by Viktoryia Kolchyna
In September, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation visited the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) for the first time since the beginning of the war. Ukraine had long sought this visit, but their calls to deploy the IAEA mission to Zaporizhzhia fell on deaf ears. Now that fighting around the largest atomic energy plant in Europe is putting European import of cheap electricity from Ukraine at risk and the world under immediate threat of a nuclear disaster, the IAEA has decided to “maintain a continued presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant”. How is this delayed emergency response connected to fears that Russia may ban export of uranium to European nuclear power stations in retaliation for sanctions?
Five of the 13 nuclear EU member states have Russian-designed nuclear reactors, VVER-440s or VVER-1000s, and depend solely on “Rosatom” for nuclear fuel and supply chain provisions.
“Rosatom”, the Russian nuclear power giant that now provisionally controls Zaporizhzhia NPP, is involved in the global nuclear power supply chain. According to a Columbia University study on Global Energy Policy, 40 % of the world’s total uranium conversion infrastructure in 2020 and 46 % of the uranium enrichment capacity in 2018 was owned by Russia. It currently operates reactors in 11 countries. Five of the 13 nuclear EU member states have Russian-designed nuclear reactors, VVER-440s or VVER-1000s, and depend solely on “Rosatom” for nuclear fuel and supply chain provisions. It is a particular concern for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia that use nuclear power extensively and have no authorized nuclear fuel to replace Russian-enriched uranium in the near future. The American fuel alternative, produced by Westinghouse, is more expensive and requires a new waste management system. Only the Czech Republic has switched from Russian nuclear fuel to Westinghouse (USA) and Framatome (France) alternatives.
Not surprisingly, despite a flight ban on Russian aircraft in EU airspace, a Russian cargo plane Ilyushin IL76TD was allowed to land in Slovakia in March with a special permit to supply the two Slovakian nuclear power plants Jaslovské Bohunice and Mochovce with fuel. Similarly, in April, Hungary received the first shipment of nuclear fuel for its Paks NPP from Russia by air. In August Hungary also hired “Rosatom” to build two new reactors at their Paks nuclear power plant, which will increase Hungarian dependency on Russian imports for the next 10 years. “The plans for the two new blocks at Paks serve Hungary’s strategic interests”, said Péter Szijjártó, a Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
The Russian orientation in Hungarian politics has historically provided the Kremlin with access to EU and NATO member states’ policymakers.
The Russian orientation in Hungarian politics has historically provided the Kremlin with access to EU and NATO member states’ policymakers. It is inevitable that Hungary will be able to influence the EU and NATO political agenda and decision-making processes. In the long run, it may lead to a lasting, strategic division inside the V4 region, particularly with Poland as Orban’s links with Russia increase Hungarian strategic unpredictability. For instance, the new Paks NPP deal with Moscow can simply one day turn from an economic opportunity into a liability, as Hungary is becoming more dependent on Russian energy.
The controversy surrounding nuclear deals with the Kremlin involves other EU members. In September, Germany also permitted a shipment of Russian uranium destined for French nuclear plants to be processed at a site in Germany. Électricité de France S.A. (EDF), which receives more than 70 percent of its electricity from nuclear power plants, has so far refused to end its cooperation with “Rosatom”. “France ensures strict compliance by economic players with all the European sanctions adopted against Russia. Civil nuclear power is not affected by these sanctions,” explained the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the German company “Siemens” stated at “Tageszeitung” that “it will also continue already-commissioned nuclear projects with “Rosatom”.
From the above information, we can conclude that in the short term, Russia will remain a strong player in the global nuclear market. Substitution of its export will cause realignment in the supply chain. In the future, it will require cooperation and investments in the production capabilities of other uranium-rich states such as Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, or Namibia, which are moving to the vanguard of a new uranium-centric geopolitical scene. These measures would lead to rising competition over uranium and more expensive fuel for operating reactors. Still, despite the ongoing sanctions burden, the Kremlin shows no signs of stopping the crediting or building of “Rosatom” NPPs globally.
Moscow can play its card to use a nuclear fuel supply ban as leverage in the ongoing conflict over Ukraine.
Although the full extent of Russian- EU nuclear collaboration has not yet come to light, it is clear that the Russian nuclear industry’s exemption from sanctions has opened a window to pro-Kremlin lobbies within the EU. What this means is that if they have little effect, Moscow can play its card to use a nuclear fuel supply ban as leverage in the ongoing conflict over Ukraine. In this case, electricity prices would jump rapidly and some nuclear plants may be forced to suspend operations altogether. Therefore the stakes are high. Exempting “Rosatom” from sanctions may have long-lasting consequences for deepening crises within the EU. Such policies are likely to provoke the rise of populism within the Union and empower authoritarian and right-wing leaders that will be backed by Russia’s supply of nuclear power.
Viktoryia Kolchyna is a Master’s student of student in International Relations and Regional Security at University of Tartu and a Marcin Król Fellow 2022/2023 at Visegrad Insight.
This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the energy security part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.