Month: December 2022

by Anton Stalchenko

“People under suspicion are better moving than at rest, since at rest they may be sitting in the balance without knowing it, being weighed together with their sins.”

― Franz Kafka, The Trial

In 2005 in the post-authoritarian space of Central Eastern Europe (CEE), I remember adults in public offices carefully whispering and acting in a way that appeared extra cautious.  Everyone made sure that children were not witnessing these secret bureaucratic operations.  To be frank, these transactions were “BRIBES”!  Every kid was well-aware of corruption and their parents’ place in that hierarchy. Talks about corrupt politicians and public officials were a part of normalcy and yet families made sure that their children never learn about their parents doing something of that sort. Why? The sense of shame before their descendants.

In 2022 these children, the post-Communist generation, constitute a majority of the electoral population in CEE.

In 2022 these children, the post-Communist generation, constitute a majority of the electoral population in CEE. Nevertheless, they must deal with the remnants of the past. It is quite frequent to hear from people from the post-communist states “I don’t care about politics” or “what is the point to vote if everything was decided for us”. On the other hand, this neglect towards political institutions could potentially lead to a neglect of the law, a greater distrust within society, and a general erosion of the rule of law. This raises a point that many people neglect: “why would we need to follow the laws and rules, if the leadership does not follow them”?

Piotr Zagorski in his article raises a point that the post-communist generation in Central Eastern Europe is quite understudied and elaborates that their electoral indifference explains the origin of current political crisis in CEE.

This passivity combined with their parents’ sense of the “good ol’ days” might be a combination that gives rise to today’s European counter-Revolution autocrats. Jan Zielonka & Jacques Rupnik in their article argue that the CEE elites are facing challenges of balancing between the democratic west and conversion into semi-autocracies.

As a result of the COVID-19 crisis Wojtas and Walecka argue that transitioning democracies of CEE have experienced setbacks in their democratic practices. Providing examples that in a state of crisis authoritarianism prevailed there. As a result of COVID, many states readily joined the framework of securitization measures to deal with crises, but it is quite difficult to define when the crises will end and when these states should de-securitize.

Only through awareness about our importance to and impact on the present can we avoid being judged by history.

Nevertheless, liberal transformation and democratization of transitioning economies of the CEE remain a distinguishable achievement of post-Cold War peacebuilding. Even though we are witnessing a backward movement in its democratization practices, the general tendency remains positive based on World Value Survey data.  According to survey perceptions in CEE, citizens deem their states to be more democratic in 2017-2022 as opposed to the 2000s.

Remembering and recognizing the legacy of the past is no less important. Only through awareness about our importance to and impact on the present can we avoid being judged by history. After all, we are all under “suspicion” by history so let’s make the best out of it.

Anton Stalchenko, soon-to-graduate Master of Administrative Sciences in Security Governance at Tampere University, with Master Interdisciplinary Expertise in Russian and Eastern European Studies from Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki. In his Master thesis, he explores the changing relationship between geopolitics and geoeconomics as a result of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Anton’s additional research interests cover: International Law, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, and electoral behavior in Central Eastern Europe.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the politics of history part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

by Giulia Musso

One of the lecture’s subjects, which was analysed within the BAMSE week, was the role that historical memory plays in politics and in the formation of a national community. The concept of historical memory, or memory of politics, refers to the role that remembrances play in the present of a nation. Hence, it is about how countries decide to experience their past in the current moment. This is linked to what is acknowledged and celebrated and how it is done. More precisely, it is about how and which elements turn into symbols of community heritage or lieu de mémoire. An important aspect is that people remember events as a social group and this is heavily related to the cultural and social context they are living in. For instance, the high political connection to memories was emphasised in the case of Estonia during the lecture and across the NGO café. First, in Estonia, this is connected to their struggle for independence. This is an essential point of all national memories, however, in the case of Eastern European countries, this event is not so far away, and the feelings attached to it are still flourishing within the community. Second, in Estonia, political memory is also connected to the presence of a Russian minority and the threat of Russia’s interference. In this case, within a nation, how events of the past and which events are commemorated are perceived completely different by different citizens of the same state. This increases the value attached to that memory and creating contradictory narrations.

Do opposite visions on national stands need to be expelled or integrated into the national narrative?

As underlined in the NGO café, this phenomenon has major political consequences on security, the clustering of society, and the uprising of nationalism.  Nevertheless, these factors can be further correlated to the aspect of integration in society as in politics. Do opposite visions on national stands need to be expelled or integrated into the national narrative? This is a highly controversial question that has been raised not only for what concerns memory but also for the growth of far-right parties in other western democracy. Given the fact that we represent democratic values, all the distinctive opinions and perspectives should equally be part of the society and be represented. Nonetheless, this underscores the necessity to incorporate actors that support ideas and visions dangerous to our freedom and security, which could possibly undermine our rights. What should be done then? What is democracy and how much is it fully applicable? Starting from a “simple” recognition of the history of a country to the acceptance of the presence of an “alternative” or conservative party in society, democracy is always the main focal point.

Crisis affects each element of our life and system, but it is how we decide to cope with them that really changes our environment.

