by Roosa Rytkönen

Galina Miazhevich is a Lecturer in Media and Communication in the University of Leicester, UK. She was a visiting fellow at the Aleksanteri Institute in March–April 2017.

Could you tell a bit about your work relating to Russia and media?

I’ve been working on post-Soviet media for a number of years and have done two post-docs on the matter: one on the representations of Islam as a security threat in the Russian, British and French contexts at the University of Manchester and another independent project as a Gorbachev Media Research Fellow at the University of Oxford. The latter project focused on the issues of censorship and press freedom in the post-Soviet space. We organized a series of Gorbachev Press Freedom lectures, with several prominent media personalities and practitioners as invited speakers, including the director general of the BBC. It was an interesting time to discuss these topics also in the UK, due to the debates on how media regulation should proceed in the country.

My research approach is qualitative as I’m coming from the field of media and cultural studies. I study indirect indicators of media management and freedom of speech, looking at what can and cannot be expressed in the official and unofficial media. This includes not only texts but also visual images, as when I explored political satire memes in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It’s important to understand the meanings generated at the grassroots level. For example, when reading online forums right after major events, the wealth of information one can get there is remarkable. For a number of years, I’ve been studying the Eurovision Song Contest, and discussions around it are not only about the music, but about the relationship between the East and the West, homosexuality, antisemitism, camp culture…

How do you see the state of freedom of speech in Russia currently?

It’s a very difficult question and becomes more sensitive with every new election cycle. One can see the tightening of regulations, as in the case of the internet recently. These changes need to be placed in the context of wider processes. A number of years ago someone said that the Russian media follows the Belorussian path. Belarus is known for quite stringent controls and it seems that Russia is following this model.

At the same time, there is another kind of development, as one can see in the diversification of the products offered to the public. You can see a variety of voices and different programmes being aired…it seems that there is a creation of a more diverse and less clear-cut scene, where there is a wide choice for the public. However, the choice is more related to entertainment. They are trying to go for this hybrid type of management, with entertainment and consumption, and less straightforward expression of ideologies or something directly related to politics.

At the same time, it seems that even TV series try to promote some messages or core values. There are many very well-made TV dramas that go back to different periods of the Soviet times, not maybe exactly romanticizing the era (even though they are semi-nostalgic), but utilizing it to create some kind of common space that the audiences can identify themselves with. There are also all these TV presenters from the Soviet era, which creates a kind of feeling of stability and continuity.

Talk show Projectorparishilton is an interesting example. The show was halted for five years and only recently re-vived. The hosts discuss, in a satirical way, topical news, which is not necessarily an easy issue for the establishment. The question is why this programme re-emerged right now? When you talk about Russian media you can’t just talk about strict regulation and ‘contained’ voices, but you need to look at dynamics and nuances, and place them in the wider context to understand why these programmes or trends are appearing. As some scholars argue, even in a very tightly controlled media environment there might be different voices (at times, accidentally) coming through. And then the question is, ‘why is that?’ Whether it was accidental, whether it is a sign of genuine disagreement or maybe it was done on purpose to demonstrate diversity or act as a safety valve. The situation with Russian media is not clear-cut and is therefore interesting for a media scholar. For example, internet management is much more complex and poses challenges, but at the same time provides a rich field for analysis and identifying trends.

Do you have any predictions concerning the future of media freedom and freedom of speech in Russia?

It’s very difficult to predict the future. Some of the trends we observe right now, such as diversification and hybridization, will persist. However, it’s difficult to say what the developments will be like concerning the attitudes to journalists, their ‘intimidation’ and corresponding self-censorship. It’s going to be interesting to compare the management of journalist practice within the country and abroad: I’ve also been studying Russia Today, which is a ‘product’ for the external audiences and has a different idea of the journalist practice. Another idea that comes to my mind is that because Russia is such a huge state with different regions, there might be some developments concerning the regional media. Some of these, including TV broadcasting and radio, aren’t so strictly regulated and they have the ability to produce good quality content. Whether the establishment will tolerate this is interesting because some of the regional media are more popular than the mainstream ones. So one can see these different levels of management concerning production for external, national and regional audiences.

Mariëlle Wijermars, post-doctoral researcher in the Russian MediaLab project, will be presenting the following papers at two upcoming conferences:

‘Website Blocking as a Means of Silencing Non-Systemic Opposition: The Russian Internet ‘Blacklist Law’ – Five Years On’
Workshop ‘Telecommunication Politics in Authoritarian Contexts’, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, 9-10 May 2017

‘New Media and the Expression of Alternative Views on the Past in Russia: The Russian Revolution as a Social Media Feed’
Workshop ‘Trauma Studies in the Digital Age’, University of Amsterdam, 10-12 May 2017

Russian MediaLab is attending the BASEES 2017 Annual Conference (31 March – 2 April 2017, Cambridge, UK) with a panel “Fields, Forums and Freedom of Speech in Russia and Moldova.” The panel will take place Saturday 1 April at 16:00-17:30.

