Month: February 2023

Text and photos by Maria Roivas

When visiting Tallinn in July 2022, I coincidentally ran across the Russian embassy on one street in the old town. The area in front of the building was filled with touching protest signs and slogans, symbolic pictures, and people stopping by to contemplate what was happening in Ukraine. Also, there were some angry Russian tourists trying to tear down the protest signs, after which the police came and told them to calm down.

What was happening in front of the embassy, can be understood as ‘conflict transportation’ – a term used in peace and conflict studies to describe how a conflict raging somewhere else can be reproduced and transported in various ways to new sites and locations. The transportation of conflicts can be “discursive, symbolic, physical, or social” (Jensen & Féron, 2021, p. 19), and causes tensions between groups and individuals. In this case, the contestations were happening between those who oppose the war and brought discursive and symbolic messages against the war to public places and Russians who told the police that there should be “no space for politics” in front of the Russian embassy.

The right to protest is a fundamental part of democracy and, by using this right now, people demonstrate their willingness to act and that they care about events in Ukraine.

After this experience in Tallinn, I travelled to Riga. I wanted to see what the surroundings of the Russian embassy looked like there. There was a huge picture of Putin’s face looking like a skull across the street from the embassy. There was also underwear covered in blood to represent rape as a horrible war crime committed by the Russian army in Ukraine.

The right to protest is a fundamental part of democracy and, by using this right now, people demonstrate their willingness to act and that they care about events in Ukraine. By political protest, I mean an individual or collective action to address some kind of issue(s). Those working in Russian embassies have to see these signs and slogans daily. People creating these signs and gathering for demonstrations can feel that they at least somehow contribute to opposing the war and Russia’s actions in Ukraine. I took part in a demonstration in Helsinki right after Russia invaded Ukraine. Even though I was shocked, sad and horrified, gathering with around 10 000 other people and shouting “нет войне” together in front of the Russian embassy made me also feel powerful and hopeful in that moment.

These are only some examples that have been taking place in front of embassies this year. In Poland, protesters brought household goods, like toilet seats, microwaves and washing machines, to decorate the front of the embassy, referencing the alleged looting of household goods by Russian soldiers in Ukraine (Grigorev, 2022, April 14). In Lithuania, attention was drawn to the rape victims of the war. Eighty women put bags over their heads, tied their hands behind their backs, smeared their bare legs with fake blood, and stood in silence for 20 minutes in front of the Russian embassy (Balčiūnaitė, 2022, April 19).

The symbolic role of protests and conflict transportation is crucial in opposing the war.

Conflicts can be transported to other locations, but at least in these cases, there is space and possibility to protest and no worry about imprisonment or persecution. I think these examples exhibit many good things about the democratic societies in which these forms of protest are occurring. The symbolic role of protests and conflict transportation is crucial in opposing the war. No matter what the angry Russians said in front of the embassy in Tallinn, these public spaces are exactly the place for politics and voicing opinions.

Maria Roivas is a master’s degree student in Peace, Mediation and Conflict Research at Tampere University. She is specialising in Russia and Eastern Europe through ExpREES studies at Aleksanteri Institute. At the moment, she is writing her master’s thesis on the meaning of home and sense of belonging to the displaced Ingrian Finnish diaspora.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the challenges of democracy part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

 

Sources

Balčiūnaitė, S. (2022, April 19). Protest Outside Russian Embassy in Vilnius Draws Attention to

Ukrainian Rape Victims. Lithuanian National Radio and Television. Retrieved from https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1676291/protest-outside-russian-embassy-in-vilnius-draws-attention-to-ukrainian-rape-victims

Grigorev, A. (2022, April 14). Polish Anti-War Activists Get Creative in Russian Embassy Protest.

Radio Free Europe. Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-embassy-protest-warsaw/31803046.html

Jensen, C. S. & Féron, É. (2021). Diasporas and Conflict Transportation: Challenges and Creative

Practices. TAPRI (Tampere Peace Research Institute).

by Līga Rudzāne

Is it possible that the war in one country has an impact on parliamentary elections in a different country? A clear answer to this question does not exist but when examining the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the 2022 Latvian parliamentary elections, a correlation can be found, especially when analyzing these events from a Latvian perspective.

The war on Latvia’s doorstep restored the Latvian collective memory of traumatic history.

The main principle that links these events is the cultural trauma of Latvian people from the decades-long Soviet occupation of Latvia. This trauma has left a significant scar on the Latvian people and has changed their perceptions of Russia for generations. The scar was starting to heal until it was ripped open again when on 24 February 2022 Russia invaded Ukraine. The war on Latvia’s doorstep restored the Latvian collective memory of traumatic history.

In the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, it is written that “The people of Latvia protect their sovereignty, national independence, territory, territorial integrity and democratic system of government of the State of Latvia”. Regardless of these written values that the Latvian people and the Latvian state stand for, Russia still tries to question them and is keen to undermine these values’ influence in Latvia.