These questions were raised within the lectures and have followed us the entire week. Crisis affects each element of our life and system, but it is how we decide to cope with them that really changes our environment. Whether the controversial aspects of the system should be eliminated or integrated represents the main takeaway of this week and an interesting starting point of reflection. Nonetheless, it could be possible to say that the rise of one party more than the another is cyclical and represents the normal flow of democracy. Hence, without coming back to old mistakes or nullifying all the steps already taken, this new political wave should be democratically integrated for the time it will be voted on. This is how democracy should work and this could also be identified as a positive trampoline for the transformation of the oppositions, which lacks appeal and understanding of the ongoing social needs.

Giulia Musso is a soon-to-graduate Master’s degree (MSc.) student of the International Relations and Regional Studies (IRRS) program at the Skytte Institut of Tartu University. Giulia’s specific area of competence concerns the Eurasian region and conflicts, with a particular focus on the role of Russia in it (Russian foreign policy, security and economy). Her Master’s Thesis is built on an analysis of the role of Gender in the implementation of security policies during international crises. Giulia’s additional professional interests cover the cross-cultural communications field, in particular the use of language in shaping the memory politics of bilingual countries.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the politics of history part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

by Danylo Herasymov

Memory politics play a significant role in the life of the modern Russian state. This is proven by the fact that one does not have to dig further than the recent speeches of Russian President Vladimir Putin. He gave one such speech on the eve of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine (23.02.2022) and another more recent one, presented during the acceptance of the newly-occupied Ukrainian territories into the Russian Federation. Putin enjoys giving lectures on history and in Putin’s imagination, events are twisted into a chimeric mix of narratives. A Kyivan Rus that has nothing to do with Ukraine, apparently created by Lenin, but is the origin of Russia, that never in history attacked any state and yet became the largest state in the world, is the result of this historical imagining.

But modern Russian appeal to the Soviet past doesn’t try to restore the ideological Soviet, communist state – it needs the USSR only as a memory of empire, and this is the only characteristic that matters.

Putin’s interpretations of history serve a big role in his plans. Putin loves nostalgia – he basically feeds on it. It is nostalgia that led Putin to become an unchangeable leader of Russia and consolidate all the power of the state in his hands. But, restorative nostalgia needs a myth of the golden age – and a cultural trauma to overcome. Putin’s Russia finds a usable trauma in the collapse of the USSR, while for most of the former Soviet republics – in fact, for many subjects and nations of the Russian Federation too, perhaps, – the fall of the Soviet Union is the opposite of tragedy. But modern Russian appeal to the Soviet past doesn’t try to restore the ideological Soviet, communist state – it needs the USSR only as a memory of empire, and this is the only characteristic that matters. This is why the modern Russian state can canonize Tsar Nicholas II and his family as martyrs, and have the body of the men who led their killers honorably buried in the heart of its capital. All the contradictions of the different versions of Russia past do not matter, as long as Russia keeps imperialism as one of its main characteristics.

Following the collapse of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, the rise of criminality and the decrease of living standards for Russians were severe – but it was not the most horrible thing to happen to Russia. However, it was used as the central piece to construct the trauma around it, revive the sense of ontological insecurity from those who used to be the rivals of the USSR, and securitize memory politics of the state to filter out what makes this picture questionable. Hence, the heroization and cult of the Great Patriotic War override the history of WWII: the Russian state doesn’t like to recall the events of 1939-1940 and likes to portray itself as the victim. The wars that do not fit in such a frame – such as the Afghan war or Chechen wars are neglected – they were neither patriotic nor particularly successful.

This mnemonic frame makes it easy for the state to justify its imperial ambitions and manipulate the internal audience and give the sense of a “besieged fortress”. Manipulating history to show only certain parts of it is the best way to ignore the lessons of history. Putin considers himself a historian – he does not need such lessons. But what will happen to Russia after Putin?

I’m far from believing that like in the Lord of the Rings novels, with Putin’s fall the rest of his empire will collapse. A vacuum of power can not exist for a long time, and sooner or later, it will be consolidated by someone – or some group of people. Putin’s rule, however, made everything in Russia connected to him – and his end will surely mean destabilization for the state he built. What will come out of it is quite impossible to predict – but a certain thing is that history and memory politics will play an important role in this process again in two ways.

If, however, there will be an attempt to de-colonize the history and cast off the nostalgia, this will be the first beam of hope for the real changes in Russia – and the whole region as well.

First, memory will be used to explain what kind of state post-Putin Russia should be and how it was “meant” to be exactly this way. Depending on the narrator, this story may vary dramatically. What matters most, is the second way that history will be important in post-Putin Russia: it will be a marker. The current war in Ukraine may end up in a very different way, but at this point in time it is quite clear that it will hardly be called “victorious”. And loss in this war has huge potential to raise the feeling of resentment, which will strengthen the empirical narrative of Russian history. If post-Putin Russia will come to this, as it did numerous times in its history, this will make a new Russia. Despite the change of ruler the nature of the modern Russian state will remain the same. Therefore, without abandoning its empirical past and the destruction of the trauma of a lost empire, more autocracy and more wars are likely to follow. If, however, there will be an attempt to de-colonize the history and cast off the nostalgia, this will be the first beam of hope for the real changes in Russia – and the whole region as well.

Danylo Herasymov, University of Tartu

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the politics of history part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.