Category: Uncategorised

by Līga Rudzāne

Is it possible that the war in one country has an impact on parliamentary elections in a different country? A clear answer to this question does not exist but when examining the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the 2022 Latvian parliamentary elections, a correlation can be found, especially when analyzing these events from a Latvian perspective.

The war on Latvia’s doorstep restored the Latvian collective memory of traumatic history.

The main principle that links these events is the cultural trauma of Latvian people from the decades-long Soviet occupation of Latvia. This trauma has left a significant scar on the Latvian people and has changed their perceptions of Russia for generations. The scar was starting to heal until it was ripped open again when on 24 February 2022 Russia invaded Ukraine. The war on Latvia’s doorstep restored the Latvian collective memory of traumatic history.

In the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, it is written that “The people of Latvia protect their sovereignty, national independence, territory, territorial integrity and democratic system of government of the State of Latvia”. Regardless of these written values that the Latvian people and the Latvian state stand for, Russia still tries to question them and is keen to undermine these values’ influence in Latvia.

One of the covert tactics used by Russia to retain its influence in Latvia is using soft power in Latvian politics. Pro-Russia political parties have put in major efforts to create a trusting relationship with Latvian society, particularly with the part of society that is Russian-speaking.

An excellent illustration of pro-Russia political parties’ success in achieving the results is the Latvian parliamentary elections of 2018. The well-known pro-Russian Social Democratic Party Harmony won the elections by receiving 19,80% of all of the votes cast throughout all of Latvia and obtained 23 out of 100 seats in parliament – public support for this party was obvious.

With regard to the Latvian parliamentary elections of 2022 that took place on 1 October 2022, the situation was quite different. Harmony received only 4,81% of all votes cast. According to Article 38 of Law on the Election of the Saeima (Latvian Parlament) “The lists of candidates bearing the same name which have received less than five percent of the total number of votes cast in the entirety of Latvia, regardless of the number of constituencies for which these lists of candidates have been nominated, shall be excluded from the distribution of seats in the Saeima”. Therefore 4,98% did not allow Harmony to pass the threshold necessary for representation in Latvian parliament for the next four years.

Harmony is not the only pro-Russia party that participated in the Latvian elections this year. For Stability!, also a pro-Russia political party, received better results and managed to receive 6,80% of all votes, obtaineding 11 seats in parliament. It is evident that while pro-Russia players reorganized between 2018 and 2022, the representation of pro-Russia ideas in the Latvian parliament did not disappear.

Although support from Latvian society for pro-Russia political parties is still noticeable, it has undoubtedly lessened. The question arises – what was the cause for these changes in Latvian society’s attitude towards pro-Russia parties?

Even if Latvians are unable to go to the battlefield and fight with Ukrainians, they use their power to show their collective attitude towards Russian aggression in other ways.

It can be argued that the cause of this is the fact that elections were held simultaneously with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Latvian people remember the history, they remember the cultural trauma, and they remember the horrors conducted by the Soviet Union occupation regime. This memory unites Latvian people in condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine, rises Latvian national spirit and willingness to protect the values written in the Constitution of Latvia, as well as deny Russia from having an impact on the Latvian legislative body. Even if Latvians are unable to go to the battlefield and fight with Ukrainians, they use their power to show their collective attitude towards Russian aggression in other ways.

Līga Rudzāne is a soon-to-graduate Bachelor’s degree student of International Economics and Commercial Diplomacy at University of Latvia. Līga’s study interests include wide rande of interdisciplinary economic fields connected to law, democracy, human rights, security, welfare and diplomacy. In addition to studies, Līga has started her internship in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Līga is socially and politically active young woman who has been elected as member of 10th Youth Parliament and participated in programme “Future Leaders Academy”.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the challenges of democracy part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

by Tomas Jankauskas

Is there a way to maintain a democratic society while simultaneously banning information or politics that can be perceived as harmful? One example of the West having to grapple with this major question involves the war in Ukraine. Since the outbreak of war, western nations have introduced many media restrictions on Russian sources. These sources are usually classified as being peddlers of Russian propaganda and are therefore considered untrustworthy news sources that can be potentially harmful to western populations.  The most prominent news channel that has been banned is Russia Today, also known as RT, having been known as strongly pro-Kremlin. RT was not the only media channel that was banned. The channel Sputnik was also banned in many western nations. While this move was seen as justified in many western countries, it still raises questions about information restriction within a democratic system.

