empire. Either the EU devises a bold strategy for accession that could encompass all Balkan countries as new members within the next decade, or it will become mired instead as a neo-colonial power in places like Kosovo, Bosnia, and even Macedonia' (ICB 2005, 11). A closer look at one of the border villages on the side of Montenegro, Vusanje/Vuthaj,² situated on the area of the so-called 'Balkans Peace Park Project' will give us a local perspective on these problems. Through an analysis of the European discourse on border regions and of its applicability in this particular border region, this article poses the question to what extent local ownership (and local knowledge) is taken into account when promoting cross-border cooperation.

European Discourse on the Border Regions: Cross-Border Cooperation as a Form of *Governance*

The European Union is often characterized as a normative power. It has a number of ways to transfer normative models of governance both inside the union (between the Member states) as well as towards its partner countries. The EU has a major role in reformulating the governance of political space starting from the promotion of integration and regional cooperation. Most countries adopt these EU-promoted normative models on practical grounds. These models however also imply identity politics. Adopting a European 'way of doing' is to prove one's 'Europeanism' – that one belongs to the European family. The enlargement policies of the European Union are based on this logic – if you want to be at least listed as a potential candidate or

² When referring to this ethnically Albanian village in Montenegro I use the name first in Montenegrin followed by the name in Albanian. The place names in Kosovo are written first in Albanian and then in Serbian.

have some kind of European perspective to be recognized as a European country, you need to start implementing the European *façon de faire*.

Border regions are dynamic areas when it comes to identity politics – different levels of governance meet at the borders. Also diverse identities, self-definitions and definitions of the ‘other’ cross paths in national border regions (Kaplan and Häkli 2002). Inside and outside are not as clearly defined on the border regions as inside the country – ethnic and linguistic groups living in these regions rarely respect national borders. Significations given to the borders differ and are sometimes contradictory: do the borders limit the nation or just a state territory? The whole border can be contested as in the case of Kosovo and Serbia, as Serbia does not recognize the border between these two states.

In brief, border areas are characterized by discontinuities and continuities, by the complexity of the political space, by borders that unite and divide at the same time. According to Delanty and Rumford (2005, 133), European borders (both EU borders and the borders between states) play a role in limiting a territory but also create new types of political spaces to administer, namely cross-border regions that connect neighbours. The subsidiarity policies of the EU (meaning that decisions should be made in close connection with those concerned) are linked with the creation of border areas, seen not as obstacles and limits, but as spaces to be governed.

Borders have to be managed. If within the EU the goal is to diminish the importance of the borders and border controls, on the outer border of the EU controls and surveillance are even strengthening (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 133). The Schengen agreement underlines the need to control the Union’s external borders. It is no longer a question of one member state deciding how to control its national borders, the regulations and ways of controlling are being defined on the EU level.

A number of instruments have been created to strengthen border controls on the Union’s outer borders. The *integrated border management* (IBM) tool is a good example of these kinds of EU-level decisions on how to deal with borders. The countries on their way to entry into the European Union have engaged in deep reform processes to implement IBM in their border controls. The ideal is that strict border controls will enhance free movement of people and goods while closing the borders to all kinds of criminal activities.

When we talk about border management, it is not the same thing as the *governance* of the border regions. Governance can be understood in a Foucauldian sense as normalization – the implementation of a new set of shared norms. The border regions were traditionally marginalized during the Communist period in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, and Southeast Europe is not an exception. They were considered to be sensitive areas often facing ‘threatening’ neighbours. Today these regions are experiencing new openings.

Even though, on the one hand, the EU emphasizes on border controls when it comes to its outer borders, on the other hand European integration is all about cooperation. This discourse of cooperation has a spill-over effect on all levels of governance – supranational, national and local level. Simultaneous processes on different levels and in different fields produce norms and regulations when it comes to governing border regions in Europe. All these processes are based on an ideal perception that borders are ‘bridges’ that unite people and barriers which in the past have separated people living on different sides of the borders should be replaced. Thus borders enter identity politics and identity games when the notion of ‘we Europeans’ is being constructed on both sides of the borders.

Border regions become regions of cooperation where Europeanism and a number of shared norms that it consists of are constructed. What interests us here is the local level. Today the border regions on the local level are understood to be spaces that are appropriate for new forms of governance. Several new models and instruments on the European (supranational) level have been created to stimulate new openings towards neighbouring countries.

Some observers make a difference between border regions and cross-border regions. ‘A border region co-operates in individual cases and mostly when co-operation is required. A **cross-border region** acts consistently and long-term. Its sole task is the cross-border co-operation that must be successfully pursued by the region. Otherwise the region would become redundant. The work is based on **long-term** joint strategies including analysis of the strengths and weaknesses. Consequently, fields of action and projects are developed’ (Gabbe 2005). Thus the term ‘cross-border’ stresses the long-term perspective of the cooperation. It is also a way of overcoming old rivalries with long-lasting solutions like the French-German partnership.

Cross-border regions have come to the centre of the dominant discourse on integration – they receive new significations and represent new

opportunities (van Geenhuizen and Ratti 2001, 6). Remigio Ratti and Marina van Geenhuizen talk about 'active spaces' as the openness of border regions provides these regions with a certain capacity to absorb new ideas and integrate change. In this ideal, in an open space, the actors are capable of profiting from openness, using new resources and networks, yet keeping at the same time continuity of action as their main objective. Thus an open space is a space that implies learning and imagination (*ibid.*, 4). This concept stresses a new dynamism.

Thus the marginality of border regions no longer signifies inferiority if these regions manage to identify with a larger cross-border region – in the European framework the support given to cross-border regions makes it possible for a new innovation to emerge and opens up opportunities for action to local actors.

Even if cross-border cooperation is not a political priority in Western Balkan countries, this new discourse cannot be neglected on the political level. This discourse is an integral part of normative Europeanism when it comes to borders, and a number of actors participate in the construction of the dominant discourse on cross-border cooperation. By financing local and regional initiatives the European Commission also uses cross-border cooperation in the Balkans as an instrument of reconciliation and as a confidence-building measure. Concerning the integration process (the EU enlargement process) these instruments are used to support good neighbourly relations – one of the clearly stated conditions. This is seen as crucial for a region that has experienced conflicts in the recent past.

An Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) was established in 1971. Still today AEBR actively lobbies to strengthen cross-border cooperation and find favourable European funding. AEBR notes that the added value of cross-border cooperation includes contributing to the promotion of peace, freedom, security and respect for human rights. More concretely, the political added value of cross-border cooperation 'involves making a substantial contribution towards the development of Europe and European integration; getting to know each other, getting on together, understanding each other and building trust; the implementation of subsidiarity and partnership; increased economic and social cohesion and cooperation; preparing for the accession of new members; and using EU funding to secure cross-border cooperation via multiannual programmes, and ensuring that the necessary national and regional co-financing is committed in the long term' (AEBR s. a.).

This discourse is based on the assumption that cross-border cooperation is a solution to the negative effects of borders. According to ABER, '[t]he willingness of citizens, communities and regions to seek cross-border solutions together [...] aims to heal the “**scars of history**”, enable the population in the vicinity of borders to cooperate more effectively in all areas of life, improve living conditions for border residents and realise “a citizens’ Europe”’ (AEBR 2004, 7). One has to cross, or better said, overcome the border – the boundary/barrier – to achieve prosperity. This discourse opposes the discourse of national construction, that is, the construction of a state for one nation, which traditionally was seen as the only way to answer to the needs of a nation and its prosperity.

Cross-Border Cooperation Models

Cross-border cooperation is promoted through a number of models to develop cooperative structures, procedures and instruments that facilitate the removal of historical obstacles and divisive factors. In the 1990s, the EU institutions and capitals talked passionately about the ‘Europe of the regions’ – a concept quite forgotten today. At that time it was important to stress the importance of local actors. The resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 18 November 1988 called on states to regionalize their internal structures (Delli Zotti 1996, 61). For a time multilayer governance was the word of the day (Aldecoa and Keating 1999). A number of institutions and forums exist since that time whose aim is to strengthen cooperation between local entities. On border regions, cooperation also changed levels and today it should no longer be under the control of the state, but should rather be cooperation between local actors. The dominating discourse on cross-border cooperation values local actors, both NGOs and local communities. The European Parliament also noted in 1988 that relations between borderland regions should not be seen as classical foreign relations but on the contrary as ‘relations between neighbours’ (quoted by Delli Zotti 1996, 60).

The most important actors formulating norms around the cross-border cooperation are the European Union and the Council of Europe. The European Union focuses on financial support for cross-border cooperation projects and programmes. Most initiatives are financed by the Structural Funds (including INTERREG programmes) but in these initiatives, at least one of the partners in the project has to be an EU member state. A new cooperation instrument at the Community level was created as part of the

reform of regional policy for the period 2007–2013: the *European groupings of territorial cooperation* (see EGCC online). The Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA) now also has special funds focusing on cross-border cooperation even for projects between non-EU members.

If the European Union has the needed funds to finance cross-border cooperation, the power of the Council of Europe lies in its normative and conceptual work. It is one of the main standard setting actors in this field by producing Charters and Conventions that at least indirectly influence cross-border activities among its member states. The *European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities* signed in Madrid on 21 May 1980 is a major example of such conceptualizing power to define what is transfrontier co-operation and to create a juridical instrument to promote it.

Both the EU and the Council of Europe see cross-border cooperation as an instrument to deepen European integration and to promote economic and social development. However, their means as well as their vocabulary differ. The Council of Europe prefers the term ‘Transfrontier Co-Operation’, whereas the EU uses the notion of ‘Cross-border Co-operation’ (Council of Europe 2006). The term cross-border stresses more geographic proximity (Bataillou 2002, 15).

Promoting transfrontier/cross-border cooperation has resulted in a number of institutionalized models for strengthening “good neighbourly relations”. If outside Europe cross-border cooperation is often based on private initiatives (see Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2003), in Europe it has received more institutionalized forms such as the **Euroregions**. The first project called EUROREGIO has given its name to many others. In 1958 on the Dutch-German border the first Euroregion was established with an institutionalized multinational council to coordinate cooperation, working groups and a secretariat. Following this example other ‘Euroregions’ – inside and outside the EU – have been established (O’Dowd 2003, 18–19). The end of the Cold War multiplied the possibilities for cross-border contacts and links. In addition, the name ‘Euroregion’ acquired a certain level of respect and recognition. For example, in Bulgaria around ten Euroregions have been established during the last 15 years.

The Euroregion is an example of durable institutionalized cross-border cooperation in contrast to any ad hoc projects. Euroregions and other forms of transfrontier co-operation structures do not create a new type of government at the transfrontier level, the Council of Europe emphasizes.

They do not have political powers and their work is limited to the competences of the local and regional authorities which constitute them. But as normative models they do provide a form of ‘governance’. The Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) defines a Euroregion as (1) an association of local and regional authorities on either side of the national border; (2) which has a permanent secretariat and a technical and administrative team with its own resources; (3) is based on non-profit-making associations or foundations on either side of the border in accordance with the respective national law in force; and (4) is also based on inter-state agreements dealing, among other things, with the participation of territorial authorities (Council of Europe, ‘What is a Euroregion?’, s.a.).

One model that is not put forth by European organizations, but which is well known around the world, is the development of **peace parks** and Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs) linking environmental cooperation and peace. The first Peace Park was established by the Swedish and Norwegian Peace Movements in 1914 to celebrate 100 years of peace between Sweden and Norway.

The European Green Belt running along the former Iron Curtain is considered a Peace Park. It ‘lies along the former militarised frontier zones that were cleared of their populations and remained uninhabited during the Cold War. The IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) now promotes the preservation of as much as possible of this strip in the semi-natural state to which, fortuitously, it reverted between 1945 and 1990. Originally a purely German initiative, the programme now links conservation organisations along the entire line of the former Iron Curtain from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea and the Adriatic’ (Milsom 2010, see also Young 2008).