Presenters:

Saara Ratilainen (University of Helsinki) ‘Russian Urban Online Magazines and New Platforms for Civic Discussions’
Dmitry Yagodin (University of Tampere) ‘Russian Cultural Diplomacy through Social Media on the Example of Moldova’
Katja Lehtisaari (University of Helsinki) ‘Media Policy in Russia: Processes and Outcomes’

With discussant comments from Vlad Strukov and Markku Kangaspuro as the Chair.

More information: http://www.basees2017.org/

The seminar’s panels concentrated on the current developments of Russian media landscape, addressing both institutional and grassroots tendencies. One of the seminar’s highlights was the roundtable “Media Literacy and Media Education in Russia Today,” which introduced the viewpoint of St. Petersburg-based journalists and media professionals to the research community.

Yana Prussakova (Fontanka.fi), Valery Nechay (Ekho Moskvy), Diana Kachalova (Novaya Gazeta) and Mikhail Tyurkin (Rosbalt) participated in the panel discussion on media and journalism in Russia.

The seminar discussions concentrate on the existing as well as new emerging fields and forums for freedom of expression from new generation online platforms to hybridized cultural and media institutions to semi-legal or sub-cultural media practices such as hacking. What kind of media agency and authority is promoted though these fields and forums and how they are regulated? The programme includes a roundtable ”Media Literacy and Media Education in Russia Today”, which brings together media professionals and academics. The official seminar language is English, but questions can also be raised in Russian.

Venue: The Finnish Institute in St. Petersburg (Ul. Bolshaya Konyushennaya 8)

Thursday 19 January 2017

13:00 Start of the seminar: welcome words

13:30-15:00     Panel I

Anna Litvinenko (Freie Universitet, Berlin): User Comment Sections on Leading News Websites in Russia: Results from a Comparative Study of 15 Post-Soviet Countries

Markku Kangaspuro (University of Helsinki): My History Exhibition and Russian Identity

15:30-17:00 Panel II

Marina Galkina (Moscow State University): Media Foresight in Russia: Changes and Challenges

Valery Nechai (Ekho Moskvy, St. Petersburg) and Dmitry Goncharov (HSE): Censorship in Russia: How Russian Twitter Sees It

Svetlana Bodrunova (St.Petersburg State University): Discussions About Migrants on Twitter: Russia in Comparative Perspective

17:00-18:00 Discussion with Margarita Kuleva (HSE, St. Petersburg): St. Petersburg creative field and new spaces of expression (via Skype)

Friday 20 January 2017

9:30-11:00 Panel III

Vlad Strukov (University of Leeds): Transgressive media: Towards a re-consideration of Russian media

Jussi Lassila (University of Helsinki): Sputnik i Pogrom: Oppositional Nationalism and Alternative Media in Russia

Saara Ratilainen (University of Helsinki): City Magazines and the Politics of the Platform

11:15-12:45 Panel IV

Liudmila Sivetc (Univeristy of Turku): Three Stories about the Roskomnadzor

Katja Lehtisaari (University of Helsinki): Media Policy and Social Media in Russia

Kamilla Nigmatullina (St.Petersburg State University): Local media in Russian Cities as a Tool for Creating Local Communities

14:00-16:00 Roundtable: Media Education and Media Literacy in Russia Today

Diana Kachalova (Novaya Gazeta, St. Petersburg)

Valery Nechai (Ekho Moskvy, St. Petersburg)

Nikolai Donskov (Saint-Petersburg Humanitarian University)

Mikhail Tyurkin (Rosbalt, St. Petersburg)

16:00-16:30 Closing Discussion

Jussi Lassila
Oct 18 2016

Russiaʼs political situation does not provide much hope for the countryʼs democratic development in the near future. As the Ukraine crisis evolved into a serious international crisis since 2014, the Kremlinʼs hardened stance towards dissent voices became tangible. Indeed, from the viewpoint of Russian domestic politics, the annexation of Crimea can be seen as a pinnacle of the authoritarian counter-strike that the Kremlin implemented after the mass protest movement of 2011-12. And, as the data of President Putinʼs public ratings demonstrate, it was the Crimea which ultimately recovered the declining legitimacy of the regime.

Russiaʼs political and societal development is an irrevocably moving target, not least because of its growing dependence on one man. Thus, it is challenging to provide estimations on what will happen if there will be no more Putin. Will there be more freedom, or is Russia moving towards a new militant authoritarian regime for which Putin is simply paving the way? In terms of the data concerning Russiansʼ weak trust in societal and political institutions except the president, we can certainly assert that changes will happen when the major political instance of trust is gone. At the same time, Russiaʼs deepening international isolation and declining economy keeps the target moving. Russiaʼs latest parliamentary election in September demonstrated that under the current presidential authoritarianism the role of Duma will be even more symbolic than in the previous term preceded by the mass protests. Now the major headache for the regime was an extraordinarily low turnout. While it is generally important for authoritarian regimes to keep people away from politics, it is equally important to demonstrate the regimeʼs popular support. In this regard the regimeʼs election performance was not very convincing.