It can be argued that due to the nature of the crisis in Ukraine, these restrictions are justified as a show of solidarity with Ukraine while keeping much of Russian media out of the public sphere.

I do not claim to have all the answers for this sensitive topic, but it must be discussed nonetheless as democratic societies often praise themselves for their freedom of information. It can be argued that due to the nature of the crisis in Ukraine, these restrictions are justified as a show of solidarity with Ukraine while keeping much of Russian media out of the public sphere. While this argument does have validity, it fails to address both the concerns of censorship within a democratic system and concerns of information used for research purposes. Academic research pertaining to hostile countries such as Russia relies heavily on public and policy discourse within the hostile country. With the banning of Russian media channels, there has also been a significant reduction of research material involving Russian public discourse about the Ukrainian crisis. This has taken a toll on the research capabilities of academics within this sphere of research and therefore will have an impact on research methodologies and conclusions due to the lack of available information. Academics are very aware that censorship has been used by many different governments, both democratic and other types of regimes, to control public narratives. However, this control can have a profound and negative effect on academic discourse. This is especially true for those academics focusing on Russia and Ukraine as well as those who focus on democratic studies. To remain in line with democratic values while maintaining a high standard level for information quality, we must first have a serious academic discussion of censorship and its role within a democratic society and academia.

Another argument for restricting Russian media is to discourage sharing both misinformation and disinformation.

Another argument for restricting Russian media is to discourage sharing both misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation is considered information that is false but not intended to be malicious. In this regard, the banning of Russian media could prevent news stories or war reporting from being misunderstood by the public. In terms of disinformation, that being information that is false with the intention of being malicious, these media bans prevent Russian media from spreading strictly false information with the intent of harming government relations with the public or influencing public narratives. However, this argument does suggest an element of government control that would otherwise not be present without the Ukrainian crisis. The concepts of misinformation and disinformation are not very well understood within society, but their effects are long-lasting and can reach many different segments of a democratic society. Whether or not governmental actions against misinformation and disinformation are preventative is yet to be seen and more research is needed to gain more insightful solutions.

There is a delicate balance between the use of restrictions and the freedom of information that must be ever present in the minds of academics and governments if we are to find a reasonable solution to this problem.

To conclude, the banning of Russian media outlets can be seen as both justified and restrictive. While the arguments for justification are compelling there is a tendency to disregard legitimate concerns of both academics and the public. In the same vein, the arguments that these bans are too restrictive do not give a reasonable solution to the issue choosing to focus on the undemocratic narratives that can be caused by such actions. There is a delicate balance between the use of restrictions and the freedom of information that must be ever present in the minds of academics and governments if we are to find a reasonable solution to this problem.

 

Tomas Jankauskas is a master’s student at Vilnius University with the Institute of International Relations and Political Science studying in the Eastern European and Russian Studies course. His master’s thesis focuses on the quality of democracy within Poland. Tomas’ specific area of expertise is in Polish studies with a particular interest in military science and law studies.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the challenges of democracy part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

by Matias Muuronen

How should we approach the usage of memory politics in film and entertainment?

Through a reading of Slavoj Žižek’s critique of the work of Emir Kusturica, I attempt to depict two approaches. They are based on Jeffrey Olick’s differentiation between collected memory and collective memory. While the former emphasizes subjective notions of remembering, the latter views culture as a collective repository of symbols. When compared, the two propose rather distinct models for understanding the role of historical representation.

Žižek criticizes Emir Kusturica’s ‘’depoliticized aestheticist attitude’’ as serving the western gaze^[1] by making use of Todorova’s concept of balkanism, according to which Southeast Europe has been rendered as a violent dichotomy to the peaceful West.

 The stage is set for presenting a passionate and emotional Southeastern Europe, which is exactly what the anemic West wants itself to be contrasted with.

Investigating Kusturica’s film Underground (1995), Žižek interprets Kusturica’s methods on the basis of the unconscious, arguing that Kusturica hides the political nature of his film into its aesthetic: the characters are presented in a static, timeless sphere, echoing the Western image of the Balkans. Kusturica gives the European audience what they want to see. The stage is set for presenting a passionate and emotional Southeastern Europe, which is exactly what the anemic West wants itself to be contrasted with.

According to this interpretation, one could situate the characters of Marko and Blacky and their disregard for the values of the resistance as a representation of weak morale – a stereotypical image of the West against the Balkans. Ideology serves no purpose: neither communist ideology nor resistance leads the people to misery. Moral degradation inherent in the region is the root cause of all evil. Žižek attempts to politicize Kusturica’s depoliticized imagery by highlighting the manner in which Kusturica presents the region as the Western gaze wants to see it.