Peace Parks exist elsewhere in the world, too, among others in the Red Sea between Israel and Jordan, and there is a project for the Green Line Peace Park in Cyprus, between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Territories. An important number of peace parks exist on the African continent.

These transfrontier conservation areas (TFCA) (or peace parks) are ‘defined as relatively large areas that straddle frontiers between two or more countries and cover large-scale natural systems encompassing one or more protected areas. Very often both human and animal populations traditionally migrated across or straddled the political boundaries concerned. In essence, TFCAs therefore extend far beyond designated protected areas, and can

incorporate such innovative approaches as biosphere reserves and a wide range of community-based natural resource management programmes' (World Bank 1996 quoted by Peace Park Foundation, s.a. online).

Balkans Peace Park Project (B3P)

Following the model of Transfrontier Conservation Areas, a group of active people (many of them foreigners and thus outsiders to the region but passionate about its future) have actively put forth an idea of a transnational protected area in the border triangle between Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro. This project has been named *the Balkans Peace Park* and according to its official web pages the project would be 'a symbol of peace and cooperation where communities from all three countries work together to protect their fragile environment, stimulate local employment and promote sustainable visitor activities in the region'. The Balkans Peace Park Project (earlier BPPP, today known as B3P) promotes the region where 'spectacular mountains and valleys of northern Albania, Kosovo/a and Montenegro share a landscape of wild beauty, exceptional flora and fauna, as well as a traditional lifestyle, that is almost unique in Europe and relatively unspoilt by modern development'. They also note the imminent threats to this region 'from declining population, illegal logging and other environmental destruction'. 'The establishment of a Balkans Peace Park would unite the existing communities of the three countries in preserving biodiversity and enabling local people to continue to live in the valleys, supported by sustainable tourism', note the project's web pages (Balkans Peace Park).

The project is not an innovation in itself as 'there are over 600 environmentally protected areas in the world which straddle international boundaries'. Over 20 of these are specifically called Peace Parks, 'symbols of peace and cooperation between countries where sometimes there has been serious conflict between them', notes the B3P leaflet. Even though Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro do show interest in creating environmentally protected areas, this 'peace park' proposal has not received official status. As an NGO (a UK charity, to be more precise³) the 'Balkans Peace Park' has for years organized hikes, summer camps and other grass-root level activities. In 2011 a sister organization, a local NGO under the name of

³ Since 2011 there is also a registered NGO on the Albanian side called the Balkans Peace Park Albania.

Balkans Peace Park Albania, was established in Shkodra in northern Albania.

The Balkans Peace Park Project is an interesting case to approach as a cross-border region. It is still quite a small project despite the potential of the region and the momentum of the border regions on the European agenda and it has encountered resistance both on the local level and among state officials. Today there is no transfrontier protected area in this region. In Albania, and since 2011 in Montenegro, protected areas have been established in these border areas of a potential peace park, but on the Kosovo side a National Park is still lacking. The plan put forward by the B3P would mean that 'the approximate 3000sq km of the Balkans Peace Park should include the Kelmend, Shala Valley and Valbona regions of Albania, the Prokletije and Komovi area of Montenegro and the Hajla-Rugova-Djeravica region of Kosovo/a'. Thus the three particular regions which concern us are the Rugova region of western Kosovo, the Montenegrin Prokletije Park and the Thethi National Forest Park in northern Albania. The Prokletije National Park is the fifth National Park in Montenegro. For a long time it was not seen as a Government priority, notes Antonia Young, the grand old lady behind the B3P project (Young 2008, 10).

In practice, the B3P is a grassroots network bringing together transnational actors, especially academics and environmental activists in the Balkans, the UK and around the globe, linking them with people living and working in the valleys and villages of the area. According to their vision, a truly international cross-border protected area in this region, which is one of the most spectacular and least-known mountain ranges in Europe, can both further the needs, interests and aspirations of the local communities, and help sustain biodiversity and ecological responsibility. The ultimate aim – reaching an established protected cross-border transnational park that would be governed together by the representatives from the three countries – is still to be achieved.



Map 1. Possible extent of the proposed Balkans Peace Park between Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro.⁴

Limits of Cross-Border Idealism

One of the grass-root level achievements of the B3P have been the cross-border hikes that have received special authorizations from the local authorities to cross the borders on non-official border-crossing points. The European Union is based on the ideal of free movement. Different EU instruments are used to strengthen the permeability of borders not only in practice (by funding border check-points among other things) but on a more mental level, too. These include cross-border cooperation initiatives such as Euroregions and financial means such as the EU Commission's Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and support on infrastructural reforms. Sometimes other infrastructural projects are however prioritized by the EU rather than those proposed by the central governments. The Albanian government has recently focused on the building of a highway between the coastal town of Durrës (the main tourist destination of Kosovo Albanians) and the capital of Kosovo, Pristina. This highway was not seen as important from the Brussels perspective. Far away from the region, it is hard to see the importance of

⁴ Outlines of the proposed Peace Park from: <http://mappery.com/map-of/proposed-balkans-peace-park-map> (24 October 2012).

certain infrastructural initiatives. However, another smaller project promoted in the region of the Balkans Peace Park Project is a road that would link the capital of Montenegro, Podgorica, with Plava lake and the Prokletije mountain range in the north-eastern part of the country. The newly reopened road would pass through Albania, but as on the Montenegrin side the region is very mountainous, it would cut travel time significantly and promote the economic development of the border areas on both sides of the border.

If on the one hand, for infrastructural projects local knowledge is the key to understanding traffic flows, on the other hand the success of cross-border cooperation projects also depends on local engagement. Many projects launched in recent years in the Western Balkans have failed to respond to the high expectations of the donors. Euroregions (such as the *Ohrid Prespa Euroregion*) in Albania, Greece and (FYR) Macedonia have stumbled on political disputes and the name issue between Greece and Macedonia. Other projects have failed to raise local interest and engagement.