One of the covert tactics used by Russia to retain its influence in Latvia is using soft power in Latvian politics. Pro-Russia political parties have put in major efforts to create a trusting relationship with Latvian society, particularly with the part of society that is Russian-speaking.

An excellent illustration of pro-Russia political parties’ success in achieving the results is the Latvian parliamentary elections of 2018. The well-known pro-Russian Social Democratic Party Harmony won the elections by receiving 19,80% of all of the votes cast throughout all of Latvia and obtained 23 out of 100 seats in parliament – public support for this party was obvious.

With regard to the Latvian parliamentary elections of 2022 that took place on 1 October 2022, the situation was quite different. Harmony received only 4,81% of all votes cast. According to Article 38 of Law on the Election of the Saeima (Latvian Parlament) “The lists of candidates bearing the same name which have received less than five percent of the total number of votes cast in the entirety of Latvia, regardless of the number of constituencies for which these lists of candidates have been nominated, shall be excluded from the distribution of seats in the Saeima”. Therefore 4,98% did not allow Harmony to pass the threshold necessary for representation in Latvian parliament for the next four years.

Harmony is not the only pro-Russia party that participated in the Latvian elections this year. For Stability!, also a pro-Russia political party, received better results and managed to receive 6,80% of all votes, obtaineding 11 seats in parliament. It is evident that while pro-Russia players reorganized between 2018 and 2022, the representation of pro-Russia ideas in the Latvian parliament did not disappear.

Although support from Latvian society for pro-Russia political parties is still noticeable, it has undoubtedly lessened. The question arises – what was the cause for these changes in Latvian society’s attitude towards pro-Russia parties?

Even if Latvians are unable to go to the battlefield and fight with Ukrainians, they use their power to show their collective attitude towards Russian aggression in other ways.

It can be argued that the cause of this is the fact that elections were held simultaneously with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Latvian people remember the history, they remember the cultural trauma, and they remember the horrors conducted by the Soviet Union occupation regime. This memory unites Latvian people in condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine, rises Latvian national spirit and willingness to protect the values written in the Constitution of Latvia, as well as deny Russia from having an impact on the Latvian legislative body. Even if Latvians are unable to go to the battlefield and fight with Ukrainians, they use their power to show their collective attitude towards Russian aggression in other ways.

Līga Rudzāne is a soon-to-graduate Bachelor’s degree student of International Economics and Commercial Diplomacy at University of Latvia. Līga’s study interests include wide rande of interdisciplinary economic fields connected to law, democracy, human rights, security, welfare and diplomacy. In addition to studies, Līga has started her internship in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Līga is socially and politically active young woman who has been elected as member of 10th Youth Parliament and participated in programme “Future Leaders Academy”.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the challenges of democracy part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

by Tomas Jankauskas

Is there a way to maintain a democratic society while simultaneously banning information or politics that can be perceived as harmful? One example of the West having to grapple with this major question involves the war in Ukraine. Since the outbreak of war, western nations have introduced many media restrictions on Russian sources. These sources are usually classified as being peddlers of Russian propaganda and are therefore considered untrustworthy news sources that can be potentially harmful to western populations.  The most prominent news channel that has been banned is Russia Today, also known as RT, having been known as strongly pro-Kremlin. RT was not the only media channel that was banned. The channel Sputnik was also banned in many western nations. While this move was seen as justified in many western countries, it still raises questions about information restriction within a democratic system.

It can be argued that due to the nature of the crisis in Ukraine, these restrictions are justified as a show of solidarity with Ukraine while keeping much of Russian media out of the public sphere.

I do not claim to have all the answers for this sensitive topic, but it must be discussed nonetheless as democratic societies often praise themselves for their freedom of information. It can be argued that due to the nature of the crisis in Ukraine, these restrictions are justified as a show of solidarity with Ukraine while keeping much of Russian media out of the public sphere. While this argument does have validity, it fails to address both the concerns of censorship within a democratic system and concerns of information used for research purposes. Academic research pertaining to hostile countries such as Russia relies heavily on public and policy discourse within the hostile country. With the banning of Russian media channels, there has also been a significant reduction of research material involving Russian public discourse about the Ukrainian crisis. This has taken a toll on the research capabilities of academics within this sphere of research and therefore will have an impact on research methodologies and conclusions due to the lack of available information. Academics are very aware that censorship has been used by many different governments, both democratic and other types of regimes, to control public narratives. However, this control can have a profound and negative effect on academic discourse. This is especially true for those academics focusing on Russia and Ukraine as well as those who focus on democratic studies. To remain in line with democratic values while maintaining a high standard level for information quality, we must first have a serious academic discussion of censorship and its role within a democratic society and academia.

Another argument for restricting Russian media is to discourage sharing both misinformation and disinformation.