It becomes worthwhile, I believe, to examine Žižek’s critique through Jeffrey Olick’s distinction between collected and collective memory.^[2] Through his psychoanalytic perspective, Žižek’s conception of political symbols differs from Kusturica’s.

For Kusturica, remembering is collective, since he presents symbols as autonomous. According to Saussure’s differentiation, the universal categories (langue) directing Kusturica’s language are visible in the human moral degradation in any societal context. These themes are communicated (parole) through characters, which instrumentalize these conceptions through their aesthetic. Perhaps, for Kusturica balkanism as practiced by the West is an autonomous symbol, which he questions by allowing his characters to bathe in the West’s bedraggled collective memory.

On the other hand, I argue that Žižek views the film from the perspective of collected memory. Žižek sees symbols as authentic solely when they are represented as such. On the basis of Jacques Lacan’s vocabulary, I consider Žižek to face the film on the level of the real.^[3] Kusturica’s approach deals with the symbolic.

For Žižek, balkanism symbolizes the creation of a depoliticized image of Southeastern Europe.

From Žižek’s view, Underground forms part of our living, kinetic experience through which the individual faces the past as material truths, not structures of thought. For Žižek, balkanism symbolizes the creation of a depoliticized image of Southeastern Europe. This depoliticization is based on the West’s interpretation of the region as a constant warfield resulting from moral degradation.^[4] Through his depoliticized aesthetic Kusturica reinforces these conceptions, which influence the way in which the West sees the Balkans.

 

Matias Muuronen is a master’s degree student at the University of Helsinki

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the challenges of democracy part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

^[1] Žižek, S. (1997) Multiculturalism, or, the cultural logic of multinational capitalism

^[2]  Olick, Jeffrey K. (2007) The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility page 27

^[3] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jacques Lacan chapter 2.1.3

^[4] Žižek S. (1997) page 38

by Viktoryia Kolchyna

In September, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation visited the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) for the first time since the beginning of the war. Ukraine had long sought this visit, but their calls to deploy the IAEA mission to Zaporizhzhia fell on deaf ears. Now that fighting around the largest atomic energy plant in Europe is putting European import of cheap electricity from Ukraine at risk and the world under immediate threat of a nuclear disaster, the IAEA has decided to “maintain a continued presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant”. How is this delayed emergency response connected to fears that Russia may ban export of uranium to European nuclear power stations in retaliation for sanctions?

Five of the 13 nuclear EU member states have Russian-designed nuclear reactors, VVER-440s or VVER-1000s, and depend solely on “Rosatom” for nuclear fuel and supply chain provisions.

“Rosatom”, the Russian nuclear power giant that now provisionally controls Zaporizhzhia NPP, is involved in the global nuclear power supply chain. According to a Columbia University study on Global Energy Policy, 40 % of the world’s total uranium conversion infrastructure in 2020 and 46 % of the uranium enrichment capacity in 2018 was owned by Russia. It currently operates reactors in 11 countries. Five of the 13 nuclear EU member states have Russian-designed nuclear reactors, VVER-440s or VVER-1000s, and depend solely on “Rosatom” for nuclear fuel and supply chain provisions. It is a particular concern for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia that use nuclear power extensively and have no authorized nuclear fuel to replace Russian-enriched uranium in the near future.  The American fuel alternative, produced by Westinghouse, is more expensive and requires a new waste management system. Only the Czech Republic has switched from Russian nuclear fuel to Westinghouse (USA) and Framatome (France) alternatives.

Not surprisingly, despite a flight ban on Russian aircraft in EU airspace, a Russian cargo plane Ilyushin IL76TD was allowed to land in Slovakia in March with a special permit to supply the two Slovakian nuclear power plants Jaslovské Bohunice and Mochovce with fuel.  Similarly, in April, Hungary received the first shipment of nuclear fuel for its Paks NPP from Russia by air.  In August Hungary also hired “Rosatom” to build two new reactors at their Paks nuclear power plant, which will increase Hungarian dependency on Russian imports for the next 10 years. “The plans for the two new blocks at Paks serve Hungary’s strategic interests”, said Péter Szijjártó, a Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The Russian orientation in Hungarian politics has historically provided the Kremlin with access to EU and NATO member states’ policymakers.