The Euroregion as a model presupposes a long-term engagement; the European Commission projects financed by the Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA) have on the other hand a limited time span. IPA funds are now also open for cross-border cooperation project applications between non-member countries in the Western Balkans. A number of small grants have been granted to projects realized between Albania and Montenegro, ranging from environmental protection to tourism development. Between Albania and Kosovo the Commission have had a plan to use the cross-border funds for developing the border-crossing point on the new highway (even though the highway itself did not receive EU funding), but at this time the EU Commission is only able to fund bilateral projects. This is due to bureaucratic reasons, as the Commission delegations in each country need to manage the funds in their respective countries, which means that if there were three beneficiary countries involved, the project would also involve three Commission delegations. Thus the Balkans Peace Park Project would not be eligible as such for Commission funding.

Many foreigners including B3P volunteers or EU civil servants are well intended and even passionate about the future of these border regions. However, they are often unaware of the interests, habits and beliefs of the local people living in these regions, which have experienced a number of profound political changes during the last century. The concept 'Peace Park' itself is one of the greatest obstacles when it comes to establishing such a

cross-border region. As a model it presupposes that there has been a conflict in the region before. Local officials, however, underline that this region was not a scene of conflict during the 1990s wars in the Balkans. On the contrary, good neighbourly relations are stressed as Montenegro has recognized Kosovo's independence, unlike its other neighbours Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The concept of 'peace' in the name of the cross-border cooperation project has been criticized in the meetings of the B3P with the local actors.⁵ Promoting the 'Peace Park' might be seen as evoking rather traumatic memories of more historical conflicts.

Indeed, region-building (as an ultimate aim of cross-border cooperation) is always linked with identity politics. Today's priorities are seen by the local authorities as framework of European integration, rather than in the reconciliation with the past. At the end of the 19th century bloody wars were indeed fought on the borders between today's Albania and Montenegro, when Montenegro attempted to occupy Albanian-inhabited areas in the Ottoman Empire. Albania declared its independence in 1912 and its borders were drawn by the Great Powers in 1919. Kosovo and a number of Albanian-inhabited areas were left outside the newly-established Albanian nation-state. This cutting of traditional communication lines created a shared trauma for the Albanian nation. The Albanian clans living outside the newly established state fought for their areas to be included in Albania. Thus, they rarely identified themselves with the new state (Yugoslavia) in which they were living. Throughout the interwar period the Yugoslav government pressured the Albanian population either to emigrate or to assimilate (Vickers 2008, 127). The Yugoslav legacy is crucial for comprehending today's situation in the border region between Kosovo and Montenegro.

The end of the Second World War marked another traumatic experience for the Albanian population. The border established between Hoxha's Albania and Tito's Yugoslavia was totally closed. The state borders and the surrounding regions were considered to be somehow threatening to the integrity and safety of the state. Albanians living in the border areas (known for their patriotism towards the ideal of a Greater Albania) were a threat to the Yugoslav state builders. Many were killed and imprisoned in Tito's purges, which lasted long after the war had ended. This region, which in Ottoman times had flourished owing to the trading routes passing through the valleys between the mountains, was marginalized and suppressed during

⁵ Interviews by the author in the region in 2010 as well as with the Chair of the B3P Ann Kennard on 24 September 2011.

the Communist period. In Albania, Hoxha's rule was no better. The Communist ideology had been put forth by southerners, but the northerners were less enthusiastic about the new state system. Thus the northerners were closely monitored by the regime. For state security the border regions were considered unreliable and their development was neglected by the central government.

Today Albanians are experiencing a boom of cross-border networking – this is sometimes looked at with concern by the ruling elites of the countries where Albanians live as minorities, such as Macedonia and Montenegro. All in all, the political changes in the region since the collapse of Communism have been dramatic: the borders of Hoxha's Communist Albania that had divided families and prevented communication for 45 years were reopened. Roads and other communication channels were rebuilt. In a Summit organized in the city of Prizren in June 2010 the Presidents of Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro discussed the creation of a mini-Schengen area to promote free movement in the area (Collaku 2010, President of Montenegro 2010). On different levels, national unity is being redefined and reinterpreted in an acceptable Europeanist discourse in contrast to traditional wordings.

It is not rare in the Western Balkans that the inhabitants of a border region can in fact feel closer to those living on the other side of the border than to those among whom the borderlanders are actually living: indeed these nation-states are characterized by imagined borders that exist within these states. To establish more permeable borders would make it easier for this border population to cooperate with those they feel close to, but this perspective wakes up the fear of affecting or even breaking the integrity of the state.

Minority issues raise vivid emotions (see Roudometof 2002). During the last few years, the pace and magnitude of change have in fact awakened old threat images, conflicts and suspicions. However, at the same time European discourse is adopted by the political elites. Rarely can a politician talk against cross-border cooperation, free movement of people or decentralization, as these initiatives are openly based on Western and European values and the ideal of freedom.

The region under scrutiny in this article has been characterized by political and identity debates and statehood disparities. Montenegro gained independence in 2006 and Kosovo (though this was contested by Serbia and several other states) in 2008. Thus the border between Kosovo and

Montenegro in the Peace Park area did not exist as anything else than an administrative boundary until 2006. From 1999 to 2008 Kosovo was a UN protectorate. Decision making in this kind of situation, where the legality and legitimacy of the decision makers at the central level is put in question by some of the actors, has not made cooperation any easier. Today Kosovo's independence is recognized by both Albania and Montenegro, which makes the situation a little simpler. The lack of a united EU policy concerning the status of Kosovo has, however, made it difficult to acquire EU funds for this cross-border area.

To safeguard international financing and aid is today a priority on all levels of society. However, local projects remain under regulation and surveillance from the state level, and it seems that it is still quite difficult to get funding from the state budget for cross-border projects.