It is the regimeʼs popular support which becomes intriguing in the situation of declining economy. Since the previous avenues for improving cosumerism are deteriorating, the Kremlinʼs hardened authoritarian stance, media propaganda against the West as well as budgetary prioririties for the sake of military at the cost of social and education sectors can be seen as central means in legitimizing the current political line with the help of a war mentality. However, as the turnout of the parliamentary election showed, the given mobilization appears to be sparse for demonstrating active support for the regime. On the other hand, this support should not be too active either.

The same kind of chop and change can be seen in the regimeʼs attitude towards numerous patriotic and nationalistic volunteers in the case of Crimea and Ukraine. After the period of patriotic and nationalistic euphoria of 2014 it appears that by 2016 all independent-like actors of the pro-Donbass issue have been marginalized. In other words, the period of patriotic mobilization of 2014 has returned to the stage of de-mobilization. In terms of the latter, it is the Russian official state media which has been the central tool of this intended de-mobilization; keep the peopleʼs minds mobilized for the regime but de-mobilized in terms of any independent nationalistic manoeuvres that the state propaganda might signal. A further challenge is the time; for how long people are willing to stay de-mobilized along with the official propaganda. What will be after Ukraine and Syria?

I would argue that it is the Kremlinʼs uncertainty which largely explains the existing plurality and dissent in the Russian public discussion left for the Internet. Of course, in light of arrests of bloggers, lawsuits and of closing various websites one could say that the regimeʼs control over dissenting voices is becoming more systematic. Yet, the existence and activity of the oppositionʼs front man, Alexei Navalʼnyi, on the web – not to mention the obvious harm that his numerous corruption revelations have caused for the Kremlin – raise interesting questions. It seems that the Russian court has hitherto appeared to be an ineffective tool of his political elimination in light of numerous lawsuits against him. Or, perhaps the regimeʼs inability to silence him via court shows some positive signs of creeping autonomy of Russiaʼs legal system.

Whatever the case may be, recurrent lawsuits and other forms of administrative violence demonstrate that Navalʼnyiʼs exclusion from the official political participation is not enough for the Kremlin. While having 1,66 million followers on Twitter and being the most cited blogger in Russia in September 2016 (53 000 references to his blog in a month), the Kremlin has good grounds to be dissatisfied with his marginalization from political participation. The dilemma is that Navalʼnyi is simply too big for a smooth elimination. And anything which appears to be less smooth for the Kremlinʼs status-quo is a risk which should be avoided.

It remains an open question whether Navalnyiʼs political capital is big enough for the Kremlinʼs political risk in silencing him against the worsening economic and social situation. As a mirror image for the regimeʼs dependence on Putin, a problem for Russiaʼs opposition is its visible reliance on Navalʼnyi and his political capital.

Side Event of the UNESCO World Press Freedom Day at the University of Helsinki Main Building, Auditorium XIV, Unioninkatu 34

The seminar focuses on freedom of expression and its limitations in Russian media from the perspectives of academic research and journalistic practices. Special attention is paid to the existing practices and new forms and modes of expression and media regulation in the context of changing political conditions and public discourses. The speakers are scholars of Russian and East-European media, culture and society and experienced journalists from Russia and Finland.

Programme
12:00-14:00 Session I
Chair: Markku Kangaspuro (University of Helsinki)
Dmitry Yagodin (University of Tampere): Social Media and Freedom of Expression
Katja Lehtisaari (University of Helsinki ): Freedom of Speech and Media Regulation
Saara Ratilainen (University of Helsinki ): ”Quality Media” vs Amateur Media

14:00-14:15 Coffee

14:15-16:30 Session II
Chair: Jussi Lassila (University of Helsinki)
Nikolai Donskov, Journalist, University Lecturer, St. Petersburg
Valerii Nechai, First Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Radio Ekho Moskvy, St. Petersburg Branch
Kerstin Kronvall, Foreign Correspondent, the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE

Register at: https://elomake.helsinki.fi/lomakkeet/68050/lomake.html

Contact information: saara.ratilainen@helsinki.fi

Russian Media Lab -hankkeen kick off -seminaari järjestetään Aleksanteri-instituutissa 25. tammikuuta 2016 klo 10-17. Tilaisuus on avoin hankkeen partneriverkostolle.

Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki

Read Anna Litvinenko’s report on the Mediating (Semi-) Authoritarianism. The Power of the Internet in the Post-Soviet World project website

And Saara Ratilainen’s report in Aleksanteri News 1/2016