The Russian orientation in Hungarian politics has historically provided the Kremlin with access to EU and NATO member states’ policymakers. It is inevitable that Hungary will be able to influence the EU and NATO political agenda and decision-making processes. In the long run, it may lead to a lasting, strategic division inside the V4 region, particularly with Poland as Orban’s links with Russia increase Hungarian strategic unpredictability. For instance, the new Paks NPP deal with Moscow can simply one day turn from an economic opportunity into a liability, as Hungary is becoming more dependent on Russian energy.

The controversy surrounding nuclear deals with the Kremlin involves other EU members. In September, Germany also permitted a shipment of Russian uranium destined for French nuclear plants to be processed at a site in Germany. Électricité de France S.A. (EDF), which receives more than 70 percent of its electricity from nuclear power plants, has so far refused to end its cooperation with “Rosatom”. “France ensures strict compliance by economic players with all the European sanctions adopted against Russia. Civil nuclear power is not affected by these sanctions,” explained the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the German company “Siemens” stated at “Tageszeitung” that “it will also continue already-commissioned nuclear projects with “Rosatom”.

From the above information, we can conclude that in the short term, Russia will remain a strong player in the global nuclear market. Substitution of its export will cause realignment in the supply chain. In the future, it will require cooperation and investments in the production capabilities of other uranium-rich states such as Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, or Namibia, which are moving to the vanguard of a new uranium-centric geopolitical scene. These measures would lead to rising competition over uranium and more expensive fuel for operating reactors.  Still, despite the ongoing sanctions burden, the Kremlin shows no signs of stopping the crediting or building of “Rosatom” NPPs globally.

Moscow can play its card to use a nuclear fuel supply ban as leverage in the ongoing conflict over Ukraine.

Although the full extent of Russian- EU nuclear collaboration has not yet come to light, it is clear that the Russian nuclear industry’s exemption from sanctions has opened a window to pro-Kremlin lobbies within the EU. What this means is that if they have little effect, Moscow can play its card to use a nuclear fuel supply ban as leverage in the ongoing conflict over Ukraine. In this case, electricity prices would jump rapidly and some nuclear plants may be forced to suspend operations altogether. Therefore the stakes are high. Exempting “Rosatom” from sanctions may have long-lasting consequences for deepening crises within the EU.  Such policies are likely to provoke the rise of populism within the Union and empower authoritarian and right-wing leaders that will be backed by Russia’s supply of nuclear power.

 

Viktoryia Kolchyna is a Master’s student of student in International Relations and Regional Security at University of Tartu and a Marcin Król Fellow 2022/2023 at Visegrad Insight.

 

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the energy security part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

 

 

 

by Daria Venikova

Worrying newspaper articles are popping up all over Europe with the rise of record-breaking energy bills: Europe is in a state of energy crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have been named among the main catalysts for this crisis, however warnings about the possibility of crisis were in place years in advance.

There are many reasons why European countries continued to have low energy resilience and were slow at implementing energy efficiency laws.

There are many reasons why European countries continued to have low energy resilience and were slow at implementing energy efficiency laws.  The different energy profiles among EU countries prevent the Union from making unified decisions.  An active lobby of powerful energy companies and even memory politics, making some countries more inclined to trade with Russia, are also contributing factors. But today, we will talk about the link between the nature of democratic decision-making and implementing effective long-term energy resilience decisions.

First off, all political leaders try to stay in power for as long as possible and in democracies, leaders do so by winning the majority of votes. It is that simple: make your voters happy and be re-elected in four to six years. However, this makes it hard for them to implement unpopular measures that will not be beneficial in the short term. This is exactly what often prevents democratic leaders from implementing measures to develop the energy resiliency of their country.

But what happens if the government needs to implement measures that will negatively affect people’s well-being in the short term, but will be good in the long run?

This phenomenon is called retrospective voting. It happens when voters base their decisions on economic prosperity and livelihood. If these indicators improve, voters are more likely to vote for the incumbent. In this way, people hold governments accountable for their living conditions, which is one of the basic principles of democracy. But what happens if the government needs to implement measures that will negatively affect people’s well-being in the short term, but will be good in the long run? There are other factors to consider, such as the fact that people are not always rational when it comes to voting, as well as the presence of partisanship in voter behavior (when people historically vote for the same party). However, research suggests that retrospective voting does in fact exist (Healy 2013).