It would, however, be an oversimplification to think that the problems that the B3P project faces today would in fact exist because the area is inhabited by one ethnic population across the borders, the Albanians. On the contrary, it is **clearly a multi-ethnic area**. If in Albania the area participating in the B3P region is ethnically Albanian, on the Kosovo side the area is also mainly Albanian inhabited, but traditionally small Serb minority live especially in the municipalities of Peja/Peć and Deçani/Dečani (both with old Orthodox monasteries). On the Montenegrin side, this cross-border region includes a small Albanian population, but the ethnic map is more diverse than in the neighbouring countries, as described by John Milsom:

One of the problems anticipated in working in this area is its extreme political sensitivity. In both Albania and Kosovo, B3P is dealing with Albanian-speaking populations, in entities for which Albanian is the majority language. The Plav opština is home to three distinct communities, two of which speak variants of Serbian and one speaking Albanian. The part of the population that is Serbian-speaking and, by tradition if not by practice, orthodox Christian is most simply referred to as Serb, which is how most of its members would describe their ethnicity, if not their nationality. Albanians and Bosnjaks (Slav-speaking Muslims) make up most of the population in the southern part of the opština, closest to the Prokletije mountains and the Albanian border. The township of Gusinje has only a small 'Serb' population, and inhabitants of Vuthaj claim that it is the only entirely Albanian village in Montenegro. Remarkably, although the Albanian language is audible in Gusinje, it is almost invisible. (Milsom and Dworski 2010.)

This ethnic disparity in itself should not be an obstacle for cross-border cooperation that is in its essence understood as cooperation between 'us' and

‘others’. However, the existence of ‘us’ (Albanians) on all sides of the borders may be a factor which causes wariness among the ‘others’ – in the case of Montenegro the Slavic-speaking majority – whether Orthodox or Muslim. On the Montenegrin side, in this particular cross-border area the Albanians represent a small minority but may still be seen as a threat in the eyes of the central government – not in the sense of state security, but economically. They could, for example, profit more easily from the cross-border networks that they historically have with the neighbouring areas.

While a ‘borderless’ Europe may well be developing inside the EU, at the outskirts of the European Union the role of borders is continuously changing and not only towards more permeable forms. In the future, this cross-border region of the B3P may encounter a new obstacle brought about by European enlargement. Indeed, on the one hand the weakening inner border controls symbolize European integration and this ideal can be seen as one of the motors of cross-border cooperation also in the Balkans. On the other hand, the ever-strengthening controls on the EU outer borders characterize today’s EU. This can easily be seen on the borders between Slovenia and Croatia for instance, where until 2004 the crossing was fairly simple and where until 1991 there was no state border. Today the crossing of what has become an EU border is much more complicated.

The Balkan Peace Park may encounter a similar problem in the near future. The border controls between Montenegro and Kosovo, as well as between Montenegro and Albania, are pretty light and on the border between Kosovo and Albania the crossing has been made as easy as possible with no passport controls during the tourist season. However, Montenegro was given an official EU candidate status in December 2010, and it started membership negotiations with the EU in June 2012. Albania, on the other hand, was asked to perform better in its reform policies. Kosovo, however, cannot even dream of contractual relations with the EU as five EU member states have not recognized it as a sovereign state. It cannot yet negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, which would be the first step in moving closer to the EU.⁶ Thus Kosovo’s EU accession lies farther away in the future when compared with Montenegro. If Montenegro joins the EU, these three countries will see the Montenegrin border

⁶ The representatives of Kosovo and Serbia agreed in February 2012 that even though Serbia does not recognize Kosovo, Kosovo can represent itself in the regional cooperation structures under the name of Kosovo. This raises hopes of opening the doors for Kosovo’s contractual relationship also with the EU.

implement much stricter EU outer border controls, leaving Albanian and Kosovo partners with a much more complicated situation concerning the development of cross-border activities.

How to Promote Local Ownership?

Today, the idea of European integration is based on the dismantling of borders – but in actual practice it often means the borders between EU member states. Europeanist discourse has, as we have noted, an impact on policies towards the border regions also in the neighbouring areas. Border regions represent new opportunities of cooperation and prosperity. Thus the Western Balkan countries that strive towards EU membership have adopted political discourse that promotes regional and cross-border cooperation. Ideally, cross-border cooperation should be seen as something which has been established – a long-term vision for the border region. But whose vision are we talking about? Governments, municipalities, NGOs and ‘diaspora often carry a completely different perspective’ on the issue as compared with those who remain in the region (Reich 2006, 21).

On the government level, despite the positive political talk, cross-border cooperation rarely materializes in the concrete action plans of the Western Balkan countries. Even though a Europeanist discourse may be adopted, it is rarely or only partially implemented (as in many other policy fields, too). Border regions – not least because they may be inhabited by ethnic minorities – are still, if not openly then at least in practice, considered with caution. In addition to the general vigilance, central governments lack an overall vision for these regions.

This can be observed in the north-eastern region of Montenegro close to the Kosovo and Albanian borders. Even though the Plava lake area could be very profitable for developing a tourism infrastructure, the Government has not allocated any public funding for tourism projects there over the last few years. Many ethnic Albanian investors are even denied building permits. The Montenegrin government rather focuses instead on the coastline, which is the obvious destination for tourists coming from Western Europe. In addition, eutrophication (which could be stopped by fairly simple means) is slowly killing the Plava lake. Untreated sewage effluent and agricultural run-off carrying fertilizers are the causes of eutrophication. Eutrophication promotes excessive plant growth and decay and causes a severe reduction in water quality. Very quickly eutrophication is decreasing the value of this beautiful lake for recreation, fishing and aesthetic enjoyment. However, the

Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development either does not know about or is unwilling to acknowledge the problems of this region.⁷ These policies of neglect are a long way from the European Union idealization of cross-border cooperation and the development of border regions.

Sometimes the ideas that the central Government might propose are strongly opposed on the local level. In the village of Vusanje/Vuthaj, for example, situated in the protected area of the Prokletije National Park, the local population has raised their voice against a power plant project that has been tendered by the state of Montenegro to tame the river passing through this village. The inhabitants of the village claim that this plan has been made at a central governmental level without taking into account the local reality. The village does not have access to a municipal water system, but its natural source and the river Gerla are the sources of clean drinking water for the village population. Moreover, the disputable gains of such a project will not benefit this village. What makes this local conflict complicated is that the project has been approved by the Plava municipality to which this village belongs.⁸

This dispute is a revealing example of the lack of dialogue between different levels of administration from the village level to the central level. An active civil society could promote transparency in decision-making processes and ensure information flow from the local level towards the capital. However, the north-eastern part of Montenegro is lacking NGOs. This has been noted even by the Centre for Development of Non-Governmental Organizations in Podgorica.⁹ Without civil society advocacy it is easy for the central Governments to neglect remote areas. The NGOs have concentrated in the capital area, a development which may strengthen David Chandler's argument: he sees the NGO sector as merely legitimizing the international/donor-oriented solutions proposed for local problems (Chandler 2006, 113–115). Even international organizations do not seem interested in the remote areas that do not have the structures to present their interests in a discursive framework that would be compatible with the international agenda and their stated goals – such as conflict resolution or European integration.