Another argument for restricting Russian media is to discourage sharing both misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation is considered information that is false but not intended to be malicious. In this regard, the banning of Russian media could prevent news stories or war reporting from being misunderstood by the public. In terms of disinformation, that being information that is false with the intention of being malicious, these media bans prevent Russian media from spreading strictly false information with the intent of harming government relations with the public or influencing public narratives. However, this argument does suggest an element of government control that would otherwise not be present without the Ukrainian crisis. The concepts of misinformation and disinformation are not very well understood within society, but their effects are long-lasting and can reach many different segments of a democratic society. Whether or not governmental actions against misinformation and disinformation are preventative is yet to be seen and more research is needed to gain more insightful solutions.

There is a delicate balance between the use of restrictions and the freedom of information that must be ever present in the minds of academics and governments if we are to find a reasonable solution to this problem.

To conclude, the banning of Russian media outlets can be seen as both justified and restrictive. While the arguments for justification are compelling there is a tendency to disregard legitimate concerns of both academics and the public. In the same vein, the arguments that these bans are too restrictive do not give a reasonable solution to the issue choosing to focus on the undemocratic narratives that can be caused by such actions. There is a delicate balance between the use of restrictions and the freedom of information that must be ever present in the minds of academics and governments if we are to find a reasonable solution to this problem.

 

Tomas Jankauskas is a master’s student at Vilnius University with the Institute of International Relations and Political Science studying in the Eastern European and Russian Studies course. His master’s thesis focuses on the quality of democracy within Poland. Tomas’ specific area of expertise is in Polish studies with a particular interest in military science and law studies.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the challenges of democracy part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

by Matias Muuronen

How should we approach the usage of memory politics in film and entertainment?

Through a reading of Slavoj Žižek’s critique of the work of Emir Kusturica, I attempt to depict two approaches. They are based on Jeffrey Olick’s differentiation between collected memory and collective memory. While the former emphasizes subjective notions of remembering, the latter views culture as a collective repository of symbols. When compared, the two propose rather distinct models for understanding the role of historical representation.

Žižek criticizes Emir Kusturica’s ‘’depoliticized aestheticist attitude’’ as serving the western gaze^[1] by making use of Todorova’s concept of balkanism, according to which Southeast Europe has been rendered as a violent dichotomy to the peaceful West.

 The stage is set for presenting a passionate and emotional Southeastern Europe, which is exactly what the anemic West wants itself to be contrasted with.

Investigating Kusturica’s film Underground (1995), Žižek interprets Kusturica’s methods on the basis of the unconscious, arguing that Kusturica hides the political nature of his film into its aesthetic: the characters are presented in a static, timeless sphere, echoing the Western image of the Balkans. Kusturica gives the European audience what they want to see. The stage is set for presenting a passionate and emotional Southeastern Europe, which is exactly what the anemic West wants itself to be contrasted with.

According to this interpretation, one could situate the characters of Marko and Blacky and their disregard for the values of the resistance as a representation of weak morale – a stereotypical image of the West against the Balkans. Ideology serves no purpose: neither communist ideology nor resistance leads the people to misery. Moral degradation inherent in the region is the root cause of all evil. Žižek attempts to politicize Kusturica’s depoliticized imagery by highlighting the manner in which Kusturica presents the region as the Western gaze wants to see it.

It becomes worthwhile, I believe, to examine Žižek’s critique through Jeffrey Olick’s distinction between collected and collective memory.^[2] Through his psychoanalytic perspective, Žižek’s conception of political symbols differs from Kusturica’s.

For Kusturica, remembering is collective, since he presents symbols as autonomous. According to Saussure’s differentiation, the universal categories (langue) directing Kusturica’s language are visible in the human moral degradation in any societal context. These themes are communicated (parole) through characters, which instrumentalize these conceptions through their aesthetic. Perhaps, for Kusturica balkanism as practiced by the West is an autonomous symbol, which he questions by allowing his characters to bathe in the West’s bedraggled collective memory.

On the other hand, I argue that Žižek views the film from the perspective of collected memory. Žižek sees symbols as authentic solely when they are represented as such. On the basis of Jacques Lacan’s vocabulary, I consider Žižek to face the film on the level of the real.^[3] Kusturica’s approach deals with the symbolic.

For Žižek, balkanism symbolizes the creation of a depoliticized image of Southeastern Europe.

From Žižek’s view, Underground forms part of our living, kinetic experience through which the individual faces the past as material truths, not structures of thought. For Žižek, balkanism symbolizes the creation of a depoliticized image of Southeastern Europe. This depoliticization is based on the West’s interpretation of the region as a constant warfield resulting from moral degradation.^[4] Through his depoliticized aesthetic Kusturica reinforces these conceptions, which influence the way in which the West sees the Balkans.

 

Matias Muuronen is a master’s degree student at the University of Helsinki

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the challenges of democracy part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

^[1] Žižek, S. (1997) Multiculturalism, or, the cultural logic of multinational capitalism

^[2]  Olick, Jeffrey K. (2007) The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility page 27

^[3] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jacques Lacan chapter 2.1.3

^[4] Žižek S. (1997) page 38