At the same time, opting for more green energy sources or a more diversified energy profile would mean in the short term more expensive energy for consumers, increased prices, and struggling businesses. An experiment carried out in Canada concluded that voters’ preferences can influence democratic accountability, thus creating barriers to addressing climate change (Stokes 2016). As a result of voters mobilizing, the government of Ontario froze the policy to install more windmills in 2012 (which was a more climate-friendly alternative energy resource), because climate policy would have imposed large costs for the public.

All over Europe, it is understood as a necessary step to help Ukraine by refusing to buy Russian energy resources.

In conclusion, we can suggest that a better framing of unpopular energy decisions can help ease the effect of retrospective voting. As an example, the war was not only the catalyst for crisis, but also a massive shock leading to change. It made leaders rapidly change their energy policies, which will cause severe economic burdens on people, yet it was faced with minimal resistance from the public. All over Europe, it is understood as a necessary step to help Ukraine by refusing to buy Russian energy resources. Of course, this is an exceptional case, but it begs the question: would the transition to green energy be smoother if it was more often framed as something necessary, rather than just a concern of only a small group of people?

 

Daria Venikova is a student of a double degree MA program in International Relations and Eastern European Studies at the University of Tartu (Estonia) and Freie Universität Berlin (Germany). Her areas of interest include Russian foreign policy, regime transitions and memory politics. Her Master’s thesis covers the topic of authoritarian regimes resisting democratic diffusion with a case study of Russian law on foreign agents.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the energy security part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

 

References:

Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013). Retrospective voting reconsidered. Annual Review of Political Science, 16, 285-306.

Stokes, L. C. (2016). Electoral backlash against climate policy: A natural experiment on retrospective voting and local resistance to public policy. American Journal of Political Science, 60(4), 958-974.

Jastramskis, M., Kuokštis, V., & Baltrukevičius, M. (2021). Retrospective voting in Central and Eastern Europe: Hyper-accountability, corruption or socio-economic inequality?. Party Politics, 27(4), 667-679.

 

by Abigail Weston

The application of biopolitics is incredibly broad, with the basic definition of biopolitics being governmental structures restricting the population’s bodily presence and/or functions. Biopolitics can be used by western liberal governments for multiple purposes but the most repressive form of biopolitics comes from authoritarian regimes such as the People’s Republic of China. The COVID-19 pandemic gave states ample opportunity to use biopolitics as a way of cracking down on protest and public dissent.

The social credit system has been used to influence population behavior by incentivizing conformity with government policy.

While the Chinese government has long been accustomed to interfering in the Chinese population’s lives, the measures taken during the COVID-19 pandemic, which are ongoing, have been an accurate representation of repressive biopolitics. The first event that the Chinese government enacted was the COVID-19 social credit pass installed on phones. The social credit system has been used to influence population behavior by incentivizing conformity with government policy. Through this system, the Chinese government has been able to not only keep a close eye on dissidents, but also actively intrude on their lives by using their individual social credit scores to bar them from fully participating in normal life activities.

A similar application was used during the COVID-19 pandemic, whereby a web-based COVID-19 pass was issued to Chinese citizens. This app not only indicated if a person was vaccinated, but also acted as a contact tracer indicating if a person had come in contact with the COVID-19 virus through social interactions. The application would display a red or green icon showing that a person had or had not come in contact with an infected person. If the icon was red, then a person was not allowed to leave a defined area, whether that be a town or an individual home depending on the province and the timeframe within the pandemic. The green icon allowed travel without as many limitations.

Biopolitics, in this case, are shown through the restriction of movement in relation to a person’s political opinions rather than a person’s health status.

The Chinese government also used this application to prevent protesters, who were planning to protest COVID-19 lockdowns, from leaving towns or homes, effectively quelling potential protests. While many governments in both the west and the east employed the use of lockdowns in an attempt to stop the spread of COVID-19, Chinese authorities used the crisis as a way to silence dissidents on a mass scale through the justification of public health. Biopolitics, in this case, are shown through the restriction of movement in relation to a person’s political opinions rather than a person’s health status.

Though the use of biopolitics within China is not an unknown phenomenon, the COVID-19 pandemic allowed for an increase in the severity and degree of biopolitics. Restricting the movement of citizens due to political stance is a very good representation of the use of biopolitics by the state against those with dissenting opinions. In essence, the health crisis allowed for a perfect storm in which the Chinese government could not only justify an extreme use of biopolitical power, but would also not come under scrutiny from the international community for such courses of action.