⁷ Interview by the author with the Deputy Minister of Nebojša Popović Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism of Montenegro, 18 October 2011.

⁸ See Friends of Vuthaj, the online petition.

⁹ Interview by the author of Ana Novakovic, the Executive Director of the Center for Development of non-Governmental Organizations, 17 October 2011.

On the European level, cross-border cooperation is presented as a way to overcome the conflicts related to nation-state building and a step towards European integration. The Patron of the Balkans Peace Park Project Graham Watson¹⁰ notes: ‘Whilst EU membership remains a beacon of hope for Balkan countries, schemes like the Balkan Peace Park Project are vitally important to peace in Europe. The Project rises above the politics that have plagued the region [...] this embodies both the spirit of liberalism and European integration’ (Balkans Peace Park).

Despite the stated good intentions, the Balkans Peace Park project presents a number of unexpected disadvantages to the people living in the border villages. The societies around the borders concerned are undergoing deep changes in almost all spheres of life. Village life is changing through *immigration* (many diaspora members just build houses in the villages around these borders leaving them empty for most of the year) and *urbanization* (young Albanians from the Montenegrin side are moving to cities in Kosovo). Even though in the countryside many see the USA, Europe and the West as the models to be followed, strong traditionalism still prevails in these societies.

The Balkans Peace Park Project is a good example of a well-intended ‘prescription’ which aims to overcome local challenges such as unemployment and environmental degradation. The Balkan Peace Park project aims to provide the borderlanders with new tools and mechanisms to cope with these challenges. The project promotes environmentally sound ecotourism, organizes hikes, visits and conferences and looks for practical ways of strengthening sustainable development in this region. Besides being a project which incorporates a number of concrete activities, it is also a conceptual framework to promote the added value of the border regions. The Balkans Peace Park Project is often understood as a tool for the local inhabitants to learn about the benefits of European cross-border ideals. John Milsom, a member of the B3P, noted when visiting Vusanje/Vuthaj village on the Montenegrin side that ‘the main need in Vuthaj is for some form of employment, and scope clearly exists for the development of eco-tourism. [...] However, the villagers have at present little understanding of the tourism potential and of the sorts of tourists likely to be attracted to the Prokletije. It is in this area that the greatest needs exist’ (Milsom and Dworski 2010, 11).

¹⁰ Graham Watson is a Liberal Democrat Member of the European Parliament for South West England and Gibraltar and a Patron of the Balkans Peace Park Project.

Outsiders have tried to understand why the villages in the peace park cross-border cooperation area have not been able to adapt themselves to profiting from the new situation when cross-border cooperation is very fashionable on the European agenda and could provide interesting opportunities. *Appropriation* is often described as the act of taking possession or assigning purpose to concepts or ideas. Thus a successfully appropriated discourse would be something that is genuinely owned by the appropriator, something that has become a part of his or her understanding and life. Ideally the Balkans Peace Park project could give a frame for different actors in the region to adapt to the new pre-EU situation in places where the borders are opened after the collapse of Communism; both Kosovo and Montenegro are now independent and all three states concerned have been given a 'European perspective'. The project could serve as a discursive frame for the actors to modify their dominant discourses and conceptualizations to attract financing, investment, jobs and political support to the region.

A number of these opportunities, such as the EU funding instruments, are unknown to many in the region, but the lacking appropriation of European discourse on added value of the border regions is due not only to the lack of access to information, but also to the fact that this discourse simply does not answer to the needs of the local populations. People feel neglected (as they had been in Communist times) and do not even want to take ownership of a discourse that in some way might promote their living areas but on the other hand threaten their traditional way of life and even their economic interests. The resistance to the new proposals that arises on the local level often stems from the strong traditionalism of the villages.

In northern Albania and the Albanian villages near the border on the Montenegrin side, a customary law called Kanun still survives in the local habits and beliefs. Often the name of Kanun evokes blood feuds, but rather than that Kanun is a customary law that organizes the life in the village. Nebi Bardoshi is the leading anthropologist in Albania studying the traditional life in the north and north-eastern parts of the country: 'The social structure of the Kanun village is composed of three integral parts which are the "brotherhoods" or "fraternity" (*vllazni* in Albanian), "womb" (*bark*) and "families" (*shpija, familja*).' The largest social unit, which includes a number of families in the village, is the brotherhood or fraternity (Bardoshi, s.a.) One village may consist of mainly one brotherhood or may contain families of a number of brotherhoods, depending on the origin of the

village. Sometimes, like in the case of Vusanje/Vuthaj, the origin of the village can be traced back to three brothers who are said to have established the village hundreds of years ago. Thus most of the families belong to the same brotherhood. Some researchers refer to the smaller social unit ‘womb’ as *mahalla*, a grouping of houses united by the same family name. The smallest unit, the family, can also be referred to with the Albanian word *shpija*, a household.

Even in the post-socialist time, people do not see intra-brotherhood marriages as appropriate and follow the local lore which explains the blood relations between the families. Compared to modern law, which allows marriages between the cousins, the old traditional law does not allow marriages inside the brotherhood. People do not marry among themselves within the village either even if they are not blood related. The justification that the people give for this practice is that ‘their ancestors left this rule and it is inappropriate [even] to *speak* about such an idea at all’ (Bardoshi, s.a.). The traditions are still very much alive in villages such as Vusanje/Vuthaj.¹¹

Bardoshi explains that ‘the whole system of village common ownership of *land* (forests, water, and pastorals etc.) is closely associated with the memory of origin. The genealogy of each family is learned by each and every member in everyday life. Remembering familial, kinship or tribal genealogy is a very important part of personal and collective identity. From an early age girls learn the reasons why they cannot marry within the village and that they will not benefit from immovable property of the family. The Kanun’s rules on village land regulate primarily the acceptance of newcomers in the village. Newcomers’ acceptance in the village depends, first and foremost, on whether they would behave according to local customs’ (Bardoshi, s.a.).

