Constrained Pragmatism

Time: 14:15–15:45
Place: Lecture room 7, Metsätalo (Unioninkatu 40)

Can practical and moral considerations make a difference to what we ought to believe?  There are good reasons to think that they can, in at least some circumstances.  Our practical interests and cognitive limitations seem relevant to whether and how we should be open to new evidence, and the stakes of being wrong seem to bear on how much evidence we need to be justified in believing.  But few philosophers wish to embrace radical forms of pragmatism that place no restrictions on the kinds of considerations that can make a difference, and thus allow factors like bribes and threats to affect what we ought to believe.  Alex Worsnip (2020) poses a dilemma for those tempted by pragmatism, arguing that there may be no “moderate” stopping-point between an anti-pragmatist view and extreme versions of pragmatism.  I will articulate and defend a “constrained” version of pragmatism that largely avoids Worsnip’s dilemma, and draw out two competing ways of filling in the details of this kind of view (based on joint work with Daniel Fogal).

Sarah Paul is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at NYU Abu Dhabi, and the author of Philosophy of Action:  A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Press, 2021).