Abigail Weston is a master’s degree student at Vilnius University with the Institute of International Relations and Political Science in the Eastern European and Russian Studies course. Abigail’s specific area of expertise is in Russian security culture; her master’s thesis is a cultural analysis of the Russian Federal Security Service focusing on the cultural elements that impact this organizations’ behavior. Abigail has additional professional interests in the developments of Eastern European region culture as it relates to the cultural memory of the Soviet Union.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the biopolitics part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

 

 

by Aino Puhto

Democratic nations seem to be more resilient to crises than authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, in the past few years, global developments have been gnawing at the foundations of democratic nations and their principles. The quality of democracy in the world has been declining for over a decade, and the COVID-19 pandemic was a hard test of its resilience. During this time, weak democracies were more prone to erosion than others. Issues democracies have faced were, among others, a decline in media freedom, emergency measures that sidelined parliaments, and inequality, since the consequences of political decisions were often felt by vulnerable groups.

Did the pandemic measures taken to limit the spread of the virus open new avenues for governments to control the public?

Did the pandemic measures taken to limit the spread of the virus open new avenues for governments to control the public? Nearly all people in the world were introduced to new regulations in everyday life such as restrictions on mobility, mask mandates, mandatory vaccines, and restrictions for the non-vaccinated. The physical restrictions controlling people’s bodies and their autonomy were the most severe seen in a while, or at least that was the impression people were left with; mandatory vaccines are nothing new but the recent vaccine programs created major resistance. Closed borders, harsh policing of people’s day-to-day functions, quarantines, and lockdowns enforced by police were also common during the height of the pandemic.

While making decisions about restrictions, governments had to determine the value of the life of the vulnerable. They had to find a balance between restricting people’s lives and risking them. According to Michel Foucault, biopolitical power is the regulation of bodies and their functions in society and it is the main form of power used by modern governments. Modern power is no longer exercised by the sovereign’s right to use violence and kill, but to preserve life and ways of life deemed worthy. The use of this kind of power can be seen during the pandemic in the mandates that regulated everyday life. Although biopower values life and does not rule by the fear of violence, governments were not always labouring under altruistic motives; the pandemic restrictions were often utilised to benefit governments. Democratic violations such as harassment of activists and journalists, excessive use of force while implementing regulations, and forced lockdowns for marginalised groups were detected. Acts of violent repression of unwanted civil movements, often justified by pandemic restrictions, were also reported. Examples range from Hungary passing mandates limiting citizens’ rights to India harshly repressing protests. The pandemic has therefore caused some governments to become bolder with regard to direct control of their people.

Pandemic measures may have opened a Pandora’s box of harsher decisions and emboldened governments to start exercising biopolitics more openly.

Biopolitical power may be the basis of modern power, but the negative effects of its use have become easier to spot in the last couple of years. Pandemic measures may have opened a Pandora’s box of harsher decisions and emboldened governments to start exercising biopolitics more openly. Any violence exercised in modern society needs legitimacy and an international crisis provides a framework for tighter control of the public. While democracies keep backsliding, the citizens are at risk of becoming more susceptible to measures restricting their movement and autonomy, normalised by the special conditions of the pandemic.

Aino Puhto is a Bachelor’s student of Area and Cultural Studies, concentrating on Eastern Europe, at the University of Helsinki.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the biopolitics part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

 

by Lance Bradley

Professor Achille Mbembe, a political scientist famous for his research in necropolitics, defined the term in 2019 as a “unique form of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to the status of the living dead”. Unfortunately, this relatively modern research focuses on necropolitics is not only related to historical empires but is increasingly relevant to our modern world.

Following WWII, many countries were interested in reducing violence and aggressiveness in politics and society.

Following WWII, many countries were interested in reducing violence and aggressiveness in politics and society. This included getting rid of domestic politics that stripped citizens down to a form of “living death”, as it’s called in necropolitical research, in which they no longer have sovereignty over their own bodies. The USSR closed gulags, the European Community helped restore peace to Europe, civil rights activists fought to end racial violence, and anti-war and anti-fascist movements grew worldwide. Extreme violence still took place despite broad acceptance of these norms, but the shock and disgust around such events lead to action against violent actors and solidarity with victims. This is thanks to media, particularly television, which brought global news into the living rooms of families all over the world. But beyond media, many shared the conscious goal of establishing the antithesis to global fascism that led to the political, social, or literal death of millions – an end to necropolitics.