Selling property – especially land – is still very complicated from the traditional point of view and does not make outside investments easy. In the Albanian villages the traditional way of life makes it difficult to provide simple ecotourism services and products that visitors expect. Following the traditional way of life, it is difficult for many Albanian families to rent guest rooms in their own homes to hikers or other foreign visitors as this would mean having foreign men in the house together with the women of the family. The traditional hospitality makes it difficult to take money for simple services. One of the leading principles of the Kanun is in fact hospitality towards visitors. To overcome these dilemmas, the jobs and

¹¹ Interviews and discussions by the author in the village of Vusanje/Vuthaj in 2010.

economic opportunities promoted by any development project need to be in line with the villagers' way of life. Such a project cannot succeed without genuine local ownership of the business initiatives and development aims.

On the other hand, the Balkans Peace Park is meant to become a cross-border/transnational protected area. There is still great local concern about the detrimental consequences of such a park for individual landowners (Young 2008, 10). The local landowners fear that establishing of national parks would mean that they would not be allowed to chop fire wood from their own forests which had become part of the national park or to attract other investments. In fact, the restitution of the lands that were nationalized during the Communist times is not seen as having been done correctly (if at all) in some of the areas in Montenegro. This raises negative feelings against the Prokletije National Park that has now been established by the Montenegrin government. Many Albanian families consider that their lands have now been permanently nationalized and without rightful compensation.

As the Balkans Peace Park Project has been promoting the idea of the Prokletije National Park in the area, it has received the criticism of the local population. This criticism has to be overcome if the project is to succeed in its aims at providing sustainable development and livelihood for the borderland villages. In an optimistic note John Milsom writes: 'It is clear that the level of local opposition to this development would be reduced if it could be seen by the people living in the Park area as a possible source of income. There will undoubtedly be opportunities in servicing tourists as the Park becomes established and more widely known, and also opportunities for employment as rangers' (Milsom and Dworski 2010, 11).

Local knowledge and ownership is necessary to create a project which the local population can relate to that finds feasible ways to resolve local problems. In the field of development aid, experience has shown that projects are unsustainable if they are conceptualized and planned entirely by outsiders (Reich 2006, 6). According to Reich, sensitivity to cultural differences alone is not enough (ibid., 20). The focus should be put on the power relationship between international donors and local actors. 'Taken seriously as a guiding principle for action, local ownership would mean far more than a consulting or participatory role given to the local actors on behalf of the donors or external parties. Rather it means that local actors have the final decisive power over a project's process and outcome. Local ownership then means a power shift, which goes far beyond existing practices. Local actors would not only be involved in the information-

gathering process or strategy development, but should have the means to decide about the agenda, strategy and budget management themselves, even decide who the beneficiaries of the project should be' (ibid., 15). Reich notes that local ownership requires more than dialogue and calls for a 'mutual learning process' between insiders and outsiders (ibid., 22). Thus for an outside funded or initiated project to flourish, a framework is needed in which both information and ideas can flow unhindered in both ways.

Conclusions

For the Balkans Peace Park project to succeed, it is crucial that the initiative takes fully into account the needs and habits of the local inhabitants. It is clear that a positive discursive framework, such as one constructed through a cross-border cooperation project, can promote the local interests in a dialogue with the capital city authorities as well as with international donors. Local knowledge needs however to be taken into account and valorized. Only if the local realities are fully incorporated into the project can the local inhabitants use it to strengthen their own bargaining position at the national level as well as to attract international investment. The current B3P as a UK charity has a long way to go if it wants to establish a real cross-border cooperation project based on genuine local partnership with local actors deciding about priorities, strategies and budgetary questions. The establishing of a local NGO called Balkans Peace Park Albania is a first step towards this goal. In the future, the B3P with local NGO partners may be able to serve as a framework for 'mutual learning' between insiders (the local NGOs and inhabitants of the region) as well as outsiders interested in the region's development, such as the active members of the B3P, foreign donors and diaspora members.

The Balkans Peace Park Project also needs to find ways to overcome the negative connotations both of its name (mentioning peace may imply that there has been a conflict earlier) and of the National Parks that it has been promoting (national park implies the nationalization of private land). Linked directly with local identity politics, the B3P can only succeed if it manages to find solutions on these conceptual but at the same time emotional issues.

Furthermore, the B3P needs a long-term vision for the region it is promoting. This is needed to attract international and European funding for the region. The cross-border cooperation that the European Union supports may not be of a long-term nature, but may instead be linked with a limited temporary project cycle. In addition, EU-funded projects are currently

established only between two states. However, an established cross-border project including local authorities from all sides of the border would make it easier to propose smaller bilateral projects for EU funding as well as to continue the cooperation activities in the future despite the uneven pace of the European integration of the participating states. In the area between Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo this situation will be at hand when Montenegro starts negotiating EU membership and needs to focus more on border management than on governing and Europeanizing its border areas. Thus the Balkans Peace Park could serve as a frame for maintaining cooperation despite the uneven EU enlargement process. Before this can happen, however, the B3P or any cross-border cooperation project needs to find ways to give a voice to the local population and provide a platform for mutual learning rather than being a tool of the Europeanization process, understood as a simple one-way street of transfer of norms and practices.

References

- AEBR s.a. The added value of cross-border cooperation. http://www.aebr.eu/files/publications/AGEG-Flyer_en.pdf (16 February 2011).
- AEBR 2004. European Charter for Border and Cross-Border Regions, New Version, 7 October 2004. http://www.aebr.eu/files/publications/Charta_Final_071004.gb.pdf (16 February 2011).
- Aldecoa, Francisco & Michael Keating (eds.). 1999. *Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relation of Subnational Governments*. London: Frank Cass.
- Balkans Peace Park. Who we are. http://www.balkanspeacepark.org/who_we_are.php (16 February 2011).
- Bardhoshi, Nebi. 2011. Toward a Theory of Legal Pluralism or Kanun Continuation during Communism A paper presented at the 6th InASEA Conference 'Southeast European (Post) Modernities' in Regensburg, Germany, 28 April – 01 May 2011, unpublished.
- Bataillou, Christian. 2002. *L'émergence du fait régional au sein de l'Union européenne: La coopération transfrontalière comme stratégie de développement*. Perpignan: Presses Universitaires de Perpignan.
- Chandler, David. 2006. *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building*. London: Pluto.
- Collaku, Petrit. 2010. Four Presidents Push for Mini Schengen Zone in Balkans *Balkaninsight*, 28 June. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/four-presidents-push-for-mini-schengen-zone-in-balkans> (12 December 2011).
- Commission [of the European Communities]. 2006. Communication from the Commission: The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity. 27 January 2006. COM (2006) 27.
- Council of Europe. s.a. What is a Euroregion?. http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/areas_of_work/transfrontier_cooperation/euroregions/what_is_EN.asp (27 February 2011).

- Council of Europe. 1980. The European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, 20 May 1980. <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/106.htm> (27 February 2011).
- Council of Europe. 1996. *Handbook on transfrontier co-operation for local and regional authorities in Europe*, 3rd edn. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Council of Europe. 2006. Similarities and differences of instruments and policies of the Council of Europe and the European Union in the field of Transfrontier Cooperation. <https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1383219&Site=COE> (27 February 2011).
- Creed, Gerald. 1997. *Domesticating Revolution: From Socialist Reform to Ambivalent Transition in a Bulgarian Village*. Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press.
- Delanty, Gerard & Chris Rumford. 2005. *Rethinking Europe. Social Theory of the Implications of Europeanization*. London: Routledge.
- Delli Zotti, Giovanni. 1996. Transfrontier co-operation at the external borders of the European Union: Implications for sovereignty. In O'Dowd, Liam & Thomas M. Wilson (eds.), *Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe*. Avebury: Aldershot.
- EGCC. s.a., European cross-border cooperation groupings. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/agriculture/general_framework/g24235_en.htm (27 February 2011).
- Friends of Vuthaj. 2011. Petition. <http://www.change.org/petitions/the-government-of-the-republic-of-montenegro-help-vuthajvusanje-cancel-the-hydropower-plant-project-in-the-village> (17 December 2011).
- Gabbe, Jens. 2005. Governance and cross-border co-operation. Speech on the occasion of the RFO Annual Conference in Joensuu, North Karelia, Finland. <http://www.aebr.eu/files/publications/governancevortragjoensuu.gb.pdf> (27 February 2011).
- Geenhuizen, Marina van & Remigio Ratti. 2001. An Active Space Approach to Regional Development. In Marina van Geenhuizen & Remigio Ratti (eds.), *Gaining Advantage from Open Borders: An active space approach to regional development*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- ICB. 2005. International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe's Future. Sofia: Center for Liberal Strategies. <http://www.becei.org/dokumenti/report.pdf> (17 December 2011).
- Kaplan, David & Jouni Häkli (eds.). 2002. *Boundaries and Place: European borderlands in geographical context*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kideckel, David A. 2008. *Getting By in Postsocialist Romania: Labor, the Body, and Working-Class Culture* (New Anthropologies of Europe). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kideckel, David A. 1993. *The Solitude of Collectivism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Milsom, John. 2010. Report by Gladestry Associates for the Balkan Peace Park Project, 4th Pan-European Greenbelt meeting, Kuhmo, Finland, 6 October, unpublished.
- Milsom, John & Marijana Dworski. 2010. Report on a Visit to Montenegro May 19–24, 2010 by Gladestry Associates for the Balkans Peace Park Project, 7 June, unpublished.
- O'Dowd, Liam. 2003. The Changing Significance of European Borders. In James Anderson, Liam O'Dowd & Thomas M. Wilson (eds.), *New Borders for a Changing Europe: Crossborder Cooperation and Governance*. London: Frank Cass.

- Papadimitriou, Dimitris & David Phinnemore. 2003. Exporting Europeanization to the Wider Europe: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in the Candidate Countries and Beyond. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 3(2).1–22.
- Peace Park Foundation. s.a. Origins of Peace Park Foundation. <http://www.peaceparks.org/story.php?pid=1&mid=2> (16 February 2011).
- President of Montenegro (official home page). 2010. Prizren, Through Dialogue to a Better Climate in the Region. 26 June. <http://www.predsjednik.me/eng/?akcija=vijest&id=2844> (12 December 2011).
- Reich, Hannah. 2006. *Local Ownership in Conflict Transformation Projects: Partnership, Participation or Patronage* (Berghof Occasional Papers 27). Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Roudometof, Victor. 2002. National minorities, nation-states, and external national homelands in Southeastern Europe. In George A. Kourvetaris, Victor Roudometof, Kleomenis Koutsoukis & Andrew Kourvetaris (eds.), *The New Balkans: Disintegration and Reconstruction*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Tamminen, Tanja. 2011. *Des frontières convoitées aux marches de l'Union européenne: La gouvernance européenne de l'espace politique dans les Balkans du Sud après la guerre du Kosovo (1999–2008)*. Tampere: Tampere University Press, TAPRI Studies in Peace and Conflict Research.
- Tamminen, Tanja. 2012. Will the EU road open for Kosovo as well? The agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on the dispute over Kosovo's name raises hopes of bringing Kosovo closer to the EU. *FIIA Comment* 4, 7 March 2012. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
- Verdery, Katherine. 1996. *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Vickers, Miranda. 2008. *The Albanians: A Modern History*. London: I.B.Tauris.
- Young, Antonia. 2008. Establishing the Balkans Peace Park (Albania/Montenegro/Kosovo/a): Overcoming Conflicts through Negotiation on Cross-Border Environmental Protection. *Central and Eastern European Review* 2/2008 (part I). www.ceer.org.uk (2 April 2011).