Democratic peace theory was born during this period, de-colonization raced through Africa, and most states made advancements in peace and democracy benchmarks. Practically, necropolitics was coming to an end. This world order created with norms, values, international law, regulations on war, emphasis on human rights, and acute interest in global policing and justice significantly formed this pacifist, caring generation that made the world more livable. This ideal so-called ‘liberal World Order’, figure-headed by Martin Luther King Jr., Lech Wałęsa, and Desmond Tutu, is slowly dying.

Since the turn of the century, it seems that global society reverted to realist political thought, war, nationalism, and egoism.

Since the turn of the century, it seems that global society reverted to realist political thought, war, nationalism, and egoism. Russia’s domestic and international terror, America’s police violence, China’s ethnic cleansing, Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the EU’s bloody border, etc. All over, democracy is decreasing, inequality increasing, and nationalism is becoming mainstream. Many new nationalist governments have either already begun violently silencing opposition and minorities, removing the rights of those “less valuable to their necroeconomy”.

How can the generation raised by anti-war hippies and democratic trailblazers be inclined to nationalism and indifferent toward violence?

Necropolitics is back, but why? How can the generation raised by anti-war hippies and democratic trailblazers be inclined to nationalism and indifferent toward violence? Media reports on atrocities used to outrage people, now the omnipresence of such reports desensitizes. The constant bombardment of news on conflict, hunger, inequality, despair, and the climate crisis hardened younger generations, creating a deaf ear listening to the multiple cries for help. Ironically, another reason is the success of the older generation in sheltering younger generations from the terrors of war. Particularly for people from Western Europe or the Americas, war is something from movies or novels, but there is a detachment to the suffering war causes. This ignorance of the horrors of war has, perhaps, increased support for nationalism, authoritarianism, and new bloody wars. Necropolitics is back, and necropolitical researchers have warned us of its consequences. History may be bound to repeat itself, but can this evil be stopped in its tracks?

Lance Bradley is a soon-to-graduate Master’s student of International Relations and Regional Studies at the University of Tartu. Lance’s research interests focus on foreign and security policy as well as European integration in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. He also has a special interest in Russian relations to de facto states in Eastern Europe. His Master’s thesis is a study of state-building in the Donbas from 2014-2021. Professionally, Lance is interested in humanitarian aid and development in Eastern Europe.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the biopolitics part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

 

 

by Anton Stalchenko

“People under suspicion are better moving than at rest, since at rest they may be sitting in the balance without knowing it, being weighed together with their sins.”

― Franz Kafka, The Trial

In 2005 in the post-authoritarian space of Central Eastern Europe (CEE), I remember adults in public offices carefully whispering and acting in a way that appeared extra cautious.  Everyone made sure that children were not witnessing these secret bureaucratic operations.  To be frank, these transactions were “BRIBES”!  Every kid was well-aware of corruption and their parents’ place in that hierarchy. Talks about corrupt politicians and public officials were a part of normalcy and yet families made sure that their children never learn about their parents doing something of that sort. Why? The sense of shame before their descendants.

In 2022 these children, the post-Communist generation, constitute a majority of the electoral population in CEE.

In 2022 these children, the post-Communist generation, constitute a majority of the electoral population in CEE. Nevertheless, they must deal with the remnants of the past. It is quite frequent to hear from people from the post-communist states “I don’t care about politics” or “what is the point to vote if everything was decided for us”. On the other hand, this neglect towards political institutions could potentially lead to a neglect of the law, a greater distrust within society, and a general erosion of the rule of law. This raises a point that many people neglect: “why would we need to follow the laws and rules, if the leadership does not follow them”?

Piotr Zagorski in his article raises a point that the post-communist generation in Central Eastern Europe is quite understudied and elaborates that their electoral indifference explains the origin of current political crisis in CEE.

This passivity combined with their parents’ sense of the “good ol’ days” might be a combination that gives rise to today’s European counter-Revolution autocrats. Jan Zielonka & Jacques Rupnik in their article argue that the CEE elites are facing challenges of balancing between the democratic west and conversion into semi-autocracies.

As a result of the COVID-19 crisis Wojtas and Walecka argue that transitioning democracies of CEE have experienced setbacks in their democratic practices. Providing examples that in a state of crisis authoritarianism prevailed there. As a result of COVID, many states readily joined the framework of securitization measures to deal with crises, but it is quite difficult to define when the crises will end and when these states should de-securitize.

Only through awareness about our importance to and impact on the present can we avoid being judged by history.

Nevertheless, liberal transformation and democratization of transitioning economies of the CEE remain a distinguishable achievement of post-Cold War peacebuilding. Even though we are witnessing a backward movement in its democratization practices, the general tendency remains positive based on World Value Survey data.  According to survey perceptions in CEE, citizens deem their states to be more democratic in 2017-2022 as opposed to the 2000s.

Remembering and recognizing the legacy of the past is no less important. Only through awareness about our importance to and impact on the present can we avoid being judged by history. After all, we are all under “suspicion” by history so let’s make the best out of it.

Anton Stalchenko, soon-to-graduate Master of Administrative Sciences in Security Governance at Tampere University, with Master Interdisciplinary Expertise in Russian and Eastern European Studies from Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki. In his Master thesis, he explores the changing relationship between geopolitics and geoeconomics as a result of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Anton’s additional research interests cover: International Law, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, and electoral behavior in Central Eastern Europe.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the politics of history part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.

by Giulia Musso

One of the lecture’s subjects, which was analysed within the BAMSE week, was the role that historical memory plays in politics and in the formation of a national community. The concept of historical memory, or memory of politics, refers to the role that remembrances play in the present of a nation. Hence, it is about how countries decide to experience their past in the current moment. This is linked to what is acknowledged and celebrated and how it is done. More precisely, it is about how and which elements turn into symbols of community heritage or lieu de mémoire. An important aspect is that people remember events as a social group and this is heavily related to the cultural and social context they are living in. For instance, the high political connection to memories was emphasised in the case of Estonia during the lecture and across the NGO café. First, in Estonia, this is connected to their struggle for independence. This is an essential point of all national memories, however, in the case of Eastern European countries, this event is not so far away, and the feelings attached to it are still flourishing within the community. Second, in Estonia, political memory is also connected to the presence of a Russian minority and the threat of Russia’s interference. In this case, within a nation, how events of the past and which events are commemorated are perceived completely different by different citizens of the same state. This increases the value attached to that memory and creating contradictory narrations.

Do opposite visions on national stands need to be expelled or integrated into the national narrative?

As underlined in the NGO café, this phenomenon has major political consequences on security, the clustering of society, and the uprising of nationalism.  Nevertheless, these factors can be further correlated to the aspect of integration in society as in politics. Do opposite visions on national stands need to be expelled or integrated into the national narrative? This is a highly controversial question that has been raised not only for what concerns memory but also for the growth of far-right parties in other western democracy. Given the fact that we represent democratic values, all the distinctive opinions and perspectives should equally be part of the society and be represented. Nonetheless, this underscores the necessity to incorporate actors that support ideas and visions dangerous to our freedom and security, which could possibly undermine our rights. What should be done then? What is democracy and how much is it fully applicable? Starting from a “simple” recognition of the history of a country to the acceptance of the presence of an “alternative” or conservative party in society, democracy is always the main focal point.

Crisis affects each element of our life and system, but it is how we decide to cope with them that really changes our environment.

These questions were raised within the lectures and have followed us the entire week. Crisis affects each element of our life and system, but it is how we decide to cope with them that really changes our environment. Whether the controversial aspects of the system should be eliminated or integrated represents the main takeaway of this week and an interesting starting point of reflection. Nonetheless, it could be possible to say that the rise of one party more than the another is cyclical and represents the normal flow of democracy. Hence, without coming back to old mistakes or nullifying all the steps already taken, this new political wave should be democratically integrated for the time it will be voted on. This is how democracy should work and this could also be identified as a positive trampoline for the transformation of the oppositions, which lacks appeal and understanding of the ongoing social needs.

Giulia Musso is a soon-to-graduate Master’s degree (MSc.) student of the International Relations and Regional Studies (IRRS) program at the Skytte Institut of Tartu University. Giulia’s specific area of competence concerns the Eurasian region and conflicts, with a particular focus on the role of Russia in it (Russian foreign policy, security and economy). Her Master’s Thesis is built on an analysis of the role of Gender in the implementation of security policies during international crises. Giulia’s additional professional interests cover the cross-cultural communications field, in particular the use of language in shaping the memory politics of bilingual countries.

This blog is a part of a blog series written by the BAMSE Tartu intensive course students. The blog series analyses the impact of crises on the politics of history, challenges of democracy, biopolitics and energy security. This blog is belongs to the politics of history part of the blog series. Read more about the blog series on Bamse News & Events website.